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ABSTRACT

Chain Reaction: The Tragedy of Atomic Governance

by

Mary D. Wammack
Dr. David S. Tanenhaus, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of fCstory
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

An unprecedented combination o f imagination and capital resulted in the most
profound, and profane, achievement in modem history—the atom bomb—but the strategies
that empowered its development caused inestimable suffering in peacetime America.
Discrete practices o f secrecy, media manipulation, and the devaluation o f scientific opinion
evolved and coalesced during the cold war, permeating institutions and pre-empting any
protection o f the unwary fi’om exposure to radioactive fallout. While the atomic testing
program and its consequences are often considered in light o f national policy, this analysis
alternatively reveals the character, fusion, and trajectory o f practices that culminated in the
collision of the government with the health and lives o f the innocent.

m
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It is, perhaps, the little curiosities rather than the grand design that propel research.
Those who study the cold war era, and particularly atomic testing, either become inured to
roadblocks o f security classifications and endless Freedom o f Information Act Requests,
or abandon the endeavor altogether. Those who adapt, however, cling to the hope that
somewhere within the dusty boxes or microfilm reels they will find some little something
that will point the way to, well, probably just another box or reel. Eventually, though,
enough little somethings form an image o f sorts; and then, like a neophyte struggling to
make sense out o f a Picasso, the researcher can finally stand back, perhaps cock her head
to the side for a different perspective, and try to say what it all means. The whole process
is set in motion by some little, curious something.
And so it was with the discovery o f the muskrat.^ Immortalized by a few brief
remarks in the transcript o f a 1956 meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission’s
Committee on Biology & Medicine and achieving momentary notoriety as an interesting
tidbit in a Newsweek article, the muskrat’s significance cannot be measured by either

^ Transcript, “Special Meeting o f the Advisory Committee on Biology & Medicine to the
Atomic Energy Commission, November 26, 1956; US DOE Archives; 326 US Atomic
Energy Commission; Collection Secretariat; Box 1271; Folder 0& M -7 ACBM BP
(“Transcript”). See also Newsweek, November 26, 1956, 64.
1
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brevity of reference or the fleetingness o f his fame. The twenty scientists who discussed
his future over forty years ago decided that he offered, perhaps, the best answers to their
questions about strontium 90—a man-made isotope—and its relationship to diseases o f the
bone. Additionally, his presence, though minuscule, validates a historian’s haunting
suspicion; that although the AEC issued constant reassurances from 1951 through 1956
that fallout and its associated radioisotopes posed no danger, those statements (at least as
they pertained to strontium 90) were baseless. The AEC apparently initiated its
investigation into strontium 90’s effect upon the biological chain only in 1956, and only
with the fortuitous capture o f the muskrat.
He had lived his whole life in a little pond just outside Oak Ridge, Tennessee,
feeding and swimming in a stream that flowed out o f the government facility, sleeping in a
little mud and cattail hut just above the w ater line. Two Oak Ridge security guards
trapped him, but whether for sport or the stew pot is not known. When the guards
noticed the tumor on the muskrat’s hind leg, they turned him over to AEC officials who
promptly classified the little fellow—his fate remains, as far as is known, a government
secret (together, of course, with any documents relating to his contribution to science.)
Though other creatures were available, and some had already been the focus o f strontium
90 experimentation, government scientists preferred the muskrat. In so doing, they
discounted data gleaned from the study o f Oxford rabbits (they were English, after all) and
ruled out examination of the two Canadian ducks o f uncertain migration habits that had
sickened hunters. The muskrat was a viable subject—the scientists could calculate the
concentrations o f strontium in his environment, he had a bone tumor, and he was
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American, a very important factor during the cold war. Newsweek called the little fellow a
“pioneer of progress” but Gioacchino Failla, the Chairman of the AEC’s Division o f
Biology & Medicine, called him a “piece o f evidence.”^
The muskrat is, however, just a “piece” of the transcript of that meeting in 1956,
and just a single feature o f a document that reflects an institutional hierarchical culture
permeated with, and functioning, through artifice. Indeed, and as will become clear,
although the AEC deceived the American public, that potentially (and, ultimately, actually)
lethal practice was only the ending link in a chain of collaborative deception that
originated within the institution itseli^ circulating between and through the AEC and (in
this instance) its Advisory Committee on Biology & Medicine. It is clear that the AEC’s
substitution o f theatrics and illusion for honesty, a practice seeded in the wartime
Manhattan Project and one that grew (both functionally and in its ability to adversely
effect the population, in proportion with the extraordinarily-rapid development o f evermore-powerful atomic weaponry itself) had become, by 1956, normative.
Two factors in simultaneous operation, pervasive secrecy and the pursuit o f a
common goal, influenced decision-making and allowed the atomic testing program to
assume its decidedly-hazardous nature. An unprecedented system o f security and
document classification guaranteed the anonymity, and thus encouraged the participation,
o f individuals who might otherwise have, at the very least, questioned the morality o f
decisions that so often cavalierly dismissed the safety and well-being o f so many. In
addition, since the two potentially-conflictive arms of the program shared a common goal-

Transcript, 46.
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-the experimentation and development o f atomic weapons—any chance that one might
provide a check upon the other was simply an apparition. Such institutional collaboration,
though invisible to the public, effectively obliterated the possibility that the Committee on
Biology & Medicine (ostensibly designed to guarantee, as far as scientifically possible, safe
parameters for testing) might temper or even curtail, in the name of safety, the intent o f
the AEC, an entity that existed solely to serve the government’s need for atomic
weaponry.
It is important, too, to recognize the influence that institutionalism had upon the
operation of the program. In this regard, Robert Cover’s analysis of state-sponsored
violence, though situated within the realm o f law and legal interpretation, can provide
meaningful direction. I have already stated that members o f the Advisory Committee and
officials of the AEC practiced routine deception and that those untruths detrimentally
impacted innocent, and otherwise unwary, individuals. That interpretation, however,
should not be taken to presume that all who knowingly participated in such organized
immorality were unprincipled beasts, utterly devoid o f human compassion or professional
responsibility. Instead, their participation as agents within a legally-authorized
organizational system countered natural inhibition.
Cover held that through the hierarchical legal system—fi-om the state, through law,
to individual victims—a judge, by interpreting law, institutes, authorizes, and legitimates
acts o f violence upon individuals. As components o f the system through which the judge
operates, collaborators (wardens, executioners) carry out in unquestioning fashion the
decision o f the judge, and so perform in a manner which might otherwise be morally
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repugnant to them. This analysis explains how the organization itself operates as a force
upon participating individuals:
Persons who act within social organizations that exercise authority act
violently without experiencing the normal inhibitions o r the normal degree
o f inhibition which regulates the behavior o f those who act autonomously. .
On one level judges may appear to be, and may in fact be, offering their
understanding o f the normative world to their intended audience. But on
another level they are engaging a violent mechanism through which a
substantial part o f their audience loses its capacity to think and act
autonomously.^

The AEC itself an organization that functioned as a legitimate agent of the state, with all
its attendant authority—an authority that became enlarged, deservedly or not, during the
troublesome years following World W ar H - existed solely to maintain the development of
atomic weaponry; and, toward that end, subordinated the welfare o f human beings to a
legitimated goal. The actors within that organizational culture, by virtue o f their
participation, divorced themselves from the day-to-day needs and wants of those outside
by virtue o f their participation, perhaps also (even, as Cover suggests, unconsciously)
divorced themselves also from the travesties that their participation engendered.

Ryan NCnow and Austin Sarat, eds.. Narrative, Violence and the Law: The Essays o f
R obert Cover (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press, 1992). See also an analysis
o f Cover’s insights by Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Keams, “Making Peace with
Violence: Robert Cover on Law and L% al Theory” Law ’s Violence (Arm Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press, 1995), and particularly the pointed comment that ethical
queries (whether implicated within law, or, I would suggest, the apparatus that was the
AEC) are problematic: “An excess o f casuistry is surely contrary to the demands o f
solidarity, and, if Cover is right, solidarity, not subtlety of th o u ^ t, is the sine qua non o f
effective legal violence.” 249. Though similarities exist between arguments against
law’s violence and a violence perpetrated by the atomic weapons program, the logical
extension of the argument cannot be similarly applied. It is, for example, a simple m atter
to recognize the benefit afforded society by law—far more difficult (at least for me) to
recognize many, if any, benefits afforded by atomic weapons or their testing as historically
practiced.
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The AEC developed methods to pursue its goals in ways that proved tragic for
many, but it is, fortunately, not necessary to rely upon supposition or models of
institutional behavior to posit that conclusion. For example, documents prove that the
AEC knew in 1949 that the strontium 90 released through atomic weapons testing was
accumulating and approaching levels that threatened some type o f biological hazard, yet it
persisted in testing weapons that increased the strontium 90 environmental burden
exponentially."^ And yet, even with an identified potential for disaster, the AEC failed to
investigate the potential consequences—no scientific studies ensued, no government
scientists placed animals in cages for the sole purpose o f testing the effects o f strontium
90—indeed, only through happenstance, in the form o f a wild muskrat near Oak Ridge in
1956, did the AEC scientists get their first opportunity to examine the relationship
between strontium 90 and biological organisms.^ It is time to take another look at 1956,
the year that Eisenhower defeated Adlai Stevenson, the Salk vaccine for polio went into
distribution, and strontium 90 hit the headlines.
Strontium’s effects were not widely known in 1956, but one was undisputed—it
caused members o f the Atomic Energy Commission to squirm. Strontium became the
issue o f the year after the National Academy of Science announced in June that rising

See 13 infra.
^ The government funded experiments on humans in 1959, when Argonne National
Laboratory injected twelve terminally-iU patients with strontium 85 or calcium 45, and
determined the extent o f tissue invasion by the substances at autopsy. The time fi’om
injection to autopsy varied from 3 hours to 124 days. Nothing in the report indicates
whether the exposed individuals were children or adults. Subcommittee on Energy
Conservation and Power of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, US House of
Representatives, “American Nuclear Guinea Pigs: Three Decades o f Radiation
Experiments on US Citizens” (Washington, D C.: US Government Printing Office,
Novefinber 1986) 32-33.
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environmental levels might be more dangerous than the government had adm itted/ The
questions surrounding strontium 90 loomed like thunderclouds in the summer sky and
placed the AEC in the middle o f a storm unlike any it had ever encountered. When sheep
deaths in 1953 and fallout-induced injuries of Japanese fishermen in 1954 angered many,
the AEC had reassured the public with denial, explanation and persuasion, successfully
lulling the anxious back into complacency.^ This time, however, AEC reassurance carried
little weight, for if the scientists who sounded the m ost recent alarm were right, the
victims o f strontium 90 would be children.
Researchers outside the government, and at least one fi*om within, found that
strontium 90 imitated calcium and concentrated in growing bone, posing the highest
danger for the world’s children whose calcium requirements and consumption exceeded
those o f adults.* In light o f their admittedly preliminary findings, they warned that any

^ See Newsweek June 25, 1956. Most of public’s education on radiation in the 1950’s
originated with physicist Ralph Lapp. As devoted to his profession as he was to the
public’s right to know. Dr. Lapp translated the always-complicated world o f atomic
science for laymen during the 1950’s. Lapp did not believe that testing o f atomic weapons
should cease, only that it be pursued in as safe a manner as possible. An outspoken critic
o f the AEC’s security policies, he was denied any direct participation within the atomic
testing program and based his calculations and conclusions upon details gleaned fi-om the
eyewitness accounts o f colleagues, published photographs and accounts. Nevertheless, on
numerable occasions he embarrassed the AEC, catching them in egregious &lsehoods and
forcing retractions. When Louis Strauss vehemently denied that radioactive fallout had
been responsible for the illnesses o f Japanese fishermen, Lapp’s public admonitions forced
Strauss to admit the truth. The New Republic, July 9, 1956, 5.
^ See Chapter 5 infra.
* Newsweek, June 25, 1956, 70. See also the magazine’s November 12, 1956 issue, 90,
about Dr. William F. Newman, an AEC biochemist w ho broke ranks with the government
and his colleagues (AEC scientists) who consistently promoted the safety o f strontium 90.
Dr. Newman had studied radiation and bone metabolism since 1943, and claimed that it
would take another ten years to establish the margin o f safety o f strontium 90. Taking his
case to the press in New York, he said “There is a grim possibility that we will gain this
information from human data.” Newsweek, November 12, 1956, 90.
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continuation of testing, absent further research into the behavior o f strontium in the
biological chain, spelled potential disaster. The fears o f the scientists spread rapidly
through the public, assuming political prominence through election-year volleys as the
Democrats accused the Republicans o f “smug scientific optimism”; the GOP parried that
the Democrats desired simply to fiighten the electorate “out o f its skin.”® Congress
threatened an investigation into fallout and the policies o f the AEC, and the United
Nations accelerated and expanded its on-going international analysis o f radioactive
fallout.*®
Confi-onting mounting pressure, the AEC scientists struggled to convince the
public that increasing strontium levels posed no danger. Though the AEC sounded the
“all’s well,” independent researchers increasingly challenged that position with alarming
mounds o f data. The AEC was unable to retaliate in kind—its safety margin for strontium
90 was not based upon the exposure o f a general population to strontium fallout

®Newsweek, November 26, 1956, 64. See also The New Republic 134, June 4, 1956,
whose editor agreed with Adlai Stevenson and urged a moratorium on the testing o f
hydrogen weapons based primarily upon testings value as a deterrent and upon its
enormous, and upward-spiraling, expense: “When small boys play at war, each one can be
a winner. One may shout ‘you can’t shoot, you’re dead!’, but the ‘dead’ rise to shoot
again, for in the make-believe world each is invincible. But in the real world of
competition for nuclear supremacy, the law o f diminishing returns robs us o f invincibility.”
P-3-

Newsweek, November 26, 1956, 64-66.
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or even animal experiments, but upon industrial exposures o f adults to radium.** Faced
with the continuing deterioration o f public trust despite their “daddy knows best”
assurances, AEC promoters made a strategic shift in emphasis.

** Despite the fact that the AEC had investigated the worldwide distribution o f strontium
90 since 1949, it did not institute any studies on strontium’s effect on health and based the
“maximum permissible” level upon dose and injury resulting from another radioisotope,
radium. In 1949, Shields Warren, then-AEC Director of Biology & Medicine, concluded
(based upon a one-man project from Oak Ridge) that “serious contamination” from
strontium 90 would result from the detonation o f 3,000 20-kiloton bombs. The study,
renamed “Project Gabriel” in 1953, broadened its base to include the Rand Corporation,
and a sister study named “Project Sunshine” joined Gabriel. The participants were sworn
to secrecy and forbidden to discuss the project or its findings, even with other AEC
colleagues or officials seeking information about strontium and its effects. The project’s
existence surfaced officially only in 1958. Barton C. Hacker, Elem ents o f Controversy
(Bericeley, C A: University o f California Press, 1994) 181-184.
Hacker attributes the extreme (even by AEC standards) security o f Project Sunshine to
a reluctance by project members to admit the comparison, by project members, of infant
bones collected from the US, India, Japan, South Africa, and South America, in an effort
to establish the woridwide levels o f strontium 90 distribution. In addition, he concludes
that AEC Commissioner \^U ard F. Libby, a Manhattan Project and Biology & Medicine
veteran. University o f Chicago geneticist and participant in Project Sunshine, continually
downplayed the significance o f strontium’s biological effects in favor o f continued
emphasis upon his own, professional genetic concerns. Throughout his career, Libby
never wavered and remained a staunch supporter o f continued atomic weapons testing.
Though I am a grateful beneficiary of Barton Hacker’s devotion to the history o f atomic
testing, his assertions that the secrecy surrounding Projects Gabriel and Sunshine
protected only the limited personal concerns o f scientists seems naive.
It seems reasonable to at least consider what Hacker does not; namely, that the
continuation o f the weapons testing program itself motivated stringent security measures.
Undoubtedly, secrecy guaranteed the insulation o f researchers collecting baby bones and
protected the pre-eminence o f radiation-induced genetic study; but secrecy also protected
the maintenance and acceleration of the testing program. With just a little fairy dust, one
could even imagine that the government instituted Projects Gabriel and Sunshine to
discover the dangers o f strontium 90 in order to adjust the weapons development and
testing schedule in light o f the projects’ findings—but fairy dust is hard to find these days.
It seems clear that the projects’ chief intent was to learn enough about strontium 90 to
m itigate any damage that might result from an ever-expanding weapons program.
Secrecy protected the ability o f the government to continue its weapons program,
irrespective o f the results o f either project. The constituency o f Gabriel and Sunshine,
the pace o f atomic weapons development, and the AEC’s disregard for the conclusions o f
its own scientists, like Dr. Warren, supports this assertion. The scientists recruited to
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The AEC tried to channel public fears elsewhere, and officials unleashed
alternative radioactive bugbears; namely, future power plants and sunlight at high
altitudes. Dr. John Bugher, former AEC Director of Biology & Medicine, told health
professionals in Atlantic City that strontium 90 was nothing compared to the radiation
hazard that the world would soon face from atomic power plants. Merril Eisenbud, chief
o f the AEC’s New York office, predicted that the amount o f radiation children would
receive was “probably ten times too high,” but since a portion of that dosage depended
upon geography, they could, if concerned, “move.”*^ That this tactic was a dismal failure
is (one hopes) unsurprising. It appears that AEC officials also recognized, probably as
soon as they approved their advance copy of the Newsweek article, that they needed some
new methods to deal with an anxious public.*^ Months after independent scientists went
to the press with their strontium fears, the heads of the AEC finally did what all
organizations do when presented with crisis—they called a meeting.

work on the projects were heavily invested in atomic weapons development. Some, like
Libby, had participated from the very beginning; others, like John Bugher, who served as
the AEC’s Director o f Biology & Medicine, had been long-time supporters of atomic
testing. All, whether employees o f the AEC or not, researched radioactive effects only at
the continued imprimatur o f the AEC. In addition, (and since even game theorists require
hard data) the Rand Corporation, a think tank devoted to the development o f atomic-age
strategy, prospered because o f atomic weapons testing and the arms race. Finally, it must
be remembered that as early as 1949, the Oak Ridge study on strontium 90 predicted
“serious” strontium 90 contamination from the detonation of an accumulated atomic
kilotonnage o f 60,000. In February 1954 (less than a year after Projects Sunshine and
Gabriel were launched) the AEC detonated “Bravo,” a single 15 megaton hydrogen
weapon equivalent to 250 tim es the kilotonnage that Warren predicted would result in
“serious” worldwide strontium contamination.
^^Ibid., 65-66.
** It cannot be known exactly when the AEC reviewed, and granted authorization for, the
article; however, the government required that any material published about the atomic
testing program and/or radioactivity had to be submitted and “vetted” prior to
publication. See Caute, The Great Fear (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1979).
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The conference on November 26, 1956, accomplished very little, but it
demonstrates that the barriers imposed upon science and scientists in conjunction with the
atomic age bred mistrust, disallowed meaningful evaluation, and prevented consensus.
Within a governmental culture that ranked loyalty over competence and security over
everything else, the twenty members o f the AEC’s Advisory Committee on Biology &
Medicine belonged to a very exclusive club. Many o f their colleagues had refused to
participate in the persecutorial atmosphere o f the cold war— some retreated to a moreliberal England, others to pursue their work in venues independent o f federal support, still
others simply gave up.*"*
Those scientists who thrived, however, like the members o f the Advisory
Committee on Biology & Medicine, served as government functionaries and voluntarily
isolated themselves from professional colleagues. The result was an insular existence as
the government scientist transferred the cold war features o f loyalty and security into his
professional behavior. These characteristics typified the scientists who met to consider the
strontium 90 problem in 1956. Each man trusted only the results o f his own scientific

*"*In 1948, members o f the American Association for the Advancement of Science came
out “militantly” against loyalty oaths, and in 1950 demanded the protection o f scientists
from Congressional persecution. By 1951, and perhaps because the Fuchs case had fueled
anti-communist hysteria, the Association dropped its appeals for scientific openness. A.G.
Mezerik declared in a February 5, 1951 New Republic article that “The scientist’s way o f
life is once again being challenged and his hopes dashed. The atmosphere o f freedom in
which science burgeons is to be supplanted once more with the atmosphere o f classified
information, interminable security investigations and secrecy.” 12-13.
Loyalty investigations took a heavy toll on all scientists, particularly physicists. At the
end o f the war, over 3,000 scientists belonged to the Federation o f Atomic Scientists. By
1950, fear o f association with any organization had reduced that number by half. By
December 1952, the AEC had investigated over “400,000 personnel.” Caute, The Great
Fear, 465.
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investigations, rarely conferred with others, never with those outside America, and even
cast a suspicious eye toward his colleagues who joined him at the conference table.
The meeting started at 9:30 a m., and discussion began on a paper circulated
previously to the committee members by Dr. Merril Eisenbud. Although Eisenbud had
participated since 1953 on two secret studies o f strontium 90 distribution (and thus,
presumably, had a good deal o f information he could have offered)*^ he limited his input
into the committee’s discussions to the conclusions o f his paper a study o f strontium
concentrations in a North Dakota milkshed. Even then, however, he did not readily
volunteer information that would have clarified the committee’s understanding o f his data.
The following discussion began when scioitists tried to assess radium uptake and
excretion, combined with the known half-hfe o f strontium 90, in an attempt to estimate a
potential range of strontium 90 burden in the bone o f a given organism. Though tedious,
the excerpt illustrates the reluctance o f even key participants to rectify misunderstandings:
Dr. Warren:
. . .1 think that in light o f these points the probability is that
it is closer on the average to the lower end o f the range, but I think we will
have to admit that there could be a possibility of an increase by a factor o f
ten in scattered individuals.
Dr. Failla:
That is not what Eisenbud just said. He is saying for a large
population it could be 25. So the individual increase will have to be added
to that.
Dr. Warren: No, he is not saying for a large population. As I understand
it, he is saying for scattered people in a large population.
Dr. Failla:
No.
Dr. Dunham: Scattered communities is what he is talking about.
Dr. Failla:
No, he is saying a large population in North Dakota.
Dr. Marinelli: There is no large population in North Dakota.
Dr. Glass:
It is not a factor o f ten anyway, is it? Didn’t you admit the
factor of two from the British data which would bring this to five?
Dr. Marinelli: Yes.
Dr. Glass:
So it is a difference o f five times.
See note 11 supra.
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Nfr. Eisenbud: There are relatively few numbers up there. This is very
complicated.*®

At the very least, Eisenbud could have clarified his own data. Instead, (but admittedly
without proof since nothing but a transcript o f the meeting exists) one is presented with an
image o f Eisenbud, sitting smugly while others argued and guessed about the
characteristics o f his control group. Similar misunderstandings characterized the
meeting’s morning session,*^ but before the lunch break they all agreed that a study o f the
muskrat might reveal (if only in muskrats) the biological effects o f strontium.
The lack o f verifiable research data on strontium 90 prior to the Committee’s 1956
decision to study a muskrat highlights the AEC’s general disregard for human health
unless, or until, adverse public relations threatened its existence. As early as 1949, Shields
Warren, Director o f Biology & Medicine, warned that levels o f strontium 90 posed certain
environmental hazards.** Warren’s “maximum” levels were based upon atomic, not
hydrogen, weapons; and when hydrogen weapons entered the picture, those “maximum”

*®See Transcript, 41-42.
*^ Though the tone, and most of the content, of the scientists’ discussions is perfectly
clear, there are portions o f the transcript that are puzzling—at least to this writer. An
example, including the comments on either end for context, is illustrative:
Dr. Marinelli: [on fish that eat strontium-rich plankton] Yes. They incorporated
[sic] in the skeleton. Do we eat fish bone? Sometimes we do. Cats do.
Dr. Failla: Then we settle on 2.5 to 25, shall we?
Dr. Marinelli: The square root o f 10 is 3.
Dr. Glass: Five to 25. You accepted that factor.
Dr. Marinelli: Yes. There might be a factor o f two.
Mr. Eisenbud: There is a fector o f four according to Colmar. That should be ten.
D r Marinelli: This is at the end o f the lifetime, mind you.
Dr. Brues: I think you should use the same philosophy at both ends. If you are
going to stretch everything at one end, you should stretch everything at the other,
p. 47.
** See Hacker, Elements, 181-182, and note 10 supra.
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levels were modified and increased.*® Nevertheless, the AEC soon exceeded even those
higher levels, producing an enormous amount o f strontium with 1954’s megaton-range
hydrogen weapons.^® Thus, despite warnings fi-om its own chief scientists, the AEC
continued, and accelerated, the testing of weapons that would significantly increase, to
dangerous levels, the amounts o f strontium 90 within the environment. They failed to
even investigate the biological effects of strontium 90 until forced to do so by an enraged
public.
So, in 1956, and in the absence of precautionary experimental study, the muskrat
was the scientists’ best hope for some answer to the questions surrounding strontium 90’s
biological effects. Since they knew the concentrations o f strontium released from Oak
Ridge into the muskrat’s water, and could measure the levels of strontium taken up by the
plants he ate, they might determine the “biological concentration” o f strontium 90 through
“some particular chain.”^* Although the transcript clearly reveals why the scientists were
pleased that they had a muskrat in their classified knapsack, there is no overt suggestion o f
what they thought they would leam from the little mammal with the tumorous hind leg.
There were, however, signs that they expected bad news.
A fair portion o f the afternoon session was spent in the analysis o f mortality tables
and bone malignancy. Dr. John C. Bugher directed the presentation, punctuated with a
table prepared by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company charting deaths from “bone

Ib id , 182.
^®See Transcript, 146. Only at the end of the day did anyone ask wAy strontium 90 had
become such a problem, and Eisenbud informed the group that testing conducted within
two or three months o f 1954 accounted for “75 per cent, I guess” o f all strontium 90 in
existence.
^* Transcript, 46.
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cancer”^ incidence in the United States since 1954. Bugher then estimated future deaths
from strontium 90 upon the “maximum permissible” industrial standard for radium, and
concluded that “in terms o f death. . .would come in somewhere about half of what we kill
with automobiles.”^ It is impossible to extrapolate from the transcript whether the
scientists were relieved, or alarmed, at Bugher’s conclusions; but his presentation
convinced them all that they could comfortably postpone any recommendation concerning
an alteration o f the existing, accepted, “safe” levels of strontium 90.
In the end, the scientists, purportedly meeting to review new data on strontium 90
and to consider an adjustment o f the maximum permissible level o f the radioisotope,
decided only to initiate studies on the muskrat and postponed reaching any conclusions
that might have altered the long-established maximum permissible levels of strontium 90.
Had they actually attempted, and agreed, to thoroughly examine a ll available evidence
relating to strontium 90’s ability to significantly increase the potential for diseases of the
bone, it seems reasonable to assume that the extant levels might have been reduced. This
assumption is further supported by the fact that legitimate research, readily available to
scientists at that time, attributed a strong correlation between the high level o f calcium
requirements o f growing children and, thus, an elevated potential for disease in the
presence of strontium 90. It seems inconceivable that twenty accomplished scientists
would, with full knowledge o f the risks involved, refuse to reconsider an outdated value

22

A decidedly imprecise categorization that neglected the many types, and varied causes,
o f bone cancers.
^ Transcript, 81.
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for strontium 90 burden that had been based upon a different element, radium, and a
different exposure group, adult industrial workers.
It is impossible to determine with absolute certainty the reasons why members of
the AEC’s scientific board neglected to reduce an outdated, illegitimate, and even (given
their acceptance of mortality rates fi’om strontium 90) lethal, value for the production and
dispersal o f strontium 90. Certainties, however, are rare, and seldom the stuff o f history.
Clearly, there could be many possible reasons why scientists failed to reduce maximum
permissible levels of strontium 90 on that 1956 day, or even shortly thereafter. Since a
probable reason may be the only one that can be found, it is worthwhile to look for it by
exploring the potential consequence o f each decision that scientists might have rendered.
The scientists had two choices other than the one they settled upon; they could have
recommended the established strontium 90 level remain untouched or that it be reduced.
That they did not go so far as to certify, in 1956, the accuracy o f the earlier standard
indicates that they were, apparently, unwilling to invalidate so much (outside) scientific
endeavor that already confirmed the hazards o f strontium 90. Alternatively, a
recommendation to reduce the maximum permissible level would have, even in 1956,
doomed any future atomic weapons test that released strontium 90, and they all did. The
probable reason, then, that t h ^ declined to adopt this latter option is that it would have
affected, adversely, the testing o f atomic weapons—the goal and purpose o f the AEC and
indeed, the Committee.
Ultimately, it was the case that their deliberations mattered little, and their
unacknowledged though unassailable agreement with the purpose o f the AEC,
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insignificant. The transcript reveals that the Advisory Committee on Biology & Medicine
was misnamed—it did not give advice, it took it. After Bugher’s presentation o f mortality
rates, AEG Commissioner Murray entered the room. When Chairman Failla turned the
meeting over to the Commissioner, he first praised the scientists, then warned them:
Murray: You appreciate. Doctor, that we have a series of tests coming up
in the spring, and we must go ahead with those tests. The amount of
contamination that we do in those tests will be, I think, insignificant after
listening to this discussion. I would not want anything to happen that
would disturb the going ahead with those tests in the spring. That is our
immediate problem, and I don’t think a rch in g will interfere with us going
ahead.

Apparently nothing the scientists might have decided that day would have dissuaded the
AEC fi"om their 1957 testing series, and in the end, nothing did. In 1957 thirty atomic
weapons shook the Nevada Test Site.

* * *

An unprecedented combination o f imagination and capital resulted in the most
profound, and profane, achievement in modem history—the atom bomb—but the strategies
that empowered its development caused inestimable suftering in peacetime America.
Discrete practices o f secrecy, media manipulation, and the devaluation and misapplication
o f scientific opinion evolved and coalesced during the cold war, permeating institutions
and pre-empting any protection o f the unwary fi'om exposure to radioactive fallout. The
illness and death that followed in the wake o f atomic testing has often been explained as an

24

Emphasis mine. Transcript, 103.
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unfortunate and unintended consequence o f cold war policy. It is not surprising then, nor
especially unreasonable, that historians assess atmospheric atomic testing in tandem with
the accompanying expansion o f state initiative that took place during the cold war; but to
do so minimizes the role o f individual actors within the structure o f that ever-morepowerful postwar state structure.

I suggest instead that the negligent, and thus

hazardous, nature of atomic weapons experimentation can best be explained through the
articulation o f national policy; and that an analysis o f the character, trajectory, and fusion
o f practices within the atomic program reflects that it was the habits and ritualized
behavior o f individually-powerful actors, not policy, that culminated in a lethal collision
between the government and the innocent.
Policy, however, hatched and fledged atomic weapon and thus is not irrelevant.
America’s atomic testing program, like its wartime predecessor the Manhattan Project,
progressed under a shroud o f secrecy and an unprecedented classification system that kept
atomic information hidden from America’s enemies, citizens, and many government
ofiScials. Other factors, too, contributed to the evolution of the testing program and its
treacherous consequences. The growing fear o f communism replaced the wartime battle
against fascism and military objectives increasingly dominated decision making, spawning
the merger o f military and civilian institutions. In addition, the internationalization o f US
interest pushed foreign policy into a dominant role, increasing the power o f the executive
proportionately.
The cold war actually began before the World War II ended and grew increasingly
frosty during Truman’s administration. As vice president, Truman doubted Soviet
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sincerity, and his suspicions only increased after Roosevelt’s death when others
substantiated his concerns. The OflSce o f Strategic Services suggested to Truman that
Russia was committed to hegemony and “may well outrank even the US in military
potential.” Against the advice o f General George Marshall and Secretary o f War Stimson,
Truman set his course and picked at the frayed edges o f American-Soviet diplomacy
during his first cflBcial meeting with foreign minister Molotov.^ Later, George F.

Martin Walker, The C old War, a H istory (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company,
1993) 18.
It is true that the relationship between the US and the USSR had begun to deteriorate
while Roosevelt lived, but Truman’s dislike for the Soviets certainly exascerbated the
tension. That Truman’s disregard for the Soviets was deep seated is clearly reflected in a
December 1941 letter telling his wife Bess that the Russians were as “untrustworthy as
Ifitler and A1 Capone.” Harry S. Truman, Dear Bess, (New York, NY: Norton, 1983)
Ferrell, ed. 471. Later, his admiration for Harry Hopkins’ success with the Soviets, did
not encourage him to smooth over any ruffled feathers: “. . he knew exactly how to do it.
He talked tough to them all the time.” Merle Miller, Plain Speaking (New York, NY:
Norton, 1974). Though analyzed in abundant literature, it is important to here review
how Truman’s dislike o f the Soviets encouraged a pattern o f antagonism and mutual
mistrust that characterized the cold war itself.
On April 20, eight days after Roosevelt’s death, Truman called a meeting to prepare for
the arrival o f Molotov. In Charles E. Bohlen’s memorandum o f the meeting, when the
US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman, suggested that US and Soviet
relations had deteriorated since the Yalta Conference, Truman wasted no time in advising
Harriman that “he was not in any sense afraid of the Russians and that he intended to be
firm but fair since in his opinion the Soviet Union needed us more than we needed them.”
Although conceding to the necessity for a “give and take” with the Soviets, Truman
undeniably expected to come out ahead on the bargaining: “The President said. . .we
could not, o f course, expect to get 100 percent of what we wanted but that on important
matters he felt that we should be able to get 85 percent.” FRUS 1945 Volume V, Europe,
321-334, cited in Schlesinger, ed.. Dynamics o f World Power, Documentary H istory o f
US Foreign Policy 1945-1973, (New York, NY; Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), 7476.
According to Secretary o f War Henry L. Stimson, at an April 23 meeting to discuss
Truman’s upcoming meeting with Molotov, Truman declined the advice o f Stimson and
Marshall. Secretary o f War Henry L. Stimson disagreed with Harriman and urged
restraint: “I said that in my opinion we ought to be very careful and see whether we
couldn’t get ironed out on the situation without getting into a head-on collision. He was
evidently disappointed at my caution and advice and passed along the circle.. nobody
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Kennan’s 1946 “Long Telegram” solidified the notion of fundamental ideological
differences between the United States and the Soviet Union effectively precluding any
promise o f postwar cooperation/^ Perhaps most importantly, however, Kennan cut the
preliminary path upon which his successor, Nitze, erected the manichean barrier that has
divided capitalism and communism for decades/^ This polarization o f ideology affected

backed me up until it came round to Marshall who wasn’t called until towards the end.
Then to my relief a brave man and a wise man spoke.. he said that he, like me, was
troubled and urged caution.” “Papers o f Henry L. Stimson,” Stimson Diary, Monday
April 23, 1945, Yale University Library, cited 'm lb id , 76-78.
Truman set the tone for a terse and uncompromising meeting with Molotov, speaking
forcefully and interrupting Molotov four times. As Truman rose to leave, he handed
Molotov the text of a press release outlining Truman’s position on the issue o f Poland.
Molotov immediately forwarded the document to Stalin. FRUS 1945, Volume V
“Europe”, 256-259; Schlesinger, Dynamics, 78-80. Truman’s terseness shocked Molotov
who complained that “he had never been talked to like that in [his] life.” Walker, The
C old War, 20.
^ Compromise was not hopeless, but it was avoided. In 1945 then-Secretary o f State
Byrnes negotiated an agreement with Stalin and Molotov over the inclusion o f opposition
ministers and non-communists within Romania and Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union had
agreed to Byrnes’ insistence on UN control o f atomic energy. Byrnes was elated that he
had re-established Roosevelt’s “wartime understanding” with the Soviets, but Truman,
the Republican Senate, and Kennan (fi’om Moscow) claimed he had “lost his senses.”
W a l k e r , 36-37.
The relationship between Kennan’s philosophy and Nitze’s in NSC 68 remains
controversial. I do not believe Kennan should be held responsible for Nitze’s alteration o f
the meaning of ‘containment’ as originally developed by Kennan—the reader will note,
particularly in the next chapter, my debt to John Lewis Gaddis’ analysis. Strategies o f
Containment (New York, NYiOxford, 1982).
Kennan was clearly not responsible for the developments which have become associated
with his interpretation o f Soviet Communism, and he consistently (but somewhat
unsatisfactorily) endeavored to adjust America’s course away from the later interpretation
o f “containment.” For example, he criticized the Truman Doctrine, see Atkinson,
“America’s Œobal Planner” New York Times Magazine, June 13, 1947. While serving as
Ambassador in Moscow in 1952, Kennan still hoped to ease the tension that increasingly
plagued the two powers. In a letter to the State Department he suggested that the Soviet
people operated quite independently o f Stalin and the party leadership, and counseled
against the adoption (or maintenance) o f irrevocable policy in reaction to Stalinist
principles: “The spiritual breach between the rulers and the ruled is one o f the things that
most strongly strikes a person returning to Russia at this juncture after a long absence.. .1
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more than foreign affairs—it stimulated domestic development that solidified America’s
postwar position vis a vis the Soviet Union.
Congress anchored US strategies o f communist containment to the withholding o f
atomic secrets through postwar legislation. In 1946, the McMahon Act mandated the
absolute security o f the atomic science, violating an earlier arrangement between the US,
Britain and Canada for “full collaboration.”^* In 1947, diplomacy and military might

would warn against drawing any.. oversimplified conclusions fi'om the observations I
have just made. But I think they have sufficient force to stand also as a warning against
the assumption into which many people have drifted: that the Soviet leaders have
somehow found some mysterious secret o f infallibility in the exercise o f power and that it
is not problem for them to hang on indefinitely and to mold Soviet society to their hearts’
desire. What is coming in this immediately approaching period may very well be a crisis o f
Soviet power quite comparable in scope and seriousness to the original civil war or the
death o f Lenin or the purges o f the thirties—but entirely different in form.” Kennan to
State Department, July 15, 1952, Sketchesfrom a Life, (New York, NY: Pantheon Books,
1989) 151-157.
Domestically, however, few exercised any ideological separation between communism
and Stalinism. The political ramifications o f communist infiltration have been adroitly
addressed by Earl Latham, The Comrmmist Controversy in Washington (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1966) 365.
General surveys o f Kennan and Nitze’s influence upon the nation’s postwar philosophy
abound, and a good general sampling includes: Ernest May, The American Foreign Policy
(New York, NY: G. Braziller, 1963); Cecil Crabb and Kevin Mulcahy, American National
Security Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole:, 1991); Karl Inderfurth and Loch Johnson,
Decisions o f the Highest Order (Pacific Grove, CA; Brooks/Cole, 1988); Robert
Pfaltzgraff and Jacqueline Davis, National Security Decisions (Lexington, KY: Lexington
Books, 1990); Cames Lord, The Presidency and the Management o f National Security
(New York, NY: Free Press, 1988).
Per the Quebec Agreement. See also claims made by the War Department that Great
Britain had violated the Agreement when the Chancellor o f the Exchequer Sir John
Anderson talked with a “. . politico-scientific representative o f the French Government..
Secretary o f War to President Roosevelt, 15 December 1944, “Correspondence (Top
Secret) of the Manhattan Engineer District” National Archives Nficrofilm Publication Ml
109, 1980, Roll 3, ( “TSCMED”). Groves brought the violation to the attention o f
Stimson on 14 December 1944 and promised to postpone “insofar as practicable the
passing o f vital information concerning it to the representatives o f any government other
than our own” pending further instructions. Groves to Stimson, 14 December 1944,
Idem.
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became irretrievably linked with the passage o f the National Security A ct.^ Additionally,
the Atomic Energy Commission, originally designed to assure civilian control over atomic
development, became a valuable tool in the Armed Forces arsenal/” All these efforts
against communism caused the expenditure o f enormous resources by those charged with
the protections o f America’s interests in a nation traditionally suspicious o f peacetime
military strength/'
Additionally, domestic faith in the United States as an invincible superpower had
gone up in flames with the ships in Pearl Harbor and joined fears o f Soviet-style
communism as an influential ingredient in the nation’s growing emphasis on national
security.

Even after victory in the war, the attack remained undeniable proof of US

^ Cecil V. Crabb, Kevin V. Mulcahy, Am erican N ational Security, 16.
Operation Crossroads put the lie to the assertion that civilians controlled atomic energy,
as evidenced by Truman’s adroit political appropriation o f Congressional troublemakers.
Military enthusiasm concerning the plaimed Pacific atomic weapons tests irritated an
already-tense Congress debating the McMahon Bill, and when Commerce Secretary Henry
A Wallace joined with Congress to remove atomic energy fi'om military control, Truman
sensed a showdown. Receiving a letter fi'om Wallace claiming that the Pacific Tests
might reflect only what the military wanted them to reflect, Truman called a meeting in
February 1946 with Secretary o f State Byrnes, Secretary o f War Patterson, General
Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Leahy (Truman’s Chief o f Staff) to discuss
criticism over the proposed tests. Leahy sharply criticized the McMahon Bill because it
“carried an implication o f distrust of the Armed Services” and would cause one of the
most effective weapons o f war to a civil commission which would dole out its product, if
it decided to make any, as it saw fit.” Tmman replied that although McMahon’s
motivations were political he “had to be sure that this test met all o f the crackpot criticism
and that not only would it need to be objective but we had to convince the public it was
objective.” They agreed to add House and Senate leaders to the already large contingent
invited to view the tests as the basis of a Presidential Commission reporting directly to the
president. Walter Millis, ed.. The F orrestal D iaries (New York, NY: Viking Publishers,
1951), 133. See also Chapter 4,
Between 1940 and 1995, over four trillion dollars was spent on nuclear weapons.
Stephen I. Schwartz, “Four Trillion Dollars and Counting” B ulletin o f the Atom ic
Scientists 5 \ (Nov-Dee. 1995) 32.
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vulnerability, and undermined the confidence o f American citizens and leaders. Later
decision-making reflects that the atom bomb only increased insecurity/^ and, in the
analysis o f threats to the nation’s security, notions of ‘probability’ were increasingly
abandoned in favor o f formulations o f ‘possibility,’ with profound implications upon
domestic and foreign policy. This change in methodology eventually resulted in a desire
to protect America’s interests from every ‘worst-case’ scenario that could possibly be
imagined.^’^’ When the nation’s enemies became conceptualized in terms of their

The bomb presented postwar American leaders with a peculiar set of circumstances.
While downplaying reports o f radiation injury in Japan, the government had to convince
the American people that they should support: (i) peaceful development of atomic energy
through the establishment o f international control; (ii) an extravagant military operation in
the Pacific to substantiate the necessity o f a Navy and Army in a world o f Superfortressdelivered atomic weapons; and (iii) approve the Army’s planned development o f three
national laboratories to support industrial development o f atomic energy. In a transcript
prepared for the radio broadcast “You and the Atom” Secretary o f War Patterson lobbied
for the public’s support o f the Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy,
among other things, and stressed the need for peaceful atomic utilization: “You must
decide—and quickly—that you are willing to enter into and live up to an agreement that this
universal force will not be available to any man or group o f men for the purpose o f war. .
.” Planned for the July 22, 1946 broadcast, it coincided with the joint Army-Navy atomic
weapons tests in the Pacific (Operation Crossroads launched on July 1) the publicity
surrounding which caused an unexpected reaction in the minds o f some, for Patterson
warned; “Don’t discount Bikini because ships continued to flo at.. .Remember that
America’s great centers o f population, our concentrations o f industry, and our ports are
vulnerable too. One atomic bomb would have done far more damage at Pearl Harbor than
did the massive two-hour raid which plunged us into war.” See “Remarks by The
Honorable Robert Patterson, Secretary o f War” 7-19-46, TSCMED.
Policy constitutive o f the memories o f Pearl Harbor gained a normative quality by 1950,
when the Joint Chiefs o f Staff (alarmed at Soviet superiority in terms of conventional
forces) advised the NSC 68 study group that based upon the tragedy at Pearl Harbor,
increase in domestic force was essential to avoid “a new type o f Pearl Harbor attack o f
infinitely greater magnitude than that o f 1941.” Strobe Talbott, The M aster o f the Game
(New York, NY:Knopf: 1988) 56, cited in John Lamberton Harper, American V isions o f
Èz/rcpe (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996) 292.
This fits well within the analysis o f Halperin who insists that this strategy not only
affects the product o f an organization, but intra- and inter-agency relationships as well:
“Organizations constantly hedge against unforeseen consequences and the possibility that
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potentiality, fear grew boundless and unchecked; and, in many ways, so did the institutions
that promised to alleviate that fear/''
Certainly, the challenges posed by perceived threats to America’s interests were
enormous, and resulted in the growth o f the “security state,” the development o f the
military-industrial complex and a spreading fear that communism, from domestic as well as
foreign sources, threatened the nation’s very existence/* A substantial body o f
scholarship explains US strategy during this period through examinations o f the diplomatic
breakdown in American-Soviet relations, the changes in American policy in reaction to
postwar Soviet activity, the divergent ideologies and capabilities o f the two major
players/” Those explanations may provide an authorizational framework through which

their private estimates are wrong. This concern leads intelligence organizations
continually to predict crises, for when a crisis does occur, they can point out that they
predicted it.” Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic P olitics and Foreign P olicy (Washington,
D C : Brookings Institution, 1974) 145.
Eric Beukel encourages the re-evaluation o f the pre- and post-atomic bomb decision
making and the interplay o f imagination and objectivity. The nature of atomic weaponry
precludes analysis based upon anything but potentiality: “.. nobody is able to establish
with certainty the borderline between wisdom and wishful thinking, between fact and
belief, between reality and myth; when decision-makers are attempting to establish some
tenable notions.. the dividing line between their subjective beliefs and facts is blurred. . . ”
Am erican Perceptions o f the Soviet Union as a N uclear Adversary (London: Pinter
Books, 1989) 24.
George W. Ball sketches a disturbing scene: “Our first reaction. . was irrational and
demeaning. How could we have suddenly become as subject to destruction as less
favored peoples? .. .What I found particularly repulsive in the ensuing hysteria was the
realization o f how little we had progressed.. now a new form o f St. Vitus’ Dance
afflicted men and women. . fiiend against fiiend, destroying trust in human decency and
producing a nation o f informers.” The P ast H ad Another Pattern ( New York, NY:
Norton, 1982) 470.
A representative sample includes John Lewis Gaddis, The U nited States an d the O rigins
o f the C old War, 1941-1947 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1972); id.
Strategies o f Containment: A C ritical A ppraisal o f Postwar Am erican N ational Security
P olicy, op. cit; id. Ih e Long Peace, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987); id.
We Now Know, Rethinking C old War H istory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997);
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the nation’s atomic weapons program developed, but do not answer the questions that
drive this study.
Why, for example, was the Navy so eager to use the atomic bomb against ninetyfive o f its own (and captured German and Japanese) ships and crafts, risking the health
and lives o f thousands o f seamen? How did the military usurp Congressional authority
and subordinate the civilian authority o f the Atomic Energy Commission’s to its own
ends? And why was continental weapons testing conducted in such a dangerous fashion
when simple precautions known at the time could have made it infinitely safer? Pohcy
undoubtedly initiated, stimulated, and maintained atomic weapons testing, but to
understand the channeling of national goals in the potent and poisonous directions taken
by the program, one must push policy aside and locate the lethal trail o f practices that
flowed through atomic testing.
While not ignoring traditional rubrics, the paths I have chosen to follow have been
illuminated in large measure by social theorist Pierre Bourdieu whose explanation of
habitus and structures suggest an alternative exploration o f atomic testing culture. The

Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance o f Power: N ational Security, the Truman
Adm inistration, and the cold war (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Hugh
DeSantis, The D iplom acy o f Silence: the Am erican F oreign Service, the Soviet Union,
and the C old war I933-I947 (Chicago, IL: University o f Chicago Press, 1980); Walter
Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise M en: Six F riends and the W orld They M ade:
Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, M cC loy (New York, NY: Simon and
Schuster, 1986); Daniel Yergen, Shattered P eace: The O rigins o f the C old war and the
N ational Security State, rev. ed. (New York, NY: Penguin, 1990); William E. Pemberton,
H arry S. Truman: F air Dealer & C old W arrior (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1989);
Walker, The C old War, Martin J. Sherwin, A W orld D estroyed (New York, NY: Knop^
1975); Gregg Herldn, The W inning Weapon (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ,
1988); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: C hoices about the Bomb in the F irst
F ifty Years (New York, NY: Random House, 1988).
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reference to the weapons program as a “culture” is a sensible one since even the most
elementary review o f atomic testing reveals that its participants belonged to a very small
club, many spending their entire professional lives within the enclave o f governmentsponsored atomic development. Those men then who developed, experimented, analyzed,
and directed atomic weapons development—all within the classified cold war environment-provide perhaps a nearly-perfect example o f a “particular class o f conditions o f existence
[to] produce habitus, durable, transposable dispositions” and the program itself a system
through which “structured structures [were] predisposed to function as structuring
structures.”^^ Bourdieu’s analyses offer an attractive rationale for the behavior of actors
within the atomic testing program, explaining if only in part, why experimentation with
atomic weapons (at least within the scope o f this thesis) never lost the critical urgency
with which it was invested at its inception.
I seek, though, not only an explanation o f how the atomic program developed as it
did, but also some understanding o f how and why its participants allowed, even
encouraged, its development to proceed down tragic courses. Two general characteristics
distinguish the literature devoted to atomic testing: sterile accounts o f the operation o f
state apparatus that ignore the individual actors except as to their performance as state
functionaries; or, alternatively, highly impassioned chronicles by or about victims that
demonize either the participants or the government itself. Both approaches are limiting
because they either present a “top-across” or a “bottom-across” model which, even if
placed together in an attempt to develop some cognitive sense o f the whole picture, result

Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic o f P ractice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1990) Chapter 3 and more particularly, 53.
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only in a compilation o f two single-dimensional, yet parallel, trajectories. It is important
though to neither absolve all participants o f responsibility behind some protective shield o f
state power nor simply rage at the consequences o f that power. This thesis attempts to
answer the often unproductive fury o f victims with an interpretation that neither ignores
the responsibility o f individual actors nor endows them with unlimited choice; and,
additionally, to emphasize the (somewhat obvious but too often ignored) fact that the state
is not composed o f faceless automatons processing directives, but o f individuals whose
participation within given institutions and personal history act as limiting factors upon
choice and therefore the articulation o f state policy.
The insights o f Bourdieu combined with those o f Robert Cover offer a compelling
bridge between the anger o f victims (“How could they do this to innocent peope?”) and
the straightforward declarations o f process (“They did what they were told to do.”). I
think it useful to look at the ways that societal norms and values are transcended, to a
greater or lesser degree, by the habits and practices of actors within a given culture and to
also explore the determinative influence o f both individual history and the systematization
o f patterns of behavior that become inscribed upon institutions and actors.
One o f the fundamental effects o f the harmony between practical sense
and objectified meaning is the production o f a common-sense world. .
The objective homogenizing o f group or class habitus that results from
homogeneity o f conditions o f existence is what enables practices to be
objectively harmonized without any calculation or conscious reference
to a norm and mutually adjusted in the absence o f any direct interaction
or, a fo rtio ri, explicit co-ordination.**

38

Bourdieu, The Logic o f Practice, 58.
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It is unreasonable, o f course, to succumb completely to the allure of institutional theory
and reach for it as a soothing balm for each and every affront that might be attributed to
the activity o f the atomic testing program. To do so would merely transfer the erroneous
notion o f participants’ slavish devotion from the state to institutions. It does, however,
deliver an attractive and coherent model through which one might reach some
understanding o f individual participant behavior within an atomic testing program that is
otherwise, in many ways, incomprehensible.
To understand a program which placed Americans at risk, it is necessary to look
b ^ o n d the obscuring attributes o f policy and into practice, spotlighting the philosophies
and performance o f the institutions and particpants. Certainly fear of communist
hegemony provided the impetus for institutional development; but, once those institutions
were created, anti-communist fervor simply facilitated the maintenance, both in terms o f
intangible ideological support and Congressional appropriations o f the nation’s postwar
institutions. Within the development of the institutions themselves, anti-communist
commitment became subordinated to other, less idealistic and less national, motivations.
The study o f institutions and their role in American government and society is
worthwhile. First, the organizational complexities and motivational realities that
permeated the cold war institutions have not faded.*” Second, and most important in

*” It is impossible to ignore Mathews’ point that the mechanisms o f state administration
and control, bureaucracies, exert enormous force in America, operating “as an equal
partner with the President, Congress and the Judiciary.” The Darker Reaches, 3.
The extraconstitutional authority and mechanized performance o f bureaucracies have
become increasingly problematical. Stanley Kutler’s investigations disturbingly
demonstrate that the explosion o f the postwar bureaucracy that accompanied the
development o f anti-subversive law resulted in an (often abusive) exercise o f arbitrary,
delegated power. The American Inquisition (New Yorkrlfill & Wang, 1982). See also
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terms o f this analysis, national security remains a vital component o f our government and
atomic weapons a cornerstone o f that protective framework. The need for natural
resources, the preservation and stimulation o f our economy, and a desire to see
humanitarian goals implemented worldwide demand that America take an interest in
international affairs. The end o f the cold war did not toll the bell on our fear of direct
atomic attack and, particularly as the international realm has continued to become ever
more sophisticated, at least in terms o f weaponry, the indirect results o f indiscriminate
atomic or nuclear weapon deployment are an increasing concern. The collapse of the
Soviet Union has resulted in mounting concern over the dispersal o f atomic weapons and
critical material to nations (or terrorist leaders) viewed as far less stable or predictable
than the USSR."*” Indeed, the recent atomic weapons tests by India and Pakistan
demonstrate the (almost casual) use o f weapons to threaten a long-standing foe with
something more impressive than taunts or outdated rifles.'"

Belknap, C old War P oliticalJustice (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977); Steinberg,
The G reat Red M enace: U nited States Prosecution o f Am erican Communists, 1947-1952
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984); Whitfield, The Culture o f the C old war
(Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991) particularly Chapter 8.
Though terrorism is an increasingly serious element o f national security, (see Crabb &
Mulcahy, American N ational Security, particularly 30-36), its prevention is undervalued
by politicians who gear priorities to particular constituences rather than to a national anti
terrorism crusade. Gideon Rose argues that Congress has been reluctant to invest money
into a comprehensive agenda since it is patently “unusual, unsexy, and provide[s] few
opportunities for pork” unlike, for example, missile defense. Gideon Rose “It Could
Happen Here; Facing the New Terrorism” Foreign A ffairs, March/April 1999, 131.
The countries with declared nuclear capability include the US, Britain, France, Russia,
China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukrain and South Africa. “Tracking Nuclear Weapons” Time, May
25, 1998, 38.
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More importantly, however, the United States maintains a large arsenal of atomic
weapons, the components of which are manufactured nationally, tested in the Nevada
desert and in Alaska, and carried in the holds o f Air Force planes on routine training
flights over the nation/^ Weapons maintenance and development continues, as do the
institutions designed to implement the government’s atomic policy. Though the following
reinterpretation opens only a window into a period where institutional practice jeopardized
the health and lives o f many, it may demonstrate the necessity for competent and ethical
oversight o f institutional design and behavior—a practical and moral imperative as long as
the United States embraces its nuclear stockpile with unyielding arms and the threat of
atomic warfare still haunts the dreams o f many.

* * *

Most scientists concede that atomic weapons development was, and is, a uniquely
dangerous activity, and although they continue to disagree in their assessment o f
radioactivity’s effects and whether or not there is any threshold below which no injury
occurs, it is important to recognize, de principio, that fallout from cold war atomic testing
injured and killed thousands o f Americans. Death lost no ground in the face o f
widespread fallout—the decade o f the 1950s, when the government conducted atmospheric
testing in the Nevada desert, has the distinction o f being the only period in this century

Department o f Energy facilities that emit radionuclides are located in Washington,
Georgia, Idaho, New Mexico, California, Colorado, Ohio, Texas, Florida, Nevada, New
York, Tennessee, Kentucky, Iowa, Permsylvania. Environmental Protection Agency,
“Radiological Impact Caused by Emissions o f Radionuclides into Air in the United States’
August 1979, EPA 520/7-79-006.
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when the nation’s mortality rates did not decline; death lost no ground in the face o f
widespread fallout/'’ It is a tragic irony that ‘friendly fire’ caused so many casualties in
the prolonged ‘war’ against the Soviet Union; and, even more unsettling that fallout’s
devastating potential was known to the government at the time and, as such, was
predictable and its consequences preventable. This examination explores the nation’s
development o f atomic weapons from World W ar II origins through the 1956—a period
generally and popularly distinguished as one o f unprecedented and sustained military
mobilization with profound global and domestic implications. In America, it was an age o f
growth and prosperity, and the surging economy counterbalanced fears of Soviet
supremacy.'” It was also, however, the age o f atmospheric atomic testing, the
consequences of which may be economically analyzed but, I argue, must also be explored
at a humanitarian level—one that ignores neither the individual responsibility of the
participants nor the decidedly uneconomic consequences to its victims.
Though grass has not yet taken root over the grave o f the cold war, its drama has
lured scholars of every stripe. The cold war can be told as a straightforward history o f the

“* Jay Gould and Benjamin Goldman have extrapolated some interesting, though unsettling
and little-known information through their comparison o f mortality statistics from the
Center for Disease Control, states, and nation. Noting that advances in nutrition,
sanitation and medicine have caused mortality rates to decline over time, they examine
how that trajectory changed during atmospheric testing. Although wars and epidemics
cause occasional spikes in a continuum o f decline, the period o f atmospheric testing
accounts for the only stable period of mortality in this centuiy. In addition, from 1915 to
1985, infant mortality improved from ten percent per year to one; but, little improvement
occurred during the period o f radioactive fallout until the signing o f the Test Ban Treaty.
D eadly D eceit (New York, NY; Four Walls, Eight Windows, 1990) passim .
” I am indebted to Paul Boyer for his work on the cultural transformation that took place
during the post-World W ar n period. B y the B om b's E arly Light: Am erican Thought a n d
Culture a t the Dawn o f the Atom ic Age (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1985).
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readjustment o f global power relationships or as a tangled bundle o f ironies and
perplexities—a curious mixture o f security and insecurity; old ideologies pressed into the
legitimatization o f new science; global transformations spawned by microscopic events;
individuality and internationalism. It is indeed a unique period, but I propose that its
novelty may contribute less to its popularity as a historical pursuit as its familiarity. No
one can deny that, at some level, we are all products o f our past, but for the curious o f this
age, the cold war is more than a focus o f inquiry, it has been and continues to be,
constitutive."'*
Few can say that they have remained untouched by the cold war. Indeed, for much
of the postwar period, the conflict with the Soviet Union filtered into every facet of
American life. On a very concrete and quantifiable level, permanent mobilization and the
military/industrial complex created a boom economy that lasted well into the 1970s, and
government’s influence upon the academy cannot be denied, particularly given the impetus
provided by the nation’s encouragement o f science and engineering.'*” Less measurable

"** See Gaddis’ comments: “Historians chose, reasonable enough, not to await the cold
war’s end before beginning to write about i t .. historians fell into the unusual habit o f
working within their chosen period rather than after it. . .[confusing] the cold war with the
stream o f time.” We Now Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 282.
In this regard, I am a devout admirer o f Robert Lifton and Greg Mitchell and their work
on the effects o f the bomb upon the collective psyche. “. . .secrecy, concealment, and
falsification have not been completely sustainable but have led to confused combinations
of ignorance, insight, and cynicism toward authorities—along with a sense o f the world as
deeply absurd and dangerous.” H iroshim a in America, 335.
'*” And ideology. Laura Nader speaks pointedly to the effects o f the cold war upon all
intellectuals (“As a class, intellectuals have been caught by the nulitary-industrial
bureaucracy. . .We oscillate between asserting our individualities and serving the ruling
powers.”) and the attempts by anthropologists to overcome the government’s influence
upon universities—the “seduction inherent in cold war tools.” In “The Phantom Factor”
she argues for some ‘down-home’ anthropology, the recognition that the loyalty
demanded by the national security state should be recognized as a taboo, and self-

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

33

but no less important, however, is the multiplicity o f cold war impressions and memories
that may have varied in their impact or intensity, but have, and continue to, shape
cognition. How many historians today spent time under their school desks during air raid
drills; went to local meetings for civil defense information; knew someone with a bunker in
the backyard or a supply o f food and water under a bed or hidden in a pantry; or, listened
to the every-day-no-matter-what testing o f the warning whistle at noon and prayed never
to hear it at night? How many have watched a spy movie where all the ‘bad’ guys (with
severe facial scarring or an eye patch) or ‘bad’ (but typically voluptuous) women spoke
with stereotypical Russian accents; read a newspaper; listened to the news, political
speeches, the radio, watched television? It is hard to imagine that any adult raised in
America was not affected, in some way, by the cold war.
It is also important to recognize the ways that national security came to assume the
dominant role in the American state, and that the public itself collaborated in that
transformation. Although few authors use the term “govemmentality,” the historical
pattern o f the cold war, including the development o f a strong centralized state, increased
national security measures, anti-communism, the crafting o f the military-industrial complex
and imperialist tendencies, may best be understood in the Foucauldian sense—as an active
force combining totalitarianism with individuality and the management o f state forces as
they exist within relationships. The postwar state certainly employed “tactics rather than

censorship the “emissary” o f a taboo culture. Laura Nader, “The Phantom Factor” in The
C old War and the U niversity, Noam Chomsky, et al. eds. (New York, NY; The New
Press, 1997), 107-146.
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laws. . .and laws themselves as tactics - to arrange things” toward certain ends."*’ In this
regard, Colin Gordon’s analysis o f governmental rationality is an exceptionally lucid
vehicle to approach an understanding o f the unique characteristics o f national security. As
a “dominant component o f modem governmental rationality,” security may operate
independently or combine with other governmental practices, namely “law, sovereignty
and discipline” and form into multi-faceted, functional configurations.'** When the state
began to exert ever more influence upon society, it required the complicity o f the public
and shaped opinion in accordance with its goals. Scholars must remember that they, too,
were shaped by national motivation and the unique characteristics o f the cold war.
We read, however, that the “past has another pattern”'*” and the recognition o f that
pattern requires a diverse analysis; and, in an approach influenced by social theorists, the
tracing of hazardous behavior woven into the institutions through practice and habituation
to discover the effects o f atomic governance. First, since the cold war was anchored in
national initiative, the character and development o f the state and its structure is a crucial
element. Second, the function o f policy as an authoritative, if not determinative, element
o f atomic weapons development and the literature surrounding this issue (though highly

'*^ Foucault “Govemmentality” in The Foucault E ffect Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon,
Peter Miller, eds. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 95. It must be
emphasized that pubhc perception, shaped in grand degree by the state, all but guaranteed
public ratification o f oppressive governmental policies, for “ideas. . may be more
contingent, recent and modifiable than we think. . the relation between government and
the govemed passes, to a perhaps ever-increasing extent, through the manner in which the
governed themselves are willing to exist as subjects.” Gordon, 48. See also Foucault
“Security, Territory, and Population” and “The Ethics o f the Concem for the Self as a
Practice o f Freedom” in EYArcs, Subjectivity and Truth, Paul Rabinow, ed. (New York,
NY: New Press, 1994) 71,300.
'** Introduction, Colin Gordon The Foucault E ffect, 1-47.
'*” George Ball, The P ast H ad A nother Pattern.
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combative) adds a necessary dimension. Third, the several chronicles o f the atomic testing
program serve as a guide to the often complicated relationship between the government,
testing program, and citizens. In concert these topics allow the examination o f the tragic
pattern that lies embedded within the atomic testing program.
The single most characteristic feature o f the American cold war period is the
overwhelming tendency o f the state, particularly the executive branch, to appropriate
power in the name o f national security. Under a constitutional umbrella granting
discretion in matters o f foreign policy, the president and his advisors instituted and
directed policy that affected the domestic realm and reduced the legitimate prerogatives o f
congress. It is tempting to suggest that the strength o f the American state in the postwar
period resulted entirely from patterns o f control established during wartime; but that type
of analysis is more appropriately used in explanation o f behaviors—individual activity and
interpersonal relationships—than it is in explanation o f state development. The state’s
ability to suppress the liberties o f citizens during the cold war was not laid down during
World War H; it was, instead, the result o f a protracted process o f political negotiation in
the face o f transformational events and ideology that pushed the power o f the state to an
apogee in the postwar years.*”

*” There is general scholarly consensus that an increased centrality o f the state emerged
during the Progressive period, and though apparently dormant during the 1920s, found
revival in the circumstances o f the depression and Roosevelt’s New Deal reforms. On
Wilson, see Richard Hofstadter, The Age o f Reform (New York, NY; Knopfj 1955) 282287. Alan Brinkley persuasively argues that the significance of the New Deal rests, in
large measure, in public identification with the national government as a societal resource,
reflecting a “long process o f ideological adaptation.” “The New Deal and the Idea o f the
State” The R ise cmd F a ll o f the New D eal Order 1920-1980 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1989) 268-269; and The E nd o f Reform (New York, NY: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1995); See also Stephen Skowronek who argues that the 19th century system of
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The role o f an enlarged centralized government, however, should not be solely
understood in terms o f its relational strength or weakness. William Novak reminds us that
any analysis o f the state, whether developed through discussions o f its capability or
impotwice, or whether through the crafting of conceptual models identifying its function
or form, is a patently irrelevant exercise unless those concepts and theories can be pressed
into the service o f an explanation. Novak’s recommendation to “[build] a public history
around the intersection o f policy and society and the actual everyday conduct and

political negotiation, carried out through parties and courts, gave way to a burgeoning
centralized national bureaucracy that resulted in an ‘extraconstitutional’ relationship
between the polity and the government. Building a New A m erican State: The Expansion
o f N ational A dm inistrative C apacities 1877-1920 (CambridgerCambridge University
Press, 1982). Bruce Ackerman, too, emphasizes the shift in executive influence during
Roosevelt’s administration and argues that popular support enhanced the president’s
ability to lead both Congress and the Court toward an ‘activist’ state. We the People
(Cambridge, MA; Belknap Press o f Harvard University Press, 1991) 106.
Barry Karl, though, denies that any ‘progressive’ notions should attach to the enhanced
centralization. Focusing on America’s diversity and emphasis on individuality, Karl asserts
that consensus only develops in the glare of crisis and argues that the New Deal and its
locally-managed programs demonstrate not centrality, but governmental sensitivity to an
inherent resistance to strong centralized control. The crisis mentality that permeated the
cold war would seem to support, at least in part, Karl’s thesis. The Uneasy State
(Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983) passim but particularly
226-228.
Efforts to understand the relationship between social change and politics enriches the
scholarship o f state development. Theda Skocpol has expanded upon Skowronek’s work
to especially assert that the state embodies two roles, one as an actor in its own right and
another as the matrix through which policies are initiated, implemented, and that
additionally restructure subsequent political possibilities and social identities. Curiously,
though, while she argues that the analysis of institutions and pohtical initiative suggest a
congruence between theory and practice—“distinctive statelike contributions to US policy
making occur exactly in those instances and arenas where a Weberian-Hintzean
perspective would insist that t h ^ should occur”—she also denies that any theoretical
model can be said to apply. P rotecting Soldiers and M others (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1992); Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, T. Skocpol, eds..
Bringing the State B ack In (Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 13.
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consequences o f government” coincides with the intent o f this thesis; namely, to examine
the impact o f atomic governance upon society.*' So, what did the strengthened pre-war
state mean to a nation on the verge of war? By the time American officially entered
World War H after the Japanese attack on December 7, the nation’s industries were
already primed, a generation of young men (many veterans o f the Civilian Conservation
Corps) were ready to fight, and Americans had already accepted the authority o f a strong
centralized state and decisive executive.*^ Roosevelt’s reliance on technology and
confidence in his authority as commander-in-chief led to his decision to fund, secretly, the
most innovative and consequential endeavor ever attempted—the development o f the
atomic bomb. A hand-picked team managed the Manhattan Project, and except for these
men and the scientists they employed, few others knew the project’s purpose until the
bombing o f Hiroshima.*"

*' The P eople's W elfare (Chapel Hill, NC: University o f North Carolina Press, 1996) 8-9.
See also Louis Galambos, ed.. The New Am erican State (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins
University Press, 1987).
*^ For an analysis o f how the administration and the social and cultural components o f the
1930s contributed to national involvement in World W ar II, see Michael Sherry, In the
Shadow o f War (fi&w Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1995.
The complicity o f citizens in state functioning should be more often emphasized in
historical application. In an interesting article, Meg Jacobs’ illuminates the circularity
between policy and society in an examination o f the Office o f Price Administration, a
national initiative managed on the local level. She finds that during the war and early
postwar period, national manipulation o f the market in the form o f price controls was
effective and had public support as long as the system operated efficiently. When national
controls proved ineffective or inefficiency interrupted supplies, the formerly-cooperative
local coalitions coalesced into strong national alliances against govemmental-controUed
price schemes. “How About Some Meat? Consumption Politics and State Building from
the Bottom Up, 1941-1946” The Journal o f Am erican H istory 84:3 (December, 1977).
** The following are ‘official’ histories, developed under the auspices o f either the Federal
government or its contractors; a contingency unfortunately necessary in a field o f classified
documents—but one that raises important issues concerning the relationship between the
state and scholarship. See Barton C. Hacker’s The D ragon’s Tail (Berkeley, CA:
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By the time Japan fell, however, Truman had succeeded Roosevelt and wartime
alliances had already begun to disintegrate.” In an attempt to avoid the individualized and

University o f California Press, 1987) and Elem ents o f Controversy. Hacker developed
both o f these at the instigation o f the Atomic Energy Commission eager to refute a
mounting swell o f criticism and lawsuits. Hacker reviewed no classified documents.
Hewlett & Duncan, A tom ic S h ield (University Park, PA: University o f Pennsylvania Press,
1969). For the Eisenhower period, see R. Hewlett and J. Holl, A tom sfo r Peace and War
1952-1961 (Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 1989). Jack Holl served as
chief historian for the DOE and Hewlett for the AEC. Hewlett includes information firom
some classified material and it is thus difficult to ‘source’ some o f his comments for
accuracy or interpretation. See also Philip Cantelon, Richard G. Hewlett and Robert C.
Williams, eds.. The Am erican A tom (Philadelphia, PA: University o f Pennsylvania Press,
1984) for a convenient compilation of major documents.
In addition, Martin Sherwin offers a concise analysis o f weapons development during
World War II. This is a significant contribution to scholarship since Sherwin posits that
the bomb solidified a connection between the ‘real’ war and the ‘cold’ war. A World
D estroyed (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1975).
For an ‘insider’ treatment o f the Manhattan Project and one scientist’s avoidance o f
military disciplinary strictures, see Richard Feynman’s entertaining Surely You 're Joking,
M r. Feynman (New York, NY: WW Norton, 1985).
See Melvyn Leffler and David S. Painter, eds.. O rigins o f the C old War (New York,
NY Hill & Wang, 1994) and Martin Walker’s The C old War. Walker’s many years as a
reporter covering the cold war gives his work a unique perspective, and its insights are
often a refreshing departure from other more sterile accounts. See also J. Dunbabin’s
encyclopaedic International R elations since 1945: A H istory in Two Volumes (New
York, NY: Longman, 1994), particularly Vol. 1.
Compilations of documents include: Warren F. Kimball, C hurchill & Roosevelt: The
Complete Correspondence, Vol. I l l { Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984);
Harold Stein, Am erican C ivil-M ilitary D ecisions (University, AL: University of Alabama
Press, 1963); Schlesinger, D ynam ics o f World Power, another particularly useful
compilation o f articles from the early cold war period is provided in Peter G. Filene’s
Am erican Views o f Soviet R ussia 1917-1965 (Homewood, IL:Dorsey Press, 1968);
likewise, Gabriel A. Almond’s compilation o f polls. The A m erican People and Foreign
P olicy (New York, NY: Praeger, 1960) lends added dimension to a subject often confined
to an elite, political sphere. By contrast, Herbert Druks’ H arry S. Truman and the
R ussians 1945-1952 (New York, NY: R. Speller, 1966) focuses exclusively, and
approvingly, upon the executive. For a more critical and detached analysis, is Eric
Beukel’s non-American perspective, American Perceptions o f the Soviet Union as a
N uclear Adversary (London: Pinter, 1989).
On Truman, see especially David McCullough’s Truman (New York, NY: Simon and
Schuster, 1992). In addition, and although Nfiller’s account o f his ‘interview’ with
Truman is questioned by (at least one) scholar, (Robert Ferrell, Review in American
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somewhat haphazard methods o f his predecessor, Truman brought the State Department
back into the diplomatic fore and initiated plans for the postwar coordination o f national
security.** The breakdown o f the US/Soviet relationship stimulated efforts against

H istory, March 1990, 5) he provides a good personal glimpse o f Truman, and Miller’s
tapes have been recently validated by McCullough’s research, see Ferrell, Review.
Timothy Walch and Dwight M. Miller, eds., Herbert H oover and H arry S. Truman
(Worland, WY: High Plains Publishing Company, 1992), Robert H. Ferrell, D ear Bess.
Those that focus upon other influential actors include David S. McLellan and David C
Acheson, eds.. Am ong Friends: Personal Letters o f D ean Acheson (New York, NY;
Dodd and Mead, 1980); James Chace Acheson: The Secretary o f State Who C reated the
American W orld (N ew York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1998); Larry I. Bland, ed. George
C. M arshall: Interview s a nd Rem iniscencesfo r F orrest C. Pogue (Lexington, KY: G.C.
Marshall Research Foundation, 1991); David E. Lilienthal The Journals o f D avid E.
Lilienthal, Vols. H, m (New York: 1964); Arnold A. Rogow, Jam es Forrestal: A Study o f
Personality, P olitics a nd P olicy (New York, NY: Harper & Rowe, 1963); Walter Millis,
ed. The F orrestal D iaries (N ew YoTk,NY:Y\km gP\ib\xsh& Ts, 1951).
For an example o f an approving analysis of the United States as a “reactor” rather than
a “motivator”, see William G. Hyland, The Cold war: F ifty Years o f C onflict (New York,
NY: Times Books, 1990); see also Jaime E. Nolan, G uardians o f the A rsenal (New York,
NY: Basic Books, 1989).
** See Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance o f Power. Somewhat reminiscent o f Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr.’s The Im perial Presidency (Boston, M A Houghton Mifflin, 1973) and C.
Wright Mills’ landmark study. The Power Elite (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 1957) that proposed the development of a governmental troika composed o f the
military, pentagon and executive in the face of a postwar power vacuum associated with
the abandonment o f (traditional) domestic focus, Leffler argues that the cold war
extracted an enormous cost from the American economy and people: “[US officials] began
to plan for contingencies. The price of preponderance—the cost o f linking Western
Europe, Japan, and their dependencies to a US-led orbit—was an unlimited arms race,
indisciminate commitments, constant anxiety, eternal vigilance, and a protracted cold
war.” Leffler’s work suffers, however, from some contradiction, for the previous
statement is followed by the approving: “Not only did US officials show a shrewd
understanding o f Soviet weaknesses.. showed their grasp o f economic geostrategic
realities.. .They correctly believed that open markets would fuel worldwide economic
grow th.. . ” 445, 499-500. See also John Gaddis’ most recent We Now Know (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997). Athough it conforms with the current trend toward
more-inclusive scholarship, I am not in complete agreement with Gaddis’ ‘revised’
assertion that the early cold war was not bi-polar. Clearly, whether in terms o f nations or
ideologies, the US/Soviet Union and democracy/communism distinctions are decidedly bi
polar and were so recognized and characterized at the time. Certainly it was perceived as
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domestic communism,*” and secrecy enveloped government*^ even as the National
Security Council entrenched a military component into executive decision making.
Athough the Council provided notional approval for policies instituted during Truman’s
such, and although the reality may have been more complex, those multiplicities cannot
override the fact that a belief in bi-polarism permeated the period.
The critical nature o f the historiography and the emotional interpretation demonstrates
the significance o f the postwar period to American scholars. The debates over the
function o f the state and society are genteel affairs compared to the hotly-contested fi-ays
surrounding interpretation o f American policy following World W ar H. The
transformation o f the nation’s government in the cold w ar years has scattered fencing
academics on both sides (and underneath) a postwar bridge. See for example, the debates
over diplomacy by John Lewis Gaddis, Bruce Cumings, Melvyn Leffler and Michael Hunt
in Am erica and the W orld, Michael J. Hogan, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press: 1995). There are, indeed, so many variations that the referents o f analyses nearly
equal the number o f tomes: “consensus,” “orthodox,” “revisionist,” “radical revisionist,”
“post-revisionist,” a d particularum .
*” See Caute, The G reat F ear, Noam Chomsky, et. al., eds.. The C old War & The
University, M. Belknap, C old War P oliticalJustice (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1977); Stanley Kutler, The Am erican Inquisition, Justice and Injustice in the cold war
(New York, NY: EBU and Wang, 1982); P. Steinberg, The G reat "R ed” M enace: U nited
States Prosecution o f A m erican Communists (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994);
Whitfield, The C ulture o f the C old war (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1991) particularly Chapter 8. In an early, yet still very useful work, the dynamics and
transitions associated with the powerplays between Congress and the Courts concerning
civil rights and internal security is cogently analyzed by W. Murphy, Congress and the
Court (Chicago, IL: University o f Chicago Press, 1962). For anti-communism’s effect
upon scientists, see Donald A. Strickland, Scientists in P olitics (Purdue: Purdue
University Studies, 1968).
*’ Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour, Unmasking A dm instrative E vil (Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications, 1998); Hugh De Santis, The D iplom acy o f Silence (Chicago,
EL:University o f Chicago Press, 1979); H. Foerstel, Secret Science (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1993); Anthony Mathews, The D arker R eaches o f G overnm ent (Berkeley, CA:
University o f California Press, 1978); Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy the American
Experience (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998). It should be noted
that unlike Great Britain’s 30-year mandatory declassification system, the United States
has no universal standard for document declassification.
Contemporary debates, and probably the cost o f storage, has encouraged a
governmental analysis o f its own classification system A Review o f the Department o f
Energy C lassification P olicy and Practice ÇNasYôxi^onDC: 1995). By May, 1999,
however, congressional concem surrounding Chinese espionage within the nation’s
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terms, those policies were initiated and implemented according to the philosophies o f
Truman’s chief Secretaries o f State, General George Marshall and Dean Acheson.**
The atomic bomb added a critical dimension to the necessity for accurate analysis,
and posed difficulty for scientists wary o f the bomb’s overutilization in the face o f a
military establishment eager for new weapons development.*” The military won out, and

weapons laboratories prompted the Department o f Energy to suspend its declassification
o f records pending a more ‘comprehensive’ review.
** See Ernest R. May, ed., Am erica C old War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, (Boston,
MA; Bedford Books o f St. Martins Press, 1993); Kenneth M. Jensen, ed.. O rigins o f the
C old War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts 'Long Telegrams ’ o f 1946 (Washington,
D C : United States Institute o f Peace, 1993); John Prados, K eepers o f the Keys: A
H istory o f the N ational Security C ouncilfrom Truman to Bush (New York, NY: Morrow
Books, 1991); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Containm ent, Cecil V. Crabb and Kevin
V. Mulcahy, Am erican N ational Security, Robert Pfaltzgraff and Jacqueline Davis
N ational Security D ecisions', Cames Lord, The Presidency and the M anagm ent o f
N ational Security.
Steven L. Rearden, The Evolution o f American Strategic D octrine: P aul H. N itze and
the Soviet Challenge, (Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1984); Joseph M. Siracusa,
Rearm ing fo r the C old War: P aul H. N itze, the H-Bomb, and the O rigins o f a Soviet First
Strike (Los Angeles, C A Center for the Study o f Armament and Disarmament, 1983);
John Lamberton Harper, Am erican Visions o f Europe, op. cit.'. Strobe Talbott, The
M asters o f the Game ', James A. Bill, George Ball: B ehind the Scenes in US Foreign
P olicy (New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, 1997); Steven M. Neuse, D avidE .
Lilienthal, The Journey o f an Am erican Liberal (Knoxville, TN: University o f Tennessee
Press, 1996); David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State D epartm ent Years (New
York, NY: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1976); Gordon A Craig & Francis L. Loewenheim,
eds.. The D iplom ats 1939-1979 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). For an
examination o f the pattems o f institutional arrangements between the National Security
Council and other governmental agencies, see Morton Halperin, B ureaucratic P olitics and
Foreign Policy.
The ‘cold warriors’ have produced a wealth of reminiscences, including: George Ball,
The Past H as A nother Pattern', Dean Acheson, Power and D iplom acy (Cambridge, M A
Harvard University Press, 1959), Present a t the Creation (New York, NY: Norton, 1969);
George Kennan, Sketches From a L ife (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1989) and
M em oirs (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1967); Paul H. Nitze, From H iroshim a to
Glasnost (New York, NY: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989); McGeorge Bundy, D anger and
Survival.
*” Fred Kaplan The W izards o f Arm ageddon (Stanford, C A Stanford University Press,
1983); Robert J. Lifton and Greg Mitchell Hiroshima in Am erica (New York, NY:
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even though many scientists warned of the dangers o f atomic experimentation, the armed
forces asserted, and received, primacy. The Navy’s Operation Crossroads and the Army’s
insistence upon a continental testing site resulted in the exposure o f many participants and
unwary civilians to radioactive fallout through the I940’s and I950’s. Because of policies
that demanded secrecy at all costs, however, much o f the information o f the early period
o f testing came to light only through litigation.^

Putnam & Sons, 1995); On cognitive problems between scientists and bureaucrats, see H.
Peter Metzger The A tom ic Establishm ent (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972).
Less critical, but illuminating information concerning the foundational scientists and their
philosophies, both before and after the bomb, is found in a series o f volumes developed by
the American Institute o f Physics, particularly Rudolph E. Peierls' A tom ic H istories
(Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics, 1997). A. Compton, Atom ic Quest (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1956) is a good overview o f the US program. See
Andrew Brown’s analysis o f the British influence upon atomic science: The Neutron and
the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
“ Shields Warren, The Pathology o f Ionizing R adiation (Springfield, IL: Thomas
Publishers, 1961); Allan Favish, “Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran” H astings Law
Journal 32: 1 (1981); A Department of Defense document: Samuel Glasstone and Philip
J. Dolan, The E ffects o f N uclear Weapons (Washington D C .: 1977); A Pubhc Health
Service report. R adiological H ealth Data (Washington D C.: 1961); The Environmental
Protection Agency’s R adiological Impact Caused by Em issions o f Radionuclides into A ir
in the U nited States: A Prelim inary Report (Washington D C : 1979) John Fuller, The
Day We Bom bed Utah (New York, NY: New American Library, 1984); H. Ball, Justice
Downwind (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986); R_ Miller Under the Cloud
(New York, NY: Collier MacMillan, 1986); Phillip Fradkin, Fallout, an Am erican
Nuclear Tragedy (Tucson, AZ: University o f Arizona Press, 1989); Jonathan Weisgall,
Operation Crossroads (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994);Stewart L. UdaU,
(New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1994); A. Titus, Bombs in the
Backyard (Reno, NV: University o f Nevada Press, 1986).
US House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations o f the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, The Forgotten G uinea Pigs—A R eport on the Health
E ffects o f Low -Level Radiation Sustained as a R esult o f the N uclear W eapons Testing
Program 96th Congress, 2d session, committee print 96-IFC 53, August 1980. US House
Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power o f the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, Am erican N uclear Guinea Pigs: Three D ecades o f Radiation Experim ents on
U.S. Citizens, 99th Congress, 2d session, committee print 99-NN, November 1986.
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Certainly, the literature surrounding atomic weapons development and testing
provides a depth of understanding often missing in other historical fields where
multidisciplinary cooperation is less necessary. The intricacies o f radiation and the
peculiarities o f its developers and experimenters have forced historians to slip into
unfamiliar scientific territory to understand (at least a little) o f the physical and social
sciences.®^ While the foregoing summary illustrates that commentary on the cold war
crowds library shelves, those volumes are insuflhcient to answer the very basic questions
that drive this study. The impotence o f existing material as tools that might uncover the
reasons for, and consequences of, fallout is, perhaps, a problem o f barriers within the field
o f history itself where intradisciplinary studies are conspicuously absent.
American historians customarily focus upon one field (diplomacy, politics, culture,
society, science) during a single time period (the Progressive Era, World War n, the cold
war) and few feel entitled, or comfortable, enough to peer over their self-imposed walls. I
suggest that these strictures, precluding as they do a progression fi’om field to field or
period to period, limit not only research, but even the ability to conceptualize a model that
would emphasize practice—a component o f governance with a distinct lack o f respect for

See, for example, the anthropological studies o f the atomic weapons development;
Hugh Gusterson, N uclear R ites (Berkeley, CA; University o f California Press, 1996) on
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory ; D. Rosenthal, A t the H eart o f the Bomb (Reading, MA:
Addison Wesley, 1990) on Los Alamos; Nigel Gilbert and NCchael Mulkay, Opening
Pandora's Box: A Sociological A nalysis o f Scientists ’D iscourse (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984). See also Helen Caldicott, M issile E nvy ^ e w York, NY:
Bantam Books, 1986); Hilgaitner, Bell, O ’Connor, Nukespeak, N uclear Language,
Visions and M indset (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1982).
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academic specialty. Thus, most interpreters rely upon a macroscopic paradigm,
compounding and molding the matrix o f cold war issues and institutions into a narrative
form too often reliant upon the articulation of governmental policy. Clearly these
explanations, though heuristic, are patently insuflScient. None manage to situate the
problem o f radioactive fallout at its source. This analysis, therefore, leans upon traditional
scholarship yet rejects the traditional explanations and barriers; and, alternatively, tracks
the chain o f negligence back to its source. By following the microscopic trail o f
determinative factors throughout the broader macroscopic field, this study locates the
source o f atomic governance—the trajectory and coalescence o f institutional practice and
behavior—that ultimately must bear responsibility for the hazardous nature o f the nation’s
atomic testing program.
Since anti-Communist ideology drove institutional development, this examination
will first explore the ways that the National Security Act thematized the development o f
the postwar bureaucracy, and discuss the influence o f individuals upon the development
and transformation o f national policy during the early cold war period (Chapter Two).
Once the philosophical base of the postwar period is established, this review will step back
in time to follow the chronological development o f certain institutional practices that
characterized atomic testing. The Manhattan Project (Chapter Three) laid the foundation
for a pattern o f atomic secrecy which continues to this day. Media manipulation joined
internal secrecy and scientific manipulation in a decidedly unholy alliance during 1946s
Operation Crossroads. Some scientists, alarmed because those testing activities
threatened the health and safety o f workers and civilians, tried to intervene, but were
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shunted aside in favor o f those scientists willing to unconditionally cooperate with the
government schemes (Chapter Four). Though Congress mandated civilian control of
atomic energy with its Atomic Energy Act, the military exerted enormous influence upon
the direction o f atomic development and experimentation and Chapter Five illustrates that
the military showed complete disregard for not only the Atomic Energy Commission itself
but also vital health and safety considerations. Finally, Chapter Six shows how the
congruence o f extreme internal and external security measures, the egregious distortion o f
information, and the manipulation o f scientists and misapplication o f science played out in
Southern Nevada with the advent o f continental testing; and, additionally, how those
practices contributed to the hazardous national dispersal o f radioactive fallout, causing (I
argue) illness and death.
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CHAPTER n

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The fa lco n carmot hear the falconer;
Thingsfa ll apart; the centre cannot hold;
M ere anarchy is loosed upon the w orld.. .
W illiam Butler Yeats

Yeats wrote “The Second Coining” before World War I’s dead and wounded had
been tallied, but its message is universal, disturbingly echoing passages from Thucydides’
ancient account o f the Peloponnesian W ar as well as the torment o f Londoners barraged
by the Blitz. ‘ Warfare is one o f those curious features branded upon human existence that

^ The motivations and consequences o f warfare, even those separated by thousands o f
years, justify the comparison. The Peloponnesian War began in 431 be and, through the
eyes o f Thucydides, is an autopsy o f an archaic power struggle littered with hoplites,
triremes, seiges and plague. Thucydides’ account o f the battle between democracy and
oligarchy betrays the tangled roots o f imperialism and illustrates the more human (and
inhumane) repercussions when states assert their superiority. : “. . the strong do what
they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
A revolution on Corcyra broke out during the fifth year of the war, “Death thus raged
in every shape; and, as usually happens at such times, there was no length to which
violence did not g o .. some were even walled up in the temple o f Dionysus and died
there.” 111:81-82. Thucydides, The H istory o f the Peloponnesian War, (London: The
Guernsey Press, 1993), V :89,111:81-82.
Beseiged Londoners sought sanctuary in bomb shelters, not temples. In June and July o f
1944 at least 100 bombs a day fell on London, killing (on average) one person per bomb.
The bombs could be extremely efficient-one demolished four square blocks, another 100
buildings. Londoners learned to estimate the danger by listening to the whistling “engine”
o f the bomb, which stopped just before it met its target. Before long though, even this
technique proved unreliable because the Germans soon altered the bombs and set them to
glide for varying distances before contact L ife July 24, 1944 19-21.
46
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encompasses immutable characteristics with kaleidoscopic variation. Each war, say the
chroniclers, rests in its own individual crypt, neatly segregated by era, scale and
technology; yet a single crimson niche cradles the poets’ ageless and seamless ribbon o f
honor, bloodshed, and mothers’ tears. B ut the perspectives o f scholars and artists meet at
a vanishing point: both have always agreed that wars end—people heal, and though
changes often follow, everyday cares slowly replace the anxieties fostered by insecurity.
World W ar II shattered that tradition. Its end hardly lived up to the expectations
o f a weary nation; indeed, tickertape still littered Times Square when Americans realized
that the atom bomb might just have sealed a devil’s bargain.^ A year after Japanese
surrender, a pollster asked a 67-year old Virginia farmer whether an atomic bomb would
hit the US, he replied “I couldn’t tell you. Afeered it will.”^
Even in the midst o f postwar elation and prosperity, millions shared the Virginia
farmer’s lingering “feer” o f the bomb, and emotions whirled as Americans emerged from

^ US society in the postwar period is too often characterized as a euphoric land o f
prosperity. Paul Boyer, on the other hand, offers a compelling alternative analysis o f this
new dimension in American life. “In the immediate post-Hiroshima period, one might
speculate . . Americans [downplayed] their atomic-bomb fears. . But as the wartime
climate faded. . .they may have become more willing to express openly the deep anxiety
that many cultural observers insisted was present from the beginning.” “This primal fear
o f extinction cut across all political and ideological lines, from the staunchly conservative
Chicago Tribune, which wrote bleakly o f an atomic war that would leave Earth ‘a barren
waste, in which the survivors o f the race will hide in caves or live among ruins’. . t o . . the
New R epublic’s. . vision o f conflict that would ‘obliterate all the great cities o f the
belligerents.. .[leaving only] scattered remnants of humanity living on the periphery o f
civilization.’” B y The B om b's E arly L ight, 15, 24.
Even before the bombing o f Nagasaki, the Arizona Republic reported that the nation’s
capital “is more apprehensive than jubilant over the terrifymg success.. the entire city is
pervaded by a kind o f sense o f oppression. . and fear.” A rizona R epublic, August 8, 1945,
6.
^ Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. and Sylvia Eberhart, American O pinions on W orld A ffairs (New
York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1948), 67.
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war facing a world o f new problems—horror at the inhumanity o f the industrialized
Holocaust, terror-tinged pride for the bomb that ended the war with Japan, and
compassion toward Europe’s displaced and hungry/ Domestic uncertainties joined these
concerns, but in a world where assembly-line genocide competed for first place on an
updated list o f depravity with the potential for wholesale atomic destruction, isolationism
offered no solution/ President Truman and Congress developed a novel strategy to deal
with a far more “modem” and fiightening world than the one that existed prior to the war.
The National Security Act, through its executive advisory component, the National
Security Council, built a framework designed to secure America’s superiority in the
international realm and (though unintentionally) cast the emotive nature o f the postwar
period into its structure. This is not to say that the visceral has ever been absent from the
governments o f men (the “seven deadly sins” have always been particularly popular) but
suggests, instead, that in the face o f widespread unease the Act marks a not-so-subtle
adjustment o f governmental policy; permanent mobilization.
Prior to World War I, national security remained a seemingly organic, function o f
government—its posture chiefly one o f economic defense, its implications and

* The nation needed no impassioned pleas to support its European fiiends, for the hearts
o f Americans went out to Europe’s suffering people before the full extent o f hardship
became known. In a June 1945 poll, 85% o f Americans agreed to continued rationing and
70% volunteered to even more extensive food rationing in the interests o f feeding Europe;
57% assented that a two-year extension o f domestic rationing to aid Europe’s hungry was
appropriate. P ublic Opinion Q uarterly, Summer 1945, 248.
^ As early as 1942, Truman said that the war was America’s opportunity to solidify its
international relationships; “That German peace offensive worries me. I f Britain were to
run out on us, or if China should suddenly collapse, w e’d have all that old isolation fever
again and another war in twenty years. We must take this one to its conclusion and
dictate peace terms from Berlin and Tokyo.” Harry S. Truman, letter to Bess, April 30,
1942, Robert H. Ferrell, ed.. D ear B ess (New York, NY: Norton, 1983) 474.
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consequences unseen and unconsidered by ail but an handful. International bonds
strengthened throughout the first half o f the century, though inconsistently, and an
awareness of the nation as a member o f a larger community developed gradually as
American participation globalized WWI and escalated when the Great Depression spread
like a bacillus throughout the world’s developed nations. Yet, even as the domestic
economic problems and New Deal solutions caused the nation to retreat inward, brittle
European powers and politics again demanded American involvement. By the end o f
World War H, the future held uncertain, nightmarish, and unparalleled possibilities. A
bundle o f motivations far more abstract and primal than economic protectionism and
support of allies shoved national security from its defense-centered perch onto a higher
plane o f recognition, consideration, and participation.*

* Ronald Steel holds Walter Lippmann and his 1943 book US Foreign P olicy: Shield o f
the Republic responsible for the ideological development o f the National Security Council.
Lippmann argued for policies based upon a calculation o f a “national interest.” Dependent
upon the anticipation and neutralization o f potential dangers, national interest was limited
only by the reach o f national power.
Steel offers an alternative, and enticing, explanation for the emotional nature o f postwar
decision-making based upon international power relationships. Since “the perimeter
expands in relation to the amount o f power available” security is “unmoored” and
“becomes a function o f power and an aspect o f psychology. . It is not a specific reality,
and it does not exist entirely in sp ace.. . It is an operating mechanism, and at the same
time an abstraction.” He suggests that national security is too often confused with
defense; “defense is a policy, national security is an attitude; defense is precise, national
security is difiuse; defense is a condition, national security is a feeling.” “A New Realism”
W orld Policy Journal, Summer 1997, 1.
The “top-down” model by Steel fails to consider, however, that the president and
congress additionally relied upon (emotional) national support in order to construct the
National Security Act and Council. See Meg Jacobs’ analysis that popular support was
crucial to policy implementation and its eventual success or failure. “How About Some
Meat? Consumption Politics and State Building from the Bottom Up, 1941-1946”
December, 1977.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

50

With the National Security Act, the nation’s leaders hoped to anchor America
firmly (and safely) within the postwar world through a dramatic restructuring of the
nation’s inefficient and outdated administrative structure. Truman claimed that the “only
new thing new in the world is history you don’t know” but history failed Truman—World
War n had unleashed a potent whirlwind for which there seemed no precedent—the
features and problems o f the new world had rendered the past a mute companion.^ A

^ Merle Nfiller PIcnn Speaking (New York, NY: Norton, 1974) 69. A voracious reader,
Truman claimed that even as a child he almost always had his “nose stuck in a book.. a
history book mostly” and saved dimes to buy a copy o f Plutarch’s Lives. History seems to
have functioned as a guide for Truman, and he credited Plutarch for helping him overcome
a political opponent who reminded him of Nero. “And I noticed some o f those same traits
in old Stark. . T he only thing new in the world is the history you don’t know.” Idem. 9
and passim .
The ways that leaders have used, and misused, history in the twentieth century are
exemplified by Richard Neustadt and Ernest May. The authors suggest that decision
makers, with few exceptions, fail to use history to its best advantage—to interpret
influences and predict outcomes. Using case studies in this work designed as a training
manual for public and private policy makers, t h ^ praise some individuals as exceptionally
cognizant o f the history embedded within individuals, institutions, and nations. General
George Marshall was one o f these “gifted” leaders who thought in a time stream, he
“looked not only to the coming year but well beyond, and with a clear sense o f the long
past from which those futures would come.” Thinking in Time (New York, NY: The Free
Press, 1986), 248.
The assumption that Truman and other national leaders made use o f history when
possible (for good or ill) is, perhaps, a bit naive and/or simplistic. In a recent work on the
development o f American social science, Dorothy Ross argues that the American ethos
itself has seriously constrained historicism. Although Ross focuses on the profession o f
history and not on those lay individuals who might rely upon (or simply enjoy) history,
her work illustrates that the atom bomb and other transitional aspects that accompanied
World War II may have only reinforced traditional American notions o f superiority and the
nation’s “natural” tendency for progress. As she points out in her study o f early
twentieth-century social science development, American history is just now breaking out
o f the confines of a conventional liberal interpretational mode that focused upon American
exceptionalism and was infused with nationalism. Under these broad interpretations,
progress always accompanied transition and rendered historical comparison relatively
useless: “Flux was contained by the liberal shape o f American society, by economic,
social, or political systems that rendered conflict harmonious, business downturns
temporary, and progress likely.” 388. Though disenchanted by the overuse o f theory.
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novel and ambitious undertaking, the National Security Act promised to streamline the
armed forces, coordinate policy decisions, and institute consistency throughout
governmental agencies.
Historians and political scientists have not ignored the National Security Act;
indeed, the literature is replete with analyses o f its organization, function and production.*
Charting the waves and patterns o f currents that flowed out o f the National Security
Council, these analyses emphasize international relationships and/or equally broad,
domestic dynamics. In the process, however, they have ignored a dangerous undertow.
As the authorizing vehicle for atomic weapons development and testing, the
National Security Act was a vital component o f postwar governance. Officially, it
provided organizational structure and its associated Council coordinated the foreign policy
directives of the executive. Though the Act’s creation was clearly a response to
governmental inefficiency and international realities, an examination of its official roles and
intentions carmot explain the myriad behaviors that controverted the Act’s intent. First, it
did not streamline government activity, it bred inefficiency. Second, although
solidification of national interests against external foes underpinned its creation, close
examination reveals motivations and assumptions strategically designed to enhance

“New” historians motivated Ross, leading her “to regret that so much o f twentieth-century
social science is historically vacuous and to see how scientism and liberal ideology have
interacted to enforce political and ahistorical constraints on social thinking.” The O rigins
o f Am erican Social Science (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,
1991) xxi. In this regard, see also NCchael H. Hunt’s critique on the state o f “state”
history and twentieth-century diplomatic historiographers, “The Long Crisis in Diplomatic
lEstory” America in the W orld, Michael J. Hogan, ©d., (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
* See note 60, supra.
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internal positions rather than achieve superiority in the face of external contingencies.
These contradictions, then, suggest an unofficial, subterranean matrix o f influence.
An examination o f practices at the highest level of government decision-making
requires a focus on individual activity and influences, and the following analysis gestures
toward the personal rather than the political.^ By spotlighting internal relationships and
comparing the ideology o f George Kennan and Paul Nitze, the two most pivotal
individuals in postwar American foreign policy, this inquiry explores the unique
motivations that stimulated the Act’s creation and the assumptions that controlled its
operation. This study proposes that the anxieties o f the war years and its immediate
aftermath both initiated and infiltrated America’s postwar organizational structure, and
when embedded, those same anxieties limited ideological shifts and severely circumscribed
the potential for innovation or modification.
Inherent within the National Security Council were two interlocking beliefs. First,
despite a traditional reluctance to maintain a high level o f peacetime preparedness,
postwar America required a strong military presence; and, second, that the continuation o f
the nation’s vitality required coordination o f its military, political and economic interests.
More importantly, however, it rationalized the potential terror o f atomic obliteration and
directed it at an ever-present “enemy.” The Act shaped postwar institutions and solidified
the peculiar characteristics o f World W ar II into a governmental fi’amework that
innoculated peacetime policy and practice with an urgent, militaristic, imperative. The

®This is, admittedly, a convenient distinction for organizational purposes and does not
dispute the fact that politics and personality are indivisibly bound.
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National Security Council institutionalized the vulnerability o f America, arguably the most
powerful nation in the world. It institutionalized fear.**

* * *

During World W ar II when Roosevelt defined America’s strategic fi-ontier at the
Rhine River, he broadly signalled America’s intention to safeguard not only her borders,
but her international interests and relationships.**

By the end o f the war, the nation’s

“interest” became irretrievably tied to “survival” as the realities o f modem warfare became

*° In a nationwide poll, 85% o f Americans agreed that the bombing o f Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was a “good thing”, but 27% also believed that “experimenting in smashing
atoms will cause an explosion which will destroy the world.” Public O pinion Quarterly,
Fall 1945, 385.
In 1946 (before Operation Crossroads), a survey for the Committee on the Social and
Economic Aspects o f Atomic Energy found that 64% of a sample answered “yes” to the
question “Do you think there is a real danger that atomic bombs will ever be used against
the United States?” O f those, 29% believed “the danger that you or any members o f your
immediate family will ever be killed by an atomic bomb” to be “fairly great” or “very
great.” Hazel Erskine “The Polls; Atomic Weapons and Nuclear Energy” P ublic Opinion
Q uarterly 21, 1963, 107.
In May, 1946, 72% those participating in a nationwide poll believed that a world
organization should pass and enforce a law so that no country could make atomic bombs,
including the US The same poll found that 56% of those believed that the same world
organization should enforce the destruction o f a ll existing atomic bombs, even though the
US possessed all bombs in existence. 118. Asked whether he thought there was a danger
that atomic bombs would be used against the US, a 67-year old Virginia farmer said; ‘1
couldn’t tell you. Afeered it will.” Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. and Sylvia Eberhart,
Am erican O pinions on W orld A ffa irs (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1969) 67.
Paul Boyer asserts that scientists (and other social groups) played upon the very natural
fears o f Americans and utilized every possible method to place their agendas before a
vulnerable public. ‘T h e emotions they worked so mightily in 1945-1947 to keep alive and
intensify created fertile psychological soil for the ideology of American nuclear superiority
and an all-out crusade against communism. . .their rhetoric of fear continued to echo
through the culture, to be manipulated by other people pursuing other goals. The
scientists offered one avenue o f possible escape fi’om atomic fear; Truman offered another.
Truman won.” B y the B om b's E arly Light, 106.
** See Crabb & Mulcahy, Am erican N ational Security.
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all too apparent. Oceans and mountain ranges lost their status as strategic boundaries; the
atomic bomb obliterated its targets along with those barriers—rendering them insignificant
features on the world’s map.*^ Technology had dissolved America’s traditional reliance
upon its relative geographic isolation. When potential destruction was limited only by the
range o f the B-29 Superfortress, the notion of national security achieved primacy, but not
without profound domestic consequences.*^
The long-standing sibling rivalry between the Army and Navy reared its ugly head
when Truman proposed a re-organization o f the military to accommodate the new reality.
Congress and the Army backed the unification o f the military, but the Navy was less
enthusiastic. *“* Sensing that the Army and its Air Corp held the high ground (owing to
General Marshall’s successes and the delivery system o f the new atomic bomb) the Navy
cast a wide and persuasive net, claiming boldly that the Army’s plan would “weaken

*^ This reality constituted a fiightening new feature in the postwar world, and was
emphasized by Truman when he submitted the NATO treaty to the Senate on April 12,
1949: “. . The world has grown too small. The oceans to our east and west no longer
protect us fi’om the reach o f brutality and aggression.” Cited in The Am erican Foreign
Policy, Ernest R. May, ed., (New York, NY: G. Braziller, 1963).
** Radiation wasn’t the only invisible danger in the postwar world. The Superfortress
amazed official spectators and reporters with a tale rivaling The E m peror’s New Clothes.
In a demonstration, “flying so high it was out o f sight” and carrying a supersonic, armor
piercing bomb “too fast to be seen or heard” the government “kept secret” the bomb’s
mission and effectiveness. New York Times, July 24, 1947, 6.
*'* Though enchanted with the potential o f the bomb to revolutionize warfare, the military
faced an uncertain future in the wake o f World War II as more than two-thirds o f
individuals in a poll agreed that the atomic bomb made a large army and navy unnecessary.
Public O pinion Q uarterly, Fall 1945, 384.
In June, 1946, Forrestal threatened to resign should the president back the “mass playsteam roller tactics o f the Army.” Truman admitted that Forrestal’s “misgivings” had
foundation and would “see that any such tactics were not successful.” The D airies o f
Jam es Forrestal, “Meeting with President” 19 June 1946, 169. See also Lord, The
Presidency and the M anagem ent o f N ational Security, (New York, NY: Free Press,
1988), 69.
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civilian control.. .[leading] to expanded military influence throughout American life.” **
The Navy finally acquiesced when Secretary o f the Navy James Forrestal agreed to serve
as the new Secretary o f Defense at Truman’s request.** With the Navy’s objections laid to
rest. Congress finally reached a compromise and passed the National Security Act on July
26, 1947.*’
The Act signaled the beginning o f a new era. ‘The most sweeping reorganization
o f national security policy” created a Department o f Defense, the National Security
Council to advise the President on all matters relating to national security (foreign or
domestic), the Joint Chiefs o f Staff to represent the armed forces and provide mihtary
advice, and the Central Intelligence Agency.** The National Security Act, however, did
more than attempt the coordination o f previously-fi-agmented governmental components—

** Crabb & Mulcahy, 12. See also Chapter 4, infra., for the Navy’s battle for vitality.
** James Forrestal provided a link between the Navy and the philosophy o f consolidation.
In 1945, Forrestal commissioned the Eberstadt Report that suggested a military council
would avoid repetition o f FDR’s haphazard strategic maneuvering. In a meeting held
before the Japanese surrender, Forrestal and Eberstadt envisioned that centralized policy
should eminate from a Cabinet-level, bifurcated board that would create and define
national policy (not surprisingly composed o f a joint State-War-Navy contingent) and
maintain information on military resources for war. James F orrestal D iaries, 87; See also
Lord, The Presidency artd the M anagem ent o f N ational Security, 69.
The New York Times hailed Forrestal’s apointment as “the best guarantee that could be
given the unification o f the services will be carried out intelligently and efficiently. . It has
been painfully evident all through the long hearings and debate in Congress that there are
many in the Navy who still distrust the whole idea.” July 27, 1947, 8.
*’ National Security Act o f 1947, US Congress, US Statutes a t Large, 80th Congress, 1st
sess., 1947, vol. 61.
** The Act did not eliminate duplication o f intelligence, for the Department o f State, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force continued to maintain their own intelligence services.
See, for example, the CIA’s “Review o f the World Situation” dated 10 March 1948, Harry
S. Truman Papers, Truman Library “President’s Secretary File,” microfilm collection,
Georgetown University Library.
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it entrenched a military component into all presidential decisions and symbolically affirmed
the worst postwar fears o f Americans.
The illusory nature o f a military unified (and more efficient) under a Secretary o f
Defense shielded the duplicitous reality o f a new system that did not temper, but rather
accomodated, long-standing competition.*^ Eager to avoid controversies in his new
position, Forrestal sought conciliation, but thereby unavoidably rewarded the inter-service
competition. Forrestal undoubtedly assuaged some of the anxiety the branches held
toward the new system, but the multiplicity engengered by the new Secretary’s policy o f
appeasement harbored implications that ranged fi"om the ludicrous to the disasterous.
During a 1948 meeting, two agenda items found the Navy nearly swamped with
the potential superiority o f the other forces. Fearing Soviet insurgency in Greece’s civil
war, the Council discussed alternative methods to determine the extent o f Soviet
involvement.^ Secretary o f the Navy John L. Sullivan ridiculed a State Department
proposal that all branches share in an inteUigence survey, claiming “that the Council could

*^ Charles E. Neu has characterized the military struggles as “open political warfare” and
claims that even though Congress strengthened o f the Secretary o f Defense and reduced
the authority o f the military in 1949, “parochialism.. .remained strong.” “The Rise o f the
National Security Bureaucracy” in The New American State, Galambos, ed., 88.
’* Greece’s civil war provided the perfect opportunity for an early Cold War scrimmage
between capitahsm and communism. The CIA reported in September 1947 that the
Greek government was in danger o f falling because of Soviet sponsored communist
guerrillas, and posited that “At any time US armed intervention may be required to
prevent its collapse and to restore the situation” thus salvaging a strategic Eastern
Mediterranean presence and preventing “profound psychological repercussions throughout
Western Europe and the Near and M ddle East.” “Review o f the World Situation as it
Relates to the Security o f the United States” dated September 26, 1947. Harry S.
Truman Papers, “President’s Secretary File,” microfilm collection, Georgetown
University Library.
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get all the information it wanted from Admiral Sherman without any formal action.” ^*
The Council rebuffed Sullivan’s offer and subsequently introduced an item concerning air
intelligence. Forrestal anticipated Sullivan’s resistance and quickly difrused the escalating
confrontation. Stating that he had already issued a directive to the CIA that gave the Air
Force the primary responsibility, Forrestal immediately announced that he had decided to
modify his earlier decision and protect the Navy’s interests in the field o f air intelligence.’^
Clearly this conciliatory behavior undermined one o f the purposes o f the Act; efficiency.
When applied to atomic weapons development, the duplication o f responsibility
strategically employed by the Army, Navy and Air Force in the early years o f
consolidation under the, new Secretary o f Defense resulted in a multiplication o f testing
and risk.’’ The compromising Forrestal established an arena through which the military
might maneuver for position to solidify its own authority; yet, the continuing influence of
the armed forces was also contingent upon the nation’s emerging philosophies that were
intended to secure US superiority and European stability.
The atom bomb decreed an urgent investment in the successful implementation o f
foreign policy, and it is an excellent vehicle through which to explore the effect of
individuals (and personality) upon national policy. Dismayed by Roosevelt’s a d hoc

’* Minutes o f the 5th Meeting o f the National Security Council, January 13, 1948, 5 Harry
S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, “President’s Secretary File,” microfilm
collection, Georgetown University Library. Sullivan’s intransigence eventually failed him
and he resigned in April, 1949 when his plans for a new fiush-deck carrier were scrapped.
See Hammond “Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers” 'm Am erican C ivil-M ilitary D ecisions,
Harold Stein, ed., (University, AL: University o f Alabama Press, 1963).
^ Ib id .
” See Chapter 4 for an example o f the Navy’s contribution to atomic testing and Chapter
6 for the Army’s role in continental testing at the Nevada Test Site, irtfra.
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diplomacy and disregard o f the State Department during the war; and, in light o f perceived
Soviet designs in Europe, Truman tried to establish a coherent and effective foreign policy
during the postwar years.’"* US policy, Truman believed, should reflect a schematic
expression o f behavior developed pursuant to an objective and unified sense o f purpose.
This reassuring plan may describe the intent o f policy formation; however, it bears little
relationship to the articulation or expression o f policy in the years following WWH when
the “objective” became an ephemeral manifestation, transformed by both personalities and
politics with little reward or consideration afforded irmovation or perception.
A strengthened State Department and National Security Council fostered the
illusion (among citizens and Congress) that the policies adopted with regard to the
deteriorating US/Soviet relationship were joint and consentual endeavors. To all
appearances, the new cooperative venue would stifle the misconceptions o f individuals yet
encourage successfial planning through intelligent and inventive solutions forged
(purposefully and necessarily) through reasoned and enlightened consideration. The truth
is that the postwar policy o f the Truman administration was only notionally a committee
generated effort. But we cherish our myths, and the fantasies that spring fi’om them were
as comforting during the early atomic age as they were to the throngs who carried gifts to
the oracles at Delphi or waited patiently while Apollo’s priests interpreted the entrails of
sacrificial bulls ’* Behind the phantasm o f institutional decision-making based upon an

’"*The arena o f foreign policy is a good example o f the notional characteristics o f a more
“efficient” postwar government. By 1949, twenty-one different agencies maintained
overseas posts. Neu in Galambos,
88.
’* This is not to suggest that the leaders and public o f the Truman era (or the ancient
Greeks and Romans) were necessarily “primitive,” unsophisticated or unenlightened; but
to emphasize that during the various (and on-going) crises o f the post-World War n
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expanded information-gathering system, consideration, compromise and consensus,
postwar US/Soviet policy was driven by a handful o f individuals as prone to human error,
inflexibility, and personal motivations as the ancient oracles and soothsayers.
The content o f the National Security Council’s US/Soviet policies was highly
dependent upon the philosophies of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff,
particularly its directors. During the scope o f this examination, George Kennan and Paul
H. Nitze were responsible for the development o f America’s positioning against its former
ally and future nemises, the Soviet Union. Both Kennan and Nitze shared the view that
communism and capitalism were incompatible and both believed that, given such extreme
polarity, the challenges posed by the Soviet Union required active resistance. They
differed, however, on the form that resistance should take. Since the crucial shifts in US
policy during this period may be traced upon the paths carved by Kennan and Nitze, a
study o f their personalities and motivations is essential.

* * *

B ut the towers o f the K rem lin cast a long shadow .. .the more I see o f the life o f this
intem ational society the m o rel am convinced th a t it is the shadows rather than the
substance o f things that move the hearts, a n d sw cy the deeds, o f statesm en.
George F. Kennan, 1947^^
period, the belief that a small group o f individuals would choose wisely among a multitude
o f alternatives undoubtedly eased mounting anxiety. See Bourdieu, The Logic o f
P ractice, 93-97.
’* Kennan’s final lecture at the War College, M em oirs 1925-1950 (New York, NY:
Pantheon Books, 1967). George Kennan is often confused with his grandfather’s cousin,
the Russian scholar George Kennan, who wrote Siberia and the Exile System, published in
an abridged edition by the University o f Chicago in 1958, for which the subject o f this
examination wrote an introduction. A spiritual thread seems to link the two men who
shared a name and an appreciation for Russia—they were both bom on the same day o f the
year, played guitar, owned the same type o f sailboats, and both founded organizations to
assist Russian refugees. Idem . 8.
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In 1947 when Marshall became Secretary o f State he chose George Kennan to
head the State Department’s new Policy Planning Staff. Impatient with the weak
character o f committee-produced “policy papers,” Marshall appreciated Kennan’s
decisiveness and ability to clearly articulate his views. Kennan’s ideology soon permeated
postwar strategy.” He looked beyond Soviet “shadows” and investigated the motivations
o f Stalin’s Soviet Union, bringing to the fore his extensive knowledge o f the character o f
the Soviet Union and the aims o f Soviet communism. In addition, he developed and
promoted a postwar strategy intended to facUitate, in the absence of any cooperative
mechanism, the coexistence o f the two nations.
Kennan’s childhood provided excellent preparation for his later career. Shortly
after his birth in 1904, Kennan’s mother died and he was raised by his father, older sisters

” See May, op. cit. 5. For a compact description o f Kennan’s ideology and influence, see
Crabb & Mulcahy, Am erican N ational Security, particularly 67-72.
Walker is critical o f Kennan and claims that Kennan’s “Long Telegram” resulted in the
growth o f totalitarian methods at the expense o f democracies. It seems, however, that
Walker has failed to distinguish whether responsibility falls in Kennan’s lap, or in the laps
o f those who chose their own interpretation(s) based upon segments o f Kennan’s analysis
rather than one that Kennan designed as a philosophy rather than as a set o f unrelated
maxims.
Kennan’s personality is complexly illusive and Walker might have been too readily
influenced by Kennan’s unorthodox pre-war musings. In 1931 he wrote that the Soviets
were “unalterably opposed to our traditional system, there can be no possible middle
ground or compromise between the tw o .. .the two systems cannot even exist in the same
world unless an economic cordon is put around one or the other o f them.” Interestingly,
despite the fact that Kennan abhorred socialism, he was not enchanted by democracy,
either. In a 1938 book he wrote that “benevolent despotism” in America would relieve the
“shrill disorders o f democracy” and suggested that “immigrants, blacks, and “frivolous”
women should be denied suffrage. He was, however, not completely disenchanted with
women, and he praised his wife for “the rare capacity o f keeping silent gracefully. I have
never seen her disposition ruffled by anything resembling a mood.” Walker, The C old
War, 31-33.
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and eventually a austere stepmother in an “eighteenth-century puritan” household in
NClwaukee. He grew up resourceful and introverted, but gained an appreciation o f social
grace and deportment in a community imbued with a “tremendous universal respect for
respectability.”’* IBs father, a farmer turned successful lawyer, spoke French, German and
Danish, and when Kerman was four, temporarily installed the family in Kassel, Germany to
introduce his children to the “purest” German.’^ In Nfilwaukee, Kennan joined his father
in the rich German culture o f the Wisconsin city, and warm memories o f Europeans
comforted him at Princeton where he found himself “hopelessly and crudely Midwestern”
and uncomfortable with “Easterners.’”*
After graduating from Princeton in 1925, Kennan applied for one o f the few jobs
open in the new Foreign Service because he “did not know what else to do”^* and found
himself serving as vice consul in Hamburg by 1927. At ease with the language he had
learned at eight, curiosity and an adult recognition o f his own inadequacies drove him to
consider leaving his position for post-graduate study in the US. A supervisor thwarted
his planned resignation when he offered Kennan a chance to keep his post while pursuing
graduate work at the University of Berlin—if he would immerse himself in Russian
language and history. Kennan jumped at the offer, and while in Berlin met and married
Annelise Soerensen, a Norwegian woman. In 1933 when the United States officially
recognized the Soviet Union, Kennan and other specialists set up the Moscow Embassy,
where Kennan served until his removal in 1937. He returned to Moscow in 1944 and

’* Harper, Am erican Visions, 138.
Kennan, Memo/rj, 19.
’* /W ,9 - 1 0 .
31
Ib id , 17.
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remained until 1946, sympathetic toward the staggering sorrow o f the Russian people in
the wake o f the war and also perplexed by official Soviet attitudes towards himself and
others in the diplomatic corps who were so eager to serve in Russia—it was, he said
“doubly h a rd .. to find ourselves treated as though we were the bearers o f some species o f
the plague.’” ’ He harbored a profound distaste for Stalin’s regime and wrapped Stalinism,
communism, and the Russian people into three distinct packages, remaining hopeful that
Stalinism and its associated oppression would eventually fail.
Kennan attracted the attention o f Washington before Marshall became Secretary o f
State. Increasingly fiustrated with the seeming inability o f US leaders to set aside their
own assumptions and appreciate the fundamental differences between the tw o countries,
Kennan did not miss his first opportunity to try and enlighten the naive. Left temporarily
in charge when Ambassador W. Averell Harriman was away fi'om Moscow, Kennan used
the relatively-minor incident o f the USSR’s feilure to adhere to the directives o f World
Bank and Intemational Monetary Fund, launching a “pedagogical” diatribe at
W a sh in g to n .T h e “Long Telegram” springboarded Kennan’s career as well. Even as

” /b/dL, 190-195.
” Kennan’s “Long Telegram” was dated February 22, 1946, and in it he sought to correct
the “naive” behavior of Washington. “Here was a case where nothing but the whole
truth would do. They had asked for it. Now, by God, they would have it. . .1 composed a
telegram o f some eight thousand words—all neatly divided, like an eighteenth-century
Protestant sermon, into five separate parts. (I thought that if it went in five sections, each
could pass as a separate telegram and it would not look so outrageously long.)” Ibid.,
293.
Kennan had little patience for those he believed instituted short-sighted policies. He
later criticized the Truman Doctrine, and used it as an excuse to promote a “working
planning staff.. an organization for thinking” that he believed the Truman administration
lacked. Under Kennan’s influence, the Truman Doctrine “might have had a more general
and positive character in the public mind—not to resist Soviet aggression but to restore to
Greece and Turkey the stability that will make them independent enough to choose their
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Kennan received a Commendation from the State Department, Secretary o f the Navy
Forrestal ordered the now-famous paper reproduced and distributed to thousands of highlevel officers o f the armed forces, declaring it required reading/"* Kennan told
Washington what it wanted to hear; and, with the help of a supportive President and
Cabinet, he proposed policy that he believed would curtial the spread o f communism while
avoiding the complete alienation o f the Soviet Union/*
Kennan held that the Soviet Union represented the antithesis o f a liberal
democracy and that the only method available for the survival o f the Soviet’s totalitarian
state was to “undermine the general political and strategic potential o f major western
powers.’”* His proposed solutions to the threat o f the Soviets involved containment of

own governments and preserve their national integrities.” Kennan in “America’s Global
Planner,” New York Tim es M agazine, July 13, 1947.
""*Kennan, M em oirs, 295. Kennan had no way (at that time) o f knowing that the future
Secretary o f Defense, James Forrestal, had already commissioned a similar study through
Professor Edward F. Willett o f Smith College who had contributed to the Eberstadt
Report. Sending a copy o f “notes” for the study to Walter Lippman, Forrestal
acknowledged that a December article by Walter Lippman December article prompted the
study. Millis, ed., F orrestal D iaries, 128.
’* Kennan later admitted that timing, rather than a unique insight, stimulated the postive
response to his beliefs: T t was one o f those moments when official Washington, whose
states o f receptivity or the opposite are determined by subjective emotional currents as
intricately imbedded in the subconscious as those of the most complicated o f Sigmund
Freud’s erstwhile patients, was ready to receive a given message. . Six months earlier this
message would probably have been received in the Department o f State with raised
eyebrows and lips pursed in disapproval. Six months later, it would probably have
sounded redundant, a sort o f preaching to the convinced. This was true despite the fact
that the realities which it described were ones that had existed, substantially unchanged,
for about a decade, and would continue to exist for more than a half-decade longer.”
Kennan, Afemo/rj, 194-195.
’* Kennan “Long Telegram” cited in May, Am erican C old War Strategy, 3.
A favorable 1947 New York Times M agazine article entitled “America’s Global
Planner” characterized Kennan as something o f a renaissance man: “. . he has had twenty
years o f foreign service in western Europe, Portugal, the Baltic States and Soviet Russia,
he has not lost his enthusiasm for philosophy, and instinctively in his conversation he
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the Soviet sphere and a tactical informational campaign designed primarily to encourage
domestic support for the interception o f Soviet designs. Since popular sentiment toward
the Soviet Union had been influenced by the wartime alliance, American perceptions
needed to be shifted toward an alternative that affirmed the domestic threat o f Soviet
communism. Kennan also argued that the best weapon against Stalinist totalitarianism
was capitalism. Particularly since, to him, totalitarianism was only a temporary condition,
a “device of despair, arising from specific and particularly painful problems o f adjustment
at given stages in the development o f individual peoples.”” Though Kennan proposed a
military presence to “contain” the Soviet sphere, it would only be necessary until the
United States could prove the superiority o f capitalism as an economically superior model.
A united front composed o f domestic support, military readiness, and the prosperity
through capitalism, Kennan believed, would force a “break-up or the gradual mellowing of
Soviet power.’” *

keeps referring to first principles o f humanity and government. . .Plato’s ‘The Republic’
[is] a favorite o f h is.. . ” Highlighting the traits prized by Marshall, the article praised
Kennan for his steadfastness, a quality that may have resulted in his inability to shift gears
once Acheson replaced Marshall as Secretary of State. “Mr. Kennan’s knowledge,
temperament and character make him particularly well suited to a job that combines the
long point o f view with hard-headed thinking.” July 13, 1947.
Halperin discusses the problems faced by “ideological thinkers” such as Kennan when
circumstances change. “Staff men who have had a long period o f involvement in a
particular area and become committed to a doctrine. . tend to see all issues in terms o f a
particular value, to disregard conflicting information and roadblocks, and to press hard for
the particular solution which would support the dominant variable.” Halperin,
Bureaucratic Politics, 23-23.
” Atkinson, “America’s Global Planner” New York Times M agazine, July 13, 1947
38
[Kennan] “The Sources o f Soviet Conduct” Foreign A ffairs 25 (July 1947) 575576, 581-582.
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Devastation in postwar Europe presented the perfect opportunity for the
application o f Kennan’s strategy. When the guns fell silent, the wartom populace faced
yet another enemy as nature’s caprices stifled the 1946 harvest and brought on the worst
winter in living memory during 1946-47.” Compassion for millions suffering food and
fuel shortages lent vigor to intervention in European recovery. Since US support was
essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also to stifle communist influence in
marginalized countries, Marshall’s national campaign for the European aid package
efficiently accomodated the goals of the Kennan strategy for peaceful coexistence. In a
speech before the Aimual Conference o f Governors, Marshall warned that if the United
States did not help Western Europe reassert itself economically, they would “drift into the
Russian orbit.”"** Marshall claimed that his short speech was written on a plane to the
conference, but “with public opinion divided” its content was actually carefully crafted to
incorporate State Department philosophy into the minds o f the American public."**

Walker’s compact description o f the problem bears inclusion; “Even before a wave of
blizzards struck Britain in January, the government had been forced to cut coal supplies to
all industries by half. Unemployment rose to six millions, double the peak of the Great
Depression o f the 1930s, and electricity was limited to a few hours each day. Food
rationing was more severe that it had been during the war.” Walker, The Cold War, 47.
New York Times, July 15, 1947, 1.
"**Marshall was, after all, a graduate o f his Under Secretary’s crash course—Acheson’s
‘Shaping Public Policy 101.’ Shortly after his appointment and before a speech to the
National Press Club, Acheson suggested to Marshall that he work with an established text,
saying; “the Secretary o f State was never off the record, and that his speeches were never
directed to swaying an audience to a specific result, but to putting out ideas for thought at
home and abroad. It was important, therefore, to say exactly what one meant to say,
clearly—no more, no less. Substance was more important than manner o f delivery—within,
of course, reasonable limits.” Marshall demurred, preferring his informal method o f
relaying ideas situated only in his head. Confident o f his ability to effectively deliver a
speech without a text, he agreed that a small group o f aides, including Acheson, could
serve as a “jury” to assess his performance before the Press Club. Their verdict came as a
blow to the General (he was “as disappointed as a small boy”) and although he continued
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Although Marshall did finish the speech on the plane, it was a joint effort o f Marshall,
Kennan and Chip Bohlen, Marshall’s Special A ssistant/’ At Marshall’s request, both
advisers submitted independent speeches, and, in the meantime, the impatient Marshall
began one o f his own. Marshall merged the best o f each; and, without clearing his final
product with the President, took his case to the people."*"
Marshall’s speech outlined three points that formed the kernel o f America’s
ripening ideology of intemational influence: That communism posed an immediate threat
to the fi’ee world; and, that the public might often become confused with the issues
because the delicacy o f the situation required diplomatic phraseology which was often
unclear; and third, that despite the public’s “need to know,” much information could not
be divulged. Thus, American leaders required only immediate public support and faith."*"*

to argue that he believed his performance exemplary, Acheson told him “This was not the
way to put out policy proposals.. .1 reminded him that he had asked us for the
ungamished truth. . .sadly he agreed to the use o f texts.” Acheson, Present at the
Creation, 215.
"*’ Kennan, M em oirs, 342. Bohlen and Kennan were both Russian specialists, but Bohlen
had been schooled in Paris instead o f Berlin. “Intellectual and professional brothers”
Kennan praised Bohlen highly and proclaimed “no friendship has ever meant more to me
than his.” Idem ., 62.
"*’ Larry I. Bland, ed. George C. M arshall Interview s and Rem iniscencesfo r F orrest C.
Pogue (Lexington, Ky: Marshall Research Foundation, 1991) 559.
"*"*The speech itself is very clear. In an attempt to convince any fence-sitters, Marshall
played upon his audience’s sympathies and resurrected the ghost of the stmggling
American colonies. Marshall noted that details would have to wait because “studies” were
being made to bring out the facts; until then, those facts couldn’t be divulged: “. . peace
has its difficulties. . it is necessary that I be very careful in what I say publicly and when I
say it. I f it had been practicable for me to talk to you off the record and in great
confidence, there is much that I would like to discuss with you.” New York Times ‘T ext
o f Address by Marshall” July 15, 1947, 6.
American leaders increasingly relied upon “faith” as espoused by the Christian ethic
and subsumed it into nationalistic goals as the struggle against communism began to
resemble a medieval crusade. Harold E. Stassen (a Republican candidate in the
Presidential primary with Dewey) believed that religious feith was also necessary to avoid
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Kennan’s formal policy prescription went to President Truman as NSC 20/4, and in 1948
Congress rewarded Marshall for his convincing arguments and fully funded the European
aid package/^
Kennan incorporated into NSC 20/4 his belief that, over time, the Soviet Union
would abandon radical communism in favor of a less aggressive system based upon the
economic advantages o f a capitalist economy. He did not deny that military strength
might be necessary to protect free nations from Soviet takeover, but suggested that
“readiness” would sufiBce as a “deterrent” and as a “source o f encouragement” to friendly

w ar “It is a competition between the ideology o f materialism sponsored by the
Communists, which denied the fatherhood o f God. . and worships the things o f the earth
controlled by rulers o f men, as opposed to an ideology based on the fundamental concepts
o f our religious beliefs.” New York Times, July 24, 1947, 4.
Faith played an enormous role in the two most frightening features o f the early Cold
W ar communism and the bomb. The bomb was proof that America contained God’s
chosen people, and this belief tempered American fears of the atomic bomb, including
those o f the President, “enfolding” the bomb within the nation’s traditions. Truman asked
for guidance even as he announced the success o f the Hroshima weapon: “We thank God
that it has come to us, instead o f to our enemies; and we pray that H e may guide us to use
it in His ways and for iCs purposes.” Boyer, By the B om b's E arly Light, Ch. 18.
Kennan drafted the plan for European recovery and presented it to Marshall on May 23-justifiably proud o f this endeavor, Kennan claimed it “finally broke through the confusion
o f wartime pro-Sovietism, wishful thinking, anglophobia and self-righteous punitivism in
which our occupational policies in Germany had thus far been enveloped, and placed us at
long last on what was, and for six years remained, a constructive and sensible path.”
KjesmaiL, M em oirs, 335.
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nations.'*^ Kennan argued strenuously against policies that supported aggression against
the USSR, characterizing such viewpoints as the “sheerest nonsense.”^’
Kennan made a significant distinction between the ofiScial threat o f the Soviet state
and that posed by the Communist party, and it is this subtle (though critical) understanding
that supported his belief the Soviets posed (primarily) a political rather than a military
threat.'** Though disagreement abounds, a careful reading o f the Long Telegram and
consideration of Kerman’s recommendations support this assertion. Bolstered by
international Marxism, the Soviet state clung to a “dogma” influenced by Russia’s
traditional fear of invasion together w ith a centuries-long development o f insecurity based

^ Kerman ventured that military preparedness directed toward a “peak o f war danger”
would be less effective than a moderate force because “this type o f effort would be
effective only for the period toward which it was directed; for the subsequent period it
would have the reverse effect. If the Soviet leaders knew that we were undertaking a
defense effort of this nature (and it is certain that they would know it), they would be able
to plan for maximum military and political pressure at a date when our own military effort
might be expected to have subsided.” NSC 20/2 D(2)(a). See also, generally, NSC 20/2
Kennan’s forthright analysis was unambiguous: “To speak o f possibilities o f
intervention against USSR today, after elimination o f Germany and Japan and after
example o f recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces o f intolerance and
subversion “capitalist” world o f today is quite capable o f living at peace with itself and
with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity o f moderate Socialist
leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success o f their efforts to improve
conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given
chance to show what they can do.” NSC 20/4 (H).
'** There is academic disagreement on this issue, and this analysis generally follows the
conclusions o f John Lewis Gaddis in Strategies o f Contaiment, particularly Chapter 2. cf.
“The Question of Containment " F oreign A ffairs 56, no. 3 (January 1978) 430-1. For a
brief discussion of the controversy surrounding the scope and intent o f Kennan’s analysis,
including the 1947 criticisms by Lippman, see John Lamberton Harper, A m erican Visions
o f Europe, Chapter 5. Harper makes a distinction between “passive” and “active” military
components, and holds that Kennan’s containment strategy sought to establish an
American passive military subservient to political control; and thus, a more effective tool
o f diplomacy. Idem. 192-193.
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first upon fear o f invasion and secondly upon fear o f more modem organized societies
surrounding them.
For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration. . .And they
have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for
total destmction of rival power, never in compacts or compromises.'*®
According to this model, then, communism supported the power o f the Soviet state rather
than vice versa, and thus it was the ideology, and not the Soviet military, that demanded
American attention. Kennan’s proposed solution was not militaristic, but political. “We
must see that our public is educated. . .It must be done mainly by Government. . World
communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on domestic and diseased tissue.. .
5750

Upon Truman’s reelection, he appointed Dean Acheson to replace the sixty-nine
year old Marshall, and Kennan’s influence w a n e d . I D s replacement. Dean Acheson, had
distinguished himself over many years in Washington, beginning as under-Secretary of the
Treasury under Roosevelt. Though they had differences o f opinion, particularly over
Keynesianism, Roosevelt and Acheson held each other in high regard. Roosevelt had fired
Acheson in 1933 when he disagreed with FDR’s gold purchase program, but Acheson
remained staunchly supportive o f the President and operated behind the scenes as an

'*®G. F. Kennan “Long Telegram” in O rigins o f the C old War, Kenneth M. Jensen, ed.
20 - 21 .
Ibid. 30-31. Time has, perhaps, offered some support for Kennan’s analysis o f Soviet
motivations. A 1946 telegram prepared by Soviet Ambassador Mkolai Novikov stresses
America’s imperialistic tendencies, offensive military buildup and economic superiority as
threats to the Soviet Union itself. 3-16.
Marshall faced surgery to remove a kidney. McCullough, Truman, 725.
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“interventionist” throughout 1940 and 1 9 4 1 In 1941, the President proclaimed that
Acheson was “without question the ablest lawyer in Washington.”^"*
Like Kennan, Dean Acheson was a complex man whose sympathies did not always
seem to lie in twentieth-century America. An American “blade o f steel” with an English
Victorian mindset,^'* Acheson and his sister were raised in Connecticut, the “most English”
part o f America.

Acheson’s environment—his parents, governess, maid and cook were

all British subjects—resulting (quite naturally) in a tendency to exhibit both English
mannerisms and a certain anglophilia, characteristics that he found occasion to both
celebrate, and defend, during his lifetime.**
Acheson w as put on the 6 st track early and he did not stop until he had neared the
pinnacle. In 1903, at age ten, he entered Groton to prepare him forYale, and had earned
his law degree from Harvard by 1918. Armed with a recommendation from Felix
Frankfurter, Acheson began his career in 1919 at an envious level, as clerk for Louis
Brandeis.*^ In 1920, Acheson joined the firm o f Covinton and Burling, and soon traveled

Acheson assisted White House attorneys in defense o f Roosevelt against Congressional
opponents, and stayed in Washington, benefitting from long-standing connections.
Harper, .(4/nmcaw Visions, 258-259.
FDR memo to William Knudsen, et al., February 8, 1941, DAP-SL, cited in Harper,
Ibid., 260.
*“*Acheson, “Real and Imagined Handicaps o f Our Democracy in the Conduct o f Foreign
Afl&irs,” cited i n
236.
**7»M,242.
** After Acheson publicly announced his support o f Alger Hiss in January, 1950, the
comments o f a Republican Senator from Nebraska focused not on Acheson’s support o f
Ifiss, but his deportment; “I look at that fellow, I watch his smart-aleck manner and his
British clothes and that New Dealism in everything he says and does, and I want to shout.
. You stand for everything that has been wrong in the United States for years!” cited in
McCullough, Trunum, 760-761.
Harper, Am erican Visions, 246.
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Europe in “sophisticating” advocacy against the US government, representing Norway
and Sweden in their World War I claims, and Arizona in its suit contesting Boulder Dam.**
Though privately influential throughout the 1930’s, it was the coming o f war that
brought Acheson back firmly into the official Washington fold. In 1941 Acheson became
Assistant Secretary of State for economic affairs and during the war years served as a
planner for the Food and Agricultural Organization and the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration. Between 1945 and 1947, Acheson served for a time as
Undersecretary o f State for Marshall, after which he enjoyed a brief 18-month hiatus
practicing law before he returned in 1949 to serve as Secretary o f State for Truman’s
second term.*®
During his stint away from the nation’s service, Acheson participated as an advisor
and consultant, promoting changes he believed would result in better government. While
serving on Congress’ Commission on the Organization o f the Executive Branch, he
favored strengthening the Secretary o f Defense and the combination o f the higher echelon
officers o f the Foreign Service and Department o f State into a single unit. These were not
the only changes he believed necessary, and when confirmed as Secretary of State,
Acheson implemented administrative modifications within the Office o f the Secretary
itself. Once Acheson began to shift responsibilities and procedure, Kennan found the
mantle o f Director of Policy Planning an ill fitting garment.

Ibid., 250
*®Robert Beisner offers a concise analysis o f Acheson’s changing sympathies toward the
Soviet Union in the early postwar years. “Patterns o f Peril; Dean Acheson Joins the Cold
VIam oT^’’ D iplom atic H istory, 20;3, Summer, 1996, 321.
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Although Marshall and Acheson were both decisive, their approaches to decisionmaking were extremely different and after Acheson took over, the Secretary o f State’s
Office was a vastly different place for Kennan. General Marshall relied on military
methods. He chose men on the basis o f their ability and expertise, and believing that it
was impossible to plan and operate at the same time, necessarily relied upon others for one
or the other function.** Marshall’s methods were honed by many years o f reliance upon
others; Acheson’s were shaped by a lifetime o f success proving others wrong.
Acheson was not inclined to accept either Kennan’s experience or ideology. The
stature that Acheson enjoyed among Washington’s power brokers may have given him too
much confidence in his own ability to direct foreign policy, efficiently foreclosing other
(perhaps more reasonable) alternatives. According to Kennan, Acheson showed no
confidence in opinions that did not coincide with his own plan o f action.** While

** When Marshall took over the State Department, he was appalled that there was no
“plarming” resource, ‘T found out that there was nothing, no planning agency at all. You
can’t plan and operate at the same time. Thty are two states o f mind. . You just had a hit
or miss affair going on around there.” Bland, M arhsall linterview s, November 20, 1956,
562-563
Henry Stimson praised General Marshall, and among the many reasons why Stimson
believed Marshall ‘great’ was his ability to achieve cooperation and success through trust:
“he was always willing to sacrifice his own prestige.. .His trust in his commanders is
almost legendary.. he leaves the man fi-ee to accomplish his purpose unhampered. Henry
L. Stimson with McGeorge Bundy, On A ctive Service in Peace and War (New York, NY:
Harper & Brothers, 1947). 662-663.
** See Yjstman M em oirs, “The thought o f consulting the staff as an institution and
conceding to it, as did General Marshall, a margin o f confidence within which he was
willing to respect its opinions even when that opinion did not fully coincide with his own. .
. All this would have been strange to him.” 450.
See also McLellan who analyzes the Kennan/Acheson relationship, but note that in
discussing the Acheson transformation o f the State Department, even McLellan seems to
recognize that Acheson’s style encouraged the same problem Marshall and Kennan had
tried to solve; namely, the successful separation o f planning and operation as separate
functions: “The problem o f blending daily operations with long run prognostications.
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Kerman’s appraisal of US/Soviet relations was based upon his Soviet experience and his
own personal understanding o f Soviet history whose proposals were based upon American
goals informed by his own individual interpretation. Acheson, on the other hand, relied
completely upon second-hand information. He had not been in Europe since 1939, and his
understanding was predominantly shaped by discussions with ambassadors from England
and France, those most willing to dramatize Europe’s situation to secure aid.*^ In
addition, according to one of his biographers, Acheson was not inclined to consider the
unique characteristics o f Soviet culture because he was a pragmatic man who “did not
become a prisoner o f a priori moralistic, deterministic, idealistic or Manichean images and
states o f mind.”*"’ Acheson himself later admitted that his perspective was, perhaps,
narrow. In 1957 he acknowledged that his legal experience had been a double-edged
sword while he served as Secretary o f State—that although logic was an essential element
in both the practice o f law and foreign policy, the habits o f advocacy narrowed a lawyer’s
perception to that o f his client’s interest.*'* It is unclear, however, whether Acheson was
referring to a specific instance o f “narrow perception” or whether this was a general
comment upon his secretaryship.
International and domestic crises meant that Acheson had a number o f interests to
protect when he took office: the nation’s, his President’s, and his own. The Berlin Airlift

often at variance with each other, is one which has never been successfully resolved.”
NlcLeMan, D ean Acheson 172.
*^ Harper, Am erican Visions, 277.
*^ David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State D epartm ent Years. Acheson’s most
recent biographer, James Chace, considers him a “pragmatic realist always distrustful o f
universal sohxûonsl^ D ean Acheson, 439.
*"*Dean Acheson to Hans Morgenthau, January 3, 1957 DAP-SL, cited in Harper,
Am erican Visions, 251.
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was in its seventh month, the new Republic o f South Korea faced a threatening North, and
the NATO treaty was still being hammered out. Before he had completed a year in office,
the Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon and China had fallen to the communists.**
Domestically, HUAC’s attack on the Truman administration picked up steam with
Whittaker Chambers’ denouncement of Alger Hiss, an Acheson friend and brother o f
Acheson’s protege Donald Hiss.** Though temporal proximity was the strongest link in
this chain o f events, in combination they certainly appeared to many as a signal o f a world
wide, Soviet-driven, conspiracy. The man who had, in 1947, counseled Truman to boost
anti-communism and “scare the hell” out o f the country to gain support for Turkey and
Greece, was now caught up in a whirlwind he had, at least in some measure, unleashed.
Not surprisingly, a shift in the philosophy o f the administration, and thus, the NSC,
accompanied the 1949 personnel change. When Dean Acheson changed Kerman’s
position to “Counselor” and Paul Nitze assumed the role o f Director o f the Policy
Planning Staff **^ Since Kerman believed that the Soviets posed a political, rather than

** According to Acheson, Communist success in China was “expected.” Ibid., 192.
** In 1946, the names o f Acheson, Alger lEss and Henry Wallace all showed up on an FBI
list o f “high government officials operating an espionage network.” Harper, Am erican
Visions, 266.
*^ There are several different reasons proposed for Kennan’s relegation to “counselor.”
Kennan himself indicates that his resignation resulted from a requirement that all his views
be run past a committee for their approval before reaching the Secretary of State, and that
given these circumstances, he resigned. He does note, however, that differences between
his “long-term” outlook and the “short-term” views of “his friends in Washington,
London, Paris and The Hague” played a role. O f particular interest is Kennan’s statement
that he did not believe in the reality o f a Soviet military threat in Western Europe.
Kscmasi, M em oirs, 464.
Acheson asserts that Kennan “left the Planning Staff to devote himself to the duties o f
the Counselor to the Department” but it is clear that Acheson had little regard for
Kerman’s views, claiming thty “were o f no help.” Acheson, P resent a t the Creation, 346,
151.
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military threat, he no longer fit into an administration “content” (to use Kennan’s term)
with the division o f Europe and a militaristic fear o f the Soviet Union. Concordant with
Acheson’s philosophy, Nitze was less apt than Kennan to rely primarily upon economic
development to contain the Soviet influence and was “more inclined that Kennan to
approach the cold war as a war.”**

* * *

On January 1, 1950, Nitze took his seat at the head of the Policy Planning table
and, as an economist, brought a different package o f skills to his position than his
predecessor. While Kennan savored the cultural distinctions of the international
community and devoted his entire life to an examination o f international relationships,
Nitze had cast a more-critical eye toward Europe believing that the turmoil following
World War I forever threatened stability. Nitze’s confidence (in all endeavors) was

Nitze says that soon after he became Deputy Director in 1949, Kennan “made it clear
that he would like to step down. He was convinced that his usefulness as policy director
was near an end and that he should leave the Foreign Service to do research and write.
Nitze, From H iroshim a to Glasnost, 86.
May suggests domestic politics rather than ideology played the major role in the
change, and asserts that Acheson, under fire from conservatives as a “striped pants snob”
who served as a “lackey o f British lords and communistic radicals/’ needed a dynamic
leader who might help quell animosity with direct action. The heat must have been intense
after Acheson proclaimed his loyalty to Alger FQss on January 25, 1950 for Acheson later
indicated that the methods employed within Washington “would have aroused the envy o f
the Borgias.” See May, A m erican C old War, 7-9 and Caute, The Great Fear, 42-43.
Republicans in both houses had called on Truman to fire Acheson even before Ifiss was
convicted of perjury. McClellan, Truman, 759.
** May, 9. Elitism peppers Nitze’s comparison o f Marshall and Acheson: General
Marshall was a “man o f impeccable character, who represented the best that middle-class
America can offer,” but Acheson “had the grace and bearing o f an Aristocrat.” Nitze,
From Hiroshima to G lasnost, 85.
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undoubtedly spurred by successes gained outside the political or governmental realm, for
he became independently wealthy in 1935, a major coup during a time which many
suffered.*® His memoirs reveal glimpses o f a man at ease in the world o f numbers, a realm
where shades o f grey are equated with mistakes, not nuance, and extremely confident in
his ability to recognize those muted hues wherever they appeared.
Nitze’s childhood seems to have been a somewhat eclectic one. His father
graduated fiom Johns Hopkins at eighteen and earned his degree in philology at twentythree. An attraction for economics did run in the family, however, and Nitze’s
grandfather, a German who settled in America following a vacation, opened a bank in
Baltimore and profited professionally fi’om the growth o f the railroad industry. In 1909,
when Mtze was two, his father accepted an appointment as head o f the University o f
Chicago’s Department o f Romance Languages and Literature, a position he maintained for
thirty years. Nitze describes his mother, “the greatest influence” his life, as somewhat of a
rebel—a unique woman who divorced herself fi"om the typical duties o f a professor’s wife,
preferring instead the company o f the dancer Isadora Duncan and crusading lawyer
Clarence Darrow. She was, he says, “a favorite. . on the more fashionable North Side of
Chicago.”™ Nitze’s childhood was certainly rich with variety, but one period in particular
seems to have been formative.
The outbreak o f World War I made a lasting impression upon a seven-year old
Nitze, and perhaps influenced the course o f his life (and ideology) more than even he

Ibid., XX.
Ibid., x-xii. Curiously and disappointingly, Nitze names only his sister Polly, identifying
the rest o f his 6m ily only through their relationship to him.
70
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recognized. Six months out o f every year, including the fateful one o f 1914, the Nitze
family lived in Europe. The young boy found himself watching as Germany mobilized
against Russia, standing at the window o f their rented apartment even as troops marched
to the front. Despite his father’s best attempts, they were unable to leave Germany before
England declared war and moved in with relatives in Frankfort. There, Nitze became
attached to an older cousin who was passionately interested in the war, and who was,
before the year was out, killed by Russian soldiers at Tannenberg.’*
Whether because o f his youthful impressions or measured adult rationality, Nitze
found World W ar I vastly more significant that World War H, proclaiming:
I would say that the emotional dedication o f the people on both sides in
the First World War was far greater than it was in World War n. Even
though more lives were lost in the Second World War, the impact o f the
First on the structure o f civilization, the disillusionment and brutalization
o f man and his humanity, were such that the civilized world was never
again the same.™
Again, it is difficult to say whether the experiences o f a small child—trapped in Germany at
the very beginning o f war, a charged moment when routine disintegrates and a mixture o f
fear and exhiliration permeates the very air, and who wears, sewn onto his clothing, a
replica o f the American flag to distinguish him from an (English) enemy—influenced the
adult more than later education and experience. It is, however, easy to see that it could.™
It must be remembered that that very same small boy who lost a fiiendly cousin to Russian
guns and who was harassed by Germans because he spoke English, later influenced.

Ibid., xii.
^ I b i d , xüi.
™My suggestion here is influenced primarily by the emphasis that Nitze himself places
upon this period in his life.
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developed, and articulated the policies o f his nation during volatile post-World War II
relations with both Russia and Germany.™
Finishing high school at the age o f fifteen, Nitze went to preparatory school in
Connecticut and then entered Harvard, graduating summa cum laude with a degree in
economics and an interest in sociology. It was his mastery o f economics that led, in 1929,
to a misadventure with the Soviet Union. When an investment banker agreed to fund the
freshly-graduated Nitze’s passage to Germany in exchange for a report on German
investments, Nitze toured Europe and ran into a fiiend in Berlin. On a trek through
Finland, they lost their way and hiked aimlessly for three days:
Unknowingly, we had crossed the border into the Soviet Union
and might still be there, buried in a Soviet prison, if we had not
run into a Good Samaritan, a Russian fishing on a desolate lake.
The Russian showed them the trail back to Finland and suggested that they run: “And run
we did until we had recrossed the border!”™
By 1940, he had formed opinions not only about the Soviet Union, but also about
Germany. His views toward Germany coalesced when he read Oswald Spengler’s The
D ecline o f the West. For Nitze, the book condensed the “faults o f the German
temperment; it was brilliant, full o f profound feeling and thought, but dogmatic, rough,
tactless” and he believed that the Germans possessed “tendencies toward cultural decay.

™In a review o f Nitze’s biography, David S. Patterson, touches upon Nitze’s “pessimism
o f human nature” and suggests that his memoirs are worthy of note because he is “almost
by default, a symbol o f the continuities o f American foreign policy.” See “Quintessential
Cold Warrior” D iplom atic H istory, Winter 1992, 150-151. In so saying, however,
Patterson completely overlooks a more significant issue: namely, that Nitze is not just a
‘symbol’ of continuity—but one o f its architects.
™Nitze, From H iroshim a to Glasnost, xvi.
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socialistic Caesarism and war.”™ It seems clear that it was easier for Nitze to approach
the cold war as a “war,” because he tended, unlike Kennan, to subsume cultures into
nationalities and then transformed those nationalities into enemies.
Nineteen-forty-nine was a year o f transition for Nitze, the State Department, and
the world. On September 3, the crew o f an Air Force B-29 picked up airborne
radioactivity. They traced the cloud over the United States and across the Atlantic, where
planes from Great Britain’s Royal Air Force continued the monitoring. By September 19
the US leaders knew that the radioactivity came from the Soviet’s first nuclear device,
code-named “Joe One.”™ On September 23, the American public learned that the
frightening power to obliterate entire cities with a single plane and a single bomb would
forever be shared.
The Soviets’ atomic capability, combined with reported economic development,
prompted Truman to order the réévaluation o f national security policy.™ Nitze shaped

Ibid., xx-xxi. The reader might note that Nitze considers “brilliance” a fault, though
perhaps this is only an inadvertent grammatical error.
™Miller, Under the Cloud, 71; Neuse, D avid E. Lilienthal, The Journey o f an Am erican
Liberal, 221.
™It is important to note that had Kennan still held a position o f influence, and had he been
correct, (a regrettable double assumption), American strategy in the years following the
Soviet detonation o f an atomic bomb might have taken a completely different form In
1948, NSC 20/2 suggested that diplomatic difficulties with the Soviets might rest in their
lack o f atomic capability : “The fact that they have not been able to dispose over atomic
weapons, whereas we have, has probably been, if anything, a contributing factor in Soviet
intransigence in the past in matters o f the international control o f atomic energy and
possibly in other matters as w ell.. To the Soviet mind it is unthinkable that we, enjoying
this factor of military superiority, are not taking it into account in our plans and attempting
to exploit it for political purposes. They therefore must assume that our international
positions, particularly in matters o f the control o f atomic energy, are predicated on this
superiority and contain a margin o f excessive demand, which would not be there if a better
balance existed in the power o f disposal over the weapon. For this reason, they may
actually prove to be more tractable in negotiation when they have gained some measure o f
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that review, NSC 68, and thereby infused his philosophy into the framework o f policytransforming the character o f atomic age strategy into the form it would hold for much of
the cold war.
In NSC 6 8 , Nitze agreed with Kennan that c o mmunism and capitalism were not
compatible, but Nitze apparently doubted Kennan’s assertions that coexistence was
possible. Concerned that European nations might risk economic instability if forced to
expand militarily, Nitze sought the expansion of US military capabilities to complement
NATO ® In addition, Acheson was convinced that since the Soviets had proved their
atomic capability, “massive conventional rearmament” was required.*® In order to
accomplish this goal, Nitze and his assistants turned to the same tactic Truman had used to
great success, they inflated the crises to cataclysmic proportions. “The issues that face us
are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destmction not only o f this Republic, but of
civilization itself.”** Though its architects hoped that its public release would “rally”
America and the West, it was (officially at least) kept under wraps until Kissenger

power o f disposal over the weapon, and no longer feel that they are negotiating at so great
a disadvantage.” NSC 20/2 B(4) The accuracy of this analysis can never be known, for
before it could be tested a new philosophy enveloped in and articulated through NSC 68
dictated policy.
™ See also Harper, who suggests that Nitze formed “basic assumptions about European
intentions that were rooted in his interwar isolationism-cum-hostility tow ard the Old
World” and agreed with Acheson that Europe could not be left to the Europeans, op. cit. ,
294. Even Kennan’s colleague and fiiend. Chip Bohlen, harbored concerns about
European strength in the shadow o f NATO, with tendencies to “drift back to its former
bad habits o f disunity. FRUS, 1950, 3, 620.
*®Walker, 77ie Co/i/ITar, 73.
** NSC 68. See also May’s engaging discussion of the process o f policy management and
the adroit’ maneuvers necessary to convince President Truman and Secretary o f Defense
Johnson. May, Am erican C old War Strategy, 9-15.
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declassified it in 1975.™ Despite Truman’s order to keep the document secret, however,
knowledge o f it spread through the Washington mmor mill.™
Acheson unabashedly claimed that NSC 68 was designed to “bludgeon the mass
mind o f ‘top government’ resulting in “action” instead o f “decision-making.”*'* The

*^ Walker, The C old War, 73; May, American C old War Strategy, 16.
*^ Although Truman insisted that NSC 68 be handled with “special security precautions”
to insure that its contents remained under lock and key while he consulted with agency
directors sympathetic to his views on a reduction o f the military, pertinent “leaks”
rendered Truman’s caution markedly insufficient. See May, A m erican C old War
Strategy, 13-15.
The council was eager to implement NSC 68. Since Truman’s hesitation rested
primarily with the expense o f the proposals contained in the document, as the first order o f
businss on April 20, the Council recommended the immediate (by April 25) appointment
o f an ad hoc committee to be designated by the Secretary o f the Treasury, the Economic
Cooperation Administrator, the Director of the Bureau o f the Budget and the Chairman o f
the Council o f Economic Advisors. In addition, the committee didn’t want to allow any
time for second thoughts should the President approve the documents conclusions.
Rather than postpone action, the Council also established a separate committee and
authorized it to make recommendations regarding the re-organization o f the government
called for in NSC 68.
In response to calls for interim action pending an executive decision, (including one by
James E. Webb, Acheson’s under secretary, for the president to “say something to the
country.. some time in early June”) only three members voiced restraint. Secretary of
Defense Johnson suggested that since the project already had priority it “should not be the
product o f haste,” Secretary o f the Air Force Symington “felt that the whole job should
be done properly, not in any half-measures” and Maj. General J. H. Bums, the Assistant
to the Secretary o f Defense “said that the whole military establishment was working on
this as a priority project and that the military program could not be expected before the
middle o f June.” Rather than prepare an interim report, the Council decided to “expedite”
a response to the president. “Minutes of the 55th Meeting o f the National Security
Council” April 20, 1950. Harry S. Truman Papers, “President’s Secretary File,” microfilm
collection, Georgetown University Library.
*^*Even as Acting Secretary o f State, Acheson was not shy about exerting his influence
upon the President. In January 1946, he bypassed customary coordination between the
Secretaries o f War, State, and Navy, inducing the President to agree to a request made by
Byrnes at the first meeting o f the United Nations in London. Byrnes planned to announce
the change o f status of certain Pacific islands into either Trusteeships or under special
arrangements for strategic areas—upon the President’s assent, Acheson immediately cabled
the approval to Byrnes. The Secretaries of War (Keimeth Royall) and Navy (Forrestal)
requested an immediate audience with the President and Forrestal bluntly stated that

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

82

document itself proves that Acheson, in his memoirs, did not rely upon exaggeration.
NSC 68, with all the nuance o f a club, was (as Acheson had so carefully planned)
extremely effective. ** Its persuasiveness resulted from three factors: a warning that
destruction would follow the absence o f an aggressive foreign policy, an appeal to history,
and manichean representations o f the conflicting ideologies o f the United States and the
Soviet Union.** Although one can place NSC 68 under many different lights and reveal its

Acheson’s action was “a desertion o f the general idea of cooperation by getting hasty
decisions out o f him on a particular point o f view, and I told him I propose to make such a
representation to Acheson in very strong terms.” Millis, F orrestal D iaries, 21 January
1946, 131.
** The role Acheson played as Secretary of State was different than he had earlier
conceived it. As Under Secretary, he had advised Marshall that the Secretary’s speeches
were “never directed to swaying an audience to a specific result, like voting in an election,
but to putting out ideas for thought at home and abroad.” By 1950, under fire in the
Senate as a communist sympathizer, Acheson traveled promoting support for the
philosophy o f NSC 68 and had clearly abandoned using ideas for bait—deciding instead to
dynamite the pond. He “made points clearer than truth” and deemed that “(Qualification
must give way to simplicity o f statement, nicety and nuance to bluntness, almost brutality”
in order to convince his listeners. In yet another link between foreign policy and religion,
Acheson referred to his various engagements as “preaching.” Acheson, Present a t the
Creation, 374-375.
The text o f Acheson’s speech at the University o f California at Berkeley combined his
avowed “bluntness” with moral righteousness: “Good and evil can and do exist
concurrently in the whole great realm o f human life. They exist within every individual,
within every nation, and within every human g roup.. The struggle will go on, as it always
has, in the wider theatre o f the human spirit itself. . .” Turning to capitalism versus
communism, he continued: “. . it also does not follow from this coexistence o f good and
evil that the two systems, theirs and ours, will necessary be able to exist concurrently.”
Ironically, and although the government’s loyalty programs silenced critics under the guise
o f subduing communist subversion and began a massive system o f classification restricting
information to all but a handful o f individuals, Acheson praised the principles o f US free
society: ‘Tt does not fear, rather it welcomes, diversity and derives its strength from
freedom of inquiry and tolerance even o f antipathetic ideas.” Acheson, cited in
Schlesinger, Dynamics o f W orld Power, 410-416.
** Curiously, the “politico-centrism” o f cold warriors seems, even today, as an acceptable
(and preferred) ethos (patriotic); while ethnocentrism appears (we hope) on the wane.
The two, however, are logically (and morally) equivalent. Emily S. Rosenberg, a cultural
historian, argues that the “binary structure” which characterized NSC 68 “fit comfortably”
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skeleton and inherent discursive strategy (as many already have) it is important to analyze
NSC 68 in relational terms, particularly through its shift in emphasis and the implications
o f that shift upon the more limited, though vastly consequential, question o f American
atomic policy.
While Kennan’s NSC 20/4 relied upon general ideological principles that separated
the United States and the Soviet Union as independent, though interrelated actors, NSC
68 instead com pared the two and claimed that in the event of atomic warfare, the Soviet
Union might hold the high ground, at least initially:™
A police state living behind an iron curtain has an enormous advantage
in maintaining the necessary security and centralization o f decision
required to capitalize on this advantage.**
within American culture and suggests that attitudes about Native Americans, World War
n , and the Truman Doctrine are all examples o f such symbolic formation. “Rosenberg’s
Commentary” in May, Am erican C old War Strategy, 161-163. In applying her thesis to
twentieth-century international expansion, she observes that the nation’s “exporters” o f
culture fail to recognize “That the advance o f international liberalism could generate its
polar opposite—entrenched conservatism and a narrrow range o f options.. There could,
American liberal-expansionists believed, be no truly enlightened dissent against the
ultimate acceptance of American ways, and this faith bred an intolerance, a narrowness,
that was the very opposite o f liberality.” Rosenberg Spreading the Am erican Brecon 18901945 (New York, NY: Hill & Wang, 1982) 234.
*^ This is not to say that Kerman had not already considered the implications o f Russian
atomic weapons. Indeed, in 1945 he prepared an ominous statement outlining his belief
that the Soviets would not hesitate to use an atomic weapon, should they be given the
opportunity: “There is nothing—I repeat nothing—in the history o f the Soviet regime
which could justify us in assuming that the men who are now in power in Russia. . would
hesitate for a moment to apply this power against us if by doing so they thought they
would materially improve their own power position in the world.” Written admittedly in
haste, Kerman asserted it was a “reflection only o f an anxiety lest this matter be handled
on the basis o f the same effort to curry favor with the Stalin regime that seemed to me to
have inspired our other policies up to that time.” Note, however, that Kennan’s
statement, however frightful, is qualified (as are others contained in the entire document.)
See Kennan, M em oirs, 296-297.
Nitze decided that the significance o f the bomb lay in the fact that it “enormously
enhanced the effectiveness o f a single bomber.” Nitze, From H iroshim a to G lasnost, 42.
**NSC68, “Vm Atomic Armaments”.
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Kennan had certainly believed (and NSC 20/4 asserted) that capitalism possessed logical
advantages over a communist system in the postwar world, and that the Soviet Union
would move in the direction of capitalism if given an opportunity (and time) to recognize
the advantages o f such a transition. It is important to look at the ways the two advisers
pointedly differed upon a seminal issue; namely, how superiority was to be measured, and
even, defined.
Clearly, between Kennan’s analysis and Nitze’s, a fundamental change had
occurred in the fulcrum o f the relationship between the two nations. The Soviet
development o f an atom bomb obviously obliterated America’s ability to threaten (if not
use) a weapon only it possessed. Kennan’s faith had rested not in weaponry, however, but
upon an abiding trust in democracy; a trust that superceded his fear o f communism. It
appears that Nitze took an opposite view; that is, that US survival depended upon an
increased military presence and a corresponding shift owqy fi’om fundamental democratic
principles.
NSC 68 posited Soviet “advantage” in terms o f security and centralized decision
making and reinforced the reliance upon those elements o f governance that already
existed and infringed upon the rights o f Americans. At the time NSC 68 was crafted, the
United States did not lack security precautions, particularly in the case o f atomic workers.
Truman had already seized on the issue o f communists in government and issued three farreaching Executive Orders that enhanced the state’s ability to act against communism
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through the denial o f rights to citizen workers.*® In addition, there seems to have been no
lack o f “centralization o f decision” though Nitze considered that characteristic only o f the
Soviet Union.®® Was Nitze actually, though rather covertly, proposing that the United
States become further “totalitarianized” in order to increase her chances in a war fought
with atomic weapons? The answer cannot be known. What is clear is that NSC 68 clearly
influenced the direction o f atomic policy, and that direction veered sharply away from
traditional guarantees in a democratic nation.

* * *

*®E.O. 9806, 9835, and 10241. An (admittedly liberal, nearly radical) analysis o f the issue
o f anti-communism during Truman’s administration can be found in Caute, The G reat
Fear. See also Earl Latham for a more in-depth analysis, though one that lacks
examination o f the implications o f the Soviet’s first atomic weapon detonation upon the
fray. The Communist Controversy in W ashington.
The expansion of state power against workers coincided with the state’s need for
workers. By 1954, plants operated by government contractors were entitled to fire any
employee believed to threaten security—a dicey situation for employees. One factory fired
over 250 employees based upon “anonymous letters, phone calls or personal visits.” By
1956, over three million workers were employed “at will” (unprotected by either union
contract or employment agreement) and required to hold security clearances. The New
Republic, September 10, 1956, 8.
®®The National Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission both served only in
an advisory capacity to the President, who ultimately rendered his decision unilaterally.
‘Tt is recognized that, in the event o f hostilities, the National Military Establishment must
be ready to utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including
atomic weapons, in the interest o f national security and must therefore plan accordingly. .
The decision as to the employment o f atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made
by the Chief Executive when he considers such decision to be required.” NSC 30,
September 16, 1948. See also “Use o f Atomic W eapons” approved September 10, 1952;
“In the event o f a positive decision, the President would authorize the Secretary o f
Defense to use atomic weapons under such conditions as the President may specify.”
Memorandum from James S. Lay, Jr. to Secretaries o f State, Defense and the Chairman o f
the Atomic Energy Commission, “Atomic Energy Policies Approved by the President on
Recommendation of the National Security Council or its Special Committee.. for the
information o f the President-elect.” December 1, 1952, Secretariat collection; Box 1277,
Folder O&M 12 National Security Council.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

86

Though not even completed, the philosophies shaping NSC 68 influenced one o f
the most momentous decisions o f the century, the development o f a “super” weapon—the
H-bomb. On November 10, 1949, President Truman, in the wake o f the Soviet atomic
detonation, asked Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and AEC Chairman
David Lilienthal to examine the possibility o f a hydrogen weapon. Confiident in his own
belief that the weapon should be developed, and perhaps confident also o f his ability to
control the committee’s recommendation and Truman’s decision, Acheson told Nitze to
coordinate the H-bomb decision with the “broader inquiry being gestated by the National
Security Council”-N S C 68.®*
Kennan, who had been working on the problem of international control o f atomic
energy, was denied a voice in the deliberations, but he tried to make a contribution
nevertheless. No longer director o f a staff. Counselor Kennan alone formulated a
memorandum that he considered “one o f the most important, if not the m ost important, of
all the documents I ever wrote in government.”®^ Kennan’s analysis challenged a foreign
policy that he considered “ambiguous and inconsistent”—one that ostensibly supported an
international decision to abolish atomic weapons whilst political and military leaders based
their defense policies on the use o f atomic weapons. Stressing a moral imperative, Kerman

®* Acheson, Present a t the Beginning, 346. Nitze erroneously cites November 19. The
date, of course, represents only the o fficia l beginning of the inquiry—moral and practical
questions about the development o f a “super” weapon had divided scientists and others
with “inside” information since the end o f the war. More formally, Lilienthal suggests that
the issue began to pick up steam in October, 1949 with Lewis Strauss’ recommendation
that the General Advisory Committee “make an intensive effort to get ahead with the
Super.” David E. Lilienthal The Journals o f D avid E. Lilienthal: The A tom ic Energy
Years, 580, 576.
®^Kerman A/emo/rs, 472.
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did not propose the abandonment o f atomic weapons, but urged that the United States
develop and articulate publicly a determination that atomic weapons would never be used
in a first-strike capacity.®’ Acheson derided Kennan’s iconoclastic analysis, and told him
to “go out and preach his Quaker gospel but not push it within the Department”®'* and then
turned to Nitze for a study that proposed a massive military expansion bolstered by
conventional and atomic weapons.®* Acheson could not act (at least officially) unilaterally
on the H-bomb decision, and although the committee suffered fi-om the outset fi’om a

®^ Kerman’s recommended a substantive declaration, and his passion and eloquence
deserve inclusion; “We deplore the existence of all weapons o f indiscriminate mass
destruction. We regret that we were ever obliged to make use o f one. We hope never to
have to do so again. We do not propose ever to do so, unless we are forced to it by the
use o f such weapons against us. Meanwhile, we remain prepared to go very far, to show
considerable confidence in others, and to accept a certain risk for ourselves, in order to
achieve international agreement on their removal from international arsenals; for we can
think o f nothing more dangerous than a continued international competition in their
development.” In hindsight, Kennan hypothesized that Acheson’s only reaction was
probably “one o f bewilderment and pity for my naivete.” M emoirs, 474.
It seems clear that Kennan’s belief that Soviet fear, not militarism, posed the greatest
threat was an influential factor in his belief that the US should demonstrate a certain
amount o f public good faith concerning atomic weaponry.
®^ Cited in McCullough, Truman, 757
®* Acheson, P resent at the C reation, 347. Kennan and Acheson also disagreed over the
rearmament o f Germany. Kennan believed that NATO acceptance o f West Germany
would threaten any attempt at conciliation with the Russians, and “most incongruous and
unpromising; namely, the effort to operate a democratic political system on a territory
occupied by Soviet troops and under the control o f an inter-AUied body that included a
Soviet commander.” Their disagreements grew as the years passed reflecting according
to Kennan “the differences in our respective backgrounds. He, having never lived in
Eastern Europe or Russia (and perhaps sharing Sigmund Freud’s view that the people east
o f the Elbe were ‘baptized late and very badly’) . . . ” Yjeaaan M em oirs, 446-447.
Pressed by his responsibilities to the president, Acheson notes that he wanted risks
measured on a “different scale” than that delivered by the Soviet experts. ‘T rom the
outset, in trying to outline with these groups the field o f inquiry relevant to the decisions, I
became aware, without full comprehension, that our colleagues Kennan and Bohlen
approached the problem o f policy definition with a very different attitude and from a
different angle from the rest o f us.” Acheson, P resent a t the Creation, 347.
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collision of ideologies and temperaments and the members o f the AEC advised against it,
he orchestrated his hoped-for escalation.
Truman’s hand-picked trio o f theorists could not have been more disparate.®*
Given Acheson’s impetus in the development of the premises outlined in NSC 68 and his
reluctance to accept any risk in terms o f foreign policy and defense development, he surely
began deliberations already convinced that no “moral argument” should hold sway.®^
Secretary Johnson, determined not to exceed the President’s budgetary restrictions on
defense, and perhaps as equally determined to remain contrary, was a cantankerous and
disagreeable participant, unwilling to discuss anything that might not reduce the budget.®*
Lilienthal, on the other hand, opposed vehemently any enhanced atomic weapons
development. It is likely that none o f the three men relished their task, but when the
Soviet Union detonated its first atomic device, the postwar musings about a massive,
almost unimaginable weapon turned firom a whispered chorus o f “can w e’s?” into a steady
refi-ain of “should w e’s?” and those voices could not then be denied.

* * *

®* The three men met officially only twice, once on December 22 and again when their
report was presented to the President, on January 31, 1950. McCullough, Truman, 758.
®^ See Acheson, P resent a t the Creation, 348. If Acheson shared what might be called
“moral” qualms about the H-bomb, he certainly didn’t express them, stating that such
restraint had no place in government, and noted of Kerman that he “had no right being in
the Service if he was not willing to face the question as an issue to be decided in the
interests of the American people under a sense of responsibility.”
®* Since Johnson played little other role in the decision, this abbreviated analysis will not
delve further into Johnson’s participation.
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Before proceeding to an examination o f Lilienthal and the AEC’s role in the
negotiations on the “super.” it is important to note that the consequences o f decision
making may have been as, or more important, than the consequences o f the bomb’s
development and experimentation. In this visual age, it is no surprise that the bomb itself
overwhelmes our imaginations and has concealed the significance that I argue must be
attached to the shifts in personnel, and therefore policy, that immediately preceeded the
bomb’s development. Many are at least glancingly familiar with the development and
experimentation o f the H-bomb and few have not been awed (or stricken) by photographs
or fifim as monstrous mushroom clouds o f radioactive steam, sea water, and vaporized
coral proclaimed the breadth of American science and power. It is important though, to
pause for a moment and consider how the very contemplation o f a thermonuclear weapon
resulted in fractures that rent the customary rubrics o f science and politics; and, ultimately,
because it resulted in a limitation o f perspective, contributed to a dramatic transformation
in the development (and articulation) o f policy itself.
Certainly, disagreements abound within those fields concerned with governing man
and nature, and the early atomic age w as no exception. From the first public detonation in
Mroshima, scientists argued about atomic weapons development, short- and long-term
effects, and shared with politicians the debates surrounding international control, strategies
o f deployment, and related policy issues.®® Conflicting individuals in both groups, o f
course, drew upon their own personal expertise, but also linked that wisdom in a
functional equilibrium with motivations that were both purely personal but also relational.

99

See Chapter 4, infra.
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Status and prestige, both within society and within one’s profession, can only be
developed and expressed through relationships; and, although it is impossible to discern
the extent to which these motivations stimulated the decision-making o f the 1940s, they
are often such determinative features that their roles should not be ignored. It is, perhaps,
enough though to note that up until the thermonuclear question entered their lives, the
advisors and scientists maintained the balance between knowledge and status—they ‘stayed
in the game” for reasons as indeterminately varied as their histories.
When asked to consider the vastly-exaggerated thermonuclear weapon, however,
some, after registering their refusal to endorse the plan, retired to the sidelines—others left
the field. It is hard to imagine that a decision to proceed with the “hell bomb” was easy
for any of the participants; for some, however, the reaction was visceral—a nearly
instinctive abhorrence for anything connected with increasing (much less expanding
exponentially) the power o f the already-dreadful atomic bomb.*®® For these men, there
was no balancing act—neither politics, ambition, nor status figured in a decision
unassociated with relationships. And although Truman optimistically stated as he ordered
the development o f a thermonuclear weapon that the world would not come to an end,*®*
it must have seemed to some men that theirs already had.

*°®One is tempted, perhaps pace Kennan, to attribute “morality” to those decisions
objecting to the development o f the H-bomb; this would be, however, simplistic and unfair
to both objectors and proponents alike. Certainly, those who chose to support the new
weapon did not consider themselves immoral. The detractors’ perceptions differed: at
least one AEC member. Hartley Rowe, objected to the hydrogen bomb because the atomic
bomb was monster enough (p. 98, infra). Oppenheimer doubted its feasibility. In regard
to the h-bomb decision, then, any discussion o f “morality” wül only be used herein when
the participant himself inteqected that component into his arguments for or against.
*®* McCullough, 763. The bomb did, however, have its casualties.
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The famous mushroom cloud results from the creation o f a vacuum, and the
decision to develop a thermonuclear weapon caused a vacuum within the realm o f national
policy, a condition that resulted in a dramatic transformion o f the intellectual and
ideological base that had driven policy since the end o f the war. The void was filled with
only those who supported atomic and military escalation.

It may be argued, o f course,

that the men who left (or, like Kennan, were pushed out of) government service at the
time o f the decision to develop the “super” had outspent their usefulness, or had become
outmoded ideologues. But who can suggest that their experience and knowledge, indeed,
their intimacy with the features of the rapidly-changing postwar world, would not have
been valuable assets as the nation confronted a world where it alone did not own the atom
bomb? Consider the abilities o f the men who could not endorse the H-bomb; Kennan,
whose influence in the postwar field o f foreign policy was, and is, undisputed;
Oppenheimer, whose objection to the bomb forged the basis for his later removal and trial
as a communist;*®^ and Lilienthal, a man who during his tenure as Chairman o f the Atomic

*®^ Caute provides and thorough and well-documented account o f Oppenheimer’s
persecution. The G reat Fear, 476, 477. Oppenheimer entered the Manhattan Project as
an admitted “fellow traveler” but Groves’ influence had him cleared for the top secret
project in 1943. Highly decorated after the war, Oppenheimer was the “most politically
influential scientist in the nation” and although J. Edgar Hoover asked Lilienthal to have
him investigated in 1947, the AEC cleared him unanimously. Oppenheimer’s opposition
to the H-bomb aroused the ire of the weapon’s major proponent, AEC committee member
Lewis Strauss; and Oppenheimer’s 1952 suggestion that the US diversify its armory
(implementing warning stations and guided missiles) meant a decrease its reliance upon
atomic weapons that pushed Strauss over the edge. As Chairman o f the AEC, Strauss
accused Oppenheimer o f disloyalty and revoked his security clearance; but magnanimously
offered him a position as a consultant if he wished to avoid a loyalty hearing. When he
refused, Oppenheimer faced not a hearing, but an inquisition.
The travesty that was Oppenheimer’s hearing is a shameful ecample of political
persecution. Not, certainly, on a par with Stalin’s infamous “show trials” but,
nevertheless, a disgraceful example o f a perversion o f American jurisprudence. When
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Energy Commission was an influential spokesman and guardian o f civilian control, and the
peacetime development, o f atomic science.

* * *

David Lilienthal preferred to focus on the “ordinary affairs o f men” and as the head
o f the civilian AEG, he insisted upon it. Under his direction, the Commission promoted
the atom’s peaceable possibilities, including medical research and power generation, that
he believed could help the lives o f ordinary people. Since the military’s preoccupation
with weapons development absorbed young scientists, the AEG established hundreds of
fellowship programs for students eager to explore the less destructive side o f atomic
science. He resisted, sometimes successfully, military requests for ever-increasing
amounts of scarce atomic material, and fought those who sought to broaden the already
oppressive secrecy rituals o f the government through its atomic arm. He traveled

Oppenheimer requested his hearing, “his phone was tapped, his home and ofGce bugged,
his mail opened and even his conversations with his attorney recorded.” Though attorneys
for both sides required the highest level security clearances (the hearing, o f course,
entailed testimony and discussion o f sensitive, classified issues) only the government’s
attorney received his; Oppenheimer endured his walk over the coals without benefit o f
counsel because despite repeated requests, his attorney was never granted clearance. The
government’s attorney enjoyed another advantage; when the three-judge panel examined
the record, they did so with the assistance of government counsel. When the panel
entered a ruling against Oppenheimer, they based their verdict upon issues never covered
in the hearings.
It is impossible, o f course, to know whether Oppenheimer was truly guilty o f antiAmerican activity. It is possible, though, to recognize that he did not receive a fair
hearing—a recognition apparent to the AEG who offered him a new hearing in 1962. The
unfair conditions that Oppenheimer endured bubbled higher than the AEG, however, for
although Oppenheimer refused a second hearing. President Kennedy offered him the Fermi
Award in 1963—an award Oppenheimer accepted and later received fi’om the hands o f
President Johnson.
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endlessly delivering speaches throughout the nation: to women’s groups in Utah, the
American Library Association, Iowa State College. Nineteen-forty-nine proved a difBcult
year and he had had but little chance to garden or write when his one vacation was
interrupted.
It was close to midnight on September 21 when David Lilienthal returned to his
borrowed cabin on Martha’s Vinyard and the last thing he expected to find was a candle
burning in his window and a man standing in his driveway. “As if I fi'equently found him
on a windswept moor, in the dead o f night, on an island, outside a goat field” Brigadier
General James McCormack, the AEC’s Director of the Division o f \filitary Applications,
appeared nonchalant while he waited for Lilienthal’s return. Within minutes, McCormack
and Lilienthal sat in the little cabin under the light of an antique kerosene lamp and
Lilienthal learned that the Russians now shared the world’s most modem secret. The two
men drank a beer and looked at the stars through the kitchen window.”^“^
It could not have taken Lilienthal long to realize that the new international problem
promised the enhancement o f military influence and heightened governmental secrecytwo things Lilienthal had worked to overcome as Chairman o f the AEC. In a curious
twist, the Soviets had actually given the military the ammunition it needed to thwart both
Truman’s proposed defense cuts and Lilienthal’s attempts to channel the resources o f
atomic science into the private sector.*”^ Certainly, too, the Communist weapon

Lilienthal, D iaries, 569.
Lilienthal accepted the Chairmanship o f the AEC only after he was assured by Truman
that he would be allowed to promote civilian applications. When Truman met for the first
time with the entire committee in December, 1946 (Lilienthal and his “little flock”) he
agreed with their plans for the transfer o f Manhattan i&cilities from military to civilian
hands: “.. the sooner the better. . we must understand that atomic energy wasn’t just a
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threatened to stifle all of Lilienthal’s arguments for more openness in government and an
end to atomic secrecy.

weapon o f destruction—it could be a boon to mankind.” When Lilienthal asked for the
President’s help in combating the War Department’s angst toward the civilian commission,
Truman said ‘T expect that. The Army will never give up without a fight, and they will
fight you on this fi'om here on out, and be working at it in all sorts o f places. But you can
count on it, I am your advocate.” Lilienthal, D iaries, 118.
Truman was right, the Army (and the rest o f the military) kept fighting, and by 1949 the
strife between the armed forces and Lilienthal had reached critical mass. The strain o f
budgetary woes only heightened the tensions that had been building since the end o f the
war; a situation not lost on Lilienthal; “. . the situation within the Military Establishment
is chaos and conflict and carnage confoimded. . The Joint Chiefs are at each other’s
throats, no decisions can be made, and even Eisenhower is discouraged and now ill.”
When the Army lashed out at the AEC for supposedly exposing military secrets to
Congress in its annual report, Lilienthal prepared for a “showdown” against the militaryone precipitated by Lilienthal’s refusal to fulfil the “requirements” o f the Joint Chiefs o f
Staff for atomic material. “. . there is nothing sacred about any o f their pronouncements.
They are made by men, and damned vulnerable men at that, and I doubt if their statement
o f their ‘requirements’ for atomic weapons material had any background that would stand
up to inquiry.” Ibid., 494
Though later infuriated, Lilienthal was at first a little bemused by the elaborate
strategies to shield atomic science. On a whirlwind 1946 tour o f atomic facilities, the
plane carried the Commission, a five-foot-long “hope chest” full o f top-secret documents,
and an armed West Pointer, Lt. Col. Noble, to guard the chest. “Some o f the documents
are such that Noble never lets them out o f his sight, off the plane, and he goes aroimd
carrying them on him, also with a revolver. I think if we did crash, what the Army would
be really worried about wouldn’t be recovering us, but the contents o f our hope chest.”
Ib id 110. By 1947, Lilienthal had become appalled at the “hysteria” that threatened
freedoms: “we should have a group o f distinguished men study the problem o f security in
the light o f our traditions of civil liberties. . .it is not only civil liberties but our position of
leadership in science that could be swept away by a wild nightmare o f fear leading to
drastic and dumb limitations on scientific men and standards of ‘personal clearance’ that
are impossible and that assume that scientists can function behind barb-wire compounds.”
Idem . 176 The problem continued to escalate. Lilienthal came under attack from
Congress in May 1949 because he refused to require the AEC’s fellowship recipients to
undergo security clearances and a closed chamber o f the Senate resounded with
accusations that Lilienthal was giving away scholarship money to Communists or those
who “had leanings.” Lilienthal didn’t back down “Seemed to me an important principle
was at stake, the extension further o f this awful dossier system, beyond any necessity or
security justification.”
529.
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The crucial battle, however, that Lilienthal was so soon to lose was one he did not
want to fight at all. It was not lack of courage that deterred Lilienthal. Never one to shirk
a stand-off, Lilienthal had successfully built and later championed the TVA against aU
critics, and had triumphed repeatedly against unwarranted attacks as Chairman of the
infent AEC.^“ Business records, documentation, and uncontrovertable testimony had
generally been enough, especially combined with Lilienthal’s uncompromising penchant
for standing his ground, to prove the legitimacy o f TVA management practices or to stave
off congressional bloodhounds looking for communists who had repeatedly tried to tree
the AEC. Those older problems centered on accountability or legal right; they could be
concretely charted, mapped, audited, analyzed, and justified. To address his critics, he had
opened the books o f the TVA and backed up his defense o f his AEC with reams of
documentation—to answer the H-bomb question, however, he would reluctantly have to
bare his soul. On November 1, 1949, he told Dean Acheson that it was “essentially a
question of foreign policy for [Acheson] and the President.” *”^
By the time Lilienthal went to Acheson hoping to avoid participating in the
decision, he had already spent a month pondering the H-bomb. In early October, Lewis
Strauss, one o f the more contentious members o f the AEC, proposed that the Commission

In his journal, Lilienthal defined courage: “What is it? Isn’t it the capacity to hang on?
I have thought o f it. . as something active, a positive action o f some sort. There’s a good
deal o f comment these days about my standing up to bullies and hatchetmen, and the
editorial writers and commentators and the writers o f letters to me use that word
‘courage.’ If it should be applied to this thing, then all it means is just that quality o f
hanging on, o f not giving up no matter what.” March 15, 1947. D iaries, 160
Ib id ., S%3.
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“make an intensive effort to get ahead with the ‘Super.’” ^®* Lilienthal invited the General
Advisory Committee, and its Chairman Oppenheimer, to present a military, technical, and
operational analysis to the C o m m is s io n .B o th committees met on the last weekend in
October, and Lilienthal’s journal reflects that the only ambiguity was on behalf o f the
military, which seemed to have been “too busy with the inter-service row, or just not too
able to grasp it.”" “ Perhaps in an attempt to focus the military’s attention on the actual
consequences o f atomic weapons, some launched difficult questions toward the General

Ibid., 580. See also Dean’s self- and Strauss-serving January 27, 1950 memorandum
entitled “Sequence of events leading to the decision on the ‘super’ bomb.” US DOE
Archives, 326 Atomic Energy commission; Collection 1947-51 Secretariat, Box 4942,
Folder 471.6 (10-5-49) Sec. 1.
Lilienthal found Strauss not a little disagreeable, but even, sometimes, despotic. When
Strauss sided with his Congressional ally Bourke Hickenlooper against cooperation (and
maintenance o f the long-standing agreement) with the UK on atomic material and
development in September, Lilienthal was not surprised at the natural British assertion o f
their “pride and pace in the world” against Strauss’ and Hickenlooper’s “pecking away at
technical cooperation.. .a shameful record o f the tyranny of a tiny minority.” Lilienthal,
D ia ries,, 575. Strauss was joined in his opposition by Leslie Groves, Acheson, P resent a t
the Creation, 314. A special Committee o f the National Security Council later
recommended full cooperation. Idem . 315.
As Chairman o f the AEC, Strauss became embroiled in controversy in 1954 over the
imfortunate “Lucky Dragon ” incident where fallout from a March 1 hydrogen bomb
sickened Japanese fisherman and caused such high levels of radioactivity that a large
portion o f the ‘catch’ from fishermen in the Pacific during that time were destroyed.
Strauss initially denied the incident and when presented with evidence o f the very sick
crew, decided that “chemical activity o f the converted material in the coral” was the cause
rather than their exposure to high levels o f radioactive fallout. Hacker, E lem ents o f
Controversy, 150.
This was a tall order since the Committee plaimed to meet again on the last weekend in
October. Among other requests, the GAG was asked whether: “the United States would
use a ‘super’ if it had one available? What would be the military worth o f such a weapon,
if delivered? Would it be worth 2, 5, 50 existing weapons? What would such values be
when modified by deüverability factors? What is the best informed guess as to the cost o f
the ‘super’ in terms of scientific effort, production &cilities, dollars, and time?” US DOE
Archives, 326 Atomic Energy Commission; Collection 1947-51 Secretariat, Box 4942,
Folder 471.6 (10-5-49) Sec. 1.
Lilienthal, D iaries, 580.
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Bradley. He, though, was unable to answer whether the United States would attack
Russia if London would suffer the reprisal, suggesting only that he believed the “Super”
would offer a “psychological” edge. Enrico Fermi believed that the nation should go
ahead and develop the weapon, but he qualified his approval, recommending that the
government consider later (and more carefully) whether to use it.“ ^ The others shared
opinions obviously honed long before the meeting began. Some, including James B.
Conant^^^ (“translucent, so gray”) and FJartley Rowe, believed a refusal to recommend the
development o f the H-bomb might somehow rectify past sins; “We built one
Frankenstein.” "'*
When the GAC submitted their written report, no member o f the Committee was
willing to step out and recommend the H-bomb’s development. Among their reasons, one
seems to reflect a measure o f contrition, if not downright guilt, over A-bomb technology.
Their refusal addressed primarily the “grave contamination” problems involved, but they
also noted that the proposed weapon promised too much devastation and that its cost
could not accurately be determined. Most interesting, however, is that the GAC would
not approve the weapon because there was “no foreseeable non-military application.”"'*
Given the rigor with which the nation’s leaders, particularly scientists, sought to assuage

*"/&/ri:,581.
Former President of Harvard University (Acheson, 152) and fiiend o f the Manhattan
Project’s Leslie Groves (Lilienthal, 82). Conant also served on a board known as the
Interim Committee during the war that helped formulate the bomb’s development and use,
and played a major role in urging Truman to combat the postwar bomb debate. See also
Stimson, On Active Service, and LiAon, Hiroshima.
Lilienthal, Diaries, 581.
"'* See Gordon Dean’s summary, US DOE Archives, 326 U.S. AEC, RG Commission,
Collection 1947-51 Secretariat, Box 4942, Folder 471.6 (10-5-49) Sec. 1.
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their burdened consciences after Hiroshima and Nagasake, this segment o f their
explanation seems to leave no doubt that endeavors toward alternative, peacetime uses o f
atomic energy soothed their souls enough that they considered it an essential condition for
the development of an even greater w e a p o n /" In addition, two physicists (Fermi and
Rabi) thought that consideration o f the H-bomb might serve a beneficial, auxiliary purpose
and that the Russians, presented with the threat o f possible US development, might agree
to a joint non-development agreem ent/"
Given the highly personal nature o f any decision to proceed with the H-bomb,
Lilienthal abandoned any search for a unified decision, urging “individual” a n sw e rs/"
During the Sunday afternoon session, the Commission learned that groups o f scientists at
Los Alamos and Berkeley were “drooling” and “bloodthirsty,” and that E.O. Lawrence
had already decided that there was “nothing to think over.” It is impossible to say whether
the images o f atomic scientists actually savoring the possibility o f an H-Bomb while others
dreaded its very mention altered the final outcome, but the Commission did not hesitate to
vote against further development. The vote was not as unanimous as it might have
appeared (or as Lilienthal hoped it would appear)—six AEC Commission members voted
against the H-bomb, and two half-heartedly made concessions to the majority view. Lewis

Certainly, military historians (and others) might disagree with this analysis; however, it
seems unreasonable to assume an opposite theory (absent evidence) that military weapons
are considered in light of some potential peacetime applications.
Dean’s summary, US DOE Archives, 326 U.S. AEC, RG Commission, Collection
1947-51 Secretariat, Box 4942, Folder 471.6 (10-5-49) Sec. 1, 3.
See, for example, Lilienthal’s 1947 comment that “There have been matters on which
we did not agree but which I kept plugging and pushing and polishing around sometimes
over a period o f several weeks until an answer agreeable to everybody developed.. it is
sometimes a very strenuous thing to manage, but it is worth all the work that goes into it
and is a recrod from which I get very great satisfaction.” LiUenthal, D airies, 177.
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Strauss and Gordon Dean alone refused an unconditional recommendation against
developm ent/"
Strauss had posed ever-increasing (and ever-disturbing) problems for Lilienthal,
and although they had been together on the committee since its inception, the early
friendly and respectful relationship between the two had become strained. “Lewis has
made it almost impossible to enjoy the Commission as a family, as we did when we started
out, something I worked hard to develop.”*" Lilienthal was accustomed to disagreement
among the members o f the Committee, but those disagreements remained, at Lilienthal’s
insistence, a private matter between committee members. Lilienthal and the committee
members had in the past presented a united front to the public and the President, rendering
decisions based upon majority vote. In the year leading up to the H-Bomb decision,
however, Strauss had begun to violate the sanctity o f the AEC family. With a Republican

Strauss, a former Naval ordnance chief turned Admiral, had been with the Commission
since its inception, and had been one o f two men picked by Truman before Lilienthal had
fully accepted the appointment. Noting his choices were neither “crooks or fools,”
Truman refused to identify Strauss by name, referring to him as a man “with fifty million
dollars who sold all his holdings and put them in Government Bonds.” Although this
bothered Lilienthal, he and Strauss (for a time) shared a good working relationship. Ibid.,
89 and passim .
Gordon Dean, on the other hand, had been sponsored for a Committee appointment by
Senator McMahon in early 1949, and Lilienthal was clearly irritated by both the political
nature of Dean’s appointment; and, by his relative lack o f experience. “. . it did seem to
me that the basis o f selection for this Commission should be. . the very best qualified man
in the United States, regardless o f who his fiiends may b e .. .1 don’t think anyone would
suggest that Gordon Dean, however fine a person and young lawyer he may be, would
quite fill that bill.” Dean’s appointment seemed to Lilienthal as “the beginning o f a
downgrading o f the importance o f the Commission by the selection o f a man who has not
demonstrated by his past activities any spec ial qualifications for so important a post.”
Ib id , 459-461.
568.
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Congress aiming at the Truman administration, Strauss seemed determined to put the
AEC in the crosshairs, and adroitly curried favor from Congress by criticizing the
Commission and its members and sidestepping the Committee, complaining directly to the
president or his immediate advisors.
Strauss’ underhanded behavior was no secret, and it became a topic of discussion
in the hallways o f the White House when the president decided (upon Acheson’s
recommendation) that the news o f the Soviet detonation be kept secret, even from
Congress. Though the Joint Chiefs of Staff the AEC, and Truman’s Defense Secretary
Johnson thought that the President should make an immediate public announcement, they
also agreed that the decision was the president’s to make. As Lilienthal and Admiral
Souers discussed the President’s refusal, Souers asked; “. . .what about Lew is.. will he
feel bound to report this to Republican members?” At that time, Lilienthal still had some
faith in Strauss, for he assured Souers that although Lewis agreed with the majority o f
them, Strauss would not betray (at least this) confidence.*^” Having known Strauss for a
number of years, Lilienthal was Airly certain that he could, with a fair degree o f accuracy,
predict Strauss’ reactions—he was less sure o f the Commission’s other dissenter, Gordon
Dean.
Dean wasted no time in validating Lilienthal’s original reluctance to see him join
the Committee. Lilienthal had opposed Dean’s 1949 appointment to the Committee
because o f his relative inexperience and because it appeared that his only qualification was

*^” Lilienthal, 573. Oppenheimer saw only one good thing in the detonation o f a Soviet
weapon; and that only if the President would announce it immediately—namely, a “chance
to end the miasma o f secrecy—holding a secret when there is no secret.” Idem ., 572
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the administration’s desire to capitalize upon a political appointee. Although Lilienthal
was (at the time) assured otherwise, it became clear that Dean supported only Strauss and
and the Republican militaristic viewpoint. Dean’s sponsor. Senator Brien McMahon o f
Connecticut had disturbed Lilienthal with his announcement that the United States should
“blow [the Russians] off the face of the earth, quick, before they do the same to us—and
we haven’t much time.”*^* Clearly, a decision to develop the H-Bomb suited Senator
McMahon. Lilienthal knew that his, and others’, opposition to the further development o f
the “super” was in serious jeopardy.
Lilienthal feared the results o f a rushed decision. When he reported to Acheson
on November 1, he presented the Committee’s preliminary opposition and stressed that
since the Joint Committee was “steamed up” on the subject, due consideration might be
neglected in fevor o f a quick decision.*^ By mid- November, the committee was openly
divided with Dean and Strauss in the minority. Dean decided that he could not “go along
with the GAC recommendation . . . to forego the development of the weapon and to
announce that fact publicly” and in an undated memorandum (but catalogued in the
archives as January 27, 1950) stressed the importance he and Strauss had placed upon not
only the development of the H-bomb, but a complete conjunctional réévaluation and
overhaul o f the military.
By January 31, 1950, contemplation o f the worst possible scenario had overridden
all objections to the development of the “super” and the Special Committee o f the

"* Ib id ., 584.
^^ Ib id , 583.
Dean Memorandum; US DOE Archives, Record Group 326 US Atomic Energy
Commission; Collection 1947-51 Secretariat; Box 4942; Folder 4716 (10-5-49) Sec. 1.
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National Security Council, Acheson, Lilienthal and Johnson delivered their official report
to the president that recommended the development o f the H-bomb

And all due speed,

as Lilienthal had feared, drove not only the decision, but its implementation. Attachments
from the Department o f Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission addressed some o f
the concerns o f the detractors, but the report suggested that the President direct the AEC
to determine the “technical feasibility” o f the H-bomb concurrent with the military
development o f “ordinance” and “carriers.” Also, that the Secretaries o f State and
Defense re-evaluate “strategic plans” in accordance with the addition o f an H-bomb to the
nation’s armory—a réévaluation Acheson had already instigated. Finally, the report
confirms that the president’s closest advisors, particularly Acheson, had foresworn
probability in favor o f possibility. The report admitted that there was evidence that the
USSR did not want an escalation o f hostility and that it would not use atomic weapons
without the first use by the United States, but warned,
we carmot safely assume, however, that these hypotheses are correct.
Even if they are correct, it carmot be assumed that the Soviet Union
would forego development o f this weapon any more than she has been
willing to forego the development o f the fission bomb.*"

*^‘*“Development o f Thermonuclear Weapon” US DOE Archives RG 326 US Atomic
Energy Commission, Collection 1947-51 Secretariat, Box 4942, Folder 471.6 (10-5-49)
Sec. 1. Researchers are denied a complete review o f the report since some sections
remain under restriction despite a conditional declassification in 1987.
For a similar treatment o f the decision to use the H-Bomb, see James Chace, Acheson,
229-236. Though Chace’s treatment documents handily the problems between Acheson
and anti-communists in Congress, he does not link those two events with the decision to
go ahead with the H-bomb, though he does include Acheson’s remark that seems to reflect
Acheson’s concern for Truman (politically) since Acheson could not “see how any
President could survive a policy o f not making the H-bomb .” Idem.
Ibid. 2-3.
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This is, however, only part o f the report delivered to President Truman. The attachment
o f the AEC’s conclusions also emphasized “possibilities,” and ones which were, perhaps,
even more dire than the Soviet threat Acheson feared.
The theoretical analysis o f the AEC’s scientific “Staff Report” provides the chilling
chain o f unknowns upon which the development o f the H-bomb proceeded. The scientists
estimated that an H-bomb had a “better than even chance o f being technically feasible” if
the nation made an immediate investment of 150 to 200 million dollars in construction and
materials. While they ventured a guess as the the feasibility o f the bomb itself and its
initial cost, they refi'ained fi'om announcing any odds they may have calculated as to the
weapon’s effects; namely that with an air burst “the possibility would arise that the blast
damage might be limited by part o f the atmosphere being blown out” or that the
“tremendous quantity o f radioactive products could be generated and might have
significant effects on persoimel down-wind” or even that “whether neutrons fi'om a small
number o f Supers, when absorbed in the nitrogen o f the atmosphere, could produce
enough radioactive carbon-14 to be a general hardship.”*" In the end, the only possibility
that mattered was the chance that the Soviets m ight develop a thermonuclear weapon.
Exactly when Truman made his final decision is unclear, but he did not wait until
he received the official, written, report fi^om his Special Committee. Within seven minutes
o f receiving the Committee’s report he ordered the bomb’s development asking only, “Can
the Russians do it?” When Acheson, Lilienthal, Johnson and the Executive Secretary o f

*" Ibid. B-1, B-2. Though this last statement is qualified by a distinction between the
number o f supers detonated and whether their individual energy release was equivalent to
ten million tons o f TNT or forty million tons o f TNT.
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the NSC all nodded their heads, he signed the statement approving the recommendations
o f the Committee.*" The decision to proceed with the development, of course, was not a
decision to actually use the weapon, and Truman stressed this when Lilienthal’s lonely
voice argued against its development. The president told him that he believed that United
States should never “use these weapons.”*^* That conviction did not outlive his term.
Truman eventually did consider the use o f atomic weapons, and NSC 68 played a
role in his change o f heart. The plan remains a contentious topic among historians, but
whether it is recognized as an example o f anticipatory genius or as a self-fulfilling
prophesy, it seems clear that it played a significant role in the direction of foreign (and
domestic) policy. By ^ r i l , 1950, Nitze had finished NSC 68, and although it received
the support o f the Pentagon, State Department, the CIA and the president’s staff, Truman
refused endorsement based upon its enormous cost. NSC 68 called for a military buildup
estimated at $50 billion, but Truman insisted that the line be held at $ 13.5 billion. In

*" See Chace, Acheson, 234. Acheson himself explained that although he was
sympathetic to the objections raised by Lilienthal and Conant (and other members o f the
GAC), his individual participation as limited by Truman’s request that the committee
deliver a decision on one question—Whether or not to develop the hydrogen bomb—and
those other objections could not play a role in his decision. Although he cited other
justifications, the role o f a statesman compared to that o f a citizen, etc., the almost
apologetic emphasis he himself and his biographers place upon Acheson’s steadfast
obedience to Truman’s directive is simply not persuasive.
Acheson had enormous influence within the Truman administration and had, on other
issues, managed quite easily to get his own way even if it differed from Truman’s original
conception; e.g., intervention in Greece and later, the massive increases in the defense
budget. There seems to be no reason why he could not have here, except that he was,
himself fi'om the beginning committed to the expansion o f atomic weapons.
*" McCullough, Truman, 763. Numerous caveats along this same line pepper the AEC
and Defense addendums to the official report.
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June, with the invasion o f South Korea, he changed his mind.*" By September, Truman
ordered the full implementation o f NSC 68,*" and by 1952, Truman had adopted a
chillingly cavalier attitude with regard to atomic weapons:
It seems to me that the proper approach now would be an ultimatum
with a 10-day expiration limit, informing Moscow that we intend to
blockade the China coast from the Korean border to Indochina, and
that we intend to destroy every military base in Manchuria by means
now in our control—and if there is further interference we shall
eliminate any ports or cities necessary to accomplish our purposes.
This means all-out war. It means that Moscow, St. Peatersburg,
Mukden, Vladavostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Darien, Odessa,
Stalingrad and every manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet
Union will be eliminated.*^*
Truman’s frightening proposal resulted from nearly a decade of aggression,
stalemate and fear. Its morality and strategy was rooted in the militarism that permeated
postwar American and conformed with NSC 68. Prior to its acceptance and
implementation, many had attempted to justify the development o f atomic weapons with a
promise o f peaceful utility.*"^ That desire to reconcile oneself with the heinous reality o f
atomic weapons may, perhaps, have resulted from a sympathetic reaction toward the
victims o f Hiroshima and Nagasake, and a growing fear that American itself might
someday be targeted for destruction. Acheson’s State Department and National Security
Council under M tze managed, however, to create a new contextual reality for US

*" Interestingly, although the CIA predicted in March that an invasion would be launched
in June, “it came as a complete surprise to Washington.” Walker, The C old War, 72-73.
*^° May, Am erican Cold War Strategy, 204.
*^* New York Times, August 3, 1980, 22. cf. McGeorge Bundy who asserts that Truman
never considered the use o f atomic weapons after Nagasaki.
*^^ William R. Lawrence (the reporter chosen to cover the Manhattan project) wrote in a
1948 article that atomic energy held enormous potential for a “promised land. . .flowing
with milk and honey.” Hilgartner, Bell, O’Connor, Nukespeak, 39.
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policymakers. The dehumanization o f communists and the inherent evil o f communist
tradition negated any immorality or indecency that might have previously been attached to
annihilation. NSC 68 thus intensified the development of anti-communist ideology and the
progression o f atomic weapons development.
Though the influence o f national policy upon atomic science and scientists is
discussed later, it will be useful to here consider the influence o f NSC 68 upon scientists.
After the war, scientists pursued their profession under governmental authority, and that
authority became increasingly oppressive and burdensome with NSC 68. There were
certainly a number o f reasons for the well-documented persecution o f Oppenheimer, but at
least one reason pertains to NSC 68. After all, the document w as stimulated by the
consideration o f a thermonuclear weapon in the shadow o f a Soviet atomic weapons test.
The suggestions for atomic weapons development contained within NSC 68 placed
scientists at the core o f national security and they became increasingly instrumental as the
government implemented N tz e ’s recommendations. A policy based upon feararticulated, accepted, and solidified within the federal system under the auspices o f
“national security”—clearly compromised the scientists it depended upon. Nitze
characterized the Kremlin’s relationship with its citizens as one based upon “universal
suspicion, fear, and denunciation,”*^^ but that same statement seems to also characterize
the treatment o f US scientists which, whether by design or dereliction, increased after
NSC 68 and was far removed from Kerman’s hopes for success through democratic
example.

*" NSC 68 (V)(a).
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It may be argued, of course, that my emphasis upon the internal dynamics of the
National Security Council and its advisors is wrong—that the entrenchment o f fear within
the executive’s highest advisory arm, and the increasing focus upon an ever-moredemonized enemy was caused by external forces and that the shifting ideological
characteristics o f the early postwar period were understandable and legitimate reactions to
increased danger. There is, certainly, ample evidence that transitional international
situations—the fall o f China, the Soviet’s demonstration o f atomic capability, and the
Korean War—legitimately risked US interests and consequently necessitated the shifting of
priorities. It is, as Dr. Eisenbud explained to his colleagues in 1956, “very complicated”
and a definitive solution as to whether external or internal forces exerted more pressure
upon national philosophical transitions may remain forever just out o f reach. It is
reasonable, though, to suggest also that shifts in the personalities, and the different
perceptions that those men brought to the table caused or contributed to shifts in policy.
In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that domestic realities, together with the
internal structure and philosophies o f the president’s advisors played a significant, if not
primary, role in the development o f US policy toward the Soviet Union during the early
years o f the cold war. The experiences o f World War II shaped the National Security
Council, and the institutionalization o f those experiences shaped aggressive anti
communist attitudes, the progression of atomic and thermonuclear weapons development,
and eventually resulted in the silencing o f moderate voices within the executive branch. In
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the next, this study will begin an analysis o f the nations atomic testing program by looking
at its conception—the Manhattan Project.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

CHAPTER m

THE MANHATTAN ENGINEER DISTRICT

Surely some revelation is a t hand
Surely the Second Com ing is a t hand
The Second Coming?
—W illiam B utler Yeats

‘Trinity” reached its apogee on July 16, 1945, in a place the Spanish had, for
the own particular reasons yet so unknowingly apt for ours, called the Joumada del
Muerto, the Journey o f Death. The conflagration that represented years o f work went
unseen by most o f the scientists—only one refused to follow the orders to wear dark
glasses and lay face down.* Twenty-seven-year old physicist Richard Feynman
protected his eyesight fi'om ultraviolet rays behind a car windshield, then witnessed:
this tremendous flash out there is so bright. . and I see this white
light changing into yellow and then into orange. Clouds form and
disappear again—fi'om the compression and expansion o f the shock
wave—finally a big ball o f orange that starts to rise and billow a
little bit and get a little black around the edges, and then you see it’s

* The scientists were twenty miles away fi'om the shot tower and given welding glasses
and ordered to lie face down with their feet toward the bomb. Edward Teller took the
extra precautions o f gloves and sunscreen. James Gleick, G enius: the Life and
Science o f R ichard Feynman (Pantheon Books:New York: 1992) 153-154. Fourteen
years later while promoting a hydrogen bomb cratering experiment in Alaska, Teller
had apparently become less cautious about radiation and fkllout, telling the University
o f Alaska’s 1959 graduating class that “fallout.. carefully controlled by the work o f
many conscientious people.. contributes to radiation less than the wristwatch.” Dan
O ’Neill, The Firecracker Boys (New York: St. Martin’s GrifiSn, 1994) 90.
109
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a big ball o f smoke with flashes on the inside of the Are going out,
the heat.”^
As the cloud drifted up and out in the pre-dawn hours o f July 16, 1945, the rest o f the
scientists finally peeked—some stood in awe, some worked—Enrico Fermi calculated
the pressure of the explosion by dropping bits o f paper—and some may have prayed/
I f one believes the later tales, the physicists conjured a splendid pantheon to join the
remnants o f Trinity that would have filled, one might imagine, the very cosmos. Some
called upon their western God, at least one called upon the titan Prometheus,
Oppenheimer invoked the Hindu’s Death—destroyer of worlds. Feynman?—he
danced.'*
And why not? The bomb was not yet a symbol o f destruction, but o f victory.^
They had teased life into an abstract theory and their brainchild rose at least 50,000

^ Feynman, Surely you 're jo kin g M r. Feynm an! (New YorkiW.W. Norton: 1985) 134.
'* Fermi was so absorbed in this task that he could not recall hearing the bomb. Laura
Fermi, Atom s in the F am ily (University o f Chicago Press, Chicago: 1954), 239.
'*James Gleick, Gemw5„ 154-155.
^ I remain unconvinced by retrospective pangs that deny the scientists enjoyed their
initial triumph. It was, after, still two weeks before the new weapon would be
demonstrated on the human population o f Hiroshima. Though the report cannot
legitimately be denied, it is certainly difficult to look back and believe the the words
one reporter put into the mouths o f scientists at Trinity, in a story written after
Hiroshima; ‘“This is it!’ the scientists whispered. ‘Atomic fission.. a great new force
to be used for good or eNH.'” A rizona Republic, August 7, 1945, 1.
On a recent television program (April 1, 1999) chronicling the development o f the
bomb and its use, physicist Philip Morrison asserted that the goal o f the Manhattan
Project was to prove that the bomb could n o t be built. “The American Century”
American Broadcasting Company. (Morrison sat at the side o f Louis Slotin until he
died after an accidental radiation overexposure on May 21, 1946 and threatened to
expose the real cause o f his death “as a symbol o f responsibility” when the government
tried to suppress the information for fear that it would cause fear o f radiation to spread
across the nation. The Army re-wrote the release. Lifton, H iroshim a, 62.)
This is not to say that there was not opposition to the use o f the bomb against the
enemy. At Chicago’s Metallurgical Lab “Met Lab,” (existing somewhat outside the
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feet above the New Mexico desert to spread out over three miles o f sky/ Years o f
sharing ideas and frustrations, cutting through the tangles o f physical science with
thousands o f transitory chalkmarks, long nights thinking, arguing, re-thinking. Against
war’s oppressive clock, they worked first to beat German science, then they worked to
tear through their own boundaries, and they won. So first they partied—got drunk,
sang songs, and, like Feynman, danced.’ In retrospect, the perfectly spontaneous and

military confines o f Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Hanford) Leo Szilard in March 1945
sent a memorandum to Roosevelt urging that the bomb not be used without
substantive notice to Japan, and also warning o f the dangerousness o f a post-war
world o f atomic weapons. Roosevelt died before the memorandum reached the
presidency, so he requested a meeting with Truman. He met, instead, with James
Byrnes on May 28, but received nothing but “fiustration.” Szilard turned to the
scientists themselves, and sixty-seven signed a petition to Truman that asked the US to
agree not to use the bomb until Japan had been informed o f the bomb’s potential and
offered a chance to surrender. Another petition that asked that the US submit a clear
“statement o f intent” to the Japanese before use o f the bomb generated another eightyeight signatures from the Met Lab and Oak Ridge before the Army blocked its further
circulation because it revealed the “state o f the progress” on the bomb. Oppenheimer
refused to allow the circulation o f the petition at Los Alamos because “he doubted the
right o f scientists to influence political decisions.” It is not known whether Truman
ever saw the petitions.
M arch to Armageddon, 17-18. Another petition,
discouraged but not snuffed out by Oppenheimer asked for a “demonstration” use o f
the bomb at some unpopulated location. U.S. News & World Report, “Brotherhood o f
the Bomb: Two Flinty Physicists Struggle over their Terrifying Legacy,” August 17,
1998, V. 125, n. 7, 65.
Whether Oppenheimer’s opinion about the “right” o f scientists to affect political
decisions is correct or not, it is clear that they had not power to do so, at least after
scientists managed to develop the bomb. Ironically, when the tables were turned,
many politicians did not hesitate to exert their “right” to influence science and
scientists, particularly Oppenheimer. See note 5, Chapter Two, supra.
^ Letter from Colonel Stafford L. Warren, Chief o f Medical Section, Manhattan
District to Major General Groves, July 21, 1945, Top Secret Correspondence o f the
M anhattan Engineer D istrict 1942-1946, National Archives Microfilm Publication
M l 109 [hereinafter TSCMEDj. The “reported” cloud height was less than the
“official”—the Albuquerque Journal reported the cloud’s height at 40,000 feet, August
7, 1945, 1; and The New York Times August 7, 1945, 1.
’ Feynman remembers only one man who did not share in the “parties” and excitement.
Bob Wilson, the man who had recruited Feynman for the Los Alamos project: ‘“ It’s a
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communal celebration seems oddly out o f place, a normal and a particularly usual
occurrence within the otherwise particularly unusual Manhattan Project.
There was, certainly, no lack o f the unusual, the peculiar, or the simply
mystifying within the range o f physical complexes and mental complexities that we
now call the Manhattan Project. The fascinating story has been told and retold—with
the suspense o f a Hitchcock thriller, enough loyalist heroes to inspire Kipling, and the
pathos of a Euripidean tragedy—it remains, year after year, a “hit.” Revisionists might
even consider broadening the audience and investigate more thoroughly ingenuity o f a
different sort and look into the brothel that thrived, for a time, in the women’s
dormitory at Los Alamos.* The widespread fascination with Manhattan indeed stems
from the fact that it all seems so extraordinary; a handful o f people made decisions and
directed the building o f three huge facilities that employed tens o f thousands o f people
and funded the bomb with $1.9 billion taxpayer dollars, all while managing to keep the
whole business mum from 1942 until Hiroshima. Like those many people whose
demand for news caused the Santa Fe New M exican to bum up its presses with a first

terrible thing that we made.’ I said, ‘But you started it. You got us into it.’ You see,
what happened to me—what happened to the rest o f us—is we started for a good
reason, then you’re working very hard to accomplish something and it’s a pleasure, it’s
excitement. And you stop thinking, you know; you just 5/qp. Bob Wilson was the
only one who was still thinking about it, at that moment.” Feynman, Surely You 're
Joking, 135-136.
* When the Army learned that scientists were not spending all their time on “approved”
physical science, they stationed shifts o f MP’s around the perimeter. The scientists
signed a protest and picketed. Gleick, Genius, 193.
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run,” I am also intrigued by the details o f the project but would here suggest that one
interesting and very important feature o f the whole story is almost always overlooked.
The very physical isolation o f the facilities from American society seems to
have inspired the decontextualization o f the Manhattan Project itself, and many,
historians included, seem remarkably content to view its features (with the exception
o f the bomb, o f course) finitely. It is as if the whole splendid and sordid business took
place in some other dimension, occurring in isolation with a beginning, a middle, and
an end. There are at least two factors that have played a role in the relegation o f the
Manhattan Project to its own special place and time: human nature and the
government.

Perhaps primarily (because it is, after all, customary) categorization

seems to be a fimdamental feature o f the assimilation o f knowledge; it is simply
convenient for humans to impose periodization for understanding and explanation.
The government, itseff though, also must take a good share of the blame, for the
information it released and the headlines that appeared led people to believe (if only
for a time) that the magnificent deception had ended: “Atomic Bomb Held ‘Best-Kept
Secret’” and “Now They Can Be Told Aloud, Those Stoories [sic] o f ‘the Hill’.” *”
The project delivered enough tantalizing detail to both justify its cost and the

” After sending a plane to Albuquerque for a new unit, the paper promised its readers a
second edition with a re-run o f “all the Los Alamos material.” August 7, 1945, 1.
*” “Atomic.. . ” New York Tim es, August 8, 1945, 2; “N o w .. . ” Santa Fe New
M exican, August 6, 1945, 1. The latter an example, perhaps, o f one o f the pitfalls o f
haste.
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deception, and somewhere amidst all the headlines, the billion or so dollars, and
vaporized metal,** few realized that the project really did not end. *^
One must not think about the Manhattan Project as though it was but another
“period room” in a museum o f Americana between, say, a dust-bowl farmstead and
postwar consumerism. Its very purpose was to develop a new thing, and to do so
quietly, during wartime, required new techniques of governance: secret accounts
through which to channel unappropriated funds, private contractual relationships
between the government, industries and universities, innovative bargains for raw
materials on the international market, manipulation o f the media. It changed, too, the
relationship between government and science. There was nothing new in using science
to fulfil a national goal (it was the scientists, in fact, who approached the government
even before the United States entered the war) but with Manhattan Project, scientists
were enlisted, they became ‘Government Issue’ and their product government
property.*" The government borrowed private industrial methods o f research and

** See, for example, just one page o f the Arizona Republic: “Two Billion Spent on
Project, Force Vaporizes Metals,” “Bomb Work is Secret to Builders,” and the nearlymiraculous “Flash ‘seen’ by Blind Girl.” 1.
*^ The Corps o f Engineers was eager to continue its participation, and on February 2,
1946, K.D. Nichols sent a memorandum to Groves to brief him for a February 4
meeting with General Eisenhower: “In order to avoid disintegration o f our research
organizations, it is absolutely essential that we make commitments for research for the
next fiscal y e a r.. .we should be spending fi'om 20 to 40 million on such research and
development work during. . .1947. . Commitments must be made in the immediate
future prior to passage o f atomic energy legislation.. . ” “Memorandum to Major
General L. B. Groves,” 2 February 1946, TSCMED.
*^ Even as the government ‘used’ the scientists, they (and their families) slept under
blankets stamped ‘USED’ A feature that bothered Laura Fermi as long as she believed
the blankets were second-hand. She later learned the initials stood for United States
Engineer District. Laura Fermi, A tom s in the Fam ily, 207.
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development and, not unlike the policies o f Bell Laboratories or Proctor & Gamble,
claimed sole ownership in the interest, here, of “national security.” It deposited the
physics of fission and the science o f its radioactive by-products to a vault more
sheltered than that which holds the secret formulas for commercial mouthwashes and
off-the-shelf puddings; but, obviously, with significantly greater risk and without the
controlling effects o f a fi'ee market—consumers simply did not get an opportunity to
decide whether or not to purchase the product. After Manhattan, those scientists in
America interested in fission and radiation worked only at the pleasure o f the
government, or they did not work at all." The nation entered the atomic age on the
Project’s path and though the road widened, it stayed there—the behaviors adopted

*“*In this regard, it is interesting to look at the notes Groves took at a meeting between
himself and Sir James Chadwick o f April 1, 1946 that illustrate the oppressive
restrictions imposed on scientists, in both countries, even after the war and the role
Groves continued to play. Though it could be summarized, the blunt realities are best
expressed in the original:
Frisch wants to visit his parents who are quite old, and at present are
refugees in Sweden. We agreed that we did not want to prevent his
seeing them, but it would be much better to see them in England or
some other country such as Denmark or Norway. Incidentally his
Mother is quite badly crippled due to an accident and is unable to
travel with ease.
Pontecorvo wants to visit his parents in Italy, who are also quite
aged. He is still an Italian but expects to become an English citizen
.. .1 told Sir James that I felt the same about him as I do Frisch. I hate
to see him go and wish it were possible to do it in some other country,
and possibly special precautions would have to be taken to prevent him
from making undesirable contacts.
It is important to remember that the scientists were absolutely unable to travel during
the war, and this was probably their first chance to visit their respective parents.
“Notes taken after meeting between Sir James Chadwick and Gen. Groves on 1 April
1946” TSCMED.
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during wartime constituted a massive, and lasting, shift in the relationships between the
government, scientists, and people.
The purpose o f this chapter, then, is not to ignore the “unusual” that so
infiltrated the entire Manhattan Project, but to look carefully at those extraordinary
features that were so useful they became “usual” and commonplace as atomic weapons
development continued.*^ Two features in particular, an overwhelming investment in
secrecy and an equally intensive military objective, permeated the Manhattan Project
and saddled atomic experimentation with the baggage it would carry for decades. As
will become clear, the government continued, throughout the testing program, to use
these two features to carve for itself an extraconstitutional, and nearly unassailable,
block o f authority and isolate it from the legitimate interests and rights of citizens.
This is not to say that at the beginning o f the Manhattan Project secrecy and/or
military objectives were envisioned as though they would offer some later panacea
against opposition. An example from the waning hours o f the war, though, reflects
that by then, at least, these principles had become entrenched.
After the bombing o f Nagasake on August 9, 1945, the W ar Department
released to newspapers and radio commentators the Smyth Report: “A General
Account o f the Development o f Methods o f Using Atomic Energy for Military
Purposes Under the Auspices o f the United States Government 1940-1945” prepared

I am convinced that Bourdieu’s observation that these practices become ‘natural’
makes them decidedly more dangerous, particularly in the realm o f atomic testing: ‘Tt
is because subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what they are doing that what they
do has more meaning than they know.” H ^ itu s causes practices “to be none the less
‘sensible’ and ‘reasonable’.” Pierre Bourdieu, O utline o f a Theory o f Practice, trans.,
Richard Nice (Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press) 79.
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by Manhattan consultant and Chairman o f the Department o f Physics at Princeton,
H.D. Smyth. The cover sheet on the document offered standard requirements o f
release (“after 9:00 P.M. EWT, Saturday, August 11, 1945” for radio, and the day
following for “morning papers”) but added a new caveat:
The best interests o f the United States require the utmost
cooperation by all concerned in keeping secret now and fo r a ll tim e
in the fu tu re all scientific and technical information not given in this
report or other ofGcial releases o f information by the War
Department.'^

A month later, perhaps because o f violations or complaints, the president (through the
War Department) reiterated the directive and added a palliative note that the action
was “in the national interest and not with any idea o f imposing censorship upon the
press or radio.” In addition, it was prominently marked “CONFIDENTIAL—NOT
FOR PUBLICATION NOTE TO EDITORS.” '^ So, the government confidently and
quite boldly (and publicly, since it was addressed to editors) declared, through the

Emphasis mine. ‘Tuture Release” TSCMED, [undated]. Since the entire statement
cannot be reproduced here, it is important to note that the statement (directive) was
not distinguished in any way, even though other elements of the release were
underlined or placed in all capitals for emphasis, this sentence appeared almost
inconspicuous as the second-to-the-last paragraph o f a one-page cover sheet.
On July 26, 1945, Groves issued a memorandum revising the “public relations
program for the Manhattan Engineer District.” In two and one-half pages. Groves
established parameters for publication that placed himself at the top o f a pyramidical
regime covering all aspects o f “the principle” —atomic science. Even the change itself
as Groves envisioned it at the time, was to remain secret: ‘Its contents and existence
will only be disclosed to those whose part in the program necessitate action.”
“Memorandum to The District Engineer fi’om Major General Groves” July 26, 1945.
TSCMED.
September 14, 1945, TSCMED. Significantly, on August 14, 1945 the OflBce o f
Censorship had issued a press release that stated “Censorship o f news. . .will end one
hour after President Truman announces victory over Japan.” Arizona R epublic, 1.
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authority o f the War Department and the president, that the public was not supposed
to know.
There are two reasons, one obvious and the other less so, why the government
decided to advertise its power its privilege and right to continued secrecy. The
immediately apparent and immensely practical explanation for the shroud o f secrecy
was to prevent an external enemy (at that time, any other non-democratic, non-allied,
even non-American nation) from developing a similar weapon. Less evident, but I
suggest nonetheless crucial, was the necessity for the government to re-establish
sovereignty potentially threatened by the anticipated breakdown of consensus
following the war and also by the divisive effects o f an ever-broadening moral cum
political dilemma that radiated from the bomb’s use. There seems to have been little
popular agreement except for relief that the war was over, and even as some
recognized the devastation (both atomic and conventional) o f Japan as a just
retribution, others delved into a more fundamental questioning o f society. The New
York H erald Tribune powerfully encapsulated their thoughts: “One forgets the effect
on Japan as one senses the foundations o f one’s own universe trembling.”'*
Important, too, to remember that divisiveness was not confined to the faceless, even
anonymous public, but from within government itself. The “cacophony” arose from
within government before it spread without, and as hfichael Sherry has pointed out.

'* Sherry, In the Shadow o f War, 115. For an extremely lucid analysis o f reactions, the
government’s attempts to stifle such reaction, and the psychological burden that
created, see Robert Jay Lifron and Greg MitcheU, H iroshim a in Am erica, passim .
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military figures such as Marshall, Eisenhower, and Admiral Leahy had objected to the
bomb’s use against Japan, as did some o f the weapon’s creators, led by Leo Szilard.'®
The War Department’s directive constitutes a virtual assertion o f state
sovereignty to stimulate domestic consolidation. There are, of course, many ways that
the state can exert its influence upon its citizen body, but this particular expression o f
state sovereignty is best understood with reference to Bourdieu’s analyses o f statesponsored juridical dispute resolution.^ It is now, as it undoubtedly was then, difficult
to assess the potential influence o f voices that posed very fundamental, moral
questions; but, it is also impossible to ignore that those elements o f dissension
amounted to a “corffiontation” and that the “cognitive and evaluative aspects” o f
disagreement could not be easily, or readily, resolved through the democratic process.
In the same way that the state uses its authority, grounded in its “monopoly o f
legitimized symbolic violence” to lend validity to the decisions o f a judge, it also
protected itself with a “quintessential form o f authorized, public, official speech which

'® Sherry, In the Shadow o f War, 114-115
Power is, o f course, an intoxicating topic for theorists (and others) and by choosing
Bourdieu, I certainly do not mean to discount those many analysts who have sprinkled
their insight throughout the decades. Foucault’s explorations along these lines are
particularly attractive, insisting, as they do, upon the recognition o f the relational
aspects o f sovereignty; and, certainly the field o f power relations is much broader than
the state, reliant upon a “conditioning-conditioned relationship to a kind o f ‘meta
power’ which is structured essentially round a certain number o f great prohibitive
functions.. .[which] can only take hold and secure its footing where it is rooted in a
whole series o f multiple and indefinite power relations that supply the necessary basis
for the great negative forms o f power.” Bourdieu’s treatment, however, o f both the
legitimacy (as legally proscribed and socially authorized) of the state and his
exploration o f habitus as a structure through which power is both expressed and
realized, encapsulates more succinctly and comprehensively the issues here raised.
Michel Foucault “Truth and Power” in Power/Knowledge Colin Gordon, ed.,
(Pantheon Books, New York: 1980) 122-123.
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is spoken in the name o f and to everyone.” By reasserting its power over atomic
secrecy, the government sought consensus;
These performative utterances, substantive—as opposed to
procedural—decisions publicly formulated by authorized agents
acting on behalf o f the collectivity, are magical acts which succeed
because they have the power to make themselves universally
recognized. They thus succeed in creating a situation in which no
one can refuse or ignore the point of view, the vision, which they
impose.^'

Had the government’s intention been strictly to assure the secret nature o f atomic
science, it is likely that it could have simply continued the elaborate, though expensive,
deception that so characterized the Manhattan Project. True, everyone would still
know about the bomb, but development and manufacturing could have progressed
relatively unseen. To do so, though, would only have solved (for a time) the dangers
inherently possible with enemy possesion o f the weapon. I propose that the
government’s proclamation o f its intention to maintain secrecy had an alternative use,
that is the suppression o f dissent through the creation o f a singular “vision” through an
expression and reinforcement o f state sovereignty.^ The directive marks a turning
point in postwar America, and is thus worthy of exploration. I will argue that the

Pierre Bourdieu “The Force o f Law: Toward a Sociology o f the Juridical Field” The
H astings Law Journal, July 1987, 836-838.
“ It is important neither to ignore, nor sublimate, habitus as an element o f the
acceptance o f governmental authority to restrict information and define perception,
particularly since the government’s dictum followed so close on the heels o f wartime
media regulation: “The habitus, a product of history, produces individual and
collective practices—more history—in accordance with the schemes generated by
history. It ensures the active presence o f past experiences, which, deposited in each
organism in the form o f schemes o f perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee
the ‘correctness’ o f practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all
formal rules and explicit norms.” Bourdieu, The Logic o f P ractice, 54.
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statement should be taken apart, unpacked, to illustrate three features o f the statement
that inscribe it with far more meaning than might be immediately apparent; namely, the
indisputable authority o f its source(s), its revolutionary intent, and the degree of
permanence it demanded, and, as will be shown, achieved.
First of all, the directives came from the War Department and the president,
two indisputably potent instruments o f government. From the perhaps unwelcome
“Greetings.. . ” to the certainly dreaded “We regret to inform y o u .. .” it might be
assumed that neither letters, telegrams, nor statements from the War Department
lacked import and that none were received casually. Any violation o f a War
Department directive carried the potential for, at the very least, a censure of
investigation, and at the utmost, charges of treason. Admittedly, the W ar Department
controlled all information during the war, and the media had become accustomed to its
dispatches and restrictions;^ certainly, too, special circumstances distinguished atomic
development. Some individuals must have violated the the War Department’s first
request or it would have been unnecessary for the president to reinforce it a month
later; but whether any editor, reporter, radio programmer or personality noticed that
this directive threatened complete postwar control (and though denied, censorship) by
the US government o f a ll atomic information cannot now be known. There is no

^ The Office o f Censorship played the major role, and the US “press and radio has
submitted to voluntary censorship during the war.” A rizam Republic, August 15,
1945, 1

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

122

doubt, however, that the 1945 threat became a promise—a clear violation, many would
later argue, of the First Amendment

24

The questions surrounding censorship and media control by the government are far
more complex than might, at first, seem to be the case and eventually devolve into a
wide range of issues, from judicial control, e.g. issues o f national security (the ‘clear
and present danger test’ o f Schenk v. US', voluntary media collaboration with
government policy that, at some levels, borders on conspiracy to orchestrated
administrative control. James Aronson, The Press and the C old War (New York, NY:
The Monthly Press, 1970, 1990). Though there is no question that governments
control information in their own bests interests (a dynamic articulated by Weber early
in this century) Barry Karl’s brief discussion is a cogent reminder that the relationship
between the government and the media is a negotiation—a conversation between the
government and the media that is susceptible from both directions, to transformation:
“Franklin Roosevelt’s use o f the intimately private press conference opened charmels
he himself was able to keep pretty well encapsulated by his own purposes, giving
newsmen reason to argue with his successors for a greater opermess that, in its turn,
reached its zenith with the live television conferences pressed unsuccessfully on
Eisenhower but initiated by John Kennedy.” See “Visiting the Recent Past” Reviews
in Am erican H istory,M axch 1990, 137.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan has more recently (and topically) addressed the problems
o f secrecy as they have affected the US since World War U, and particularly within the
realm o f atomic development: “The Cold War had come. Americans were used to
secrecy during wartime.. This was wholly new. Profound aspects o f the culture, even
the nature of energy (the oldest o f mysteries), were now to be known by a few but
withheld from the rest. In a sense, it was the most primitive o f arrangements in the
most advanced o f societies.” Although articles from 1949 and 1950 on atomic
weapons development (“The critical facts about this greatest o f all publicly owned
enterprises have been withheld. . public ignorance is the extension o f secrecy far
beyond the limits o f true security.”) that were published in L ife stimulated Moynihan’s
curiosity and analysis, I see no reason why they are not perfectly applicable to the
immediate post-war period when the government began media restrictions pertaining
to atomic testing. Secrecy (New Haven, CT; London; Yale University Press, 1998)
141 and passim.
It is not possible to overemphasize the role secrecy played in atomic development.
The Atomic Energy Act permitted (but did not mandate because o f a last minute
alteration) the issuance of the death penalty against those accused o f breaching the
security provisions of the Act. See the New York Times, that noted that a “late
alteration” had been included stating that “even if a jury found such an intent it could
recommend clemency or life imprisonment. July 6, 1946, 3.
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Remember, too, that it was knowledge that the government withheld. On the
one hand, it seems perfectly reasonable to restrict “scientific and technical
information” that might allow an enemy to assemble a bomb; on the other, and even at
the dawning of the atomic age, the mandate gagged any opposition and rendered
whatever national discourse that might perchance develop suppositional and, thus,
readily dismissable.^ In time, this restriction would even prevent the dissemination o f
information that would have allowed citizens to take simple precautions to reduce the
risks o f fallout because owy information might have benefited an enemy.
Finally, the directive provides a clear indication o f the military’s intentions for
atomic weapons (and any other conceivable use for atomic science) together with a
certainty that the W ar Department’s authority would extend beyond w ar’s end,
perhaps indefinitely. Did no one at the War Department think about what it meant to
claim sole possessory and distributory right to “all scientific and technical information.
. now and for all time in the fixture”? Did a typist even blink? The questions, of

^ There seems to be no reason why Ronald Powaski’s assertion that the lack of inter
governmental debate about the bomb made its use against Japan a foregone conclusion
cannot be carried into the post-war years. See Powaski, M arch to Armageddon, 7.
See also Foucault who dealt insightfiilly, though cursorily, with the issue o f post
war political suppression o f “specific” knowledge through a short discussion of
Oppenheimer, where “for the first time, I think, the intellectual was hounded by
political powers, no longer on account o f a general discourse which he conducted, but
because o f the knowledge at his disposal; it was at this level that he constituted a
political threat.” Foucault, “Truth and Power”, 129. Foucault, though, is wrong to
conclude, unless he does so only because o f the highly public nature o f Oppenheimer’s
persecution, that scientists with specific, particularly atomic, knowledge were not
oppressed politically before Oppenheimer. Indeed, the Bulletin o f Atomic Scientists,
founded in 1945, became the vehicle through which scientists attempted to maintain
their own freedom o f expression in the seemingly inseparable relationship between
politics and science that developed in tandem with the atom bomb.
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course, cannot now be answered; but it is important to recognize that even at w ar’s
end, the military did not intend to either relinquish, or even reassess, its atomic
monopoly.
The statement did not fade away with the W ar Department nor meld into
memory with the official dissolution o f the Manhattan Project. Secrecy and an
associative military objective became the fiamework upon which all future atomic
development was built, it became “usual” and its essence scriptural. The Manhattan
project sowed the seeds o f a culture o f atomic governance that has shaped
international and domestic relationships since its inception, consuming over $5,400
trillion dollars.^
The remainder o f this chapter approaches the isolated world of wartime
atomic development as a cultural system.

In this regard, I have been influenced by

the work o f the noted anthropologist Clifford Geertz who argues for an analysis o f
culture that begins with the most elemental features and then moves to an exploration
o f those same features as they transform, and are transformed, by surrounding society.

^ $5,481 trillion as o f 1996, in 1996 dollars. Swartz, Atom ic A udit, 5.
For a complete history, I would refer the curious to Peter Bacon Hales’ recent and
extremely lucid, thorough, and broad-based account o f the project that takes
appropriate and overdue notice and appreciation for the thousands of workers who
have not yet achieved fame for their participation. A tom ic Spaces (University o f
Illinois PressiUrbana and Chicago: 1997).
The reader is warned, however, that Hales’ interpretation o f Manhattan’s medical
director Stafford Warren is somewhat one-dimensional, for his criticism o f Warren is
general, though flawed, informed solely by the author’s strict adherance to a negative
view o f Groves and o f medicine within the wartime project. It simply fails to
acknowledge postive contributions by Dr. Warren (and other medical personnel) who
were undoubtedly influenced by factors other than their profession. Physicians within
the Manhattan Project were controlled not only by hippocratic oath, but by the Army.
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Accordingly, I have chosen to appropriate, though not duplicate, Geertz’ methods and
have explored the isolated world o f the Manhattan Project, particularly Los Alamos,
by examining the attainments and learned behavior patterns o f those individuals who
were enveloped for a time at the locus o f institutional atomic development.^* There is
certainly no more potent symbol o f US power than the mushroom cloud, yet the
formulation and articulation o f strength represented by that cloud resulted from an
assortment o f relatively miniscule characteristics o f the Manhattan Project—isolation o f
scientists, military manipulation, and secrecy. The following, then, is an attempt to
locate those significant features o f the Manhattan Project that emanated, tentaclelike,
and transformed the society at large.^

* * *

Individual initiative, ability, and personality can shape, and come to
characterize, amazingly complex institutions, and the Manhattan Project is an excellent
example. It is almost impossible to separate the project itself from its Director,
General Leslie Groves, a former Deputy Chief o f Construction for the Army Corps of
Engineers, whose previous tasks included management o f the massive construction

^* Since this thesis argues that certain patterns and practices became embedded in the
atomic testing program, the attributes o f cultural features that spread into “ordered. .
system o f families o f thought, whence into ‘^artical integration. . .incongruencies. .
independencies.” is fimdamental. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation o f Cultures
(Basic Books, New York: 1973), 408.
^ In due deference to Geertz, this is an attempt to sort the “winks from twitches and
real winks from mimicked ones.” The Interpretation o f C ultures, 16.
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required by military mobilization and the building on the Pentagon/" Groves was
appointed in September 1942, less than a year after Roosevelt directed Vannevar Bush
o f the National Defense Research Committee to proceed with the development o f the
atomic bomb. Blessed with a blank check (others had to try to find the money)
Groves acquired property, supervised construction o f facilities, negotiated for raw
materiel, chose the renowned physicist Oppenheimer to head up the weapons team,
operated his own intelligence service,^' and bargained with the president, his cabinet,
those few members of Congress who knew about the project, and with the associated
British “tube alloy” facility.^^
As impressive as this list o f accomplishments is (and certainly he had some
help), two others were more important. Groves wove his own intensity into the
project and blanketed every feature with military necessity and invented and

Stanley Goldberg “General Groves and the Atomic West” in The Atom ic W est, ed.
Bruce Hevly and John M. Findlay, (University o f Washington Press: Seattle, 1998) 41.
Goldberg convincingly argues for a transposition o f the accepted ideology that the
bomb ended the war, asserting that Groves and the W ar Department had such an
investment in the atomic bomb that they made sure the war would not end without it.
The Manhattan Project destroyed Groves’ belief in the security o f his earlier great
accomplishment, the Pentagon. In his report on Trinity among comments about the
bomb’s effects on a steel tower one-half mile from the detonation: ‘T no longer
consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb.” TSCMED Groves to
Secretary o f War, 18 July 1945.
By the end o f the war, over 485 “creeps” protected all o f Groves’ secrets and
engaged in espionage in the US and abroad. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, (New
York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1962) 139. In this regard, see also the undated typed
drafts o f memoranda in Groves personal files concerning suspected “Russian agents”
and MED’s involvement: “All suspects are under continuous surveillance” and
another, “Steps are being taken to avoid any draft deferment of Weinberg, Lomanitz,
or any other Communists” TSCMED
Groves kept a permanent London office staffed with three WACS who reported
directly, and only, to him. TSCMED “432 WACS Assigned to Manhattan Project”
August 13, 1945.
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implemented a method to secure the project’s secrecy: compartmentalization. This
system, a task-oriented and multi-dimensional web, so diffused relationships and
interconnections between information, people, and product that the bomb-building
process became nearly unfathomable without a complete flow c h a rt/ ’ As proof of
Groves’ faith in both himself and the complex project, he handpicked a reporter to
later piece together those selected pieces o f the story that would glamorize the project,
justify the expense, and keep the secrects secret/"'
Much of what the public first learned o f the Manhattan Project came fi'om the
pen o f New York Times science reporter William L. Laurence, a man who was
conditioned, perhaps, to confiront and address the unusual. Like many others on the
team, Laurence was not bom in the United States but he was, perhaps, the only one
who, as a child, was stuffed into a barrel by his mother and smuggled out o f Russia.
Groves offered Laurence and his editor few details but promised them both the story
o f a lifetime in exchange for Laurence’s services. When Laurence got his first glimpse

After the war, in testimony favoring the McMahon Act that would minimize the
military’s control over atomic energy, Leo Szilard claimed that Groves’
compartmentalization caused an 18-month delay in the bomb’s development, because
scientist were unable to put “2 and 2 together.” Weisgall, 85. Claus Fuchs, though,
figured out enough o f Manhattan to shorten the Soviet’s weapon project by about a
year. Moynihan, Secrecy, 144. See also Barton Hacker’s comment that secrecy
“stood second only to making bombs that worked,” and his discussion o f how
compartmentalization compromised radiation safety. The D ragon’s Tail: Radiation
Safety in the M anhattan Project, (University o f California Press, Berkeley: 1987) 84
and more generally ch. 4.
And also cast Groves himself in a feir and flattering light: “A pleasant-mannered,
gracious officer who outwardly never shows the strain and worry o f his jo b .. .a
constant source of amazement to his associates and subordinates. . .firm and blunt
when the occasion demands, but withal considerate and fair-minded.. .” Press Release
[undated] “Major General Leslie R. Groves Directs Vast Project” TSCMED.
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o f the Oak Ridge facility from a mountaintop, he knew immediately that Groves had
not exaggerated—just one building in the vast complex was four stories high and half a
mile long. He also became concerned that his editor probably had underestimated the
length o f time that Laurence would be “out o f commission,” so to tease some patience
out o f his boss, wrote that the story was worth waiting for: “a sort of Second Coming
o f Christ yam.”^^
The Oak Ridge site that so impressed Laurence was just one piece o f the
enormous, and expensive, Manhattan Engineering District (MED).'" Covering 57
square miles, the Tennessee facility produced enriched uranium while a second facility
in Hanford, Washington, delivered plutonium; a third, at Los Alamos—54,000 acres in
with an industrial plant that covered over forty acres o f floor space—designed and
produced weapons.^^ The expenses o f the project, at first, were seriously
underestimated. When Groves took over the project, its cost was projected at $100

Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1988), 99-100. Groves was initially unimpressed with his new assignment. As Deputy
Chief o f Construction during the intense mobilization, he had been in charge o f almost
“one million people.. completing about $600 million worth o f work each month.”
The bomb project was not expected to exceed a budget of $ 100 million. Groves, Ncfw
I t Can Be Told, 4, 390. See also Martin Sherwin, A W orld Destroyed, 58.
^ The project’s original name had been “The Laboratory for the Development o f
Substitute Materials” or “DSM”, but Groves’ appointment resulted in a change. On
August 13, 1942 the project officially became “TTie Manhattan Engineer District”
because o f Groves’ fears that the original title might arouse curiosity. Interestingly,
and despite Groves’ insistence on the name change, he himself continued to use
“DSM” in reference to the project as late as M arch 1945. See TSCMED
Memorandum 6 March 1945, Groves to Secretary o f War.
Kevin O’Neill “Building the Bomb” in A tom ic A udit, Stephen I. Schwartz, ed.
(Brookings Institution: Washington, D C : 1998). 58-59. On Los Alamos, see
Groves, Now I t Can Be Told, 113.
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million;'* by December 1942, Vannevar Bush wrote the president that a bomb could
be delivered by the “first half o f 1945” but “the total estimates for a full program reach
the serious figure o f $400,000,000.”^® By 1945, the project’s cost had reached $1.9
billion, excluding $76 million for the modification of 46 B-29 bombers assigned to the
Project and 14,700 tons o f silver “borrowed” fi'om the Treasury Department.^
Secrecy and a dominant military objective operated in tandem to override
seemingly unavoidable safeguards to fund the project. Not one dollar o f the $1.9
billion that the Project cost was knowingly appropriated by Congress, and it is at this
point where the government began to deceive itself. Roosevelt started the project with
funds from a hidden reservoir within the Treasury Department. By December 1942,

^* Groves, Now It Can Be Told, 4.
*®V. Bush to “The President”, December 15, 1942, AEC HX Document No. 121,
declassified NARS 7 August 79.
The $1.9 billion figure differs somewhat from others; but is believed to be the most
current (and complete) estimate available, even according to an “official with DOE’s
Defense Programs office.” O’Neill, Atom ic Audit, 34. The Air Force project,
codenamed “Silverplate,” cost $76 million. Idem ., 56. Since copper was scarce and a
critical war material, silver offered a logical (if finally expensive) replacement and
provided the material for electromagnetic coils at Oak Ridge. The silver was officially
borrowed from the Treasury through a formal lease agreement that was amended each
time a new request was made. Stimson guaranteed the Secretary o f the Treasury that
the silver would be used only on government property, would be stamped as “property
o f US government” and adequately guarded. See Stimson to Secretary o f the
Treasury August 29, 1942 and Lease Agreement dated November 1, 1943, TSCMED.
The New York Times said that the War Department borrowed more than a one million
pounds o f silver from the Treasury at the suggestion of E.O. Lawrence. New York
Times (August 26, 1945) E9.
It was an unusual request. When approached by an Army Corps o f Engineer
Lieutenant Colonel Nichols, a tentatively receptive Undersecretary o f the Treasury
Daniel Bell asked how much silver the War Department might need. When Nichols
asked (initially) for 15,000 tons. Bell chastized him; “Young m an.. I would have you
know that when we talk o f silver we speak in terms o f ounces.” The War Department
failed to return the silver within the agreed-upon five years; but in 1970 the AEC
delivered $3.3 billion worth o f silver to Treasury. O’Neill, Atom ic Audit, 56.
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that initial outlay was running short, and Vannevar Bush suggested that the president
either reconsider the pursuit o f the project or approach Congress for a discretionary
outlay o f $315 million since ‘It would be ruinous to the essential secrecy to have to
defend before an appropriations committee any request for funds.”"" Instead, three
members o f Congress, House Speaker Sam Rayburn, Majority Leader John
McCormack, and \finority Leader Joseph Martin, Jr., were briefed and they agreed to
keep expenditures ‘%uried in the Army’s budget” and also silence the questions o f their
colleagues."*^ Before the w ar was over, however, it became more and more difficult to
“silence” potential adversaries.
Groves managed to outmaneuver the administration in Spring 1945 and avoid
an investigation recommended by Secretary o f State James Byrnes. As victory in
Europe drew closer, the expense o f the project had become too large to hide and
Roosevelt’s cabinet began to express doubts about both Groves and the never-ending
outlays.

With Germany on the ropes, Byrnes worried about postwar public relations,

and suggested an “impartial investigation” which might protect the president,
particularly in case the bomb failed:
No harm could come from an impartial investigation and review
[though] it might hurt the feelings of those now engaged in the
Interestingly, Bush’s suggestion to the president that he reconsider his commitment
to the project even in light o f a high probability for bomb delivery suggests that at that
time, the project had not achieved its later prominence as a military “necessity.” Bush
to President, December 16, 1942. TSCMH).
H. Foerstal Secret Science, 27.
It seems as though Congress recognized later, and perhaps with more than a little
irritation, that traditional controls (voting and appropriations) had been subverted by
the project. Howard Ball indicates, citing N ieho^ that the Atomic Energy Act created
a Joint Committee to present AEC ideas to the public in an effort to avoid future
subterfuge. Ball, Justice Dcwnwind, 225, note 9.
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project.. .Still 2 billion dollars is enough money to risk such h u rt..
.In any event, it would be clear that we were mindful o f the
tremendous expenditure o f men and materials."*'

On March 6, Roosevelt forwarded Byrnes’ letter to Secretary o f War Stimson. On
that same day Groves sent a letter to Stimson suggesting that appropriations might be
secured if he invited a select Congressional committee to tour Manhattan project
facilities (though excluding Los Alamos for reasons o f security) to “demonstrate the
scope and complexities o f the project.”"*"* On March “6 or T ’ (for even Groves was
uncertain o f the date) he told Stimson that Byrnes’ suggestion o f an independent
investigation would be “impossible” because o f the complexity o f the project and
(amazingly) that “there were no American nuclear physicists not connected in some
way with the project.”"*" Groves’ statement was, of course, false.
It is, though, just another piece o f a vast array o f evidence demonstrating that
Groves and a handful o f individuals, through the authority of the Executive, mortared
the Manhattan Project together with manipulation, subterfuge, and deceit."*" The

"*^ Memorandum for the President from James F. Byrnes, March 3, 1945, TSCMED.
"*"* Memorandum for the Secretary o f W ar from Groves, 6 March 1945, TSCMED.
"*" Memo to File from Groves, 7 April 1945. Though there is no indication that this
memorandum was distributed. Groves may have written it a month after the event for
some other reason than his own reference. Groves’ memoranda were generally
informally prepared on plain paper and initialed; this one, however, appeared on
official letterhead with a signature block for Groves, which is signed “L.R. Groves”
TSCMED
"*" In September 1942, the president designated vice president Wallace, Secretary o f
War Stimson, Chief o f Staff General Marshall, Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant,
General Styer, Admiral Purnell and Groves to administer the project (then known as
S-1). “Memorandum A” September 23, 1942. Though Roosevelt had let Wallace in
on the project, Truman had no knowledge o f it until after he became president, and
was briefed by Marshall and Groves on April 25, 1945. See “Memo to File” “Subject:
Report o f Meeting with The President April 25, 1945.” TSCMED.
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building and funding o f the project was but one part o f the development o f the atom
bomb, and this examination will now turn to those crucial individuals who knew little
about government funding and executive prerogative. Groves had not hired all the
nation’s physicists, but most o f the ones involved with the Manhattan Project fought a
running battle not only against the barriers o f atomic fission, but also against his
methods.
Groves was so committed to secrecy that he managed to manipulate the way
scientists “naturally” operated, probably to the detriment o f the project."*^ To reduce
“the opportunity for cross-chatter” he enforced his program o f compartmentalization

The project developed fi-ee o f any existing constraints, and the conditions under
which it operated facilitated its ability to maneuver extraconstitutionally: “because o f
it’s [sic] magnitude and highly scientific ramifications, it was established more or less
as a separate entity. Because o f the extreme secrecy, it was not possible for the
business to be handled in the usual manner, and for that reason it was normal for
General Groves to report verbally to his superiors, including the Secretary of War and
the Chief of Staff. TSCMED [undated] Press Release.
Groves refused to relinquish control even after the formation o f the Atomic Energy
Commission. When Major General Curtis LeMay, a top Air Force planner, asked
Groves for the number o f atomic weapon. Groves refused; “That iiiformation is quite
complicated and is based on many factors.. .1 cannot answer your question because I
force m yself to fo rg e t the num bers involved.” [emphasis m ine] Weisgall, Operation
Crossroads, 286.
“.. scientists are deeply, almost mystically, committed to the notion o f sharing
ideas.” Ball, Justice Downwind, 19. After the war, scientists were eager to avoid the
repetition o f Groves’ methods. When Oppenheimer lobbied for the establishment of a
civilian Commission to oversee the development o f atomic energy before the House of
Representatives’ Military Affairs Committee, he pointedly expressed his belief that
scientists should remain independent and uncontrolled: “Scientists are not used to
being controlled; they are not used to regimentation, and there are good reasons why
they should be averse to it. . the individual is to be given a certain amount o f freedom
to invent, to think, and to carry on the best he knows how. . .” Oppenheimer asked
for the bill to be reinforced to assure that the Commission would “not interfere with
scientific work except when there is a national hazard involved.” TSCMED
“Oppenheimer Statement” October 18, 1945.
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upon even the scientists, and he tried to insure that they received only the amount o f
information necessary for them to perform their specific, limited task."** In addition.
Groves enforced strict rules restricting the scientists’ movement and communication.
The government discouraged scientists from any outside personal contact, censored
their mail; and, for the first eighteen months, forbid the scientists to travel away from
the site. In 1944, Groves relented a bit, believing that an “improvement in morale
would outweigh the increased security risks.”"*®
Groves’ methods undoubtedly insured the clandestine nature of th e project but
they did little to enhance the ability o f the scientists to perform their role—unless, o f
course, the restrictions served to encourage them to get the job done and get out as
quickly as possible. In addition, the Army’s unwillingness to accept the authority o f
scientists and its technique of “compartmentalization” became counterproductive and
perhaps even potentially lethal. There was, also, the very real clash o f cultures as the
men o f science met the nation’s warriors. As Oppenheimer later remarked, scientists

"** Groves, Now It Can B e Told, 29.
"*®Groves was undoubtedly a stem taskmaster, and exhibited little understanding, or
patience, with the normal behavior o f scientists (or most human beings) in response to
pressure. Jonathan Weisgall indicates that Groves “.. became annoyed th e night
before the test when Nobel Prize-winning physicist Enrico Fermi offered to take bets
from the other scientists as to whether or not the bomb would ignite the atmosphere,
and if so, whether it would destroy only New Mexico or the entire world.” Weisgall,
Operation Crossroads, 5. Groves admitted his “annoyance” in his autobiography, and
noted that he “afterw ard.. realized that [Fermi’s] talk had served to sm ooth down the
frayed nerves and ease the tension o f the people at base camp.” He could not resist,
though, adding justification: “There was an air o f excitement at the camp that I did not
like, for this was a time when calm deliberation was most essential.” Groves, Now It
Can Be Told, 168, 291, 297.
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need a “certain amount o f freedom to invent, to think. .

so, how did they manage to

accomplish so much in such a stifling atmosphere?
It will be useful to look at the reminiscences o f Richard F^mman to help
answer this question, and explore, through his experiences, the effects o f
compartmentalization upon the project itself and the methods at least one scientist
employed to satisfy an independent spirit within the confines o f Los Alamos. Richard
Feynman made not only an enormous contribution to the Los Alamos project but he
also confronted the Army head-on, achieving, “freedom to invent, to think. . .” by
breaking almost all o f the rules.
The government did not have to call scientists into action, and by the time the
United States entered the war, almost one-fourth o f the nation’s physicists were
already applying physics to warfare."" Working in loosely-organized groups formed
around fiiendship, mentorship, and respect, some had already formed cliques of
specialty. Feynman’s senior professor at Princeton, Eugene Wigner, had been part of
the three-man team (with Leo Szilard and Edward Teller) who alerted Roosevelt
(through Einstein) o f the possibility o f a German bomb. Another Princeton professor,
Robert Wilson, was preparing to leave Princeton for Britain to work at their newlyformed Rad Lab. Wigner stopped "W^son in his tracks when he told him of
Princeton’s plan to develop a nuclear reactor.
The Office o f Scientific Research and Development, together with the National
Defense Council, formalized the relationship between the government and the

"" At that time, there were more than seven thousand physicists in the US. Gleick,
Genius, 138.
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universities, and groups o f students and professors aligned themselves to specific, and
official, projects. Wilson convinced Feynman, still working on his Ph.D. thesis, to join
him by giving him as much information as he knew about the German potential for a
bomb and the British work on the separation o f uranium."' Wilson put together a
group o f about thirty physicists, shop workers and technicians divided into a
experimental division and a two-man theoretical division composed of Feynman and
another graduate student, Paul Olum, a mathematiciaiL
In 1942, Oppenheimer substituted a Berkeley experiment for Wilson’s. The
short break gave Feynman time to finish his thesis and he earned his Ph.D. before
signing on again with Wilson’s team to work for the Manhattan Project. While they
waited for the government to ready Los Alamos, W^son sent Feynman to Chicago to
gather all the information he could on Fermi’s atomic “pile” and, “as efficiently as a
spy” Feynman brought back so much data that Wilson’s group began working on
problems that Fermi’s group had not even identified. AVhile in Chicago, he impressed
everyone who met him, in one instance explaining “on the spot how to gain a quick
result that had evaded one of our clever calculators for a month.

Feynman was

twenty-four years old.

"' At that time, the problem of a possible German bomb and the potential o f an
American one was not secret: “The military still did not take the physicists completely
seriously” although the scientists had agreed among themselves that most o f their
information should remain confidential. Though intially Feynman refused the offer, he
reconsidered when he remembered that a top German physicist, Werner Heisenberg,
had slipped firom view, and believed that if Heisenberg were working on nuclear
research, the Germans had a good chance at developing a bomb. Idem ., 137-140;
quote, 138.
Philip Morrison, cited in Gleick, Genius, 157.
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Oppenheimer served as a dignified fether figure to many, easing their burdens
as much as he could and standing between Groves and the scientists he had recruited.
Feynman and the rest o f the Wilson group impatiently left for Los Alamos before it
was ready and shipped the Princeton laboratory out ahead of them to join with a
dismantled cyclotron, generators, and accelerators fi'om Harvard. Feynman’s journey
was complicated by the fact that his new bride, Arline, suffered fi'om tuberculosis; but
when Oppenheimer arranged for Arline’s stay at an Albuquerque sanitarium and
offered the extra money required for their travel to Santa Fe via a private room and
wheelchair on the train, Feynman became a devoted admirer.” Oppenheimer “paid
attention to everybody’s problem s.. he was a wonderful man.”""* The issue o f secrecy
already had Oppenheimer and Groves at loggerheads; but they both agreed that all
physicists, to avoid suspicion, should buy tickets for any destination other than New
Mexico. F^mman, though, figured that if all the others were buying tickets for other
states, he might as well buy his for Albuquerque.""

"' While at Los Alamos, Feynman visited his wife every chance he got, and since he
did not own a car he often hitchiked or caught a ride with a scientist ftiend who did
own one, Claus Fuchs.
""*Feynman, Surely You ’re Joking, 110; and Gleick, Genius, 160. The admiration was
mutual. In 1943 Oppenheimer wrote to his department at Berkeley that they should
hire Feynman so that he could start there at the end o f the w ar “He is by all odds the
most brilliant young physicist here, and everyone knows this. He is a man o f
thoroughly engaging character and personality, extremely clear, extremely normal in
all respects, and an excellent teacher with a warm feeling for physics in all its aspects.”
Gleick, 184. Berkeley and Oppenheimer, though, lost out when Cornell jumped at
Bethe’s recommendation to Wre Feynman. Hans Albrecht Bethe “Feynman in Los
Alamos and Cornell” M ost o f the G ood Stuff, M em ories o f R ichard Feynman, Laurie
M. Brown, John S. Rigden, eds. (American Institute o f Physics, New York: 1993), 35.
"" Ibid.
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Despite all o f the praise that Groves received for directing the building of
Manhattan facilities, most o f Los Alamos was incomplete when scientists arrived
because the construction crews were baffled by the instructions and plans for the
laboratories. One theater and a couple o f “modified mobilization style” buildings were
up, but little else was finished. In fact, when Feynman arrived the only telephone at
the site was a single Forest Service line powered by a crank on the side o f the box.""
By April the population o f Los Alamos had swelled to about 30, and Feynman was
reunited with his former colleague Paul Olum, who was passing the time by pitching in
with the construction—manning a clipboard to check off lumber deliveries. Since
Feynman belonged to the theoretical group and did not have to wait for a laboratory,
he began working right away. A mixed group fi'om Berkeley and Princeton began
learning from one another, taking turns at the only blackboard on the mesa. Feynman
spent the rest o f the time studying; “Every day I would study and read, study and
read.”"’ Most o f the scientists kept busy one way or another, and soon after Wilson
took over supervision o f the building o f the laboratory, Los Alamos was the “best
equipped physics center in the world.”"*
The laboratory was the “best equipped” not only because Wilson supervised its
constmction, but because the scientists at Los Alamos could get almost anything, or
anyone, they needed. They requisitioned two hemispheres o f pure gold from Fort
Knox, each about half the size o f a basketball, to test gold’s ability to reflect neutrons;

"" CHeick,
161.
"’ Feynman, Surely You 're Joking, 112.
S8
Gleick, Genius, 160.
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once they completed their experiments, they used one o f the gold globes as a doorstop
in the room that held a single small, warm, ball o f plutonium upon a pedestal/®
People, too, could be requisitioned. When Feynman noticed a femiliar name on a list
of available physicists, he simply filled in the name o f the man he wanted, T. A.
Welton, on a form. Soon, a stranger invited Welton to a meeting in a hotel room in
Chicago, and then offered him an undescribed job that would require relocation to an
undisclosed place. Despite all o f the mystery surrounding the offer, Welton
acknowledged that he, like many other physicists outside the project, knew that
“something” was in the works. He accepted.""
The scientists worked under intense pressure and when they could not get.
everything t h ^ wanted as quickly as they wanted, they improvised. The most
sophisticated calculator at the time, the Marchant, could add, subtract, multiply, and
divide (but only up to ten digits.) F^mman and a Greek mathematician, Nicholas
Metropolis, organized banks o f Marchant calculators to perform like a primitive
computer, and chains o f scientists’ wives handled bits o f complex equations in array,
one cubing, another adding, each passing their finished piece to the next. Under the
almost-constant pressure o f the serial routine, the mechanical calculators broke down
often and were sent to California for repair. Frustrated at the waste o f time while the
project ferried computers back and forth, Feynman and Metropolis learned to repair
the calculators themselves, and advertised their new talents on a shingle; “Computers
Repaired.” In 1943, the scientists requisitioned new computers and related equipment

Feynman, Surely You 're Joking, 135.
"" Gleick, Genius, 169-170.
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from IBM; and, in yet another example o f impatience, before the new machines arrived
they figured out how to triple the machines’ output by rearranging the plugs. They
had also requisitioned a recently-drafted IBM employee to set up and service the
machines; but when the computers arrived ahead o f him, Feynman and Metropolis
used the wiring diagrams that were enclosed in the crates to assemble the system. To
make things interesting, Feynman soon developed programs that allowed the machines
to “clatter” out the rhythms o f well-known songs."'
Intellectually, their boundaries were almost beyond understanding but they did,
nonetheless, live under physical restraint. Feynman’s biographer James Gleick called
Los Alamos a “magic mountain” and quoted one resident who compared it with the
European stereotype o f an American pioneer community: “a self-contained town with
no outside contacts, isolated in vast stretches o f desert, and surrounded by Indians.”"^
In an interesting shift, though, the ‘indians’ in the Manhattan Project turned out to be
the Army. The irritation the scientists experienced by the Army’s attempts to
discipline them was never far from their minds. Once, when Bethe presented a
calculation to Feynman and his 40-man group, Feynman mechanically swiveled in his
chair and commanded: “All right, pencils, calculate! Present pencils! Integrate!” Bethe
laughed as the team mocked military drill and performed in perfect unison."' It was

"' Gleick, Genius, 181. Theoretical physicists seem strangely attracted to gadgets.
Enrico Fermi’s wife Laura relates that he, too, had always been fascinated by
mechanical and electrical labor-saving instruments; including the first Christmas
present he bought her in America, a step-on garbage can. A gift she called “his neverforgotten present.”
A tom is in the Fam ily, 149.
Gleick, Genius, 185.
^^Fbid., 171.
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easy to share a joke over regimentation, and military regulations like censorship and
restrictions on travel were bothersome, but compartmentalization posed additional,
and serious, consequences.
It was particularly difficult for scientists to ignore the authoritarianism o f the
Army when Oppenheimer insisted upon stringent egalitarianism and absolute
democracy at Los Alamos. “Oppie” tolerated no distinctions between graduate
students and world-renowned scientists,""* and the result was an untraditional ‘leveling’
o f professional relationships. The Army, though, managed to reduce some o f the
premier intellects o f the age even further since in the name of security, scientists (to
the world outside Los Alamos) lost even their identity. Within a month o f his arrival,
Feynman got a new drivers’ license, and in place o f his name he became “Engineer”
who Hved at “Special List B” and whose signature was “not required.”"" The famous
Niels Bohr turned into Nicholas Baker."" To Groves, scientists were nothing but a a
group of engineers. "’ The Army understood neither scientific complexities nor the

""* A technique Oppenheimer used to great effect to encourage fi-esh approaches and
faster results. Because o f that rule, and perhaps because o f Feynman’s intellect and
contrariness, he became the only man at Los Alamos to openly challenge Niels Bohr.
Afterwards, Bohr bounced his ideas off Feynman first. Feynman, Surely You 're
Joking, 133.
"" Ibid., 162. To the world at large Los Alamos did not exist. Children bom in the
Los Alamos hospital were bom at Post Office Box 1663, Santa Fe. Fermi, 232.
"" When Danish police wamed Bohr that the Germans were looking for him, he took a
small boat to Sweden, flew to London and then on to America with his physicist son.
He left his Nobel medal in Copenhagen, but the Nazis were unable to locate it because
he had dissolved it in a bottle o f nitric acid. After the war, he recovered the gold from
the acid and the medal was recast. Fermi, Atom s in the Family, 223.
"’ Groves became “defensive” around the scientists, and told them on one o f his first
visits that even though he did not have a doctorate, he had gone to school for ten years
after West Point, so had eamed the equivalent o f two Ph D.’s. Goldberg in The
A tom ic West, 47. Or soldiers—Groves awarded each o f them a special military-type
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pride the physicists took in “voluntarily” serving their country. A shared cause was the
only bridge between the two cultures, and among the many barriers, censorship was a
constant.
The Army opened all mail entering and leaving Los Alamos. In order to avoid
the obvious suggestion that this was an illegal intrusion into the rights o f ordinary
citizens, the Army asked the scientists to “volunteer” to the practice by not sealing
their outgoing mail and agreeing that all incoming mail could be inspected. Feynman
posed a particular problem for the censors, because along with the news he enjoyed
receiving from his parents and his wife, they cooperated in his appetite for games by
enclosing puzzles in their letters or by writing the whole letter in code. Feynman had
to then decipher the code before he could read his mail. The censors (obviously) did
not understand Feynman’s penchant for mental gymnastics, nor could they interpret his
mail in order to censor it. The censors and Feynman worked out a deal: Feynman’s
family would send a key for the censors to use, and the censors would remove it so
Feynman could still enjoy his game. Another problem with the censors, though, arose
when Feynman tried to pass on a division problem that resulted in a repeating number
(‘I t ’s quite cute”) and he ended up afoul o f “Paragraph 17B: Letters are to be written
only in English, Russian, Spanish, Portuguese, Latin, German.. Permission to use any

shoulder patch, an army star surrounded with a large question mark. According to the
news release, “the symbol betrayed no ‘military secrets’.” New York Times (August 22,
1945) 4.
Laura Fermi treats Groves generously in her account o f life in Los Alamos, and
even when she details Groves’ 1944 speech wherein Groves told the assembled
military: “At great expense we have gathered on this mesa the largest collection o f
crackpots ever seen” she insists that “The ‘crackpots’ were dear to the General. . .”
Fermi, A tom s in the Family, 226.
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other language must be obtained in writing. No codes.” He finally convinced them
that it really was just a “cute” mathematical trick, but did then have to formally ask
permission to use arable numerals in his letters. The problems persisted because
Feynman could not resist needling the censors; and from then on, Feynman and Arline
(until her death) came up with novel additions to their repertoire.®*
While the Army took some things very seriously, there were problems at Los
Alamos that they simply, to Feynman’s astonishment, disregarded even after he
pointed them out. When his verbal requests or suggestions failed, he turned to games.
Noticing a hole in the perimeter fence, he alerted a guard. When he discovered later
that the hole had not been repaired, he spent a day leaving the facility through the hole
and re-entering through the gate. Finally, the sergeant at the gate called the lieutenant,
who decided to arrest Feynman. He avoided jail by explaining, again, that he had been
trying to get them to fix the hole.®^ He also became concerned when he realized that
“terribly important secrets” were kept in wooden file cabinets equipped with cheap
padlocks. When they were not replaced despite his repeated suggestions that someone
should do something, he put his mind to work and figured out how to open every lock
at Los Alamos, including the combination locks on the supposedly “secure” safes.

®* Feynman, Surely You ’re Joking, 114-118. Among the many rules the pair broke,
Feynman found 8(1) a “delightful” regulation that disallowed any reference to the
regulations, requiring the omission (or deletion) of “any information concerning these
censorship regulations or any discourse on the subject o f censorship.” Gleick, Genius,
186.
Feynman, Surely You 're Joking, 118. What Feynman did not know, and no one
told him, at the time, was that the hole was there at Oppenheimer’s request so tliat the
“people fi’om the local tribes” could watch twelve-cent movies in the Los Alamos
theatre. Gleick, Genius, 187. Laura Fermi found many more, guided by her son
Giulio. YevtvL, A tom s in the Fam ily, 207.
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using mathematics. When Teller boasted that he kept everything important in his desk
drawer, Feynman slipped out o f the meeting and emptied Teller’s desk of documents—
-from the back o f the drawer, pulling out the paper “like those toilet paper dispensers.”
They never did change the locks, but Feynman acquired a reputation as a safecracker
and even carried a dummy set o f tools around with him to keep up the charade.^®
Holes in the fence and less-than-adequate locks, however, were minor compared to the
potential disaster Groves’ compartmentalization almost caused at Oak Ridge.
The Army so restricted the information it gave to workers at the Oak Ridge
fecility that they unintentionally became ineffecient and careless, jeopardizing the
whole plant, and everyone in it. The Army even tried to prohibit the better-informed
Los Alamos scientists from teaching the Oak Ridge workers about uranium 235.
Oppenheimer became aware, almost by accident, that the Oak Ridge team had no
knowledge o f why they were refining uranium, or even the most basic understanding
o f uranium’s properties. Workers at the Tennessee facility separated uranium 235 for
the bomb from uranium 238, though in very limited quantities because, as Feynman
recalls, they were “practicing chemistry.”’^ When they began to have some success at
recovering small amounts of the material, a plant superintendant with Tennessee
Eastman Corporation sent a letter to Los Alamos: “Dear Sir, At the present time no
provisions have been made. . .for stopping reactions. . would it make sense to install
some kind o f advanced fire-extinguishing equipment...? ” Clearly, the superintendant
had no idea o f what type o f reaction uranium might cause; and almost certainly had no

™Feynman, Surely You 're Joking, 118-119. Gleick, Genius, 189.
Feynman, Surely You 're Joking, 120.
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idea that if uranium 235 reached critical mass at Oak Ridge, the problem would
become, immediately, critical certainly beyond the resources o f a fire extinguisher,
beyond even his worst nightmare.
Feynman recalled that only the “higher people knew they were separating
uranium” but no one knew why, “how it worked, or anything.”^ When Oppenheimer
and Emile Segre, head of the experimental radioactivity group at Los Alamos, decided
that Segre should go to Oak Ridge to not only brief them on more efiScient methods o f
uranium refinement, but also to check out their procedures for safety, the Army
refused: “it is our policy to keep all the information o f Los Alamos at one place.”^
The scientists finally had to wield a big stick and threaten that limited production of
uranium 235 would hamper the successful development of a bomb and also that
careless handling o f the uranium Oak Ridge had refined could send the whole place
“up in s m o k e . T h e travel restrictions were removed.
When Segre got to Oak Ridge, the report he sent back to Oppenheimer
resulted in an entire restructuring o f the procedures at Oak Ridge. Upon his arrival,
Segre noticed that workers were wheeling uranium nitrite solution in tanks, and
explained to them that only because the material had not been further refined did it not
explode.

Two teams at Los Alamos worked on the problems o f accumulation and

storage o f uranium 235, and when their calculations were complete, Feynman traveled

^ “Dear Sir. . . ” (Gleick, G enius., 198); “higher people.. .” (Feynman, Surely You 're
Joking, 120)
^ Feynman, Surely You ’re Joking, 120
Ibid., 121
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to Oak Ridge to help implement the new procedures, but discovered then that the
problems were worse than Segre had reported:
Through dozens o f rooms in a series o f buildings Feynman saw
drums with 300 gallons, 600 gallons, 3,000 gallons.. .He realized
that the plant was headed toward a catastrophe. . .At some point
the buildup o f uranium would cause a nuclear reaction that would
release heat and radioactivity at near-explosive speed.^^
He insisted the Army allow Oak Ridge workers to be briefed on basic nuclear physics
and demanded plant and procedure changes. When he believed he w as not being taken
seriously, he used the magic words Oppenheimer had given him before he left: “Los
Alamos cannot accept the responsibility for the safety o f the Oak Ridge plant unless. .
«76

while the Army’s methods protected the country’s secrets from the workers

at Oak Ridge, had the scientists from Los Alamos not stepped in, there would have
been no Oak Ridge for the Army to worry about.
It seems likely that the Manhattan Project could have proceeded more
efGciently and safely from the very beginning had the military recognized the role o f
scientists as partners in atomic development, rather than as instrum ents toward a
specific goal. Only through Oppenheimer’s insistence that the expertise o f scientists
be recognized was the O ak Ridge facility saved from almost certain disaster. However
reluctantly and belatedly, the Army (and General Groves) recognized that the
scientists’ warnings were serious enough to warrant an exception to established
procedure.

* * *

Gleick, Genius, 197.
Ibid., 199; Feynman, Surely You 're Joking, 121-123.
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The nation’s commitment to secrecy. Groves’ military methods, and
compartmentalization built the Manhattan Project, and at the same time, narrowly
missed destroying it. But, in the end, nothing devastating occurred and the nation got
a spectacular bomb while millions o f everyday Americans learned at least something
about atoms and fission. This chapter has tried to show that the government carried
out two experiments behind the closed doors o f Washington conference rooms, the
barbed wire enclosure atop a New Mexican mesa, and the high walls o f Oak Ridge.
One, o f course, was the development o f the bomb. The other was the crafting o f a
system o f governance based upon deceit and manipulation, justified and fueled by a
military objective. Both were hugely successful, and both continued long after the war
that stimulated their creation ended. The novelties o f the Manhattan Project, among
them an ability to rely upon a military objective to secure funding and ensure secrecy,
formed the core around which future testing progressed. Sadly, as those features
became entrenched within the atomic testing program, they became ever more
consequential.

* * *

Before leaving the Manhattan Project, it is important to look at the report on
Trinity submitted to Groves on July 21, 1945 that illustrates that before the war ended
the government gave more consideration to civilian and military personnel than would
be the case by 1956. The report is not only useful as a chronicle o f the events of July
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16 but an instrument through which the personality o f one medical professional,
practicing (literally) in the glare o f the first bomb, might, in at least one sense, be
understood. The report, prepared by Colonel Stafford L. Warren, Chief o f the Medical
Section o f the Manhattan District, reflects that although the date of the test was
accelerated, the effects o f the bomb upon civilian populations were not considered
negligible.^ Warren reported that scientists considered July 16 and 17 appropriate
since the wind direction and speed would “localize the outfall o f active material” and
“dilute the outfall most effectively in the early hours o f the life o f the cloud” even
though these winds would make monitoring more difficult. In addition, monitors
patrolled the entire area collecting data on radioactive intensity and could have
vacuated, if necessary, the few families that might have been endangered.
Warren did not hesitate to voice his relief that no one had been injured in the
first test, nor was he reluctant to assess the consequences of future tests upon
persormel and civilians; and, additionally, to make recommendations to avert future

^ Although the bombing o f the Japanese has received enormous attention, some
con&sion remains concerning the date the bomb was tested. As the bomb neared
completion, the struggle between the scientists and the military assumed another
dimension as the bomb became an integral, though at the beginning only potential,
element o f the Potsdam Conference. Martin Sherwin asserts that Groves ordered (on
July 2) that the scientists plan for a July 14 detonation, but Oppenheimer, concerned
about “unacceptable risks” that would result fi"om a rushed detonation, asked for three
extra days. Groves refused to grant the extension, and later that same night,
telephoned Oppenheimer and insisted upon the July 14 date because the “upper crust
want[s] it. . A W orld D estroyed 222. Oppenheimer evidently bought some time by
insisting on appropriate precautions; that analysis, however, still cannot explain why
even “official” accounts disagree: The test, of com se, took place on July 16, a date
that Stafford Warren says as “two days ahead o f the tentative schedule because
everything o f importance to the test was ready.” TSCMED, Warren to Groves 21 July
1945.
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dangerous tests. lEs account was neither neutral nor sterile; he found “fortunately”
that the highest intensities o f radiation occurred only in deserted regions; those,
however, were high enough to “cause serious physiological effects.” To protect
resident populations, the monitors “all took considerable risks knowingly.. they
should not be exposed to more radiation within the next month.” He pointed out that
“quick and adequate” monitoring was essential and that radio communications,
transportation, and meters needed improvement.
KBs conclusions reflect that his interest as a medical doctor took preference
over accommodation to military objective. Finding “partially eviscerated dead wild
jack rabbits” more than 800 yards fi'om the test and a farm house three miles away
with “extensive damage,” Warren noted that personnel up to two miles away would
sustain lethal or severe injuries. In addition, he warned that only “under very special
conditions” should another test be attempted, since Trinity caused a “potentially..
very dangerous hazard” thirty miles wide extending ninety miles northeast. The
government ultimately, and unfortunately, ignored Warren’s final recommendation;
specifically, that no test the size o f Trinity be repeated unless a site could be secured
that was fi-ee o f population for at least 150 miles.’* Unfortunately, too, the expertise
o f medical professionals such as Warren and other scientists lost ground as the military
exerted even more influence in the continuation of the nation’s atomic weapons
program.

’* “Report on Test 16 July 1945” Warren to Groves 21 July 1945, TSCMED.
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World War II had not been enough—generals wanted atomic energy. Millions
in Europe tried to repair their war-shredded lives while they braced for winter, US and
allied forces occupied Germany and Japan, and hundreds o f thousands o f Jewish
refugees sought entry to British-controlled Palestine. Americans, still under shoe and
tire rationing, neverthess sought out new things, instant coffee and kiss-proof lipstick
made their debut.’^ In the meantime, the US military slabbered over the possibility o f
ever-more-lethal weapons. One can only imagine why, on September 4, 1945, the
Joint Chiefs o f Staff asked General Groves about the “maximum rate o f delivery from
storage in the United States. . using present persormel and facilities” and “How long a
period o f time will be required to stockpile 123 bombs if production is continued on
the same scale and priority as at present?”*®
On October 18, 1945, the military submitted to Groves a compilation o f
service requests, a ‘D ear Santa”, proposing the development o f a panoply o f
atomically-enhanced weaponry.*' A very small sample o f the exhaustive list reflects
the allure o f the atom: “to use as the explosive in the warheads for all missiles and
projectiles” including conventional bombs, artillery projectiles and shells; short,
medium, and hemispheric-range ground-to-ground missiles; ground-to-water and
ground-to-air, for the coast. In addition, the military wanted countermeasures,
including “neutron escape” warning devices and “means for the destruction o f

” “The Year in Pictures” L ife May 15, 1995, v. 18, note 6, 91.
*° “Memorandum for: Major General L. R. Groves, U.S.A.” from H P. Gibson for the
“Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment” 4 September 1945, TSCMED.
*' See TSCMED “Memorandum for the Chairman [Groves], War Department Atomic
Energy Advisory Board” 18 October 1945.
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vehicles used to transport atomic energy.”*^ The military also unimaginatively
envisioned other conventional uses for the decidedly unconventional weapons:
“simplification of the mechanisms o f the warhead and associated bombs” so that
military personnel could prepare and deliver the weapon; “techniques for storage and
use under all climatic conditions,” “prophylactic treatment to be used by persormel
exposed to the effects o f the bomb,” “detection devices” and “suitable indicators or
warning devices” to alert “fiiendly” persormel o f dangerous conditions.*^
Although these extravagant requests, and many others like them, are (and
were) perhaps meaningful in a military sense, one particular wish seems to stretch the
bounds o f military necessity. One is hard pressed to imagine, even putting oneself in
the shoes o f an overly-enthusiastic general, the need for ‘Development to perfect the
loading and detonating techniques so that the carrying vehicles for atomic energy can
penetrate the earth’s crust.”*^ It is an alarming request—illustrative, though, o f the
military’s inflated sense o f its own immediate importance and future purpose.
Atomic energy may have been all-but-imagineless to any but physicists before
Hiroshima and Nagasake. Those events, though, erased old cognitive barriers and
replaced them with visions terrifying to many but provocatively enticing and
intoxicating to the military: vivid churning o f towering clouds 50,000 feet high and
tens o f thousands o f deaths—destruction at a single stroke, fi-om a single airplane.

Ibid.
^ Ib id
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Imaginations ran wild inside the nation’s military establishment, with only ‘the sky’ (or
perhaps the Earth’s core) as “the limit.”
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CHAPTER IV

OPERATION CROSSROADS

A s soon a s the war etuJed, we located the one spot on earth
that hadn 't been touched by war and blew it to hell.
— Bob H ope‘

The atom bomb was the stuff o f warriors’ dreams, and the grisly wish list that the
nation’s military men developed illustrates, perhaps, the extent to which each contributor
believed that he might be only one weapon, one device, from heroic laurels. Other men,
perhaps a little older, a little wiser, or just a little more realistic, recognized almost
immediately that the bomb might be more portentious than promising—the stuff not o f
dreams, but o f nightmares. A nation with the atom bomb did not need warriors, only
scientists, planes and pilots. The reality struck the Navy particularly hard, for in those
heady August days o f 1945, the Army ‘had the com er’ on scientists with its stilloperational Manhattan Project and its Air Corps was replete with planes and pilots. So,
long before the public and Congress began their clamor for demobilization, some top Navy
men, with more ships and sailors than planes and pilots, started planning Operation
Crossroads.

' “So This is Peace” L ife (October 21, 1946), 119.
152
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The Navy insisted that Operation Crossroads was a pragmatic and practical
experiment, designed to “evaluate the strategic implications”^ o f the effects of atomic
weapons upon naval vessels, and even though almost no one (except the Navy) thought it
was a good, or even useful, project, on January 10, 1946, President Truman approved it.
The Army bitterly opposed it, the scientists believed it uimecessary, the diplomats worried
that it would aggravate already-shaky international relationships, many Congressmen tried
to kill it, and a dean o f women at a New York college said that it smacked of folly, “the
whole project sounds like bad boys playing with matches in the hay mow.’” The
opposition was understandable, for the Navy’s plan was not really an ‘experiment’ within
any accepted usage o f that term, and it can only be said to have been ‘pragmatic and

^ Jonathan M. Weisgall, O peration Crossroads (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1994), 31. The reader will note my reliance upon Weisgall’s book throughout this
chapter. Weisgall, an attorney, successfully represented and negotiated the settlement
between the US government and the Marshall islanders, and his book is a wonderful
combination o f narrative and meticulous documentation that makes it a valuable resource
for work on the Navy’s first attempt at Pacific testing. Weisgall’s book includes little
analysis except as it pertains to his focus, the treatment o f Bikini islanders.
Despite the enormous publicity Operation Crossroads received at the time and the
importance that I beheve must attach to it as an element o f the atomic testing program, it
has been all but ignored by historians, and even those scholars interested in atomic testing
give the Operation only minimal attention, e. g. Barton Hacker deals with the operation in
his straightforward, uncontroversial way and insists that “Crossroads adhered to
Manhattan safety procedures” and that B aker surprised everybody (ignoring, o f course,
the scientists who had warned o f fallout before the project, especially DuBridge),
concluding that the operation ended in “some haste.” E lem ents o f Controversy, 4-5; as a
“source o f embarrassment” by Gregg Herkin in The W inning Weapon, 225; Richard Miller
mentioned the operation only as a way to explain why Louis Slotin died from radiation
exposure while trying to perfect a new trigger for the Operation’s bombs. Under the
Cloud, 68. To this writer’s knowledge, the only works other than Weisgall’s that deal
comprehensively with Crossroads are those prepared as technical reports by the Navy and
the Report o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff Evaluation Board housed in the National and Naval
Archives.
* The letter fi-om the dean o f women was one o f many that the White House received
protesting the operation. Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 56.
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practical’ in the service o f precepts far more fundamental than those that the Navy posited
publicly and to the president. Operation Crossroads was not about weapon effects, what
an atom bomb might do to a ship; it was, instead, about the meaning o f the bomb and what
atomic weaponry might mean to the military. The extravaganza that was Operation
Crossroads should not be understood as an experiment or evaluation, but as an expression
o f power and prestige—hubris cubed.
In July 1946 the Navy pitted two atom bombs. A ble and Baker, against a floating
array o f 95 allied and enemy ships and landing craft. Four times larger than the wartime
invasion of Guadalcanal, the operation put a fleet o f over 250 support and target ships
around Bikini, incorporated into its design over 150 aircraft, consumed the talents o f over
43,000 military men, and sacrificed nearly 6,000 animals in a spectacle later valued at $1.3
billion. Unlike the Manhattan Project, Crossroads was d e s ir e d to make news, so the
Navy handpicked 150 of the nation’s top reporters to relay home every detail the Navy
wanted released. For a permanent record of the display, the Navy installed 328 automatic
cameras in planes and purchased other 700 cameras—some o f which went unused because
the Navy could find only 500 photographers. The shortage o f photographers proved
insignificant when, within moments o f shot Able, the Navy used up half o f the world’s
supply o f film.'*
The Navy already knew about ships, learned a good deal about cameras and a little
about animals; but, as the operation’s Radiation Safety Advisor, Stafford Warren, soon
discovered, it seemed content to remain blithely ignorant o f radiation. During the week

Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 121.
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following the Baker shot Warren fought an uphill battle against ships’ captains and
crewmen who had little fear o f an invisible enemy and even less regard for Warren’s crew
o f radiation monitors. Desperate, he took his case straight to the top and on August 3,
1946 urged Admiral Blandy to surrender. Warren warned that continued decontamination
promised only the exaggeration o f an already “extremely difficult and dangerous
problem.”^ In a four-page top-secret memorandum, Warren explained that the extent o f
contamination combined with the dangers o f radiation demanded that someone reconsider
the whole operation. Over one-hundred acres o f ship surfaces remained seriously
contaminated: “In most cases areas o f dangerous intensities remain on deck surfaces in
spite o f strenuous efforts to remove them.” Warren then outlined the potential hazards to
crewmen if the Navy continued its attempts at decontamination:
progressively increasing sterility. . .defects in children o f first and second
generation. . anemia. . good experimental evidence to show that in some
tissues there is never complete recovery fi-om radiation injury no matter
how small.®
Finally, Warren reminded the Admiral that sailors w ere more than “persormel” and were,
after all, young men whose “heredity is o f prime importance to them and their families.”’
Warren’s arguments fell on deaf ears, and it was not until August 10, and, as will be
shown, after more persuasive arguments by Warren, that he finally convinced Admiral
Blandy to cancel the operation and postpone a planned third detonation, Charlie. The

®Memorandum from Stafford L. Warren, Radiatiological Safety Advisor to Admiral
Blandy, Commander Joint Ask Force One, 3 August 1946; Stafford Leak Warren
Collection, University o f California, Los Angeles, Collection 987, Reel 1, Box 75, 76
(hereinafter cited as Warren MSS).
^ Ibid.
’ Ibid.
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Navy then hurridly cleaned up and cleared support ships and personnel for a return to the
States. For the men o f Crossroads, however, their job was not over even after t h ^ left
Bikini.
Ken Haugen was one o f those men, and like many, many others, he had spent most
o f the spring and the entire summer attached to Operation Crossroads. By September
1946 he was anxious to get into port, perhaps have a few beers and maybe a little fun. HSs
plans were delayed, however, because his ship, the USS W harton, could not find a Navy
port that would take her. It was, as Haugen said; “so radioactive it must have glowed in
the dark.” After Kwajalein refused to allow the ship entry, the crew set their sights on
Pearl Harbor only to be, yet again, turned away. The floating pariah finally stopped fifteen
miles off"the California coast. Unwilling to spend any more time living through some
modem perversion o f The A ncient M ariner, Ken and his shipmates did their best to “cool”
off the ship. To do so, they threw everything made o f canvas or wood overboard,
including all their spare clothing and blankets, mattresses, bunks, life rafts. Then, after
they “scrubbed and scrubbed” everything else, the USS W harton finally got clearance and
entered the Port o f San Diego, more than two months after the sailors got their first
glimpse of an atomic bomb.*

* Ken Haugen’s is one o f several stories o f atomic veterans told to Gary Turbak and
chronicled in “Under the Mushroom Cloud” VFW M agazine, March 1998, 12-19. What
Ken and his shipmates did not know was that they were, at the time, part o f a plan to see if
the open ocean would reduce the levels o f radioactivity on the support ships. Ports were
manned by radiation monitors and ordered to refuse the entry o f any radioactive ship to
avoid “wagging tongues.” “As I see it, the most serious aspect o f it is the one which may
arise in regard to public relations.. . ” Letter from George M. Lyon, Captain USNR to
Vice Admiral Ross T. Mclntire, Chief o f the Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery, 12 August
1946 Warren MSS, boxes 75, 76.
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In the eye o f the public. The Navy’s Operation Crossroads was a success—most of
the target ships survived floating—but since cameras do not record radioactive
contamination, only to the Navy did it became abundantly clear (particularly after Baker)
that the bomb’s most hazardous feature outlived its mushroom cloud.® Success is hardly
the word to describe the Navy’s battle against radioactivity. Radiation was decidedly
more tenacious than the Navy’s ships, and almost all o f the target vessels were later
scuttled or sunk when efforts at decontamination failed. In addition, many non-target
support ships like the U SS Wharton became dangerously radioactive—exposed through
contaminated seawater, marine life, and even crewmen themselves who returned to their
bunks radioactive after shifts on the target ships and in the bay. As Haugen’s story
shows, more than a month after the Baker test many were still fighting radiation. The
eventually-worthwhile efforts to slow the relentless clicking o f port inspectors’ geiger
counters prove that Ken Haugen, and many others like him, had been continuously
exposed to radioactive material even after leaving Bikini atoll— resting their heads on
contaminated pillows, sleeping on contaminated mattresses, wearing contaminated
clothing, ‘swabbing’ and sweeping with contaminated brooms and mops.'® They had
lived for more than a month in an environment that was so radioactively hot that the Navy
itself refused to allow them docking privileges at its own ports.

®The final report admitted that radiation was the real weapon, not the bomb: “These
contaminated ships became radioactive stoves, and would have burned all living things
aboard them with invisible and painless but deadly radiation. Weisgall, Operation
Crossroads, 291.
'®Gary Turbak “Under the Mushroom Cloud” VFW M agazine, March 1998, 12-19.
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This chapter argues that Operation Crossroads was one element o f the nation’s
testing program that adversely affected the nation’s future course o f atomic development
and also urges the reader to recognize the consequences of that contribution: that it so
irradiated an island and its lagoon that the area remained completely uninhabitable for
forty years, jeopardized the health and lives o f tens o f thousands o f servicemen and
islanders, and consumed enormous amounts o f taxpayer dollars. In addition, the operation
escalated the nature o f governmental secrecy. Despite the fact that in response to
opposition the president appointed civilians to serve in key evaluative roles during the
operation, the Joint Chiefs o f Staff neutralized that civilian input, fearful o f “serious
political problems for the military.”"
A year after Crossroads disbanded, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board
issued a preliminary report, and even though the Pentagon had assured Chairman Karl T.
Compton that civilians and the public would have access to the Board’s findings, the
military decided to alter and delete the conclusions o f civilian board members and released
only fragments. Compton resigned in protest, but returned when the Joint Chiefs told him
that the deletions and alterations were the result o f inadvertent clerical errors. The final
report evaluating the operation so “outraged” Truman that the White House requested all
copies be turned over to the Joint Chiefs o f Stafl^ who immediately suppressed the
document because:

" Weisgall, O peration Crossroads, 289.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

159

the findings about the effects o f the atom bomb are so disturbing and
frightening and the recommendations so sensational that the White House
won’t permit it to be made public at this time.
Karl Compton refused repeatedly to relinquish his copy o f the report, and even after his
death in 1954, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, the successor to the Joint
Crossroads Committee, tried unsuccessfully to retrieve his copy and then even asked the
FBI to investigate.

The report revealed what scientists had said all along, that the bomb’s

radioactivity, not the bomb itself was the most lethal (and in war, effective) component of
the bomb. It quite simply “scared the hell” out of everyone on the evaluation board.
What the Joint Chiefs o f Staff wanted suppressed, and what Compton wanted everyone to
Imow about, was contained in the opening lines o f the report, that radioactive fallout, the
extensive dispersal o f radioactive material that occasioned shot Baker, could:
especially if employed in conjunction with other weapons o f mass
destruction, as, for example, pathogenic bacteria. . depopulate vast areas
of the earth’s surface, leaving only vestigial remnants o f man’s material
works.'®

293-298.
Ibid.
Weisgall, O peration Crossroads, 291. In connection with this comment. Rear Admiral
Ralph Ofstie, a Navy member o f the board suggested that the report, and its fiightening
conclusions, left the impression on one “highly experienced and keenly intelligent naval
officer” that “somewhere or other we may have slipped a cog.”
'® The Final Report o f the Joint C hiefs o f S ta ff Evaluation B o a rd fo r O peration
Crossroads, June 30, 1947, JCS 1691/10, cited vnlbid., 291. Curiously, Weisgall had to
cite Ross and Rosenberg, A m erica’s P lansfo r War, Vol. 9, for quotations from the
report; suggesting, perhaps, that he was either unable to obtain a copy, or the one he did
have still contained classified deletions. The report may exemplify one o f the many pitfalls
o f the complications within the nation’s framework o f documentary classification. The
government’s system is gargantuan, but often haphazard and fickle—and two copies o f the
same document recovered at different times from different locations will often have quite
varied deletions. Sometimes, with enough copies from different sources, the researcher
can actually get the text o f an entire document.
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* * *

Manhattan scientists developed a method that allowed man to manipulate nature,
instigating a reaction that changed the world, and the Project itself initiated a chain o f
practices that (since they seemingly contributed to its success) became inscribed within the
testing program, changing the relationship o f the government to its citizens. This chapter
will show how Operation Crossroads built upon the secrecy, military objective, and media
manipulation o f the earliest atomic weapons project and added a fourth element when it
capitalized upon the divisions o f scientists to achieve military goals—all of which only
multiplied the hazardous nature o f postwar atomic testing—and effectively altered the
government’s perception o f the authority o f science and scientists. I continue to be
interested in individuals and their ability to initiate behaviors and structure organizations,
but do also believe that at this juncture the business o f history first requires a broader
perspective—especially since the atomic bomb caused monumental transformations in the
ways that Americans look at the world and their leaders. Accordingly, then, it is
important to look not only at what Operation Crossroads was and how it affected future
atomic testing, but also to look at why it came about.
I have already suggested that the motivating influences o f power and prestige
played the major role in the planning and execution o f Operation Crossroads, and although
those two terms signify concepts that are commonly fi-amed in the mind’s eye o f the

The comments by the JCS concerning biological warfare should not come as a surprise
to readers o f Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman’s The U nited States and B iological
W arfare (Bloomingdale, Indiana:Indiana University Press, 1998).
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historian with an oversize ‘warning!’ sign, they are, nevertheless, fundamental and worthy
topics for consideration.

Though a complete understanding o f the ways that power and

prestige—two multi-dimensional and complex features—have ever operated to shape the
actions o f individuals is impossible. Crossroads offers an opportunity for historians to
confront an instance where their influence cannot be ignored—the historical record reveals
that there is simply no other logical explanation for the Navy’s plan. First, there was no
need to set bombs against naval vessels: scientists warned all along that radiation would
pose the greatest hazard, particularly since the Navy’s ships were built for combat and
structurally designed to withstand bombardment. Additionally, radiation’s effects upon
ship material could be more safely, and scientifically, studied in a laboratory setting.
Second, many contested the Navy’s presumption that any possessor o f an atomic bomb
would expend, actually waste, such a costly and supremely effective weapon o f
depopulation upon ships at sea. Third, and particularly in light o f the foregoing, the
operation demanded an enormous expenditure at a time when the nation’s domestic
problems demanded immediate attention. Fourth, the operation could only but aggravate
the tense relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and jeopardize any
possible agreement on the hotly-debated issue of international control o f atomic energy.
Finally, and perhaps even more telling, is that the Navy designed Operation Crossroads as
a public demonstration—it fully intended to confi-ont and emerge victorious fi'om its battle
with atomic weapons before an audience—armouncing to the world its superiority. It
seems, then, a more-than-reasonable suggestion that the Navy’s public arguments for the
operation shielded more primal, fundamental motives.
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To understand why the Navy sought to aggrandize itself at the expense o f atomic
weapons and ships, it is important to bring the Navy and its relationship with the nation
into context. In this regard, it is helpful to look at Operation Crossroads in light o f the
Manhattan Project and recognize that although there are similarities, there is also a very
dramatic difference between them. In a very broad sense, if the Manhattan Project can be
seen as a process driven by unity and confidence, then Operation Crossroads must be
understood as the product o f disunity and (though perhaps too modem a w ord) insecurity.
The Navy planned and executed the ostentatious Operation Crossroads to prove
itseli^ and its ships, militarily viable in the aftermath o f atomic weapons development and
grossly underestimated both its costs and its consequences.'® To Congress, the Navy
estimated the expense o f the maneuver at $10 million, less than the actual $ 100 million the
Navy itself spent, and miniscule compared to the actual cost to the nation o f Operation
Crossroads: $1.3 billion.

This is not to say that the operation’s consequences and

'®It must be noted that the Navy, and perhaps almost all those who supported Operation
Crossroads, failed to recognize the impact of radiation upon ships; and, failing to take note
o f the scientists who tried to warn them, considered that if ships continued to float, the
operation would constitute a valid indicator of the Navy’s continued presence in the
atomic world. Hanson Baldwin suggested that despite the concerns o f scientists, the tests
would help the Navy plan better ships, even if they were yet “another piecemeal
improvisation which represents the daily evolution o f our postwar defense policy.” He did
suggest other tests, though, so a citizen might “know how deep he might have to go
underground to obtain some reasonable degree o f immunity fi-om atomic explosions.” New
York Times, February 20, 1946, 9.
'’ This astronomical figure does not include later expenses associated with veterans’
compensation schemes or those connected with the settlement o f claims brought by the
Bikini islanders. O’Neill, “Building the Bomb” in Atom ic A udit, V^\ and Weisgall,
O peration Crossroads, 294. Blandy justified the lower, $10 million, figure by valuing the
target ships as salvage, and estimating costs only upon their value per ton as scrap.
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influence can be legitimately measured in dollars alone,'* but the figures do illustrate the
willingness o f the government to funnel postwar dollars into a military program despite the
fact that few believed it worthwhile, and lends credence to my argument that the Navy
placed enormous significance upon Crossroads; indeed, that the Navy believed that the
operation might just secure its very survival. In 1994, Jonathan Weisgall, the attorney who
later successfully represented the Marshalese in their lawsuit against the US government
refused to lay blame, commenting: ‘T his is a story o f a fatal combination o f ignorance and
arrogance. There is no conspiracy and no genuine villain—only victims.” '® There may
have been no conspiracy, but there was plenty o f blame to go around, beginning with the
Army and Navy who trained their sights only on each other.
America’s war against Japan had been, in one sense, the Navy’s own battle, at
least, that is, until the Army dropped two atomic bombs and ended the war. Japan had
attacked the United States through the Navy—the raid on Pearl Harbor killed over two
thousand, sunk or disabled nineteen ships and 150 planes, and coordinating attacks in the
Philippines, Guam and NCdway only increased the losses of Naval personnel and

'* The solution is not that simple. How, for example, can one really place a value on the
suffering o f the displaced 167 Bikinians, the anxiety o f atomic veterans who knew that
they were overexposed, o r the illness and deaths o f those same veterans. Congress,
though, has attempted to do so and has passed legislation compensating both islanders and
veterans.
The Bikini islanders suffered tremendously. Rongerik, the island that served as their
temporary relocation destination, had neither sufficient food nor space for the Bikinians.
It was one-quarter the size o f Bikini, and its lagoon carried more poisonous than nutritious
fish. By August 1946, the islanders had harvested all the island’s food and during the
winter o f 1946-47, the islanders sailed eighteen miles to Rongelap to leave their
malnourished children and elderly and to ask for additional food to take back with them.
WeisgaU, O peration Crossroads. 308-309
Ib id , 5
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equipment. Battleships, carriers and cruisers dominated the war in the Pacific even as the
Army took to the field in the European theatre; but although Japan started the war against
the Navy, the Navy did not get the opportunity to finish it.’® Instead, General Groves
and a special Army squadron o f bombers set up on Tinian Island and, in a week, ended the
war. The atom bomb put the Navy at a perilous junction—it could either prove its viability
or face eventual oblivion as the Army and its spawn, the Air Force, dominated a world o f
atomic weapons.” Tension within the nation’s military establishment filtered into the
public realm quickly, and before the Japanese had even signed the formal surrender, a New
York Times article neatly defined the problem, reporting that the end o f the war gave the
military a “green light to resume their campaign, and Navy leaders are preparing for the
coming fight.””
The atom bomb enormously raised the stakes o f a longstanding intraservice rivalry.
Even during World War U, the military had not expended all o f its energies against the
enemy, and their attacks against each other were so vociferous that Truman later said “. .

’®Indeed, Ralph Bard, Undersecretary o f the Navy and a member o f the Committee that
ostensibly decided whether or not the bomb would be used against Japan, argued that
Japan was already “licked” and that Japan should be warned explicitly before the bomb’s
use. In a memo to Stimson, he said that the Army only wanted to use the bomb to “be in
on the kill.” cited in Robert Jay Lifton and Greg \CtcheU, H iroshim a in Am erica, F ifty
Years o f D enial (New York, NY; G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995).
Interestingly, the US even interviewed Nazi prisoners for their comments on the bomb
and navies. In an August 10 interview, the Hermann Goering sympathized with the US
Navy, noting that the atomic bomb would make “battleships impractical” but
(optimistically) that a new defense was found for every new weapon. New York Times,
August 9, 1945,17. Six months later. Admiral Chester Nimitz made the same argument:
“There are some people who claim that the atomic bomb makes navies obsolete.. That
has been claimed for every other new w eapon.. .Let the ‘false prophets’ prepare the
headlines in advance, such as ‘atomic bombs sink ships in test’ or ‘navy is doomed’ but
don’t take them seriously.” New York Times, February 13, 1946, 13.
^ New York Times, August 25, 1945, 1.
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that if the Army and the Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other,
the war would have ended much earlier.”” The Army and the Air Corps had delivered a
stunning blow in Europe, and delivered the cotq? de grace in the Pacific. The Navy, faced
with a loss o f prestige and money, accepted a suggestion by Lewis S. Strauss (later
Chairman o f the AEC) and plaimed Operation Crossroads as the means to insert a naval
quotient into the atomic equation. Before it was over, the Navy had used up one-third o f
the nation’s supply o f atomic material and rendered a tropical paradise uninhabitable.”

* * *

Analysis reveals that practices within Operation Crossroads correlate to those of
Manhattan: both capitalized upon an overriding military objective, secrecy, and media
manipulation. Crossroads is, perhaps, less well known than Manhattan, but it also
consumed vast amounts o f money justified by an overriding military purpose. In fact.
Admiral Blandy convinced a doubtful Truman by invoking not just the Navy, but the entire
US military establishment—Crossroads was necessary: “o f great importance by the Joint
Chiefs o f Staff.”” And, just as the government and General Groves manipulated the
media, so too did the Navy for Crossroads. The Navy’s operation, though, had the added
benefit o f being able to deliver the goods, live. To chronicle its success, the Navy invited
the most prestigious group of reporters ever assembled at government expense for a six-

” Jonathan Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 26.
” Truman signed the order authorizing a significant obliteration of the nation’s atomic
arsenal without knowing its full implications; only Groves and Eisenhower knew how
many weapons existed at the time. In fact, Truman chose ignorance, telling his cabinet
that he did not want to know. WeisgaU, O peration Crossroads, 8-9.
” James Forrestal, The Forrestal D iaries, Walter hfillis, ed., 22 March 1946, 22.
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week floating excursion to the Pacific—168 print and radio reporters became participants
in the grand public relations scheme. Unfortunately, the large number o f talented
reporters did not get a chance to excercise much creativity—secrecy remained paramount
and the Navy excluded reporters fi'om everything (and everyone) save official press
conferences. They were the epitome o f a captive audience, and according to one, had
“fireedom o f action—on the end of a shrinkable leash.”’® But it is important to look at
Crossroads as more than the sum total o f Manhattan behaviors with the addition o f
displaced islanders and radiation-exposed veterans.”
Operation Crossroads represented a second and crucial stage in the development
o f the nation’s weapons testing program because it was responsible for a profound
perceptional and operational shift in the relationship between scientists and the
government. While the operation promised to solve a number o f questions about atomic
weapons and ships, one o f the most important things it proved was that scientific
information itself could be manipulated in the interests o f a military objective. When the
physicists developed the first atomic weapon, they assumed nearly mythic status but within
a year fi-actures within the scientific community itself developed and the military
capitalized upon those disagreements ’* The end o f the war provided the physicists with

’®Robert Littell “The Voice o f the Apple” H arpers September 1946, cited in Weisgall,
Operation Crossroads, 142. The press fered better than the invited foreign contingent
who were restricted fi'om even press releases. Two Russians attended, a physicist and a
KGB agent w ho posed as a mineral processing expert. Idem ., 144.
” Weisgall does recognize that Crossroads instituted a pattern o f secrecy that had
continued since the inception o f Manhattan, when the first atomic “seeds o f arrogance”
were sown. Ib id , 8.
’* “. . no dinner party is a success without at least one physicist to explain. . the nature o f
the new age in which we live. Ib id , citing H arpers, 83.
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an opportunity to inteiject their own personal attitudes about the atomic bomb and its
consequences. Anxiously, they instigated a national discourse that many thought would
lead to international control and enhanced atomic development; progress divorced, they
hoped, from the limiting and lethal utilization o f physics for warfare alone.
That conversation, though, infused as it necessarily was with the moral, practical,
and political ramifications o f atomic energy belied the all-too-human characteristics o f the
bomb’s creators: their image as derai-gods was shattered. Clearly, as long as scientists
remained mysteriously gifted with knowledge o f the seemingly unknowlable they were
elevated from the rest o f humanity, somehow detached from the cares o f everyday men;
but, when they voluntarily re-entered the world by decrying the power o f their own
invention and politicized their arguments, they became, like any other, susceptible to not
only criticism, but appropriation. The division among physicists at the end o f the war
allowed the Navy to utilize a “one guess is as good as another” philosophy, discarding
those that did not suit their purpose and embracing those that did. Agreeable scientists
became cogs in the military machine and science itself a tool o f the military.

Exception must be made for General Groves, o f course, who from the very start
believed scientists little more than engineers. Groves’ fiustration with scientists only grew
after scientists began to report radiation damage at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and although
he was not particularly concerned with the injury to the Japanese, reports indicated that
the white and red corpuscles o f soldiers had diminished. Groves telephoned Lt. Col. Rea
at Oak Ridge Hospital on August 25 who told him that the drop was possible, but believed
the reports were generated as propaganda. Groves replied “O f course, we are getting a
good dose o f propaganda, due to the idiotic performance of the scientists and another one
who is also on the project.” Dr. Rea, although implicating propaganda, admitted that the
reports were probably correct: “O f course, those Jap scientists over there aren’t so dumb
either and they are making a play on this too. They evidently know what the possibility
is.” “Memorandum o f Telephone Coversation between General Groves and Lt. Col. Rea,
Oak Ridge Hospital, 9:00 a m. 25 August 1945” TSCMED.
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Though the previous chapter discussed the ways that the government suppressed
information about the bomb, it is important to understand that those restrictions limited
discussion about the science o f the bomb, not attitudes about its use. After Hiroshima and
before anti-communistic fervor became inscribed upon the nation’s consciousness, a
vibrant and fluid national discussion ensued over the bomb and the future o f atomic
energy. The issues raised in newspapers illustrate that during the last few montiis o f 1945
and 1946, the nation’s reliance upon atomic weaponry was not (in the public’s mind, at
least) a foregone conclusion and also that some believed that international control could
successfully restrain future use o f the bomb and potential devastation.^ Naturally, too,
others thought that America alone deserved the keys to wholesale destruction and relished
atomic weaponry as an instrument o f everlasting superiority. Before this chapter turns to
the exaggerated demonstration o f naval pride that was Operation Crossroads, it will be
helpful to look at the ways that some politicians, citizens, and scientists articulated their
concerns and shaped a short-lived national debate over atomic weapons and energy.
The monumentousness o f the bomb itself stimulated immediate comment, and
perhaps reflective o f the ‘absolute’ nature o f the bomb, a sampling o f press coverage

^ It is significant, however, that as early as September 21, most members o f Truman’s
cabinet fevored American control o f atomic information. The editor o f Forrestal’s diary
indicates that at a meeting called to determine the US position vis a vis the bomb and
international relationships, most agreed with Forrestal, whose point was that the
knowledge o f the bomb was “the property o f the American people” and that the President
could not give it away without the public’s permission. Willis, The F orrestal D iaries, 9495. Forrestal’s point was undoubtedly reinforced when an October poll o f Congress
reflected that ninety percent believed that the US should retain sole control o f the bomb
and a public poll demonstrated that an almost identical number o f Americans agreed.
Weisgall, O peration Crossroads, 59. Given this, then, it seems that those who urged
international control through 1946 spoke to a small audience o f supporters and a far
greater number o f the unpersuadable.
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reflects that the debate quickly assumed an all-or-nothing stance/® Two letters to the New
York Times, both written on August 7, 1945, illustrate the polarity that occasioned the
widespread belief that America should keep her own counsel. One writer believed that
only wise choices o f leaders could save the earth and that the “fate o f humanity largely
rests upon a course of wisdom or one o f primitive ferocity. . .[and] only men o f great
vision and warm human understanding” should be elected. Another rejected
“understanding” in favor o f aggression, and argued that theUnited States should use “all
its power to obtain military and political control.’” ^ After the bombing o f Nagasaki on
August 9, yet another writer offered an even more determinative, if naive, solution to the
problem of the bomb; “Let us. . .dump the whole thing into the middle o f the Atlantic or
the Pacific, whichever is deeper. .
The bomb’s clandestine deployment also resulted in some poorly-articulated and
decidedly uncontemplative responses. Three days after theUnited States bombed
Nagasaki, New Mexico’s Senator Hatch, obviously a proponent o f the “big stick”
philosophy o f foreign relations and harbinger, perhaps, of atomic diplomacy, proclaimed

It is impossible, o f course, to assess the beliefs o f those whose views were not recorded,
but there is no reason to believe that they differed significantly fi'om those published. The
British, too, were divided; Churchill proposed that the US maintain sole custody and
control, while other members o f Parliament, especially Laborites, noted that “exclusive
knowledge and exclusive use in the sole discretion o f one power o f an overwhelmingly
destructive force. . would make nonsense o f the whole conception o f collective security.”
New York Times, August 22, 1945,4
A. Diaz and R. Harrow, respectively. New York Times “Letters to the Editor” August
9, 1945,11.
New York Times “Letters to the Editor” August 11, 1945. On August 9, the New York
Times published excerpts fi’om the English Press demonstrating allied anger over the
bomb’s use: ‘Ts there to be no protest against the crime of Hiroshima” and “Japan has
never aroused my sympathy until today, and now my heart goes out to her.” New York
Times, August 9, 1945, 11.
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that the “the world” would have to accept the US way, or else: “we die tog eth er.. .the
world is going to have to accept the rule o f law and justice or be destroyed.’” ^’ A perhaps
too-patriotic chemist with the University o f Washington concluded that international
control was unnecessary and thatUnited States should keep control; this, despite his belief
that other countries could not even build such a weapon: “It is doubfiil that any country is
capable o f its development except the United States because o f this country’s production
capacities and great resources.’’^*'^
Others, though, had less faith in the possibility of maintaining the scientific secret
and thus emphasized international guardianship. Scientists, many o f whom were
themselves members o f the world community, wasted no time in stressing the importance
o f international control. Oppenheimer, who said he spoke for the bom b’s developers,
relayed the united hopes o f physicists that the bomb could ensure peace, “. . .the
cooperation and understanding between nations which has seemed desirable for so long
has become a desperate n e c e s s i t y . A veritable “who’s who” o f scientists contributed to
a book. One W orld or N one that relayed their desperation;
Make sure that your Senators and Congressmen know that you are aware
o f the unprecedented gravity o f the problem. Urge them to act with
courage and vision in solving the problem o f the atomic bomb within the

James D. White “Atom Bomb Secret is Big Responsibility” A rizona R epublic, August
12, 1945, 2.
The Arizona R epublic August 9, 1945,5. There were utilitarian hopes at this early
stage. The mayor o f Miami Beach, Herbert A. Frink, embraced a more functional use for
the bomb and telegraphed a proposal to Truman that it be used against hurricanes, more
particularly against the one brewing in the gulf that was about to threaten his city. Santa
Fe New M exican, August 21, 1945, 1.
Oppenheimer, New York Tim es, August 9, 1945.
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framework o f the new ideas that, as this book shows, are necessary to the
solution. Time is short. And survival is at stake.^®
Newspaper editors too, believed that the bomb’s secrets could not be kept and stressed
the need for international control. Waldemar Kaempffert called it an “unsecretive secret,”
noting that Great Britain and Canada already knew about it, Germany had come close, the
Russians would eventually, and when small countries developed bombs “little Davids”
would be able to lay Goliaths low.^’ Another editor with the A rizona R epublic insisted
‘Tf ever there was a need for international machinery to maintain the peace o f the world. .
the atomic bomb. . has made it vital.”^* While those inside the nation argued whether
international control was necessary, or desirable, statesmen negotiated with the Russians.
Perhaps because o f the rapidly changing international situation, or because
historians are limited to written material and do not have the luxury o f discovering what
may have stirred in the minds o f those long gone, it is difficult to establish a clear measure
o f commitment on the part o f the administration to an international agreement on atomic
weapons. \ ^ t h little direction from the president. Secretary o f State James F. Byrnes tried

Contributors to the volume included, among others, Oppenheimer, Bethe, Louis
Ridenour, Albert Einstein, Leo Szilard, Harold U r^ . Dexter Masters, Katharine Way,
eds. One W orld or None (New York, NY; Wittlesey House o f McGraw Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1946), 79. The book’s reviewer, John J. O’Neill, said that “the scientists
are, like Luther, tacking their thesis on the door of state departments and parliaments
throughout the world.” New York H erald Tribune Weekly B ook Review , VU, March 17,
1946.
See also the Am erican A ssociation o f Atom ic Scientists ’B ulletin that stressed the
maintenance o f US military superiority in tandem with international control o f atomic
energy: “Much as we may all hope that the millenium of peace is about to arrive, there is
little reason to believe that it is here.” April 1946, vol. 5, no. 4,27.
Waldemar Kaempffert, “Now That We Have Got an Atomic Bomb, What Do We
Expect To Do About It? New York Times, August 26, 1945, E9.
Arizona R epublic, August 9, 1945, 1.
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to secure a Soviet agreement to participate in an international scheme for atomic control.
As the “only American ever to serve as governor, secretary o f state. Supreme Court
justice, congressman, and senator” Byrnes probably had no doubt that he could solidify
Soviet cooperation.^® His methods betray no lack o f confidence, and during September
1945 at a conference with Molotov, warned “If you don’t cut out all this stalling.. .1 am
going to pull an atomic bomb out o f my hip pocket and let you have it.”^ By December,
though, after Byrnes had taken some advice from Stimson, Kennan and Truman, he
approached Stalin directly (with considerably less bravado) and received a verbal
agreement from the Soviets on the issue o f international control. Shortly after Americans
got this news during Byrnes’ homecoming radio broadcast, Truman called him to the
White House and chastized Byrnes for believing a Soviet promise.*”
International control was not “dead in the water”**^ but as Weisgall notes, the
relationship between the Soviet Union and the Americans (and British) was beginning to
deteriorate. On February 9, Stalin delivered a speech promising the trebling o f Soviet
industry and claiming that “peaceful international order. . was impossible under the

39

Weisgall, O peration Crossroads, 57.
Gregg Herkin, The W inning Weapon, 203
Weisgall, O peration Crossroads, 58-60; and McCullough, Truman, 479.
In late March, 1946, the long-awaited Acheson-Lilienthal plan for international control
received high praise, but Truman’s choice of the US representative for the plan, Bernard
Baruch, casts some doubt upon the president’s commitment to the plan. When Baruch
accepted the position, Truman noted “He wants to run the world, the moon and maybe
Jupiter-but we’ll see.” The most outspoken proponent for intemation control,
Oppenheimer, claimed that the day Truman appointed Baruch was the day that “he gave
up hope.” Weisgall, Ib id ,lQ , citing Peter Goodchild, J. R obert O ppenheimer
(Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1981) 71. One of the plan’s developers and later Chairman o f
the AEC, David E. Lilienthal, had serious doubts about the Baruch appointment,
particularly after Baruch admitted that “he wasn’t much on technical scientific stufl^ but he
could smell his way through it.” Lilienthal Diaries, The A tom ic Energy Years, 32,43.
40
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capitalist world economy,” a speech that Justice Douglas and James Forrestal considered
privately the “declaration o f World W ar

Shortly thereafter, the “breaking moment”

in this nation came on March 5, 1946, when Churchill delivered his ‘iron curtain’ speech in
Missouri."” It cannot be known, o f course, whether all the publicity surrounding the atom
bomb contributed to international friction, but it is not unreasonable to assume that it had
some effect. If that is the case, then, the many confrontations over the Atomic Energy
Commission and Operation Crossroads that played out in the nation’s press may have
intensified the progress of the cold war.*^
The issue o f international control had given the scientists an arena through which
they might articulate their uniform arguments, but domestic control of atomic energy
provided them an arena o f a different sort, and that issue became and highly public point
o f contention between scientists. On October 3, 1945, Truman proposed that Congress
establish an Atomic Energy Commission and two bills, one by Senators Andrew May and
Edwin Johnson (the May-Johnson Bill), another by Senator Brian McMahon (the
McMahon Bill), were introduced. Although Oppenheimer, Lawrence, Compton, and
Fermi supported the May-Johnson Bill, most other scientists considered it simply a
continuation of the Manhattan Project and argued that the associated military restrictions

Millis, The Forrestal D iaries, 134.
” Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 61.
On Independence Day, 1946, the New York Times reported that Boris Izakov of the
Soviet’s Pravda had claimed that Crossroads amounted to a military demonstration
designed to force concessions. Crossroads “explode[d] something more important than a
couple o f out-of-date warships. It fundamentally undermined the belief int he seriousness
o f American talk about atomic disarmament. . This is what in the long run atom
diplomacy boils down t o . . it is by no means more attractive when it is accomplanied by
light and explosion effects. July 4, 1946, 4.
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would not serve science.**® Sixty prominent figures, including Albert Einstein and twentyseven other physicists, petitioned Capital FBII in support of their argument that the MayJohnson bill would establish “totalitarian authority” and “promote a competitive arms
race.” The rival bill reflected not only McMahon’s personal dislike o f General Groves
(one o f McMahon’s Connecticut neighbors who previously threatened to run against him)
but also his firm belief that atomic energy required civilian, not military, control.**^ The
highly charged debates over the domestic issue o f atomic control drove a fi-acturing wedge
through the heart o f the scientific community and resulted in a long-term, and enormously
consequential, division.
Even as international and domestic control o f the bomb itself stimulated divisive
and heated debates, the aptly-named Operation Crossroads became the locus for the
gamut o f atomic concerns, including disputation o f international control, domestic
trusteeship, military rivalry, and civilian atomic interests. Admiral Blandy had hoped that

**®A physicist’s letter to the Association o f Los Alamos Scientists declared that “my
confidence in our leaders. . .is shaken.” Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 65. The
supporters, however, pointedly qualified their support and urged for the relaxation o f both
compartmentalization and secrecy so associated with Manhattan. In this regard, see
Oppenheimer’s statement before Congress in TSCMED.
**^ The B ulletin o f the A tom ic Scientists, February 15, 1946,1; Weisgall, O peration
Crossroads, 67. See also Herkin’s analysis o f the relationship between McMahon and
Groves, The W inning Weapon, 133. As early as August 10, 1945, Senator McMahon
urged some sort o f ‘constructive’ use for atomic energy, apart fi’om weaponry by sending
a telegram to Truman “that the united energies o f scientists of the world be combined in
some effort to discover causes and cures for the deadly diseases o f mankind.” New York
Times, August 19, 1945, 6.
Secretary o f War Robert Patterson “attacked” McMahon because his bill excluded the
military control. Curiously, he argued that the civilian commission would not develop
military weapons and also that any military weapons it developed would be un&miliar to
the military forces asked to use them. Samuel A. Tower “Patterson Fights for Voice on
A X oxpl'’ New York Times, February 15, 1946, 3.
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the operation could be reviewed by an all-Navy board, but that proposal disturbed the
Army Air Corps which became irate and insisted that it also participate in the review, but
proposed to report only to the president. Senator McMahon, already an outspoken
opponent o f the military’s influence in atomic affairs, criticized the operation and forced
Truman and then-Secretary o f the Navy Forrestal to announce on February 13, 1946 that
the operation would be evaluated by civilians."** Still, on February 17, Hansen Baldwin
stated the obvious self-serving nature o f the tests: that the Navy’s experiment would not
result in the advertised fact-finding and scientifically-beneficial operation, but rather that
the Navy planned the maneuver solely in its own best interests and would undoubtedly
serve as “judge and jury.”**® On February 19, 1946, President Truman tried to quell some
o f the debate and armounced personally that a civilian board w ould oversee the tests and
report not to the military, but to him. This move infuriated both the Army and the Navy
who joined in a rare display o f common cause, believing that it reflected executive
mistrust and also because it appeared that Truman had finally committed to support the

***During the meeting about the tests, Truman called the critics “crackpots” but decided
that a special commission would attend the tests to validate the Navy’s findings for the
benefit of Truman and the public. Forrestal and Admiral Leahy objected especially to
McMahon’s bill, claiming that it insinuated a “distrust o f the armed services. . .[since it]
proposed to turn over the making o f one o f the most effective weapons o f war to a civil
commission.” The D iaries o f Jcanes Forrestal, 13 February 1946, 133. Their comments,
though, do betray a like distrust o f civilians.
At the March 22 cabinet meeting, Truman insisted that Operation Crossroads (originally
scheduled to begin on May 15) be delayed until after July 1 because a sixty-member
Congressional delegation planned to attend while they still “had business” to take care of.
McCullough,491. At the same meeting. Commerce Secretary Wallace proposed that the
Navy limit the test to the deep-water detonation experiment. M llis, The D iaries o f James
Forrestal, 22 March 1946. Had that recommendation been accepted, the results might
have been disasterous.
**®Hansen Baldwin, New York Tim es (February 17, 1946), 32.
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McMahon Bill, one that they were united against/® Additionally, Secretary o f State
Byrnes still worried that the publicity associated with the tests would disturb international
relations and the summer’s Paris Peace Conference and asked that they be postponed/*
Respected physicists agreed with Byrnes that the operation could be
counterproductive to international cooperation on atomic energy and weaponry and that
the tests promised to add little scientific information/^ The B ulletin o f Atom ic Scientists
clearly defined its subscribers’ belief that the tests would have little effect upon battleships
and that the American people might be convinced that the atomic bomb was ‘ju st another
big bomb” and not worthy o f international control/*’ In its May issue, Lee DuBridge,

®®The president had vacillated in support for the May-Johnson and McMahon bills.
Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, p. 66. Arthur Krock, “Civilian Atomic Rule” New York
Times, February 20, 1946, 8. The Navy did not rely upon Crossroads alone, however, and
spoke freely (and publicly) every chance they got to convince the American public that the
Navy was necessary. On February 14, Secretary o f the Navy James Forrestal and Fleet
Admiral Nimitz claimed that the Navy was the “surest defense” against atomic
bombardment, and that the House should agree to increase the Navy’s enlisted men in
order to build a “strong Navy with bases sufficiently distant to interdict a ll approaches to
either surface or airborne launchers. ” (emphasis mine). Their testimony was
accompanied by a map that generously sprinkled “Main,” “Secondary” ‘Naval Air” and
“Submarine” bases throughout the Pacific and Atlantic. New York Times, February 15,
1946,1,3. The Navy’s testimony came one day after retiring General “Hap” Arnold said
that the US should “capitalize on the atomic bomb. . to assure world peace” with
(naturally) a “strong air fo rce.. to destroy hostile airpower before it reached its target.
New York Times, February 14, 1946, 1.
Jonathan Weisgall proposes that Byrnes’ argument were probably more influential in
Truman’s decision to postpone the operation from May till July than the stated domestic,
legislative concerns. O peration Crossroads, 92.
Hanson Baldwin “U.S. Defense Held in Peril” New York Times, February 17, 1946, 32.
Baldwin detailed the extent o f the opposition, “The atomic bomb physicists and many of
the nation’s scientists” and noting that their arguments were “sound” suggested that
Truman pick a committee o f “outstanding civilians with scientific or engineering
background” to review and evaluate the tests. Baldwin’s suggestion was a good one, but
unfortunately, few “outstanding” civilians wanted anything to do with the tests.
B ulletin o f Atom ic Scientists, Y ebvuary 15, 1946, 1, 11.
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President of the California Institute o f Technology, worried that the tests could not
possibly improve international relations, and that “at this critical hour they are in poor
taste.”^** The Association o f Los Alamos Scientists concurred, and Louis N. Ridenour,
spokesman for the Federation o f American Scientists called Operation Crossroads “The
Great Boondoggle.” A University o f Chicago physicist, Albert S. Cahn, succinctly
analyzed the problem: “In case o f war, no power is going to be foolish enough to waste
its bombs on a few boats. They are going to bomb the cities and harbors.”^® The
operation’s supporters, though, pushed these legitimate concerns aside.
When some scientists questioned the safety o f the project and whether the
ramifications had been carefully investigated, they were dismissed and the opinions o f
supportive scientists (and civilians) accepted instead. DuBridge had also expressed health
and safety concerns unaddressed by the Navy, particularly fallout—warning that water
spray onto observation vessels or a sudden rainstorm that could trap radioactive material
and carry it to unsuspecting, and unprotected, locations.^® When presented with
DuBridge’s concerns, a member o f Operation Crossroad’s civilian evaluation board
superficially dismissed them, saying ‘DuBridge has been wrong before.” The Navy’s
choice of Technical Director for the project. Dr. Ralph Sawyer, an expert in spectroscopy,
demonstrates the dearth o f physicists willing to participate in the questionable
‘experiment.’”

Lee DuBridge, B ulletin o f Atom ic Scientists, May 15, 1946, 7.
Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 86.
®®Lee DuBridge, B ulletin o f the A tom ic Scientists, May 15, 1946,7; Weisgall, Operation
Crossroads, 88.
Ib id
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After Truman had decided to back the Navy’s operation, the administration began
a process o f manipulation designed to stimulate support and avoid public criticism. As the
list o f opposing scientists grew and as their arguments became public, it looked for at least
one famous scientist to support the project. Truman asked Groves to contact
Oppenheimer and ask him to serve as part o f the president’s oversight committee. Groves
agreed and contacted Oppenheimer, asking him to attend the tests, but knowing
Oppenheimer’s objections, did not ask him to participate in the evaluation—a nuance
apparently lost on Oppenheimer (and Truman.) Although Oppenheimer initially agreed, he
wrote a lengthy letter to Truman on May 3, 1946, asking to be excused. The
administration, reluctant to fuel the already-heated debate over the tests; or, perhaps,
equally reluctant for the public to know wAy Oppenheimer chose not to participate,
refused to excuse him o r even announce that he would not be participating until after the
operation began.®*
There was, indeed, no lack o f controversy or chicanery leading up to Operation
Crossroads and those features only continued (and escalated) once the Navy’s ships were
anchored around Bikini. Let us turn now and look more closely at Operation Crossroads
to see why, in the interests o f naval prestige, the Navy wasted almost a hundred ships,
exposed tens o f thousands o f servicemen to radiation, and how one man, Stafford Warren,
struggled to save crewmen from needless radiation exposure and how he finally
convinced the Navy, with a radiographic image o f a fish’s scale, to finally give up.
* * *

®* After a lenthy list o f reasons, Oppenheimer told the president that whatever the outcome
o f the tests, it “could well be most undesirable” for him to produce a report on the
operation. Ibid., 98-99.
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When it was all over and he was on his voyage home, Stafford L. Warren, the
operation’s Radiological Safety Officer, wrote his wife from sea on August 20 that, having
slept for four straight days, he had partially recovered but was ready for a vacation; he
was “tired o f bombs and radioactivity.”®® The Operation had been an ordeal throughout
its planning stages, and once Crossroads got underway in the Pacific, Warren had battled
not only radiation, but arrogant ships’ officers who seemed unable to understand the
potential o f the invisible enemy. He was not accustomed to such widespread disregard of
his professional competence and had, after aU, spent years working to protect the
uninformed from, and teaching others about, radioactivity. As Chief o f the Medical
Section o f the Manhattan Project and Ad\isor to General Groves, he had built the medical
and industrial radiological program “from scratch.” Additionally, he was second in
command o f the survey team that the United States detached into Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.®® After he left Japan and had accepted the Navy’s offer to serve on Operation
Crossroads, he realized immediately that his experiences with General Groves had not
prepared him for the Navy and the highly politicized and publicized atmosphere of postwar
atomic testing.®*

®®Letter from Stafford Warren to Viola, August 20, 1946, Box 1, Viola Warren
Collection, Young Library, UCLA.
®®Letter to Dr. George F. Lull from Stafford Warren, December 5, 1946, Warren MSS,
Box 73, 74. Warren performed the first studies in Japan and concluded there that
radiation in Japan caused far more damage than the bomb itself and conducted the first
systemic study o f fallout, and after Crossroads, developed an inexpensive meter to
measure radioactivity.
®* Warren had demonstrated his willingness to take on the military in the interests of
science, and humanity. While he served on the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in
Japan, he reported that Japanese scientists, “eager to publish the results o f their studies”
had been prevented from doing so by the military occupation. Additionally, and though he
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Warren confronted the potentially contradictory reality that while safety was his
responsibility, the Navy’s chief concern was publicity. Since Warren needed so many
physicians, trained medical personnel and technicians that he could not rely upon the
Navy’s resources, he began recruitment in the private sector almost immediately.
Acquiring civilians, though, presented an additional problem because Warren was unable
to tell them exactly when, or for how long, they might be needed. Scheduling posed
problems for Warren—it was a crucial factor that might determine whether or not Warren
could locate enough willing personnel. After Truman had already ordered the first o f
three planned shots (originally scheduled for May) postponed until after July 1, the Na\y
proposed another change that would have extended the entire operation. At a January 22
meeting, they suggested a mid-August date for the second test. Warren became
“disgusted” and, blaming the delay on the Navy’s desire for publicity, demanded that
unless the two shots were scheduled closer together, he would insist that the entire team
leave after the first shot and then return for the second:
Groves’ method o f w orking.. .may have been upsetting but it was decisive
in the main and accomplished what you were supposed to do. Blandy will
soon have to put the foot dow n.. .there is no distinction between what is
public relations and what is a working session.®^
Finally, Able was tentatively scheduled for July 1, and B aker as quickly as cleanup from
the first had been completed and weather permitted.

probably had little reason to include this statement except as a criticism o f the occupation
forces, he noted that at the University o f Literature and Science in Hiroshima, a professor
o f zoology had mated some rabbits that had been caged 1.6 km from the hypocenter, but
(sadly) they had to be killed for food before the young were bom. Report No. 4: 16-22
December 1946, Warren MSS, box 84.
®^ Stafford Warren to Viola Warren, January 22, 1946, \fiola Warren Collection.
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It is not necessary, however, to rely sole upon Warren’s disdain as evidence o f the
Navy’s emphasis on public relations, since plenty of evidence exists to illustrate that the
Navy’s commitment to the operation was firmly grounded in a desire for positive press.
First o f all, hoping that image just might, perhaps, be everything, the Navy changed the
name o f the operation. The new name, “Joint Task Force One,” carried none o f the
critical baggage that had been directed at “Operation Crossroads” and, additionally,
acknowledged the Army’s contribution through both Manhattan Project cooperation and
the Air Corps’ delivery o f the Able weapon, de-emphasizing, too, the power struggle
between the armed services.'’^* There is evidence that the tactic was not completely
successful, for by the time the Navy published its official operation plan, the Navy insisted
that all publicity refer to the operation as “Joint Army-Navy Task Force ONE.”®**
Secondly, the Navy’s public information office encouraged the development o f a
more positive image and coordinated all publicity to already-prevalent criticism. With the
approval o f Admiral Blandy, the Navy’s Public Information Office distributed bulletins
designed to help task force members deal with a wide range o f criticism. On March 7
Warren received the first “Public Information Estimate” under a Joint Task Force One
letterhead that informed him o f the “general attitude of the public toward Operation
Crossroads” and suggested “appropriate public information policies to be followed.” The
report’s short, positive, preface suggested that the public’s attitude seemed to be “sane
and encouraging” and that the operation was “widely recognized as a forward-looking

®®Without legislation controlling domestic atomic energy, the Manhattan Project (and
General Groves) maintained control o f atomic weapons and materiel.
®**“Appendix I to Annex ‘O ’ o f ComJointTaskFor ONE No. 1-46” (4)0-I-2. Warren
MSS.
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military experiment” but the bulletin’s three pages o f sample criticism and suggested
responses demonstrate that it was clearly designed to assure that task force members
respond properly to existing, and possible future, criticism/® The tone o f the missive
clearly indicates that the Navy was confident that it could successfully sway public
support, particularly since “opposition to the tests has been sporadic, relatively
unorganized, and ineffective. Widest opposition appears to come fi'om the ‘dissatisfied
scientists.’” The Navy indicated that the only “strong” opposition came from objections
by the Society for the Prevention o f Cmelty to Animals.®®
Despite, or more likely because o^ the Navy’s investment in positive press, it
severely limited the activities o f reporters allowed to participate in Operation Crossroads.
It did, though, accomodate them by setting aside one ship for reporters only, the
Appalachian-, and another equipped with communications equipment and wire services,
the Panam int. The Navy’s formal “Plan of Operation” covered every possible eventuality,
and dedicated “Annex O” and its multiple appendices to the press corps.®^ In the interests
of national security, the Navy invoked President Truman’s order o f September 14, 1945,

®®The Navy’s use o f the word “sane” as an attribute o f those who encouraged the tests
leads one to wonder ifj perhaps, the Navy believed the obverse—that any criticism o f the
operation was “insane.” The report includes a litany o f criticism, some already noted
earlier in this chapter, but other criticism cited included: “uncontrollable chain reaction. .
volcanic eruptions. . radiation effects at great distances. . grave risks to personnel. .
destruction o f marine life and damage to fisheries. . pacifistic reaction. . .” It should be
noted that although the testing resulted in no uncontrollable chain reaction or volcanic
eruptions, the rest o f the criticisms seem to have been feirly leveled, rational, and borne
out by time—including the feared, though perhaps too-long-delayed ‘pacifistic reaction’.
“Public Information Estimate No. 1”, 7 March 1946; Warren MSS, box 73, 74, reel 1.
^Ibid, 2 .
®^ Including a typhoon plan complete with air-sea rescue and evacuation.
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to editors and broadcasters to rely solely upon official releases/* and placed other
restrictions upon reporters and the information they divulged. Information that focused
upon the grandiose nature o f the operation, however, was encouraged. For example, the
Navy admitted that it would use a Nagasaki-type bomb and although almost all other
information was restricted, it made a notable exception where the size o f the weapon
might be used as a measure o f naval strength in the face of atomic weaponry: “Note; It
may be said that the bomb has the explosive power equivalent to 20,000 tons o f TNT; it is
2,000 more pow erful than any other bomb y et used.’’’^'^
Additionally, the Navy managed a far-flung empire devoted to public relations. It
censored photography, posting “photographic review officers at all necessary points”
including on the Appalachian, Kwajalein, and at “processing laboratories” in the US. The
public relations aspect o f the operation was not limited to nationally-recognized reporters
and broadcasters, however, because the Navy had “established procedures” to furnish
stories to hometown newspapers o f participating servicemen. A not-insignificant task
considering that over 43,000 servicemen participated in Operation Crossroads.^®
The Navy’s image, though, required the legitimazation o f its spectacle, a task
which only increased the extent o f the operation’s planning. The incorporation o f
‘scientific studies’ inserted a massive civilian component into Crossroads and required an
elaborate set o f contingencies. To the already-complicated military organization was
added the transportation, security, housing, and evacuation o f civilian researchers.

®* “Appendix I to Annex ‘O ’ o f ComJointTaskFor ONE No. 1-46” (I)(2),0-I-l, Shields
Warren Collection, box 79.
Ibid. (2)(b)(3),0-I-l. (emphasis mine).
'"'Ib id (5)(e),0-l-2.
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General Groves, who had confidently gnawed through the intricacies o f building the
Pentagon and the even more complex Manhattan Project said that

. .it would be difficult

to get it more complicated.” And the Navy itself said that the Operation’s planning was
“so vast and detailed as to suggest the Book o f Fate itself.”’* Designed to illustrate the
Navy’s commitment to methodical operational development, the statement also betrays the
more fimdamental motivations and subjectivities lurking within the nation’s military in the
wake o f the atomic bomb. The “fate” o f the Navy rested upon its ability to justify its
hairy-chested display as something more noble—a contribution to science.
Hence, Blandy publicly placed science ahead o f military concerns, repeatedly
announcing that the operation was a joint scientific-military venture.” One commentator
fi'om L ife noted that so many university scientists were involved that Bikini had become
the most studied place on earth, and that “astrology” seemed to be the the only “ology”
missing in the contingent.” The military, though, placed great emphasis upon its own
experimental animals. The Burleson, an attack transport modified with concrete-covered
decks, holding pens, feeding troughs, special drainage systems, and carrying eighty tons o f

’* Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 118.
” The Navy was, perhaps, a little slow in recognizing the value o f co-opting science into
their program, because although planning for the operation began in August, 1945, a letter
fi'om the Massachusetts Fisheries Association o f December 12, 1945 to Secretary o f War
Patterson complained bitterly about the ocean testing; “Warnings have already been
issued to both branches o f the Armed Forces by the Fish and Wildlife Service o f the
Department o f the Interior, coupled with requests fi'om the industry for detailed surveys
before such tests are conducted. If these experiments are carried out without regard to
the effect on Marine life, the results are likely to be disasterous to commercial fishing
operations both afloat and ashore.. W e suggest that y o u .. immediately request a
postponement of all such experiments until conditions are properly studied.” Thomas D.
Rice to The Honorable Robert Patterson, December 12, 1945. Warren MSS, Box 77.
” Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 120.
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hay and grain in its hold, housed 5,664 pigs, mice, guinea pigs, goats and rats. Blandy
announced that he regretted that “some o f these animals may be sacrificed.. but we are
more concerned about the men and women of the next generation than we are about the
animals of this one.”” The self-aggrandizement o f that statement deserves little comment,
but it should be noted that Blandy apparently assumed (and no one apparently questioned)
that radiation experiments on animals could only be carried out 4500 miles from the
nearest US laboratory.
Important, too, is the fact that Blandy’s statements about the operation’s animal
experimentation reveals an inexcusable ignorance about radiation and its effects. The
animals were destined for tether or cage on decks, bridges, turrets, and engine rooms of
twenty-two target ships; some dressed in Navy antiflash suits, others covered with
sunblock cream. Planned for exposure to shot Able, the Navy admitted that some animals
might die, but believed that although many would become sick fi'om radiation, they would
eventually be returned to Washington and remain subjects o f study until they died “a
natural death.”’® Initially, A ble seemed to confirm Blandy’s confidence: ten percent of the
animals died immediately as a result o f the blast, and the Navy boasted (and the press
dutifully reported) that the goats, seemingly “imperturbable” had continued eating
throughout the ordeal. Most animals, though, died within months o f the shot from
radiation sickness. There was one survivor of the radiation: the lucky pig “3 11” had
escaped sometime after the shot and was rescued while swimming in the lagoon. She lived
out her days, though apparently sterile, at the Washington, D C. zoo, and finally died in

'^^Ibid.

Ib id , 120-121.
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1950.’® The public heard little about the delayed fate o f the experimental animals since
most died after the reporters had left Bikini and the Joint Chiefs o f Staff" suppressed the
final report on the operation. Blandy’s willingness to believe, though, that the effects o f
radiation might, like the flu or chicken-pox, subside, even despite mounting contradictory
(and perfectly legitimate) evidence, explains bis almost-complete disregard for the effects
o f radiation upon servicemen that would be exposed during shots A ble and Baker f
Shot A ble was, ironically, both a success and a failure. The Navy believed A ble
would be the most predictable o f the planned tests, presumably since it was an air drop
like ffiroshima and Nagasaki. As the first shot. A ble enjoyed the most press coverage, and
(as has already been shown) employed the so-called scientific animal studies. Additionally,
the Navy hoped that A ble would demonstrate the “joint” nature o f the operation since Air
Corps pilots would deliver the bomb. The Army had held contests among General
Groves’ special B-29 crews to chose the best one to fly D ave’s Dream and deliver A ble.
Perhaps to the Navy’s great satisfaction, though, the Army’s contribution to the operation
was less-than-exemplary. Despite the weeding-out process, practice runs demonstrated
that the pilot was unable to hit (or even locate) the Navy’s central target ship, the N evada,
with a dummy bomb. For the ease of Air Corps bombers, the Nevada, a ship that the
Navy chose because she was the “most rugged ship available” and had served nobly

76

Ib id , 190-191.
” Blandy had only to consider the warnings o f US scientists (including DuBridge), or his
own RadSafe officer, Stafford Warren, to realize that radiation’s effects were not
temporary. Indeed, had he sought a realistic appraisal o f the potential for radioactive
injury, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in Japan could have provided him with
ample (and heartbreaking) evidence. In this regard, see the volumnous files in the Warren
MSS, particularly box 84.
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throughout the Pacific theatre despite having been run aground at Pearl Harbor, was
painted an undignified bright red and orange.” The paint did not help. At 4:00 am on
July 1, 1946, the bomb missed its target by over a half mile. It landed, instead, upon the
Independence, a ship carrying an enormous quantity of instrumentation, “invalidating
much o f what had been planned as a scientific test.”” Fires burned on many ships, and
others suffered twisted metal, but the rugged Independence kept floating even though the
twenty-five fighter planes on her deck had been tossed into the sea. Blandy capitalized
upon the dramatic scene and accompanying the official Crossroads press release was a
picture o f Blandy and Secretary o f the Navy Forrestal rushing into the smoking hulks,
emphasizing the duo’s bravery, “unmindful o f radioactivity still lingering aboard ships in
th e .. bull’s eye circle.”*® After all the buildup, the bomb disappointed the press, and they
returned to Bikini Island from their observation ships and noted that not only did the palm
trees seem untouched, but photographic towers and even shoreline vegetation appeared
normal.** The Navy had won, though, because the ships kept floating, the goats seemed
ok, and the Army’s Air Corps had, after all, missed its mark.*’

’* Weisgall, O peration Crossroads, 3, 168, 189. YoxBaker, the Navy put the Nevada in
the outer ring o f ships, and was “listing” by July 28—three days after the blast. In a report
calculating the amount o f time necessary for ships to ‘cool o ff sufficiently to allow their
re-use, Warren estimated that the Nevada could go back into service in 1949. Warren
MSS, box 78, 79. After Crossroads, the Navy towed the N evada to Pearl Harbor and
sunk 65 miles southwest o f Pearl on July 31, 1948. The battleship, however, did not go
gently into that good night’—it took “four days o f gunfire, bomb, rocket, and torpedo hits”
to sink the Nevada. Weisgall, O peration Crossroads, 317.
” /&«i,189; also Warren’s “Resume” 6 July 1946, Department o f Energy, CIC 140588.
*®Weisgall, O peration Crossroads, 191.
** Ib id , 191-192. One said that “there were more explosions in that first Red Sox game at
Fenway”
187.
*’ Understandably, each service had a different version after A ble. Admiral Blandy
claimed that he had seen worse damage from Kamikaze attacks; the Air Corps armounced
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Warren and his radiation safety officers began their battle with the Navy over
radiation almost as soon as A ble was detonated. The bomb exploded five-hundred feet
over the array o f ships so there was little radioactive water spray, but radiation was an
immediate problem—as was the Navy which refused to heed Warren’s warnings. The
submarine Skate appeared to have suffered severe damage, but since its structure was
sound and watertight, it became the focus o f the Navy’s attempt to prove its invincibility.
Reporters, unable to see more than the delapidated and burned surface believed her a
goner. Warren’s team estimated that the Skate would remain dangerously radioactive for
three days and his team posted large warning signs ‘DANGER! VERY RADIOACTIVE!
KEEP CLEAR!” The signs, however, made little difference to the Navy and by July 2, the
Skate, still carrying its warning signs, cruised around the lagoon with a full crew, receiving
a salute fi'om Admiral Blandy and his flagship. A weapons team member from Los
Alamos was astounded: “That submarine was hotter than all hell. . but here was the Navy,
all gung-ho, lining up those sailors.”*® Warren was probably encouraged because the
monitors after A ble confirmed earlier estimates of amount and decay rate, but should have,
perhaps, taken the Navy’s reluctance to respect his “warning” signs as an ominous sign o f
the Navy’s lack o f respect for radiation. Warren, however, made no particular notice o f it
in either letters to his wife or in reports about Able. Instead, he looked ahead to the Baker
shot and worried about a more fearsome battle with radiation.

that the test demonstrated the flexibility and power o f its force, and had they been at war,
that bomb would have “wiped out” the entire fleet; and Groves was furious, not only
because the Navy underestimated the bomb’s effects and associative radiation, but because
the Air Corps missed its target. Ibid., 186, 196, 197-198.
*®Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 195-196.
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The Navy had been warned against trying an underwater shot like Baker, but they
had also been warned against the very deep water planned shot C harlie—zsA they ignored
both. The potential for a disaster with Baker may have seemed inconsequential (“waves a
hundred feet high, winds reaching a thousand miles and hour, and heat measured in
hundreds o f millions o f degrees”) compared to the prospect for C harlie, a shot that even
Blandy admitted was lethally unpredictable:
no one can be sure what the results will be. . among the things that have to
be considered are whether this bomb might set up an endless chain reaction
in the ocean, or radioactivitize the water over large areas.***
Thankfully, in the aftermath o f Baker, the Navy postponed (forever) Charlie

and one

can only be saddened that Blandy did not listen to the warnings about B aker that began in
December 1945. Warren and scientists from Los Alamos warned that an underwater
explosion would prevent the dissipation o f radiation and most radioactivity would fall
directly back into the lagoon or into shipping lanes. Additionally, that even support ships
would not be able to avoid the uptake of radioactively-contaminated saltwater into ships’
systems. One scientist warned Blandy that the Manhattan Project would fervently oppose
the underwater shot unless it could be “demonstrated to be absolutely vital and
[information] obtainable in no other manner.” In view of this warning, Blandy originally
abandoned the plans for an underwater shot, but then, under “political” pressure that the

***Ibid. 116-123. Note that Blandy’s comments about Baker relate only to phycial effects-waves, wind, heat—and ignore the problems he had been warned about concerning
radiation.
*®Groves probably played a role in C harlie's cancellation. He had complained throughout
that the tests compromised national security, and finally, with C harlie claimed that since
the “important casualty producing radioactivity would be lost under water” it would be
scientifically unproductive. Ib id , 257-261.
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Navy might just be trying to avoid damage to ships, took a firm stand in support o f an
underwater atomic detonation.*®
It is clear that with Baker, the Navy knew and accepted that there would be an
enormous radioactive contamination problem and that the only ‘mystery’ the test might
solve was how long before ships’ crews could make the hot ships habitable.*’ A summary
o f scientific opinion gathered before the Baker shot reflects that Blandy, and the rest of
Crossroads’ planners, knew that it would, without a doubt, contaminate not only target
ships, but support ships as well. Los Alamos predicted a “witch’s brew” o f plutonium
near the surface—enough to poison all US forces at their highest wartime strength. The
University o f California warned that a 10,000 feet or less rise o f the atomic cloud {Baker
had been estimated to rise 5,000-8,000 feet) would present “the greatest hazard.” A
British explosives expert warned that the low cloud height would result in a “collapse of
the water column. . .[and] cover many ships with water and contaminate them.”** It
seems preposterous that, given all o f the warnings Blandy received (fi'om his own
scientists and others) that Baker would result in catastrophe, he continued with the test
because o f ‘political’ reasons; and, I suggest, for a chance at another public relations coup.
Baker was a precision weapon that delivered its punch with exactness, predictably
(and unfortunately) confirming the fears o f scientists. Before detonation, the Navy

*®/&/ril, 213-215.
*’ The ‘habitability’ problem was the only one he presented to the Joint Chiefs o f Staff
when he advised them o f predictions for the shot—after he had received those dire, “it will
undoubtedly be some weeks before the lagoon and target ships are again habitable.” Ibid.,
216.
Ib id , 215-217.
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anchored the bomb 90 feet under a specially-equipped landing craft/® At 8:50 am on July
25, the water column appeared “to spring from all parts of the target fleet at once” and
rising at a rate o f two miles per second, gained a mile’s height. Within 10 seconds it
formed a “doughnut-like circle.. .[and] seemed to wrap itself around the target fleet.”
The column was a half a mile across and carried two million gallons o f w ater from the
lagoon. Only, possibly, did the 1883 explosion of Krakatoa create larger waves: fifteen to
twenty surge waves emerged, the first 94 feet high, moving at 50 miles per hour. The
waves’ backrush carried more than 50,000 tons o f Bikini island back into the lagoon. This
time ships did sink, among them the Arkansas and the Saratoga and the crews who rushed
to try and save the latter (against Warren’s orders) suddenly “put heels in the water,
slowed down, stopped, and then backed up furiously.”®® Warren was pleased that at least
some seemed to be finally coming around to the fact that radiation was dangerous, and he
shared the vision in a letter to his wife:
while the Sara [Saratoga] was sinking in plain sight for hours even the
salvage people could be seen charging in toward her & turning tail at 1 mile
away! .. .at least those with us. . are convinced of the danger now.®*

*®Before it was packed. Senator Hatch o f New Mexico (the same Senator who
proclaimed that either the world would accept the rule of law or everyone would just die!)
chalked “Made in New Mexico” on its side. Senator Hatch seemed to thoroughly enjoy
his trip to the Pacific, and he appears in many, many pictures in the Warren MSS.
Spotting his presence in photographs became quite easy because he was always the only
one in the frame with an absolutely clean white shirt—a standout compared to the other
individuals in the photographs whose garments were almost always rumpled, and generally
sweat-stained from the heat and humidity.
®®Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 223-225. The blast floated submarines that had been
anchored to the ocean floor, including the Tuna. Hanson W. Baldwin ‘Radioactivity Bar
to Bikini Surveys” New York Times, July 28, 1946, 31.
®* Warren to Viola, 26 July 1946, Viola Warren MSS, box 5.
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They were not all completely convinced, however, and the longer the Navy captains had
to sit around after the blast, the more impatient they became to get to the target ships.
When they did get restless, Warren sent radiological safety team members out with the
Navy crewmen far enough toward the target ships that the hand-held radiation monitors
would register dangerously high levels of ra d ia tio n .W a rre n ’s tactic seemed to solve the
problem, for a time.
Warren was ill prepared, however, for the problems that would arise on the
support ships once they re-entered the lagoon and the Navy became too impatient to
handle. On July 27, the Navy had tried to reduce radiation on the target ships by washing
them down from a distance with seawater sprays, but that had not proven effective. By
July 29, the Navy was already looking for alternative ways to decontaminate the stillfloating vessels, and Warren and the salvage oflScer Admiral Solberg suggested an
abrasive spray—coconut and palm trees, pulverized with a grinding mill from Pearl
Harbor.®^ Warren finally began letting small work parties attend to the less-dangerous
target vessels, but set strict regulations on the amount o f time and exposure they would be
allowed—regulations that they began, almost immediately, to violate.

Using geiger counters to measure the presence o f radiation, and allowing those alone to
serve as a warning for the Navy, may have been a tactical error on Warren’s part. The
geiger counters that the Radiological Safety team used, X-263, measured only high energy
gamma radiation, not longer-lived plutonium. The Navy’s oflScers relied on the clicking o f
the geiger counter rather than Warren’s calculations o f alpha based upon gamma readings,
and thus assumed an absence o f radiation in the absence o f a clicking counter; when, in
fact, hazardous levels o f alpha and beta were present. On the geiger counter, see
Weisgail, O peration Crossroads, 213, 233.
Memorandum 29 July 1946 “Radiological Safety Section to Admiral T .A Solberg”
Warren MSS, box 75, 76; Weisgail, Operation Crossroads, 230.
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The pressures o f mounting radiation in the lagoon combined with the Navy’s
attempts to decontaminate its vessels had grown by August 1. W arren pulled out an old
teletype that he had sent over the Navy’s wire on Able day to “Jupiter Pluvius” and “Davy
Jones” requesting “half gale from Northeast with copius rainfall at Bikini Atoll. . urgently
needed to clear lagoon o f hot w ater and wash target vessels” and updated it, scrawling
across the bottom; ‘Tlease belay and replace 1 July by 1 August. Then send again with
higher priority.”^ In addition to anxious Navy men wanting to get out to the target fleet—
“staring us in the face and saying ‘when can we get aboard—we want our instruments..
the support vessels that came back into the lagoon refused to obey Warren’s
directives for safety. He had issued orders forbidding the use o f any equipment, distillers,
evaporators, and other equipment that would bring contaminated sea water into the ships,
but the day after the ships re-entered the lagoon, Blandy countermanded that order and
authorized the use o f evaporators to distill water for drinking. This one order resulted in
the contamination o f every support vessel, as radioactivity became “concentrated in every
ship’s condensers, evaporators, and saltwater pipes ’’^
There seemed to be no escape from radiation, and the problems became worse
than even those predicted. When Bikini lagoon became highly radioactive, Warren
instituted stricter regulations concerning the disposal o f radioactive clothing and
showering by the men returning from the target ships, but the levels o f radiation kept
climbing. The Navy moved the support fleet to ‘cooler’ water on August 2, but even that

94

Teletype “Priority” “From CJTF-1, Haven (AH-12)” Warren M SS, box 75, 76.
Warren to \fiola, 30 July 1946, Warren to \riola, Viola Warren Collection, box 5.
96
Weisgail, O peration Crossroads, 230.
95
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move did not cool down the ships’ hulls. Radiation Safety men ordered the sailors’ bunks
moved away from the walls to try and cut down on their exposure, but they still received
more than an acceptable daily dosage just from their own ‘home’ ship—and that dosage
climbed as they worked under orders to try and decontaminate the target ships.

Later,

Warren learned that much o f the radioactivity absorbed by the hulls came from marine life
that typically concentrates “fission products by a factors o f 100,000.” Barnacles on the
hulls kept the ships “hot.”^
In the face o f climbing levels o f radiation, Warren urged the cancellation of
Operation Crossroads. The day after Warren sent his letter to Blandy on August 3
warning that continued decontamination could result in serious health problems for the
seamen involved, Warren received word that Blandy would not cancel the operation.^
That same day his Radiation Safety team advised him that the Navy’s working crews had
been deliberately avoiding his monitors (some at the urging o f their oflBcers) so he
gathered proof and wrote another letter to Blandy.

It, too, m et with a negative

Ibid., 232-233.
^^Ibid.

^ After Baker, the Navy assigned over forty percent of its workforce at Bikini to ships’
decontamination.
Warren to Viola Warren, 11 August 1946. Viola Warren Collection, box 5. Navy
officers ordered their men to disregard safety procedures, telling them that the
recommended limitations bad “such a large safety factor that it can be ignored” and
plundered the target vessels for material that would add to the comfort of their own,
support, ships. Weisgail, O peration Crossraods, 237.
The Navy’s oflBcers simply did not fear invisible radiation. The radioactivity on one
ship measured fifty times the maximum daily tolerance dose. “Nevertheless, crew
members stayed on board the ship for as much as 16 hours or more. Some were ordered
to spend the night there, because the ship’s oflScers believed that the daily tolerance dose”
had a large “built-in safety factor.” Mike Moore, “The Able-Baker-Where’s Charlie
Follies” B ulletin o f the A tom ic Scientists (May-June 1994), 24.
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response. In the meantime, one o f the Rad Safe team members sympathized with the
Navy:
Decks you can’t stay on. . but that seem like other decks; air you can’t
breath without gas masks but which smells like all other air; water you
can’t swim in .. good tuna and jacks you can’t eat. It’s a fouied-up
world.
The Navy, though, made little effort to understand radiation. Warren urged Blandy, again,
to call off all decontamination efforts except on the almost-clean target ships. Blandy
refused.

Warren then called upon the Los Alamos lab for more sophisticated equipment

and analysis, requesting that “this [be] treated as an actual emergency involving safety to
life.” ‘°^ On August 10, with Blandy at Bikini for a visit and just hours before he was
scheduled to leave, the Los Alamos reply arrived “just in the nick o f time.” While
Admiral Blandy looked over the Los Alamos data—“curves” o f possible rates o f radiation
injury from beta and gamma—Warren took a scale that he had removed from one o f the
lagoon’s radioactive fish and laid it on a piece o f photography paper in front o f the
Admiral. When the scale reproduced itself on the paper, the Admiral said: “WeU, this
stops us cold alright.” '^

* * *

Weisgail, O peration Crossroads, 234.
Blandy’s motivation stemmed from the adverse publicity that could accompany any
armouncement that ships had been lost to radioactivity. At an August 6 staff meeting, he
stressed that even the ‘hot’ ships could not be considered casualties “in the sunken ship
sense o f the word” and ordered that any ship scuttled, sunk, or destroyed more than 30
days after Baker would “not be considered as sunk by the bomb. . The idea must not be
fostered that nothing can be done about the radioactive condition o f the ships.” Moore,
“The Able, Baker, Charlie Follies” 24.
VIeisgdSi, Operation Crossroads, 241.
Warren to Viola Warren 11 August 1946, Viola Warren collection, box 5.
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Baker confirmed the worst fears o f the cautious scientists and jeopardized the lives
and health o f thousands. Had it not been for Warren’s consideration for the health and
safety of servicemen, many would have died. B aker certainly should have taught the
government that fallout was fickle and fiightening.**^^ But then, the Navy continued with
the planned underwater detonation even though they had ample warning that Baker would
be dangerous. Many need not have been put into harm’s way. Scientists had known since
the twenties that a few millionths o f a gram of ingested radium could fatally lodge in the
bones o f radium dial painters .

The levels of plutonium, in radium equivalencies,

following Baker was measured in the “thousands o f tons,” and as radioactive mist it
“settled on the decks, moistened every bit of exposed metal, wood, and canvas.”

The

Navy finally had to admit that although many ships might survive the blast, few would be
serviceable because o f radioactive contamination—the crews would not stand a chance.
In its zeal to prove itself a worthy opponent in atomic warfare, the Navy had failed.

Given the history o f atomic testing, though, it did not.
“In 1924, Blum discovered that severe osteomyelitis and necrosis o f the mandible
occurred with great fi'equency in the workers o f the New Jersey plant. The reports which
followed on the clinical course and death o f those women from anemias, crippling bone
lesions, bone tumors, have now become classics on the destructive effects o f
radioelements in humans.”302. Karl Morgan and J.E. Turner, P rinciples o f Radiation
Protection (New York, NY; Wiley, 1967) See alsol7-19, 303.
Weisgail, O peration Crossroads, 227, 224.
On August 13, Warren informed Blandy that casualties would result from future
decontamination: “. . the presence o f beta emitters in even moderate intensities is an
indication that it is present in dangerous if not lethal am outs.. .[it is] the most poisonous
chemical known. It can only be measured with very preceise equipment which is not
available, and cannot be made available. . The use o f personnel for cleaning without
proper indoctrination and special complex protective equipment, particularly in the inside
o f ships, is exceedingly dangerous.” Memorandum, Warren to Commander, 13 August
1946, TO 1.2, JTF-1.
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One o f the reasons for the disaster at Bikini was that the Navy seems to have
forgotten that the war was over. They had the luxury to plan a relatively safe, peacetime
exercise—but they were more accustomed to the pressures o f war. They rushed into the
tests fearful that t h ^ might lose in the postwar arguments over demobilization and atomic
w e a p o n s . W a r r e n said that Crossroads “was conducted as an emergency and a lot o f
compromises were made to meet this emergency.’’” ” In 1946, the w ar was long over, but
the Navy did not accomodate itself to peace. Crossroads was not about science or
possible warfare—the Navy’s only enemies were its own insecurities, the Army, and the
atom bomb—poor reasons to expose thousands o f military personnel and civilians to such
dangerous levels o f radiation. ‘‘^
As with Manhattan, secrecy and media manipulation contributed to the success of
the Navy’s planned operation and enchanced its detrimental effects. The Navy, and the
military, shielded the public from the facts o f the operation. The Navy insisted that it was
only carrying out its duties imposed upon the military by the Constitution; but its actions
served only the Navy itself.” ^ The Joint Chiefs o f Staff classified all adverse conclusions.

The Navy pushed an inadequate geiger counter into production without field testing it,
and they neglected the measurement o f inhaled beta radiation, until Warren (in an
emergency) got Los Alamos to do the calculations.
” ” Weisgail, O peration Crossroads, 233.
Admiral Robert Monroe o f the Defense Nuclear Agency denied in 1979 that men who
served in the military during Able and Baker later contracted radiation-induced cancers
because the average exposure was 0.5r. Weisgail points out that families “do not think in
terms of averages” and identified men who spent extended periods o f time in ‘hot’ areas,
never wore protective gear, suffered radiation bums, etc. EQs examples include men who
worked up to nine hours in the radioactive lagoon repairing damaged ships, others who
put out fires on newly-contaminated ships in tennis shoes, shorts, and t-shirts. Ibid. 274278.
See Annex “O” W arren MSS, box 79.
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particularly the report by the Evaluation Committee, with such a high rating that only the
they had access. As for other issues, particularly the acclaimed “scientific” nature o f the
operation, military media control allowed few to know that Crossroads only confirmed
valid and widely-known scientific conclusions. It cost the nation over a billion dollars and,
more than likely, resulted in the future deaths o f at least hundreds o f over-exposed
servicemen; but again, the true taxpayer cost was hidden and the military simply
disavowed, until the 1980’s, that radiation exposure could have injured servicemen.
The Navy claimed that Operation Crossroads would solve a number of questions
about atomic weapons, but among the most important things it proved was that scientific
information its e lf could be manipulated in the interests o f a military objective. Operation
Crossroads was the first time in the nation’s testing history that the military was able to
draw from a divided group o f scientists “pick and choose” its desired opinion. Rather than
err on the side o f caution, the Navy picked the scientific opinion that best suited its
purpose and instituted a practice that became tragically commonplace in the future of
atomic testing. This practice widened the gap between policymakers and scientists just as
the time when the correct opinion became ever more crucial because o f the theoretical
nature o f atomic science. Additionally, the government learned one very important lesson
fi"om Crossroads; that it could, in the interests o f a military objective, and even in the face
of hundreds o f reporters, deceive the American public.

* * *
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Stafford Warren, “tired o f radiation and bombs,” left the Navy after Crossroads
and accepted an offer to become the Dean o f the Medical School at UCLA. Warren was
clearly disillusioned with the military’s influence over atomic science.

In January 1947,

Admiral Parsons asked him to participate in a Crossroads seminar and give his
recommendations on “radiation tolerance.” Warren refused, but did submit a letter.
Warren told Parsons that the only data available amounted to “guesses” by committees
with “no one” satisfied with, and no one willing to be held responsible for, the results.
Furthermore, he noted that no reliable estimate o f safe radiation dosage would be possible
without a “proper program” o f study, continuing for at least 10-12 years. He
recommended additionally:.
that no attempt be made at this time to fix a range o f tolerances. . .Once
they are stated in writing or put in a manual, they are almost impossible to
change. They would hardly be worth the paper they were printed on and
would be misleading in the light o f subsequent findings.” ^
Warren’s answers to a Navy questionnaire about Operation Crossroads also offer a good
summary o f the views o f a knowledgeable Crossroads participant:
Are further tests necessary? From my standpoint, no.
If there are to be other tests should they be over land or water? Use B ikini.
Is there any likelihood that terrestrial conditions, such as the
amount o f dust in the upper air.. be significantly
or permanently changed by a number o f atomic
explosions? Yes.^^^
Unfortunately, his suggestions pertaining to dosage went unheeded, as did his admonitions

Warren’s remarks proved astonishingly correct, particularly given the 1956 experiences
with the Atomic Energy Commission’s Division o f Biology and Medicine’s half-hearted
attempt to change the standards for strontium 90 exposures. Warren’s letter to Admiral
Parsons was not declassified until 1965. Warren to Parsons, 18 January 1947, Warren
MSS, box 77.
“Impressions o f the Bikini Tests” Ibid.
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regarding future testing.
The repressive and hazardous practices that began with Manhattan were enlarged
and enhanced by Operation Crossroads and were already solidified when the Atomic
Energy Commission took over control o f atomic energy and testing. By June, 1947,
Warren had completed some articles on atomic weapons, but when he submitted them to
the AEC, as required, they refused to give him permission to publish them. He wrote his
wife from Washington that he was in quite a “tizzy” because the AEC feared public
reaction;
I was advised [the papers] were too scary to publish now and they agreed
to a panel o f psychologists, psychiatrists, and social scientists with w ar
experience to study this problem so that the info could be put out without
causing mass hysteria.” ^
It is likely, I suggest, that the AEC was less concerned with public hysteria than they were
about public outrage.

Warren to Viola 14 June 1947, Warren MSS, box 1. Perhaps no one will ever know
what Warren said in his articles. Various articles appear in the Warren collection, but I
have been unable to locate any articles that he wrote that would have been considered
particularly alarming, even by 1947 standards.
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CHAPTER V

THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Our obsession w ith the atom led us to assign to it a separate and unique status
in the w orld So greatly d id it seem to transcend the ordinary affa irs o f men that we
shut it out o f those affairs altogether.
D avid E. Lilienthal, fir s t Chairman o f the AEC

Operation Crossroads made big waves not only in the Pacific, but in Washington
as well. It is, perhaps, a reflection o f the astuteness o f congressional leaders that as the
Sara sank into the waters o ff Bikini they officially transferred control of atomic energy
from the military to a civilian commission. Congress charged that commission with sole
authority to control atomic development in the interests o f national security and public
safety. Congress, though astute, had seriously underestimated the military. By 1951,
civilian control was only a mirage—the military had regained its hold over the atom bomb.
On July 26, after ten months o f hearings and controversy and two days o f intense
negotiation, congress reached a compromise between the rival McMahon and MayJohnson bills and officially subordinated a Director o f Military Apphcation and Nfilitary
Liason Committee to the all-civilian Atomic Energy Commission, with the responsibility to
administer all future atomic development—for peace and war.^ The Atomic Energy Act of
1946 effected no more than a notional transformation—indeed, the Act became the

* See Chapter IV, supra.
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legitimizing vehicle through which the hazardous practices o f the Manhattan Project and
Operation Crossroads were authorized, continued, and enlarged when the military,
ultimately, assumed control.
Congress did not mandate civilian control to limit weapons development, rather,
those who sought to reduce the military’s influence in the realm o f atomic energy
apparently did so on methodological, not ideological grounds. Certainly, congress never
believed that the military should be sequestered from atomic science; but the establishment
o f an unconventional Joint Committee to relay Commission ideas to the public suggests
that the short history o f atomic development haunted congressional leaders—a result,
perhaps, o f legislators’ recognition that traditional controls, namely approval and
appropriations, had not been sufficient during the wartime Manhattan Project.^ Yet,
congress linked this provision with extensive support o f military requirements and
weapons development as evidenced by the Act’s provisions for a Director o f NClitary
Application and Military Liason Committee. Additionally, congress directed the military
to appeal directly to the president if it decided that the civilian commission had not acted
in its best interests. Others, too, clearly supported weapons development. The first
Chairman o f the Commission, David Lilienthal, and most scientists, believed that atomic
development should not only serve industrial and medical applications, but also, crucially,
weapons.'’ What they all seemed to fear and tried to avoid, however, was not weapons

^ Ball citing Niehoffi Justice Downwind, 225. Though well intentioned, international
events and the growing fear o f communist subversion kept the Joint Committee from
fulfilling its intermediary role, a which might have benefited citizens.
^ Stafford Warren believed that weapons development would guarantee interest and
appropriations for a wider range o f atomic science, particularly in the field o f medicine.
His continued interest in radiogenic diseases and radioactive treatment led to a
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development, but the perpetuation o f insidious wartime characteristics o f the Manhattan
Project: extreme secrecy and the militarization o f science.
Their plan failed. Congress may have forced the military to relinquish the grasp it
had held on atomic technology since the beginnings o f the Manhattan Project, but the
armed forces did not, like Admiral Blandy at Bikini, surrender. Militarily-influenced
behaviors that characterized the Manhattan Project and Operation Crossroads came to
play crucial roles in the developing realm o f atomic energy despite the fact that so much
emphasis had been placed upon civilian control.** Additionally, and although it probably
was not evident at the time, the divisions within the scientific community that began to
affect weapons testing as early as Crossroads became endemic as the military’s influence

professional interest in cancer; indeed, be is perhaps best known for developing (with
another scientist) the ‘cervical smear’ for diagnosis o f cancer of the cervix.
Lilienthal constantly reminded the military o f his belief in the importance o f atomic
weapons. ¥ or examples, soo The D icaies o f D avid Lilienthal, December 21, 1946, 121;
and Minis, Forrestal D iaries, March 27, 1947, 259.
** Since this thesis proposes to answer limited questions that relate to feUout and weapons
development, other components o f the Act are not here addressed. This is not to say,
however, that the Atomic Energy Act only served military concerns. Certainly the Act
and the Commission stimulated, especially under the leadership and influence o f David
Lilienthal, the development and application o f radiological science throughout medical,
industrial, and scholarly fields. Features that attended the Act, however, particularly the
licensing provisions and govemmental-imposed secrecy provisions, undoubtedly restrained
(to some extent at least) innovation; and although the Act, and the cold war, stimulated a
tremendous growth in the academy, the strings that accompanied funding carried with
them their own set o f consequences. In this regard, see in especially Chomsky, The C old
W ar and the University, passim .
Though I have not researched the issue, it seems obvious that as anti-communistic
fervor mounted, the funding for weapon-related science in laboratories and universities
would flow more freely than that for peacetime applications. It is clear that the AEC’s
budget grew proportionately with increased US tension, expanding five and one-half times
between 1947 and 1952, from $312.3 to $1,766.4 million dollars. Hilgartner, Bell,
O ’Connor, Nuclear Language, Visions a n d M indset (San Francisco, C A Sierra Club
Books, 1982), 42.
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grew. Operating in concert, these characteristics limited the ability o f the Atomic Energy
Commission to properly administrate its congressionally-imposed duty, and significantly
encouraged the de-emphasization of public health concerns in favor o f military objectives.
To better understand how these characteristics affected the Commission and the
development o f the nation’s testing program, it will be helpful to look at three distinct
consequences that I believe caused weapons testing to be more hazardous than necessary.
First, and perhaps primarily, the military waged an almost-continual rearguard action
through the president and congress against the commission and individual members and
ultimately managed to exert enormous control over the civilian commission. Second,
military-style secrecy and security precautions led to the classification o f nearly every
element o f the testing program, a practice that severely limited meaningful debate and
investigation both within government and without.^ Third, since the AEC’s policies
limited discourse and since the AEC came to rely upon its own, hand-picked scientists,
enormous cognitive barriers developed that (in the very best scenario) resulted in
insignificant misinterpretations, but too often accomodated deceptive forms o f explanation
and manipulation that promoted hazardous testing practices.
Although some scholars have argued that the predomination o f militaristic trends
within the development o f atomic energy resulted fi-om the increased confi-ontational
nature o f the international situation, and that the goals o f the commission merely reflected
this change, I think it is important to look at these features as they opposed, or at least

^ The Department o f Energy has recently declassified many hundreds o f thousands of
documents, but the mass o f material and the haphazard organization makes research
difficult. Additionally, many o f those released documents still bear classified deletions.
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controverted, policy.^ This distinction between policy and its articulation may perhaps be
recognized more conveniently as a distortion o f national intent, and in this regard
Crossroads offers a convenient and familiar example. Clearly, the president approved the
operation and congress appropriated money for it because the Navy convincingly argued
that it needed to test its ships against the atom bomb. The operation certainly fulfilled that
goal—but it is abundantly clear that there were additional motivations than those presented
and approved, and certainly the operation itself vastly exceeded the expectations o f both
the president and congress. Additionally, and most importantly for the scope o f this study.

®Research suggests that domestic considerations, particularly convenience for the
laboratories and economic considerations o f the military, played a far greater role in the
development o f the continental testing site than the worsening international situation;
indeed, both the Army and the weapons laboratories began lobbying for a site more
accessible than the Pacific Proving Grounds before either the Berlin Airlift, the first
Soviet atomic detonation, or the Korean War:
“The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory program for development o f
nuclear weapons requires nuclear field te sts.. .In 1947 the Laboratory
programs had progressed to a point where developmental field tests were
required and LASL proposed that the AEC activiate a continental site. A
survey disclosed possible sites on the coast of the Carolinas, at
Alamogordo (N.M), Dugway (Utah), and two sites in Nevada. Largely
because o f unresolved questions concerning off-site hazards to the United
States public. . it was decided to have the spring 1948 (Sandstone) series
at Eniwetok.”
“Summary o f Minutes Committee on Operational Future, NPG” meeting January 14,
1953, CIC 26306. Most historians give the Korean War at least some credit for
influencing the decision, though they differ as the the extent o f its significance. Miller
places most emphasis upon the Army’s desire for tactical weapons and economic
considerations (U nder the Cloud, 80) while A Constantina Titus asserts that the Korean
W ar was the determinative factor in the selection of a continental testing site (Bom bs in
the Backyard, 55.) Hacker strikes an in-between note, noting earlier requests for a
continental test site but places the emphasizing economics, suggesting that weapons
development coincided with economic cutbacks in atomic weapons (forced by the Korean
War) to stimulate the creation o f the Nevada Proving Groimds. Elem ents o f C on trovert,
p 38-40.
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is a direct confrontation between policy and practice—that the government certainly did
not knowingly and intentionally, as a function o f policy, approve an operation that would
needlessly waste resources and endanger men. As the Navy shaped Operation Crossroads,
so did the military with the AEC—overwhelming official intent in the service o f its own
objective.^
The following discussion o f Crossroads and the militarization o f the AEC raises
important questions about the relationship between the state and the military and seriously
jeopardizes the notion that the military operates solely as a state functionary. Thus, while
I have argued, and hope to have made clear, that the practices that developed within the
Manhattan Project filtered into peacetime atomic development and weapons testing, those
behaviors could not have become determinative without access to the levers o f power.
Accordingly, it is important to look at not only habitus but beyond—to the complexities of
a substrata o f power relationships as they developed under the auspices o f the Atomic
Energy Act. My desire to burrow beneath a conception o f the military as merely an organ
o f the state has been influenced by the French political philosopher Foucault who
admonished political theorists to “cut off the King’s head”—to see that the influence o f the
state is limited by the existence o f power relationships that operate independently—and
explore the ways that those those forms o f power structures become “detached” from the

^ The reader should note that although the term ‘AEC’ refers technically to the
commission formed under the Atomic Energy Act, the use o f it here encompasses not only
the collective activity o f a small group o f presidential appointees, but unless otherwise
apparent from the context, also the range o f organizational initiatives and institutional
management o f that governmental agency that administered the development o f atomic
energy and weapons.
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state itself* Additionally and in accord with this alternative interpretation o f the
relationship o f subterranean levels o f influence that function within and comprise the state,
is a recognition that all relationships are by nature, fluid. In this regard, my attempts to
puzzle through some o f the many curiosities o f policy and its articulation have been
influenced by Nietzche, and particularly his reminder that aU things, including institutions,
are not appropriately understood through an analysis o f either initiational intent,
construction, or ultimate terminus since they are inherently transformative and
unpredictable. Although Nietzche’s analyses are rooted in a period far removed from the
cold war, they address the prerogatives o f power and are equally applicable here, where
military objectives seem to have subverted the intent o f congress. Nietzche warns
historians especially:
That the actual causes o f a thing’s origin and its eventual uses, the maimer
o f its incorporation into a system o f purposes, are worlds apart; that
everything that exists is periodically reinterpreted by those in power in
terms o f fresh intentions. . .But all pragmatic purposes are simply symbols
o f the fact that a will to power has implanted its own sense o f function in
those less powerful.”
It is clear from this examination that the military managed to overcome the barriers
congress imposed through the Act, and successfully “implanted its Own sense o f function”
into the “less powerful” commission. Additionally (and ideally) this discussion of the
military’s relationship to the AEC should also help shape the reader’s understanding o f the

* “The State, for all the omnipotence o f its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy
the whole field o f actual power relations. . .which render its functioning possible.”
Foucault,‘T ruth and Power,”
particularly 121-123.
” Nietzche, G enealogy o f M orals, trans. Kaufinan, (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1979),
2 . 12.
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following chapter that explores the AEC’s impact the nation when it came to Southern
Nevada. Toward this end, then, it will be useful to first return to the AEC’s beginnings.

* * *

The AEC immediately became the target of postwar military insecurities. The last
chapter explored the Navy’s attempt to come to terms with its postwar world, but it is
important to view the immediate postwar period as one o f extreme transition and conflict
between the nation’s collective armed forces and the government itself. A push for rapid
demobilization by the public was matched by congressional scrutiny of military budgets
and appropriations; additionally, the proposed National Security Act threatened each
branch individually with its cabinet-level consolidation o f the forces under a Secretary o f
Defense.*” Into that mix o f antagonism, then, ten months o f heated hearings and
negotiation eventually resulted in the subordination of the military to civilian authority
under the Atomic Energy Act. Such intense public scrutiny and transformation perhaps
only strengthened the military’s resolve and, focusing a measure o f animosity against the

*” In this regard, see James Forrestal’s letter to Edward Hopkinson of December 7, 1946
where he points out the obvious paradox between verbal assurances of maintained military
strength and budgetary restrictions: “There is great danger o f repetition o f the pattern
which developed after the last w a r.. in wrapping up a balanced budget and a decreased
tax rate. That these are sometimes accompanied by reaffirmation of necessity for
remaining strong isn’t much consolation.” NGUis, F orrestal Diaries, 236.
There was a clear line o f influence from the Manhattan Project through Crossroads to
the development o f the AEC. As Secretary o f Defense, Forrestal retroactively authorized
the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project that had been initiated during the planning
stages o f Operation Crossroads. Under the leadership o f its first chief. Major General
Groves (of Manhattan fame) it “was charged with providing nuclear weapons support to
the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Maj. J. Stinson and K.K. Horton “Historical Chronology
o f DOD Weapons Testing Organizations” October 19, 1984, Defendant’s exhibit DX
21958, Prescott v. USA [consolidated] CIVLV-80-143.
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president who had proposed consolidation and (eventually) supported civilian control o f
atomic energy, the armed forces began strident behind-the-scenes lobbying efforts. They
found a ready-made alliance in the form o f the new Secretary o f Defense, former Navy
Secretary James Forrestal, and in Republican legislators led by Senator tCckenlooper of
Iowa, a vociferous critic not only of Truman, but also o f former TVA Director and the
new Chairman o f the AEC, David Lilienthal.
Tension between the AEC and the military characterized atomic development from
the beginning. Truman firmly believed that atomic energy belonged in civilian hands, and
when David Lilienthal and the other four members o f the Atomic Energy Commission met
with him on December 11, 1946, .Truman told them that if necessary he would mediate
problems between the Commission and the War Department. “The Army,” he said “will
never give up without a fight.” ** Six days later, the Army’s Manhattan Project seemingly
assented to the Act, and “lots o f braids and stars,” surrendered to the Commission and the
Military Liason Committee its accounting o f the nation’s atomic stockpile—the most
“critical numbers in the world.” *^ On New Year’s Eve, 1946, after a month of what
Lilienthal reported as “very deep troubles with the War Department about who got what”
atomic energy became the official responsibility o f the Atomic Energy Commission.*^

** Lilienthal, D iaries, 118.
^llb id , 119.
*" Although diaries are an invaluable source o f impressions and conversations that would
otherwise not be available to researchers, this quote points up one o f the pitfalls o f
reliance upon them when exploring questions o f atomic development. This chapter uses
the diaries o f two men, Lilienthal and Forrestal, both o f whom were extremely cognizant
o f security; thus, it is impossible to know exactly what type o f custody issues Lilienthal
referenced. Ibid. 127.
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The military, having already lost the public battle over control, began to wage a
private one. During a meeting on January 22, 1947, five days before Lilienthal began the
ordeal o f Senate confirmation, the military and its congressional supporters were already
pinpointing dangerous influences in the AEC.*** At a meeting between Jfickenlooper,
Forrestal, and Rear Admiral Parsons o f the Military Liason Committee, Hickenlooper
complained o f Lilienthal’s “tremendous power and responsibility” and (perhaps in an
attempt to shape future discourse) complained o f a “pacifistic and unrealistic trend” within
the commission.*^ After a month o f confirmation hearings, Hickenlooper hinted that
Lilienthal had been negligent and was possibly lenient toward communists. Complaining
o f Lilienthal’s “intransigence and inflexibility” he asked Forrestal to bring to the attention
o f the president that Lilienthal had hired appointees without having them screened by the
FBI. Forrestal considered Hickenlooper’s charges serious indeed, and contacted Truman
that very evening to relay the concerns.*” Animosity mounted even after Lilienthal’s
confirmation, and in September, Forrestal noted in his diary that he had told Lewis Strauss
that the Military Liason Committee had complained to him that Lilienthal was
uncooperative.*’

***Regarding the Senate confirmation, Lilienthal privately questioned his own judgment:
“what is it in a man that makes him willing to risk his name, his health, and his chance o f a
decent way o f living to get into such an impossible setup?” He knew from whence he
spoke, having been on the receiving end o f congressional opposition from his years with
the TVA. Lilienthal, D/or/ej, 133.
Is/ËXàs, F orrestal Diaries, 240-241. This is an curious comment to make about a
spanking-new commission with no history upon which to base a pattern or ‘trend.’
*” Ibid., 255. Forrestal also contacted Lewis Strauss to discuss HBckenlooper’s concerns,
demonstrating (perhaps) Strauss’ complicity in the subversion o f Lilienthal’s leadership
long before it was recognized by the Chairman. In this regard, see Chapter H, supra.
Ibid., 319.
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The increasing political pressure that occasioned complaints about Lilienthal
eventually resulted in Truman’s decision to replace a retiring committee member with
Gordon Dean, a favorite o f the militarists—thus changing the ideological constituency o f
the commission.** As time went on, Lilienthal’s aggressive public relations campaign for
atomic energy and his national popularity as a speaker had only increased the suspicion
with which his opponents viewed his leadership, and Forrestal’s role as intermediary
between Lilienthal’s military and congressional enemies and the president grew.*” During
a lunch meeting in February 1948, Forrestal, Hickenlooper, and the president o f
Bethlehem Steel discussed their “vague misgivings” about the direction o f the AEC.
fBckenlooper also voiced concern about Lilienthal’s public speeches that emphasized the
use o f atomic power for industrial and other private purposes, and complained that there
had been no significant advances in the “art” since the dissolution o f the Manhattan
District. Hickenlooper especially disliked Lilienthal’s repeated public references to the
control o f atomic energy by “the people” believing they smacked o f “statism.” Again,
anti-communism played a role in attacks directed against Lilienthal. Within days, the
AEC’s Director o f Security, Rear Admiral John Gingrich, told Forrestal that Lilienthal
observed lax security procedures, based on his observation that Lilienthal had distributed
$40 million to Brookhaven Laboratories through which “nine universities” shared
participation.’” There is no evidence that Truman suggested to Lilienthal that he change

** See Chapter H, supra., for a more thorough discussion o f Gordon Dean’s appointment
to the Commission and the political circumstances of that appointment.
*” Lilienthal traveled extensively promoting atomic energy and attempting to stimulate
academic and industrial interest in its development. Lilienthal, D iaries, passim .
’” NfiUis, F orrestal D iaries, 3 79-3 80.
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his methods. Politically, though, Truman tried to pacify congressional opponents such as
IBckenlooper through the appointment of one o f their chosen, Gordon Dean.
Although international events played into the military’s hands, it still found itself
unable to officially retrieve the bomb from civilians. The Berlin Blockade o f June 1948
encouraged the military to take a more aggressive stand against what they perceived as
pacifism within the Truman administration as a whole and especially against Lilienthal and
his custody o f the atom bomb. On July 15 Forrestal and the armed forces scored a victory
against Secretary o f State Marshall and convinced the National Security Council to send
B-29s, the atom bomb’s delivery system, to England.’* Forrestal apparently anticipated
that England would become a permanent outpost for an American atomic arsenal, since he
noted that the force would not only demonstrate American resolve (domestically and
abroad) but would “accustom” the British to the accommodation o f an “alien. . though
allied, power” so that the force would become an “accepted feature.”” Emboldened by
this victory, perhaps, Forrestal approached the president that same day and and requested
a meeting to consider the transfer o f the bomb to military custody. On July 21, at a
meeting between the President, Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the AEC, and the Act’s
military liason, Forrestal presented a formal request from the “National NClitary
Establishment” for custody o f the bomb.” Lilienthal objected, insisting on civilian control,
the president agreed, saying “You have got to understand that this isn’t a military weapon.
. .we have got to treat this differently from rifles and cannon and ordinary things üke that.”

’* Despite assumptions made at the time (particularly those importantly made by the
Soviet Union) theUnited Stateshad not armed the B-29s with atomic weapons.
” Mülis, F orrestal D iaries, 455-457.
” Ibid., 459-461.
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That, however, was just what the military intended, and the Secretary of the Air Force
resolutely told the president that “our fellas need to get used to handling it” as though an
atomic weapon could be handled like any other weapon.’** Aside from mentioning that he
would personally maintain responsibility for the weapon, the president delayed. Within
two days, however, Truman told Forrestal that there would be no change o f custody from
the AEC because it would be disadvantageous politically. All was not lost, though, for
Truman told Forrestal that he would reconsider the issue after the election.’^

* * *

The foregoing demonstrates not only the vigor with which the military
maneuvered to regain control of the bomb but also that it did so by discrediting David
Lilienthal. It is worth considering that Lilienthal was targeted not only because he was
Chairman o f the rival civilian commission but also because he had been one o f the main
opponents o f the elaborate apparatus that the Army had developed to hide all atomic
issues from the nation’s public. The value o f secrecy to the military establishment had
grown proportionately with its plans for atomic weapons, and although Lilienthal was not

’“*McCullough, Truman, 650.
Millis, Forrestal D iaries, 459-461. Although Forrestal’s entry is limited to the decision
itseb^ it appears that Forrestal did not want the public to leam that the military had lost the
battle for the bomb. Lilienthal received the news at his office, and was advised that
Forrestal fairly graciously accepted the President’s decision, but did object to the
President’s plan to announce publicly the intention to leave control o f the bomb in civilian
hands. Forrestal apparently “objected strongly.. .questioning why it should be announced
that he had been overruled.” Liüenthal, Diaries, 392.
The President’s attempts to assuage antagonistic congressmen (particularly
Hickenlooper) with the appointment o f Gordon Dean to the Commission and Lilienthal’s
objections to this politically-stimulated appointment have been discussed in Chapter n,
supra.
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the only one opposed to military classification methods (Truman had nominated Lilienthal
and congress confirmed his appointment with full awareness o f his steadfast objections to
the Army’s broad provisions for secrecy) he was a powerful adversary. To understand
why the armed forces wanted to remove Lilienthal fi'om his position with the AEC, the
deep roots o f Lilienthal’s abhorence o f military-style secrecy need to be examined.
Long before Lilienthal became Chairman o f the AEC, he had made a clear
distinction between the type o f secrecy favored by the Army (as exemplified by General
Groves’ management o f the Manhattan Project) and security precuations that unavoidably
occasioned atom bombs. The University o f Chicago invited Lilienthal, scientists,
researchers and philosophers to attend a Conference on Atomic Energy Control on
September 20-21, 1945. The conferees addressed a number o f issues including
international control, Soviet development, psychological effects, and comparison between
jellied gasoline bombs that were dropped by the thousands on Japanese cities before two
atom bombs ended the war.’”
The issue o f secrecy, however, stimulated the most discussion; prompted to some
extent, perhaps, by the fact that the Army itself had tried to obstruct the University o f

’” Curiously, Lilienthal referred to some ‘unmentionable’ scientific developments that, for
him at least, could made international control o f atomic energy irrelevant, or at least too
limiting to deal with the broadening field o f general scientific developments: “I note that
all these proposals address themselves to the particular kind o f hell that the scientists have
brewed in the atomic bomb. . .Would it not be important to make plain to the American
people—if such is the fact-that you fellows have other things cooking, not related to
atomic explosions, that may be just as bad or worse? Why work ourselves blue in the face
to develop a method o f .. .[inspection]. . when science has other, equally destructive
things on foot that do not involve either uranium or even the atom?” Lilienthal, D iaries,
640.
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Chicago from even holding the meeting.” The group concluded by the end o f the first day
that there were really only two ‘secrets’ that might remain so for any period o f time: the
materials required for the diffusion process; and, the production rates (“super secret”) o f
‘critical’ materials. On the second day, Lilienthal drew a firm line between issues of
security (weapons and weapons production and secrecy (oppression):
These scientists are under a rule—whether legally enforceable or not is
immaterial—that they will submit everything they say, before a
congressional committee, say, or elsewhere, to the “review” and
“approval” o f the Arm y.. .Nothing o f the kind has ever been proposed..
that a citizen’s opinions shall be subject to a pre-audit by the military in
peacetime. What happens to the “right to talk” . . This pre-audit over the
opinions o f men will create a . . .creep/wg-paralysis.. mental. . ethical,
moral. This whole discussion. . has been wholly in terms o f power
politics, surely it is assumed that there are other forces at work in the
world. . that are within the individual controls and disciplines and urges. .
moral compulsions.”

Lilienthal told scientists that they must “insist” upon their moral duty to educate the
public; and then, with obvious pleasure, received the enthusiastic support of the other
conferees. It is clear that while Lilienthal believed it was undoubtedly necessary to keep
certain information secret, he was (almost from the outset) wary o f the expansion o f
secrecy and believed that it could detrimentally transform the nature o f governance and
science. Had this sophisticated distinction between “secrecy” and “security” been allowed
to develop in the postwar period, the progression and nature o f atomic testing could have,
perhaps, been a safer enterprise.

^ Ibid., 642.
” Lilienthal, Z)/ar/e.s, 642.
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Secrecy, though, was not the only issue discussed at the conference, and this is an
appropriate place to provide an example o f early postwar thinking about the atomic bomb,
and how structures o f secrecy operated against discourse and thwarted the development,
or even consideration, o f alternatives during the cold war. The following forgotten
dialogue demonstrates the range and value of intellectual insight that might have
influenced crucial national issues had it been allowed to circulate publicly. Jacob \riner, a
University o f Chicago economist, technically disagreed with a point made by Reinhold
Mebuhr: that the only secret (“techniques not known”) was patently insignificant. Viner
though, traced Niebuhr’s argument to its logical conclusion and identified the consequence
that Niebuhr had only hinted at:
There is a secret—perhaps a six-months’ secret, but still a secret.
Will six-months’ secret generate another six-months’ secret—can we remain
six months ahead indefinitely?”
The issues that would shape decades o f American history were, prophetically, addressed
by fifty participants in a conference that few, if any, paid much attention to, except, of
course, for the Army which tried to prevent its occurrence. It is unavoidable that the
bounds o f secrecy essentially strangled those who might have been able to influence,
through meaningful debate and intellectual stimulation, a vastly different (and I believe,
probably better) postwar environment—one without, perhaps, an arms race. Fear, though,
rapidly overtook reason.

* * *

29

Ibid., 644.
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It seems clear that secrecy offered far too many benefits not to prevail. Mounting
anxiety that America might lose its atomic monopoly encouraged congress to incorporate
stringent military controls on atomic energy. The extreme secrecy and classification
systems that occasioned the Manhattan Project have already been discussed, and those
same structures served the Navy well in its management o f the media during Operation
Crossroads and inquiries after. Similar restrictions gave the Army, the AEG, and the state,
the perfect opportunity to effectively conceal a rc h in g it could even remotely link with
atomic science, whether related to valid matters o f national security or not. Additionally,
the supporters o f secrecy held a tactical advantage against their opponents, and those who
criticized the implementation o f strict security measures might as well have drawn a giant
red buHseye on their backs.

Indeed, Lilienthal’s continuing objections to needless

security precuations simply gave Hickenlooper, for example, the means through which he
could attack Lilienthal’s credibility. Secrecy then, served many purposes—it purportedly
kept rival countries out o f the atomic loop, it provided a convenient shield for
questionable practices, and the value placed upon it rendered its opponents vulnerable to
attack.^” It is important, now, to look at the meaning o f secrecy as it was applied to the
field o f atomic science and development.
The Atomic Energy Act authorized the most comprehensive classification system
known, exceeding even that o f the National Security Council—the organ primarily

This discussion, o f course, addresses only the very obvious uses o f ‘secrecy’ and
unavoidably ignores its psychological role—a topic intelligently discussed by Hugh
Gusterson in his anthropological examination o f Lawrence Livermore Laboratories,
Nuclear Rites, 68-100.
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responsible for the nation’s security/^ The National Security Council’s methods o f
restriction required a decisive act to classify information: an individual actually reviewed a
document and rendered a decision whether or not it was in the nation’s best interests to
restrict access.

By contrast, the AEC adopted the Army’s stringent scope where

anything even remotely associated with atomic science was classified but then it added a
twist: everything within its pervue was ‘bom’ classified. In other words, everything
associated with atomic weapons or science immediately entered a classified realm and
required no positive decisive action on behalf of anyone to restrict its circulation.'’^
The AEC’s system severely compromised legitimate oversight and substantially
thwarted the effectiveness o f the representative function o f congress and the intermediary
function of the Act’s Joint Committee."^ On May 5, 1947, the Joint Committee learned.

“Security markings” had long been a feature o f military documentation during wartime,
but the practice was not formally extended into peacetime until 1921. Roosevelt issued an
Executive Order four days after Mussolini joined the Axis powers that gave presidential
recognition, and added legitimacy, to the practice. Initially, the process affected only
public exposure, as with the press, and Congressional committees remained entitled to full
disclosure. Roosevelt’s action, however, resulted in the practice becoming an institutional
feature of the State Department and it soon spread throughout the government. Access to
classified documents remained restricted after the war. By 1951 Truman had authorized
any executive department or agency to classify information.
“Any information related to the design, manufecture, or utilization o f atomic weapons,
the production o f enriched uranium or plutonium, or the use o f those materials for the
production of energy is Restricted Data, unless the information has been removed fi'om the
Restricted Data category by order o f the Secretary o f Energy. . no matter where
originated or by whom generated.” Hilgartner,
62-63. A1957A'ew York
Tim es article focused on the problems o f a system that classified ideas and concepts. “An
anonymous professor awaiting citizenship and clearance, ‘Professor X a renowned
scientist, has an embarrassing faculty for producing ideas that rail in the classified realm; in
effect, he thinks classified thoughts. Ifis colleagues cannot discuss his own ideas with
him—not because they aren’t cleared, but because he isn’t.” Idem .
H. Peter Metzger, The A tom ic Establishm ent (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster,
1972.)
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for the first time and to their great amazement, that British and Canadian scientists had
worked in cooperation with American scientists and knew how to “make the bomb.”
Lilienthal was stunned when he learned that the committee had not been given access to
(admittedly) classified information that they required. Lilienthal’s subsequent diary entry
notes that “we caimot operate on a reasonable basis with the congress if the congress does
not receive information that is classified.’” '* The Army did not agree, and continually
thwarted the exchange o f information. In 1949, it stepped up its attack and publicly
lambasted Lilienthal and the AEC because its yearly report to congress divulged secret
information.'’^ The inability o f the Joint Committee, let alone congress itself to acquaint
itself with atomic developments rendered it useless: nothing more than a superficial
intermediary between the Commission and the public. Equipped, perhaps, only to confirm
or deny the obvious—that a certain bomb had (or had not) been detonated.
The atom bomb w as the perfect excuse for the imposition o f exaggerated security
precautions, but as weapons testing progressed, it became patently obvious to even
militarists that the detonation o f a bomb was a difiScult thing to hide. The 1952 test o f the
first hydrogen device in the Pacific exemplified, for at least those with logistical ties to Los
Alamos, the absurdity o f trying to conceal a blast equivalent to tens o f thousands o f tons
o f TNT. An editorial in The New M exican that discussed an awe-struck sailor’s letter
home is representative o f the obvious contradiction between secrecy and bombs. The
sailor’s letter exposed the supposedly secret Eniwetok explosion:
All of which makes the AEC’s super-duper security precautions look pretty
silly.. .With Los Alamos only 35 miles away, it has been common
Lilienthal, D/or/es, 176.
Ibid., 493.
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knowledge for m onths.. .but strictly hush-hush as far as the AEC was
concerned. . .With modem detection instruments, it is a foregone
conclusion that if the Hell bomb is at last a reality, the Russians know that
it has been exploded and knows when it was exploded and how powerful it
was."®
This example illustrates not only the recognition of a fundamental flaw in the AEC’s
security precautions but also that those regulations perhaps needlessly infringed upon
domestic rights in the interests o f spurious assertions."^
Despite the opposition o f a few bold critics, the AEC zealously clung to its
stringent classification system throughout its history and the practice has been continued
by its succcessor, the Department o f Energy. The DOE itself may have only a vague idea
of the number o f documents that remain classified. In 1993 it estimated the number at 25
million, yet in 1995 claimed that it maintained over 250 million classified documents.^* It
is not enough, though, to count the reams o f material that ended up within locked file
cabinets; one must also explore the consequences o f the AEC’s policies.
The AEC used its ability to restrict the dissemination o f information to encourage
and maintain support for the military’s program o f weapons development and testing.^^
Certainly, many people had at least a minimal awareness that an atomic detonation posed

"®The New M exican, November 8, 1952, 2.
The issue remains a valid one—who is served by such extreme precautions: The USSR
duplicated US efforts and detonated a hydrogen device on August 12, 1953. Meanwhile,
historians and other researchers are still trying to pry records from the AEC’s grasp that
were produced during the early atomic period, in the mid-1940s.
National Research Council A Review o f the D epartm ent o f Energy C lassification P olicy
and Practice (Washington, D C : National Academy Press, 1995) 12.
Anthony S. Mathews recognizes this as a universal problem: “When too much secrecy
surrounds government institutions, the implementation o f its policies discourages a
feedback o f relevant information and increases the tendency o f pushing through its
programmes come hell or high water.” The D arker R eaches o f Government, (Berkeley,
CA' University o f California Press, 1978), 34.
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risks beyond the actual explosion itself. Certainly, too, the AEC knew that it could
reliably conceal neither an atom bomb nor its remnants—fallout and the dispersal o f
radioactive material. The military, though, had wanted an accelerated testing program
since (at least) 1947, and the government’s remote Pacific site was an expensive option.**®
In the wake o f the Navy’s Operation Crossroads (and perhaps envious of the spectacle), a
memorandum to the Army Chief o f Staff fi'om Commanding Lieutenant General Hull
demonstrates that the Army not only wanted its share o f atomic weapons, but that it
believed only public opinion stood between it and an exhorbitant arsenal o f bombs and
smaller, tactical weapons. Accordingly, Hull hoped to desensitize the American public;
tremendous monetary and other outlays [for Pacific testing] have at times
been publicly justified by stressing radiological hazards.. .1 believe that it is
high time to lay the g h o st.. There appears to be a need for adequate
education o f the people.. in order that the hysterical or alarmist complex
now so prevalent may be corrected. . Alleviation o f their fears would be a
matter o f reeducation over a long period o f time, and, until the public will
accept the possibility o f an atomic explosion within a matter o f a hundred
or so miles o f their homes.***
The outbreak o f the Korean War may be said to have helped initiate General Hull’s re
education program since it gave both the military and the AEC an excuse for the
development o f a convenient and relatively inexpensive weapons testing site within the
US. The Nevada Proving Ground became a reality despite the fact that the government’s
experiences with fallout at Trinity, Crossroads, and subsequent Pacific testing vividly

**®Other countries, too, found remote, ocean, testing cost prohibitive. The Soviet Joe
One was detonated continentally, and although Great Britain eventually chose an island
site off the coast o f Australia, they had seriously considered a site in the Scottish
Highlands near Wick. y ^ e x ,U n d e r the Cloud, 81.
*** International Physicians for the Prevention o f Nuclear W ar and the Institute for Energy
and Environmental Research Radioactive H eaven a n d E arth (New York, NY; The Apex
Press) 53.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

222

demonstrated its unpredictability and potential for harm. The military got its way, though,
and to avoid adverse public reaction, the AEC engineered an elaborate campaign that
emphasized its ability to safely test weapons in the continental US—the education had
begun.
It was not too difficult to convince the uninformed that weapons testing and fallout
posed no hazards. After all, the few who knew the most facts about radioactive fallout
either worked for the government or were oppressed by it. The AEC held licensure
authority over atomic material, and any scientist who might choose to speak out against
continental testing or individual who earned his livelihood through government contracts
could find himself unemployed. Additionally, the AEC’s ability to classify knowledge
meant that there was little information readily and conveniently available to the public that
might have cast doubt upon the AEC’s assertions o f safety. In the absence, then, o f
contradictory information, the comforting ‘spin’ delivered by the AEC prevailed.

* * *

Even though congress delegated authority for atomic science to a civilian
commission, the military wasted no time in usurping that civilian authority and insinuating
its own agenda and methods into the development and testing o f atomic weapons—turning
the AEC into little more than a military functionary. Indeed, a transformative trend in
military influence is evidenced by the correspondence between the military’s weapons
development and its requests for a continental testing site.**^ In 1947 the AEC received

42

The military relied upon Los Alamos for weapons development.
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the first request for a continental site; the request was renewed in 1948 but the AEC
remained hesitant “largely because o f unresolved questions concerning off-site hazards to
the United States public.” Again, in 1949, the continental testing issue came before the
AEC because of a “need” for a test in advance o f the planned Pacific Greenhouse testing
series. Finally, in 1950, “security o f a far distant Pacific site” and “Korean logistics”
overrode earlier concerns o f off-site hazards and the AEC approved a site in Southern
Nevada, less than seventy miles firom Las Vegas.**" Reason itself, though, would seem to
disallow (to some extent, at least) this argument since if the Korean War were the primary
reason for a change o f testing location fi’om the Pacific to Nevada, then once the situation
stabilized and theUnited Statesbegan to pull out o f that country, why did testing not return
to the Pacific site? The AEC offers, perhaps, the solution to the puzzle.
A close reading o f the same AEC document reveals a subtle, but different set of
reasons than “Korean logistics” or Pacific security. Indeed, economy and efficiency
seems to have played the greater role.**** Under the heading “Reasons for a Continental
Site” the first specifically identified:
The basic reason was the material advance in pace of weapons
development foreseen if Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory could have a
backyard laboratory where developmental tests could be quickly mounted
and quickly h eld .. coupled with this primary reason were obvious
**" “Summary of Minutes Committee on Operational Future, NPG” January 14, 1953.
****This analysis is also evidenced by an announcement made publicly in 1952 by AEC
officials at the opening o f the Tumbler-Snapper series; “we needed a continental test site
because the program was moving, by necessity, very rapidly, and the delays which are
involved in making overseas tests were such that the program was necessarily being
seriously delayed, you cannot have overseas tests without planning and worry. . .Dollar
wise, aside from overseas effort, etc., I think the taxpayer, the country as a whole, you and
myself can feel that this is a wise expenditure o f money.” See “Appendix B—Texts to be
used in briefings by Carrol L. Tyler, Dr. Alvin C. Graves, Everett F. Cos and Dr. Gaelen
Fast”, [undated], Tumbler-Snapper, Vol. 2, CIC 39040.
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secondary advantages in economy of manpower (particularly scientific),
time (o f scientists and in gaining new weapons goals) and o f money /®
The promise (“foreseen”) o f more efficient and economical weapons development appears
to be the primary reason why the AEC agreed to continental weapons testing and why,
finally, only Americans were injured by those same weapons that the military so wanted
rushed into service/®

*^IbicL, 4.
‘*®This somewhat unsatisfactory conclusion may be disputed (forever) by historians. It is,
after all, their penchant, if not their duty, to engage in interpretational quibbles. In this
instance though there may be no other choice, since even the AEC, in its own document,
could not pin down an exact cause.
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CHAPTER VI

THE NEVADA PROVING GROUND

. . .som ewhere in the sands o f the desert
A shape w ith lion body and the head o f a man,
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun.
Is m oving its slaw thighs, while a ll about it
R eel shadow s o f the indignant desert birds.
W illiam B utler Yeats

Many take some small, and too often smug, comfort in asserting that no global war
has ever been fought on American soil, but they are wrong. This nation fought the cold
war in the Nevada desert, and, like all wars, there were casualties. These soldiers did not
die with dog tags, they did not come home in body bags or govemment-issue coffins, and
at their funerals no soldiers fired rounds in salute to their sacrifice or played Taps at their
passing. With the cold war over, the United States stands proudly above the disorganized
rubble that was the USSR and claims victory. But that does not tell the whole story, for
where—in what office, what file, what government safe—is the tally o f the w ar’s toll?
That gruesome balance sheet would be embarrasing indeed, for it would show that the
only casualties o f the cold war fell victim to fiiendly fire. Unlike the atom bomb itself that
dramatically announces its presence in a furious burst o f energy, power, light—radiation is
insidious. It kills quietly, sometimes slowly, and its effects often go unnoticed,
unrecognized, hiding behind other causes. The victims o f the cold war, then, remain, for
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the most part, unnamed, faceless. It would take a talented artist indeed to memorialize the
diversity o f these casualties—the weathered Nevada cowboy, the pigtailed Utah schoolgirl,
the paunchy Indiana farmer, the NYU student sampling mysteriously radioactive rain. The
only failures o f these, and so many others like them, were commonplace: they drank
contaminated milk, or ate bread baked with radioactive wheat, or drew stick figures in the
radioactive talc that settled on the Buick in the driveway. They stand witness to a war that
did not end.
We cannot count the cold w ar’s casualties, but it is possible to look into the
program itself—to the military’s approbation o f the Nevada Proving Ground—to find the
seeds o f their suffering. This thesis nears its conclusion at the historical moment when the
hazardous practices o f the nation’s testing program—secrecy, media manipulation,
misapplication of science, and an exaggerated military objective—coalesced and became
inseparable from the program itself. This examination o f the Nevada Proving Ground
demonstrates that with the inception o f continental testing, atomic governance had taken
root, matured, and blossomed into full, poisonous, flower. Indeed, even the birth o f
continental testing was marked with an odious taint o f deceit and manipulation.
Evidence suggests that the AEC hedged its bets on the proposed weapons site and
misled the president, proposing that any continental testing would be minimal. And, based
upon that proposal (supported, incidentally, by the National Security Council), Truman
had every reason to believe that scientists fi'om Lawrence Livermore or Los Alamos might
just need to spend a day or two in the Nevada desert to solve some puzzling experimental
riddle that would otherwise have required a trip to the Marshall Islands. Indeed, the
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record fully supports that assumption. Truman authorized the testing o f atomic weapons
at the Nevada Proving Ground on December 18, 1950 before the Army Corps o f
Engineers had completed studies on radiological factors because the site would be used
for a “few relatively low-order detonations” on an "“emergency basis.” * There is no doubt,
however, that the AECs intentions were distinctively different than those it proposed to
the president, an ‘operation’, not an ‘emergency experiment’, was certainly already in the
works. Six weeks after Truman approved continental testing, the first unimaginativelynamed shot o f Operation Ranger, A ble, had caused doors to slam in nearby Las Vegas,
and four more detonations followed within two weeks. There were, obviously, more than
a ‘few’ shots necessary, and the elaborate maneuvers planned by the military belie any
characterization o f the tests as ‘emergencies. ’ Slightly more than a year later, by the time
Truman left office, the military had detonated twelve atom bombs in the Nevada desert
with three equal or greater than the 21 KT weapon dropped on Nagasaki. It was,
however, only the beginning. By October, 1958, the United States detonated 119 atomic
weapons in Nevada and all but 23 released radioactive fallout off site.
When the civilians lost the tug-of-war over atomic energy, the military took a
trophy—the Nevada Proving Ground. There, and in Washington where decisions
continued to be made, military objective reigned supreme, achieving primacy over all other
considerations, including ethical responsibilities to the commander-in-chief and, (so very
importantly) moral responsibilities to the health o f participants and iimocent civilians. In
his excellent history of atomic testing, Richard Miller drew an enthusiastic portrait; “The

* W ashington Post, December 19, 1978, 12.
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generals rushed to the chalkboards. There would be war games to end all w ar games.
Troops. Tanks. Artillery. Paratroopers.”^ The Army played its games (not unlike
Admiral Blandy’s Navy) against an unbeatable opponent and to try and win—to harness
the bomb Iot som ething, perhaps just pride—it pressured and cajoled the AEC onto its
team.
The complicity o f the AEC in the military’s program o f atomic game-playing,
when combined with established behaviors within the AECs institutional structure itself,
contributed to what we can now recognize as yet another step along a perilous pathway.
The decision to locate the test site in Nevada offers an ideal opportunity to explore the
ramifications o f the screening out o f disadvantageous scientific opinion that had become
commonplace (since Operation Crossroads) within the nation’s atomic program.^ In
considering the Nevada location, the AEC relied upon only those scientific opinions that
supported its intentions. According to the AEC, the choice o f the Southern Nevada site
was based upon the “approval o f eminent advisory scientists as to safety factors” who

^ Richard Miller Under the Cloud (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1986).
^ Scientists were, o f course, crucial and as the number o f ‘approved’ scientists became
fewer in number, the government increasingly relied upon a small coterie o f ‘experts’ that
increasingly became less and less iimovative, supporting each others’ opinions and
apparently hesitant to point out discrepancies ( if indeed, they noticed them) and unable,
or unwilling, to inject any element o f innovation into the program. It is perhaps only
through hindsight that this becomes obvious. Eisenhower framed the problem in terms of
numbers, not variety o f opinion, and in 1953 indicated that “[national security] in this
atomic age is endangered by a shortage o f first-rate research scientists, particularly
physicists.”
c/owrAia/, May 18, 1953, 1. Eisenhower remained alarmed though and
in 1954 commented in relation to the denial o f a security clearance for Robert
Oppenheimer, said ‘W e’ve got to handle this so all our scientists are not made out to be
Reds, because that Goddam McCarthy is just likely to try such a thing.” Hewlett and
HoU, A tom sfo r Peace and War (Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 1989) 89.
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claimed that the site was suitable even though it was “only 65 miles from Las Vegas.”** By
accepting that recommendation, however, the AEC ignored the 1945 advice o f Stafford
Warren, the primary medical officer on the Manhattan Project who witnessed Trinity.
Although Warren had recommended that no test o f a weapon o f Trinity’s size be repeated
in any area not “free o f population” for at least 150 miles, the AEC detonated three
weapons larger than the Trinity device during the first 1951 testing season at the Nevada

**I acknowledge that I have chosen to take this evidence at its ‘face’ value, yet recognize
that the reasons given in 1953 for the establishment of the test site may be more selfserving that factual, particularly since the motivations of historical actors (and particularly
those who relied upon an earlier assertion o f ‘emergency’ for the test site’s creation) may
have changed. “Summary o f Minutes Committee on Operational Future, NPG” January
14, 1953, CIC 26306. Certainly, the supportive influence o f Nevada Senator McCarran
may have been significant. McCarran sat securely on the military appropriations
committee and favored the Southern Nevada site and was influenced, undoubtedly, by the
promise o f economic benefits to Nevada that testing would bring. Additionally, and
officially, the site was large, remote, and not prone to rain. See too, Titus, Bom bs in the
Bakcyard, 56, 57.
An internal memorandum prepared in anticipation o f the formal meeting to settle the
details o f the official report for the choice o f the Nevada Test Site, prepared also in 1953,
includes some points left out o f the final memorandum mentioned above. That document
indicates that fallout was a consideration, and shows that the AEC was perfectly aware
that a good portion o f the United States would be exposed to perhaps “prohibitive
concentrations” o f fallout. The memorandum indicates that a lth o u ^ “the probable
distribution o f waste from carefully conducted nuclear tests has been described. . The
fact was established during the Eniwetok tests o f 1948 that no prohibitive concentrations
o ffa ll-o u t were observed beyond a radius o f300 m ilesfrom the test site. The suspicious
samples collected within this radius came from air-craft runway water following rain
show ers.. It is also self-evident that fall-out occurs anywhere toward the surface under
the vertical projection o f the radioactive cloud aloft. It has been shown, however, that this
fallout has a negligible concentration a t the surface outside a radius o f600 m iles from
the test site. . .” [emphasis mine] Memorandum from Carroll L. Tyler, Manager Santa Fe
Operations Office “Documentation o f Establishment of Continental Test Site” September
14, 1953,326 US Atomic Energy commission. Location; LANL, Collection Records
Center C-2 D-44, Folder Comm, to Study on Future of Nevada Proving Grounds”
Defendant’s exhibit P rescott v. US, DX 21914.
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Test Site.® The AEC could so comfortably reach a decision contrary to earlier
recommendations because no agency but the AEC had access to the records o f the
Manhattan Project or knew the identities o f the mysteriously unnamed “eminent advisory
scientists” that the AEC said it had relied upon in 1950.® The self-serving and dangerous
decision to ignore an informed warning about the safety o f weapons testing, is, however,
only a start.
It seems clear that as the military assumed greater control over atomic
development, the commission paid less and less attention to the ramifications o f testing.
As has been shown, in 1948 the commission disallowed a continental site based upon
safety considerations.’ Yet in anticipation, perhaps, o f the military’s push for a continental
site and accompanying troop maneuvers. Dr. Shields Warren, Director o f the Division of
Biology and Medicine, contacted Dr. Joseph G. Hamilton at the University o f California in
July 1949 and requested his help in evaluating radioactive hazards. Warren, who is not

®“Report on Test 16 July 1945” Warren to Groves 21 July 1945, TSCMED. Trinity’s
yield was estimated at 21 KT; o f the ten detonations at the Nevada Test Site during the
first season, three exceeded 21 KT.
®It is important to remember that secrecy continued to permeate every element o f the
program. William Twitchell, who had been in charge o f a California radiation laboratory,
was hospitalized at the Letterman Army Hospital for security reasons so that anything he
might say during periods o f delirium would be safeguarded. B ulletin o f the Atom ic
Scientists Mscy 1953, 150.
’ It is important to note the effort that Lilienthal individually expended in his effort to
understand atomic weapons and their consequences. In mid-1949, before he resigned as
Commission Chairman, Lilienthal made note o f his concern: “How many atomic bombs,
set off within a short space o f time, will so contaminate the atmosphere as to kill off a
substantial part o f the world’s population. Stafford Warren and others have emoted about
this, placing it very low; E.O. Lawrence [of Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, a long
time participant in atomic weapons development] and his people think this is rot. . .Now
we get a report, fi'om one individual only but pursuant to a request I made, that puts it
very low. We must try to get a reasonable answer. What a business!” Lilienthal, D icay,
553.
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related and should not be confused with Stafford Warren o f Operation Crossroads,
nevertheless tried, like the earlier Warren, to temper the military’s enthusiasm for atomic
weaponry by attempting to instill some realistic concern for radiation’s dangers/ He, like
Stafford Warren, failed.
Hamilton received all the health information collected from Trinity, Japan, Bikini
and Eniwetok, and by November 28, 1950 had completed his research. Hamilton’s
analysis focused upon acute injuries that might result from a serviceman’s radiation
exposure. Significantly, he warned against the very things that troops would eventually
face at Camp Desert Rock. For example, Hamilton noted that the chances o f radiation
injury would probably be enhanced if the exposed individuals had “been subject to
previous stresses such as prolonged physical effort, loss of sleep and other fatigue” and
that the effects o f inhaled material might be significant, producing “a severe and possibly
fatal radiation injury to the pulmonary tissue.” Hamilton believed that there existed
insufficient data upon which to base more reliable predictions o f injury, and his conclusion
offers a glimpse into the macabre subcurrents o f thought that flowed through this early

* The AEC demanded that the military assume radiation safety responsibility. Letter to
“Commanding Officer Test Command AFSWP [Armed Forces Special Weapons Project]
from K.F. Hertford, Director, Office o f Test Operations, June 2, 1952. P rescott v. US,
CIV LV 80-143, Defendant’s Exhibit DX 21920. The military’s committment to radiation
safety, though, turned out to be negligible. In 1953 the Test Director complained to Seth
Woodruff^ Field Manager o f the Las Vegas Office, that although a great deal o f
decontamination work followed a test, the technicians o f the military rad-safe group that
remained was “not well-qualified. . I was questioned by the rad-safe officer and technician
regarding the proper film developer temerature to be u sed .. and dosimeter techniques..
questions were raised which indicated there was a real problem o f being able to
differentiate between gamma and beta radiation in the film measurement and analysis.”
Memo dated 28 May 1953, 326 Us Atomic Energy Commission, LANL Records Center,
Collection C-2, Folder Rad-Safe (Upshot-Knothole) TR 306.
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stage o f atomic weapons tests. Even as he urged controlled experimentation, Hamilton
significantly qualified his proposal:
For both politic and scientific reasons I think it would be advantageous
to secure what data can be obtained by using large monkeys. .
.Scientifically, the use o f such animals bears the disadvantage o f the fact
that they are considerably smaller. . and evaluation o f their subjective
symptoms is infinitely more difficult. If this is to be done in humans, I
feel that those concerned in the Atomic Energy Commission would be
subject to considerable criticism, as admittedly this would have a little of
the Buchenwald touch.®
Unfortunately, history has borne out not only Hamilton’s obvious concerns, but also the
disdain for human radiation experimentation that Hamilton predicted. Unfortunately too,
however, Warren’s emphasis upon preventative health and safety, based upon hazards
fully recognized at the time, deteriorated within the institutional culture o f atomic
guardianship, the AEC.
By September 1952, AEC oversight had become notional, at best. After twenty
atomic bombs had sent tons o f radioactive debris into the air and eventually onto
teetertotters in Louisiana and milksheds in Dakota, in September 1952 AEC Chairman
Gordon Dean “said he was interested in knowing how responsibility for health and safety”
was determined and applied.*® In accordance with the AECs promise to the president and
the National Security Council to consider each continental test in light o f its consequences,
though, the commission should have asked that question before the testing began.

®Hamilton to Warren, November 28, 1950; original in the Bancroft Library.
*®Memorandum to Brig. Gen. K. E. Fields, Director o f \Clitary Application fi'om Acting
Secretary to the Commission, Harold D. Anamosa, September 26, 1952, US DOE
Archives, RG Commission, Collection Secretariat, Box 1264, Folder MRA 7-1, Proving
Grounds, Vol. I.
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By 1953, after two years o f continental testing, the commission had been
transformed into a board almost completely ignorant, apparently, o f the most fundamental
qualities o f atomic testing itself and one that only superficially directed or controlled the
decisions made by its operational staff. When the commissioners learned that
thunderstorms might result in heavy, isolated concentrations o f radioactive fallout, they
asked Alvin Graves, the site’s test director, how weather affected the testing o f
weapons.** Graves’ response was, at best, vague: “. . .what was safer for nearby areas
might be more dangerous for distant regions, and vice versa.” Graves then agreed with
Commissioner Eugene Zuckert’s conclusion that “a lot seemed dependent on good
luck.” *^

* * *

Commissioner Zuckert’s reference to luck betrays a realization by the AEC, and a
reminder, that atmospheric testing was more than a nation’s need for defense, more than
bombs, more than fallout; it was—as Stafford Warren tried to convince a self-indulgent
Admiral Blandy—about human beings. It is certainly worthwhile to examine institutional
culture, to look at the ways that individual personalities shaped cold war policies; how the

** There was really no reason for anyone associated with atomic testing to not recognize
the hazards o f thunderstorms and âllout. Trinity, itself^ was delayed until thunderstorms
passed for fear that fallout would not become dispersed, but instead could become trapped
within the storm cell and deliver a potent radioactive stew onto a small area. The
problems o f secrecy, though, will rear their ugly heads indiscriminately: “. . .many
govemmnet enterprises go wrong because unpalatable facts are screened out and mistaken
decisions consequently go unreviewed.” J.R. Lucas, Democracy and P articipation
(Harmondsworth; Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1976) 155.
*^ Fuller, The D ay We Bom bed Utah, 36-38.
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atomic program paired secrecy and deception from the very beginning; how the
government first separated atomic scientists from the everyday world and then capitalized
upon the scientists’ own philosphical and professional divisions; and, how the government
manipulated the media to serve its own ends. History, though, properly asks us to look
beyond the processes o f the politically prominent (and also, in the case o f the atomic
establishment, the administratively and institutionally secretive); to remember, as Linda
Kerber urges, that “history involves simultaneously the stories o f the powerful and the
stories of the weak.”*"
Accordingly, it is importam now to track the decisions o f the mighty as they made
a journey from the Washington conference room to the Nevada desert and confront the
impact of those decisions upon the less powerful, the weak. What did the practices and
behaviors that characterized the atomic testing program mean to Southern Nevada? the
Utah schoolgirl? the soldier in a fox hole less than four miles from an atomic detonation?
the rest of the nation? These people are the main focus o f this chapter because their
stories reveal that by using the bomb as a measure o f national strenth to keep the Soviets
at bay, the nation put iimocent people directly in the line o f fire.
The atom bomb, as Operation Crossroads demonstrated, was not a precision
weapon. Its effects were terribly widespread and to capture its diverse impact, this
chapter will examine the dual facets o f atomic testing, those who set off the bombs and
those affected by them. First, then, and even though it is clear that the military played a
fundamental role in the decision to christen a continental testing site, it is important to

*" Linda K. Kerber, in “Teaching American History” The Am erican Scholar (Winter,
1998) 99.
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look also at the ways it positioned itself in the institutional heirarchy and came to ‘occupy’
the Nevada Proving Ground despite some tentative attempts by the AEC (with at least
some concern for radiation safety and prompted additionally by laboratories that wanted
to preserve the area for scientific studies) to curtail, at least to some extent, the military’s
extravagance/** The military, though, once firmly entrenched, blatantly disregarded not
only commonsensical but also scientific approaches that could have made testing a safer
enterprise/® Second, this chapter will show how the military’s overweening self-

***Even the weapons laboratories had become weary of the military by 1953. Norris
Bradbury, Director o f Los Alamos objected to the military monopolization o f the site; ‘T
regard the tendency to use the NPG. . .for weapon system tests, for civil defense.effects
tests, for troop indoctrination and maneuvers, and for the reportorial press as quite outside
the original concept o f the site. . this trend, if continued, can force us to abandon this site
for no other reason than that the military has taken it over. . it may sometime be necessary
to recall that this area was actually established at the specific request o f the LASL for its
own needs.” Another member o f Los Alamos focused on the unique characterists o f
atomic testing and consequent limitations imposed: “If these five sites [at Yucca Basin]
are contaminated by being used for other purposes they are not available for
developmental tests.” “Summary o f Minutes Committee on Operation Future, NPG” 6,
CIC 26306. LASL also tried to get the AEC to curtail the military’s influence by pointing
out (in a later memorandum) that military involvement seriously compromised security by
allowing access to personnel who had not been sufBciently ‘cleared.’ “Memorandum to
Reuben E. Cole, Chairman fi'om Dr. Ralph Carlisle Smith, LASL” May 8, 1953.
*®The conclusion is unavoidable that by July 1951 the ‘tail’ was energetically wagging the
dog. The military demanded that the AEC report directly to the military liaison committee,
and had decided that the AEC had become simply a “contractor” for the military—
accordingly, the armed forces would present to the AEC its specifications for weapons
that the AEC would then provide. A memorandum from the NClitary Liaison Committee
to the Chairman o f the AEC proposed that to avoid ‘misunderstandings’ the AEC report
directly to the military on a monthly basis o f “all the latest concepts and possibilities in the
atomic weapon field plus the status and progress o f all previously presented concepts”
together with study plans, designs, specifications, and time estimates for delivery;
quarterly reports from the AEC summarizing and updating the above and the same from
the contractors and laboraties engaged in development; and letters “when there arises any
change or an actual or foreseeable delay. . [including] the reasons therefor, alternatives. .
and new times estimates.” ‘Memorandum for the Chairman, Atomic Energy
Commission; Subject: Nfilitary Guidance in the Atomic Weapon Field” from NClitary
Liaison Committee, July 18, 1951. R G 326 US Atomic Energy Commission, Location
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importance, not policy, may have harmed the lives o f some of those who, perhaps unaware
o f it at the time, were touched by the atom bomb.

* * *

So, what did it mean to the Test Site, to Nevada, to the rest o f the US, for the
militaiy to get the chance to p lcy with atomic weapons? This section looks at the
military’s use o f the Test Site to explore the ways it not only maneuvered the AEC into
developing the site; but, also, how it overran all AEC objections to military plans for the
site that seemed (to the AEC) either irrelevant or hazardous.*® When the AEC asked the
National Security Council and the president to dedicate a portion of the Nevada Bombing
and Gunnery Range to the atom bomb, it promised to maintain vigilance (and although

ALOO, Folder MR & A 9 FY-52. The president approved the military’s proposition on
September 10, 1952. See Memorandum from the Executive Office o f the president.
National Security Council, December 1, 1952. 3. US DOE ARCHIVES, 326 US Atomic
Energy Commission, Collection Secretariat, Box 1277, Folder O&M 12 National Security
Council.
*®The AEC was, o f course, in the best position to identify possible hazards—and also to
have prevented them. Allan Favish, in a comprehensive article aimed at the burdenshifting provisions o f the Federal Tort Claims Act and the consequences o f those
provisions on downwinders and atomic veterans, details the wide range o f information
available to, and even produced by, the AEC prior to the institution o f continental testing.
His research suggests that definitive links had been established between radiation and
anemia, lung cancer, diseases o f the blood and lymphatic systems, bone disorders,
malignant changes over long periods o f time, leukemia, and stomach cancer. “Radiation
Injury and the Atomic Veteran” H astings Law Journal, 32; 1 (1981), 939.
One o f the sites under consideration, on the Carolina coast, offered the significant
benefit o f prevailing winds that would have swept fallout away from populated areas and
over the Atlantic was discarded because o f its “relatively great distance from Los Alamos,
does not have the necessary Government-controlled land area.. .” Memorandum from
Carroll L. Tyler, September 14, 1953, (see note. 4, supra?).
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reliant upon the somewhat questionable objectivity o f its “recognized experts”)
optimistically declared:
some o f the most urgent atomic weapons tests can certainly be
conducted well within acceptable limits o f public radiological safety.
Each specific test operation would o f course be subject to examination
and approval by recognized experts.” *’
On the contrary, although the AEC may have hoped it could retain authority, the military
had only to cite a military necessity to overcome AEC reluctance or threatened
disapproval. By 1951, even the AEC had to concede, at least privately, that the military
was running the show.
The military wasted no time in positioning its objectives above those o f the AEC.
After the military’s successes with their first tests at the Nevada Test Site held in January
1951 (code-named Operation Ranger) they immediately began planning for two successive
operations, Buster and Jangle. Problems arose, however, when the AECs test director,
officially in charge of all tests at the site, objected to the Army’s planned use o f animals,
specifically 32 dogs and 26 sheep for thermal bum experiments and “bio-medical”
experiments on 15 dogs and “some rats.” The director lodged his objections based upon
adverse public reaction (a continual, and perhaps since so often mentioned, primary
concern) and the fact that any data received fi’om the experiments would only duplicate
previous experiments. Identified in an AEC Operations Report as a “difference o f
opinion” the problem was summarized “as one of concept of responsibility and authority
o f the Test Director.” The Department o f Defense, however, told the commission that
“military requirements are not matters for decision by either the commission or its test

17

Ibid.
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organization.” In the end, the AEC refused to support its test director’s recommendations
against the planned experiments and surrendered instead to the Department o f Defense.
The Army’s animal experiments remained features o f Operations Buster and Jangle.**
Men, too, joined animals as victims of military requirements as the military sought
not only to introduce troops to the atom bomb but also to explore the psychological
reactions o f exposed soldiers.*® In 1951, the AEC successfully limited troop participation
to one shot and required that soldiers remain five and one-half miles fi’om ground zero
during Buster-Jangle.^® Severely disappointed with the results o f this limited exposure, the

** “Atornic Energy Commission Operations Planned for Buster-Jangle” and attachment
“Report by the Director o f Military Application” September 5, 1951, US DOE Archives,
326 US Atomic Energy Commission, Collection 1951-58 Secretariat, Box 1261, Folder
MR & A-9 Buster-Jangle, Vol. 1. See also note 50 infra., on the prioritization o f positive
public relations.
Affects to industry and public relations were a major feature o f Buster-Jangle, even if
radiation safety was not. The military ordered ‘long range cloud tracking to Atlantic
Coast” not for possible feUout measurements to civilians, but “for puposes o f industrial
protection and AEC public relations.” The government had been concerned about
radiatioactive fallout to Eastman Kodak laboratories, who threatened to claim extensive
damages should its photographic processes suffer. It became one o f the only private
entities in the nation privileged to advance information o f any atomic test after Trinity.
Miller, Under the Cloud, 58-59.
*®‘Tndoctrination in essential physical protective measures under simulated combat
conditions, and observation o f the psychological effects o f an atomic explosion are reasons
for this desired participation.” Memorandum fi’om NClitary Liaison Committee to
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, July 16, 1951.
^ For Buster-Jangle, the military had requested permission to expose servicemen to
excessive levels o f radiation, considering the AEC’s limit of 3.9r “unrealistic.” Shields
Warren objected, the AEC turned authority over to the Test Director Carroll Tyler, but
Warren wasted no time in warning the him that the Division o f Biology & Medicine took
their job (at least under Warren’s direction) seriously. In a letter to the Santa Fe
Operations office of October 11, 1951 conceded that although the Test Director had
ultimate control over the military’s request, the Test Director would have to explain
thoroughly to Warren why he allowed excesses: “this Division does not look lightly upon
radiation excesses. Only true emergencies should be granted special privileges” and if
such emergency should arise, the Test Director would be required to present thorough
documentation including “full explanation as to why the job cannot be performed in
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Army planned more extensive maneuvers for the 1952 test series. The AEC rebuffed the
Army’s arguments and established a seven-mile limit for trenched troops for Operation
Tumbler-Snapper in 1952. The Army, though, wanted its troops stationed less than four
miles from the site o f the explosion—a proposal considered ludicrous by Shields Warren.^*
He was less concerned with the initial burst o f radiation than with the thermal energy o f
the blast—energy which he calculated would scorch “most anything” within two and onehalf miles.^ Considering Warren’s limit “tactically unrealistic,” the Army and Air Force

another manner, how many people are to be over-exposed, how much over-exposure, and
. . . the recent exposure hiAory o f the individuals and what is planned to enable them to
pay off the over-exposure.” Additionally, Warren told Tyler that he believed the military
should be able to accomodate the requirements with only minimal inconvenience and ‘Tn
other worlds, compliance with the permissible limit should become a mark o f distinction in
the exercise o f ingenuity, rather than a concession to be avoided upon pretext.
Indoctrination o f this attitude early in this series may save us much trouble, and possible
radiation injuries, in the several series to come.” Letter included in the “Minutes” o f the
Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine, September 12 and 13, 1952. US DOE
Archives, 326 US Atomic Energy Commission, Collection Secretariat, Box 1271, Folder
B&M7 Biology & Medicine adv. CMTE, vol. 1. The meeting was held after Dr. Warren
had left his position as Director o f the division, and is indicative o f insider recognition o f
Dr. Warren’s strident refusal to back down to the military that his letter was used as an
example o f the ‘safe’ nature o f the 3.9r limit.
Shields Warren should not be confused with Stafford Warren, who left government
service permanently right after Operation Crossroads.
^ Dr. Warren’s first letter illustrates the disparate interests within the atomic testing
program, and particularly the importance o f public relations to the AEC:
“The Division o f Biology and Medicine recognizes that it is not its function to set
standards for the military nor to impede the operations o f the Department o f Defense.
However the test and the Continental Proving Ground are the responsibility o f the
commission both in fact and in the public mind.
“The Division o f Biology and Medicine recommends against permitting troops to
be closer to ground zero than the seven miles used in the Desert Rock [1951] operation
for the following reasons: 1. The Continental Proving Ground is o f great value to the
program o f the Atomic Energy Commission and has been accepted by the public as safe.
2. Accidents occuring at the time and place o f an atomic explosion are magnified by the
press out o f all proportion to their importance, and anay injury or death during the
operation might well have servions adverse effects. 3. The explosion is experimental in
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launched a letter-writing campaign, and the AEC backed down. The AEC’s Los Alamos
manager suggested that the AEC simply relieve itself o f responsibility. That hint was the
tool the commission needed; it suggested that the military prepare a safety plan acceptable
to the test manager; if, however, “officials o f the Department o f Defense.. .still feel that a
military requirement justifies the maneuver, the commission would enter no objection.”^
The military ultimately decided to place its troops within 7,000 feet o f ground zero—and
the AEC, while indicating that its own safety precautions for civilians remained in effect,
deferred to military objectives and admitted that there was “the necessity for realistic
training by the military in all fields, often accompanied by serious injuries, and that such
training was also necessary in the field o f atomic weapons.”^** The military may have
readily admitted to the AEC in 1953 that it expected that serious injury could result fi'om
type and its yield cannot be predicted with accuracy.” Warren to Brigadier General K.E.
Fields, Director, AEC Division o f Military Applications, March 25, 1952.
Additionally, the desert sand was “thermally nonideal.” Since an intensely hot
“preshock thermal layer” could be expected to surge ahead o f the shock wave, carrying
“dust, smoke, and heated air,” the effects on troops in foxholes were unknown, but
potentially lethal. Miller, Under the Cloud, 139.
Warren probably relied upon Stafford Warren’s report after Trinity that emphasized the
termal effects o f the blast, “several times greater than that expected.” Trinity eviscerated
jack rabbits more than 800 yards fi'om zero and a farm house three miles away suffered
“extensive damage” including doors tom loose. He predicted “severe casualties” to any
personnel within two miles and severe eye damage to those within five to six miles o f zero,
“sufficient to put personnel out o f action several days if not permanently.” Warren to
Groves, 21 July 1945, TSCMED.
^ “The Commission has approved the attendance o f a military combat un it.. .for the
purpose o f indoctrination and training o f individuals and organizations.. .No responsibility
was accepted for this administrative movement, security control or support o f this
personnel but the authority to impose necessary operational restrictions on their
participation was reserved. You will set the criteria o f time, place, radiological safety and
security necessary. . .” “Designation o f Authority as AEC Test Director for BusterJangle”, US DOE Archives, 326 US Atomic Energy Commission, Collection 1951-1958
Secretariat Files, Box 1261, Folder MP & A-7 Buster Jangle, Vol. 1. See also NCUer,
U nder the Cloud, 142.
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troop maneuvers with atom bombs, but veterans since have spent years trying to get the
government to admit that their service in Nevada trenches and in the midst o f radioactive
dust may have caused their cataracts, their cancers/®
Warren tried (albeit fruitlessly) to protect not only troops, but also civilians, from
military extravagance. Although there were civilian injuries from radioactive material at
the test site (particularly employees o f government contractors) it is clear that fallout
needlessly constituted the greatest hazard to civilians off-site. As was demonstrated by
both Trinity and Baker, the amount o f radioactive material exploded into the air
corresponded with the proximity o f the bomb’s detonation to the surface. Accordingly, in
1951, Warren recommended against a military experiment that would involve a tower
shot—a method to detonate a bomb close to the surface that deviates from a safer, planedelivered “air-drop” bomb that would explode at a higher altitude. It appears that Warren
recognized that the armed forces might not be convinced by his appeals to radiation safety,
so he also mentioned the problem o f public relations:
It is not possible for us to disregard a potential long-term inhalation
hazard. There would be a continually recurring problem of dust
contaminated with material o f long half-life being blown around by the
winds. The arid character o f the region increases this hazard.. .From
the policy standpoint, hazards that might arouse alarm and prejudice
against its future use should be avoided. . .We would have no objections
to such a test being carried out in an area where much o f the fallout
material would land over the o cean.. .eliminat[ing] the problem of
recurrent spread o f contaminated dust by the winds.^®
Cited by Favish, “Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran” 945, n. 39.
^ Cataracts and eye injury was the most common immediately-recognizable consequence.
Six soldiers from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania suffered eye injury from witnessing blasts. Las
Vegas Sun, March 20, 1955, 1.
^ Office Memorandum to General James McCormack, Jr., Director Division o f Military
Applications from Shields Warren, M.D., Director Division of Biology and Medicine,
February 21, 1951. US DOE Archives, Collection DMA, Box 3783, Foler MRS 7.
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Three months later, an unnamed committee met to “consider the feasibility and condition’
for the shot that Warren had warned against. The committee overruled Warren,
specifically addressing his warnings concerning inhalation hazards by relying, as had
become the custom, on scientific opinion that conformed to the military’s (and thus,
AEC’s) wishes;
It is not obvious that a very nonhomogeneous distribution o f radiation is
always more toxic and therefore less tolerable than a uniform
distribution. . .Many pathologists do not believe that cancer is due to a
somatic mutation which produces a malignant c e ll.. .when such
[insolubale and radioactive] particles are breathed, however, large
particles are filtered o u t.. .with the result that the number o f particles o f
diameter, greater than 5 microns which find their way into the lungs is
negligjble.^^

Later, Warren had to combat the military’s request for a “deep sub surface shot” to
produce a “low cloud”—a shot that could have been disasterous. He won. AEC meeting
no. 584, July 27, 1951. US DOE Archives, 326 US Atomic Energy Commission,
Collection 1951-58 Secretary Files, Box 1261, Folder MA& A-7, Buster-Jangle, Vol. 1.
The AEC might have taken a lesson fi’om history. Although under tremendous pressure
to prove the viability o f the first atomic bomb. General Groves noted the Manhattan
Project’s considerations for civilian populations following a tower shot: “With the bomb
explosion only one hundred feet off the ground, we expected a great deal o f material fi"om
the tower and the ground surrounding it would be made radioactive and carried as small
particles for great distances through the air. . .we did not want the cloud, if one
developed, to pass over any populated areas imtil its radioactive contents were thoroughly
dissipated. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, 291-292. While Groves’ own personal (and
often self-serving) recollections are admittedly problematic, this statement is substantially
verified by Stafford Warren’s report and his emphasis on fallout.
There was widespread interest in the possibility detonating a weapon that would remove
“something on the order of 50,000 cubic yards” o f material fi'om a bomb crater. It was a
large committee by AEC standards, 20 nülitary, university, laboratory, and AEC
individuals topped the list of those present, and the bottom o f the list mentioned “(And a
few more)” “Meeting o f a Committee to Consider the Feasibility and Conditions for a
Preliminary Radiologic Safety Shot for Jangle, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, May 21
and 22, 1951” P rescott v. US, Defendant’s Exhibit DX390241.
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Warren’s warnings were ignored by a determined military, and tower shots—those that
carried a large amount o f radioactive material onto ofiP-site locations—confirmed his
predictions. The heavily-deleted minutes o f an AEC meeting in May 1952 illustrate that
the commission considered (probably high) levels o f off-site fallout. Warren warned the
commission that it could not risk any shots larger than those already fired, and additionally
to avoid tests when “winds in the upper air reach high velocities.” Chairman Dean,
however, declined (apparently but not conclusively since a large portion of the minutes are
still classified) to address the health consequences to which Dr. Warren alluded. Instead,
recognizing the problem as one o f public relations and information management,
suggested a “popular” article would “reduce the possibility o f public anxiety.”^* The
AEC has become not the watchdog, but the accomplice o f the military.

* * *

As this discussion turns to the victims o f atomic testing, it is important to
remember that the medical effects o f radioactivity are, perhaps, as hard to pin down as the
motivations o f historical actors. There are, after aU, many different radioactive elements
with many different properties, potencies, and effects. While it is readily accepted that
radiation causes various forms o f cancer and probably distresses the immune system, even
those “pure” sciences that promise to offer definitive answers become hesitant and
indecisive about the effects o f radiation. It is a murky problem, compounded by the
presence o f so many other carcinogenic substances in our environment. For example.

28

AEC Commission Meeting No. 694, minutes. May 14, 1952, item 3.
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radiation can cause lung cancer, but so can cigarettes and petroleum fumes; radiation can
cause colon cancer, but so can biscuits and gravy. ^ Some scientists argue that any
radioactive exposure equal to or less than “background” solar radiation must be harmless—
others that human beings live in equilibrium with solar radiation and that there is no safe
threshold beyond that equilibrium. Congress finally admitted in 1990 that the nation had
to bear some responsibility and passed legislation designed to compensate some for their
losses, but the claimants face a tremendous burden o f proof

It may be impossible to

prove that fallout caused increased rates o f cancer (together with other illness and disease)

^ This last argument applied with biting success by a young Justice Department attorney
during trial testimony in P rescott v. US. When asked by the attorney to explain why she
believed her late husband died prematurely o f colon cancer, the widow o f a deceased test
site worker explained that while he worked in a tunnel at the Nevada Test Site he had
been exposed to dangerously high levels o f radiation and then collapsed. She went on to
explain his lengthy hospitalization that followed this exposure. The attorney patiently
waited through this explaination and then asked the woman whether her husband had ever
eaten biscuits and gravy. The witness chuckled and explained that since she and her
husband were both fi'om the South, they had eaten a lot o f biscuits and gravy. The
attorney then asked the widow if she was aware that biscuits and gravy were high in fat, a
substance known to contribute to the incidence o f colon cancer.
The Radiation Exposiue Compensation Act supports compensation for uranium miners,
test site workers, and downwinders and each is faced with a strict burden of proof based
upon the particular circumstances under which they were exposed. The disease criteria is
limited to fifteen radiogenic cancers based upon the Radium Dial Painter legislation. This
is interesting for two reasons. First, the circumstances o f exposime differ between the two
groups. Radium dial painters were exposed to radioactive substances primarily through
ingestion. Fallout posed inhalation and ingestion hazards. Second, our understanding o f
radiogenicity has increased substantially since the approval of the Radium Dial Painter
legislation. The National Academy o f Science has published six “BIER” reports by the
time Congress enacted the RECA legislation, and although those reports altered and
expanded upon earlier categories o f radiogenic cancers. Congress ignored those analyses.
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that seem to have visited areas exposed to fallout, but important to consider those who
firmly believe that their own government poisoned them/^
Important, too, to look at the ways that the government d id recognize the
problems of fallout yet how it also so woefully misdirected its concern; It warned the
photographic industry because it feared lawsuits, and followed the clouds o f radioactive
fallout across the United States in planes for public relations purposes; but failed the
people most affected. Instead, the government—too concerned with public relations—
issued constant reassurances that any radiation off-site was harmless.^^ The government
pressed its emphasis on public relations at, probably, great cost.^^ The circumstantial
evidence is irrefutable—prior to atomic testing, the Mormon population o f St. George
suffered incidences o f cancer at one-half the national average. By the 1960s, Irma
Thomas, a woman who lived on a block with only five homes, noted that there had been
seven cancer deaths and two additional cancer surgeries. Within another one-block radius,
Irma identified another eight cancer or leukemia deaths and twenty-nine afiOicted others.^"*

Cancer, reduced immunities, and birth defects all have so many causes other than
radiation and all are such complex physiological processes, that exact causes are all-butimpossible to discern.
During the first series at the Test Site, Operation Ranger, the AEC set a range for offsite exposures almost ten times that for workers, and emphasized not safety, but public
relations; “It is felt that figures must be used as general guides but that no drastic action
which might disturb the public should be taken unless it is clearly felt that such action is
essential to protect local residents fi’om almost certain damage.” cited in Jenkins, A llen v.
US, 386.
See Jay Gould and Benjamin Goldman, D eadly D eceit, passim ; and Fuller, who cites
Dr. Joseph Lyon’s research that shows childhood leukemia in Southern Utah grew to two
and one-half times the normal rate. The D ay We Bom bed Utah, 152.
^ Fuller, The D ay We Bom bed Utah, 152.
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It is, perhaps, unlikely that radioactive fallout caused all of these cancers; but is is just as
unlikely that it did not cause some.
Had secrecy and the government’s emphasis on public relations not been such
important features o f atmospheric testing, it could have addressed fallout and
recommended simple precautions that would have effectively reduced the likelihood o f
exposure to hazardous levels o f fallout. Martha Laird, in a televised interview, said that
she lived within 80 miles o f the test site and believes (without any doubt) that the
government destroyed her family. Living on a small farm, Martha and her family drank
milk from the family’s cow, drew their water from a shallow well, played in the spring and
ate vegetables from a backyard garden. When someone from the test site visited the
Laird family, Martha asked about the fallout clouds that she said lasted, sometimes, “all
day.” He told her that the radiation was harmless, no worse than an X-ray, and even
though the representative must have noticed that the family was probably ingesting fallout
that settled on its own produce and in the water, he gave her no precautionary advice. In
1955 she lost her son, a first-grader, to cancer. Shortly after that, she suffered a late-term
miscarriage and delivered a stillborn child with no legs. The family left the farm and
moved to northern Nevada. Martha, though, still mourning her losses, wrote a letter to
the Chairman o f the AEC, Lewis Strauss, who, she says responded to her coldly to her
concerns: “former President Truman had said that any dangers that might result from
fallout were a small sacrifice.”^^ Martha, whose daughter had since contracted thyroid
cancer, did not agree. Nor would many other victims.

Martha Laird told her story to Peter Jennings during “Coverup at Ground Zero” a
segment o f “Turning Point” that aired on ABC in 1994.
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Although Nevada’s sparse population was one o f the reasons for the test site’s
location, it appears that the AEC was unprepared to deal with the consequences o f atomic
testing upon Nevada’s scattering of mines, ranches, farmhouses and temporary occupation
by those who used large open range areas for periodic grazing o f sheep and cattle. The
Air Force’s use o f the bombing range had previously affected the people who earned their
living in remote regions o f Southern Nevada and it had established a procedure for rapidly
compensating residents for broken windows, injured livestock, and short-term loss o f use
(as with mines). When it took over part o f the bombing range, the AEC adopted this
policy, and required only the submission o f claims to settle with those who had suffered
damage as a result o f blast effects, e.g. shock wave damage to structures or livestock.^®
Fallout damage, though, posed a new set o f circumstances that often caused confusion
between not only residents and the AEC, but among the various test site components and
other governmental agencies involved in recompense.
The experiences o f mine operator Daniel Sheahan and his wife provide a good
example o f the AEC’s problems with a rural Nevada mine operator affected by testing."^

A prominant Nevadan, Floyd Lamb, filed a claim against the AEC for radiation damage
to cattle. Aware that Lamb had hired an attorney, the AEC decided to wait and see
whether the animals’ symptoms conformed to typical radiation disease progression; “A
period o f 60 to 90 days in the future may give us the clue to whether these animals will
‘heal’ or develop the typical Trinity lesions.” US Attorney Madison B. Graves to Mr.
Chester G. Brinch, Assistant General Counsel, US AEC, Albuquerque; CIC 1338.
This account is drawn primarily fi’om government communications: a letter fi’om the
Manager o f the Santa Fe Operations office to Brig. Gen Fields, Director o f Military
Applications dated August 20, 1954, CIC 78946; letter fi’om Chalmers C. King, General
Counsel Santa Fe Operations Office to William Mitchell, General Counsel (Washington)
dated April 14, 1955, CIC 78937; Memorandum to Colonel Alfred D. Starbird, AEC
Director o f Nfilitary Application from Donald J. Leehey, Manager o f Santa Fe Operations,
September 9, 1955, CIC 78977; Daniel and Martha Sheahan filed a claim against the
United States in District Court, Case No. 100-55.
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During the early 1950s, the Sheahan’s Groom mine, located at the northeast comer o f the
test site, suffered damage from Air Force weapons practice and atomic tests, and although
the government sometimes advised the family to evacuate because o f either possible shock
or radiation damage, its warnings and promises were often contradictory. Though
radiation monitors advised them to leave the area because o f fallout, they also told the
Sheahans that the fallout posed no danger. Sheahan though, an avid diarist, believed
differently—especially after he began to notice changes in resident animals. He recorded
his impressions during those years and later testified;
that the hides o f deer, horses, and cattle that grazed in the area were
speckled with bum m arks.. A group o f researchers from the University
of California at Los Angeles. . .fled the area [because o f high
radioactivity].^*
Contradiction characterized the information Sheahan received from the government. After
the 1951 tests, an oflGcial (who he was unable to identify) told him that “such dangerous
type tests” would not be held again within the US.^^ He also claimed that on another
occasion “health men” said that “none of us should live at Groom during the tests.” When
confronted with irrefutable evidence o f its contradictory statements to Sheahan, the
government found a way to deny responsibility. Although the government had to admit
that a Los Alamos employee had written a letter to Sheahan that advised him to reach a
settlement with the AEC or try to initiate special legislation, others within the AEC simply
claimed that the letter’s author lacked authority and though the employee “purported to
act oflScially, had no authority to discuss the matter o f the Groom Mine with the

Testimony o f Daniel Sheahan in B ullock v. US, cited by Philip Fradkin Fallout (Tucson,
AZ; University o f Arizona Press, 1989) 5-6.
39
Leehey to Starbird, September 9, 1955, CIC 78977.
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Sheahans.”^ Sheahan obviously had no idea o f how to separate the authorized from the
unauthorized statements o f the AEC upon which he necessarily relied.
The government was willing, however, to admit responsibility for relatively-minor
damage to Sheahan’s property for not only structural damage, but also effects o f fellout.
As a result of 1952s Tumbier-Snapper series, the government paid (in 1953) $1,000 of a
$1,138.78 claim to Sheahan for loss o f income following a test-related mine shutdown.
The AEC noted that during negotiations for that payment, Sheahan mentioned that his
wife Martha had recently been diagnosed with skin cancer, and though he filed no claim,
indicated that he thought her condition might be related to fallout. More damage to his
mine followed, and the government had one o f its contractors replace windows and repair
building siding at the mine. Shortly thereafter, on June 14, 1953, Sheahan sent a letter to
the AEC and requested that the government buy his mine for $150,000 since continued
testing precluded its continued use.'*^ The government declined, not because it disagreed
with Sheahan that radioactive and shock damage ammounted to a ‘taking,’ that the AEC’s
activity precluded Mr. Sheahan’s use o f the property, but because “AEC appropriations
do not permit purchase o f property for which it has no use.” In September, Sheahan filed
a claim against the government for $ 100 for “radiation damage” to his 16-year old horse.
The government had the horse appraised, twice, and based upon those estimates of value

See note. 37, supra.
The Sheahans blamed the Air Force too because it (according to the government’s own
review) “dropped missiles over and upon and in the close vicinity o f the. . mine” while the
Sheahans and other workmen were on the property, additionally “the Air Force discharged
machine gun fire or dropped missiles. . upon the mill with such devastating eflFect as to
cause an explosion which resulted in the total destruction o f the mill.” April 14, 1955. See
note 37, supra.
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offered Sheahan $50.00. Unable to receive compensation for his mine and blaming the
government for his wife’s eye disease, Sheahan contacted a lawyer and in 1955, when the
AEC refused the proposed settlement, the Sheahans filed a lawsuit. They were
unsuccessful.
Sheepmen, too, peppered the southern Nevada desert; but, unlike the ranchers and
miners who had permanent residences or recorded locations o f business, they used various
areas for fall and winter grazing in Nevada that might only be accessible from horseback
and were, thus, often more unaware than even the Sheahans. Kem and Mac Bulloch were
two such sheepmen who lived through the late spring and early summer at their Utah
homes. They knew that the government had begun to test atom bombs west o f their
traditional winter range, but without radio or newspapers, the Bullochs often found out
about a test only when they saw the mushroom clouds in the west (the dawn shots,
“bloodred and ugly”) after which they would be engulfed by debris that rushed relentlessly
toward them and their s h e e p . O n e such onrushing radioactive dirt storm changed their
lives forever.
Fallout from one o f 1953 s Upshot-Knothole series, N ancy, found the Bulloch
brothers and their 2,000 RambouUet sheep in Sand Springs Valley on March 24, 1953.
Twenty miles south, radiation monitors from the AEC and scientists from UCLA who
were performing experiments associated with the test took shelter in a mine. The
monitors knew the two sheepmen were directly in the path o f the highest radioactivity and

Unless otherwise noted, this summation o f the Bulloch brothers and their problems with
the government is taken from John G. Fuller’s The D ay We B om bed Utah, passim and
particularly here, 4.
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called their superiors to discuss a helicopter rescue, but the idea was abandoned. Later
that day, another radiation safety team on their way to the mine in a jeep told the Bullocks
that they were “in a hell o f a hot spot.”^'’ The team told the brothers that they should
leave the area immediately. The two men, though, would not leave their sheep and since
sheep graze as they walk, the group moved slowly. At six miles per day, the brothers
continued their move toward the lambing sheds o f Cedar City, Utah.
It proved a difficult and unusual trip for the experienced sheepmen. Many ewes
gave birth prematurely to potbellied lambs without legs or wool; and equally strange, the
ewes took no interest in their young, abandoning them on the desert floor and rejoining
the flock. The lambing sheds o f Cedar City offered no relief; deformed lambs were bom
and died, and hundreds o f adult sheep succumbed. Some died standing, some while
eating—frozen as if in a stupor. Their hooves became hard, their wool separated from
their skin and oozing sores covered their bodies and the insides o f their mouths. Other
ranchers returning from the Nevada range suffered the same misfortimes as the Bullochs.
Though thousands o f animals died, the AEC denied responsibility, and the Bullochs and
other sheepmen who finally filed suit in federal court, lost."”

Ibid., 13
At a June 10, 1953 AEC meeting, the AEC’s medical officer Gordon Dunning reported
that he estimated approximately 10,000 sheep grazing within 50 miles o f the test site and
some had beta bums in their nostrils and on their backs and that collected “specimens”
would be tested. AEC Meeting No. 875, CIC 14013. Unfortimately, this section o f the
meeting identified as item 10, is the first declassified portion o f the entire document.
The Iron County R ecord reported that the AEC cited “malnutrition” as the cause o f the
sheep deaths, but the Utah Health Commissioner said that although malnutrition was
present, so was radiation. July 2, 1953, 7; July 16, 1953,2.
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The bomb that so devastated the Bullochs, Nancy (24 KT) was only one of three
o f the eleven Upshot-Knothole shots that became memorable. The other two, Simon (43
KT) resulted in high levels o f radioactive rain in Albany, New York,

and Harry (32

KT) was so consequential that it has come to be known as “Dirty H a r r y . B e f o r e
exploring the effects o f H arry it is worthwhile to consider that the shot may provide an
excellent example o f the way that the government compromised health and safety in its
effort to promote its public relations campaign; for although the AEC had been warned by
Shields Warren to avoid shots when the cloud might encounter high speed winds—that is

The second shot o f Upshot-Knothole, Simon, caused a ‘hot-spot,’ isolated
concentrated fallout, that showed up in New York. Students at the Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute in New York noticed their geiger counters registering radioactivity.
They alterted radiochemistry professor Herbert Clark who called the AEC. An official
denied that testing might be the culprit. Clark and his students turned the mystery into a
project, and measured radioactivity in outside puddles at 270,000 times more radioactive
than water approved for drinking. Finally, the AEC investigated and discovered that
Albany, New York, had had an “unfortunate” encounter with fallout carried by a
thunderstorm. The dose estimated for Albany ranged up to a ‘% w thousand milirads.”
Miller, Under the Cloud, 170. The AEC launched its investigation too late to have
warned residents, had it decided to do so at all. On March 20, the New York Times told
New Yorkers that radioactive rain had fallen, “City is sopping but safe.” 25.
Fallout was ‘planned’ into Upshot-Knothole. In a memorandum from Test Director
Alvin C. Graves to Personnel concerned with Weapons Test Report Programs” dated May
6, 1953, one item (27.1) is defined as “Study o f Off-Site Air-Bome radioactive materials,
Nevada Proving Grounds, Gamma Fallout originating from Upshot 2,3,4,5,7 and 8 at
various distances up to 100 miles from ground zero.” CIC 14169,
There is additional evidence that given the high kiloton range o f testing planned for
Upshot-Knothole, fallout became a real concern for the AEC before the tests began. It is
presently impossible to leam more than that on on February 4, 1953, the AEC held and
meeting and developed an “information plan concerning the public health aspects of spring
tests” since the meeting minutes for that date, and others associated with UpshotKnothole remain almost completely classified. AEC Meeting no. 814, CIC 14001. As is,
for example. Meeting no. 845 on April 1, 1953 that discussed fallout and “PR aspects”
CIC 14003.
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exactly what happened with Harry.'*' The AEC planned the shot as a demonstration, and
the government had invited a large group of Congressmen and (because o f complaints that
resulted from earlier testing) a large group o f visitors from Utah together with an
assortment o f national observers to watch Harry.

Originally scheduled for May 2, the

test was postponed because high levels o f radioactivity from a prior shot precluded
workmen and scientists from entering the area. Rescheduled for May 16, rain and clouds
against caused another delay."*^ There must certainly have been some impatience on the
part o f those who had gathered in Las Vegas prior to May 2, the first scheduled date and
then ended up waiting, only to be disappointed yet again. It is likely, too, that the AEC
was also anxious to put on its show before everyone gave up and returned home. On May
The AEC also apparently ignored the problems associated with fallout and weather
systems. The Las Vegas Review Journal reported that the mushroom cloud was not
visible from Las Vegas because o f an “overcast” sky. May 19, 1953, 1. Additionally,
H arry, was a ‘tow er’ shot—the type that Warren had suggested was not appropriate for
the continental test site.
Animosity had been building in Utah against the testing. One year before H arry, an
article in Salt Lake’s D eseret News said “We are living in the atomic age whether we like
it or not; but we don’t want the atomic age to be living with us.” May 9, 1952, 2B. Ralph
Hafen, a student at the University o f Utah demanded that the AEC address plutonium
inhalation, fallout-induced cataracts and radiation-induced mutation. Iron C ounty R ecord
May 7, 1953, 9.
The AEC invited himdreds o f people from Utah to witness the test. One, Rae Ashton,
president o f the Women’s Auxiliary, said H arry had “spun like a child’s toy top” yet an
editorial printed along with her article noted “The [AEC assurance] is comforting. But at
the same time, an eminent and experienced nuclear scientist. Dr. Lyle Borst o f the
University o f Utah expressed increasing concern. . .even a small amount o f radiation can
be harmful to a degree.” D eseret News, March 27, 1953. Dr. Borst later wrote an article
for the B ulletin o f Atom ic Scientists that called into question the AEC’s reported ‘safe’
dose (3R) for downwinders was not appropriate. Saying that the AEC apparently made
no allowance for beta. Dr. Borst complained; “Predictions o f this level will cause the test
organization to evacaute communities. Communities are not notified to keep children
indoors in the case o f fallout contamination unless predicted levels are near the 3R
integrated limit. These levels are far above the levels set for [reporters] at the test. April,
1953, 73.
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19, although the sky was overcast and winds aloft from the northeast, the AEC finally
detonated H arry before the huge group of awed spectators. The cloud climbed to 38,484
feet before it met up with a 91 mph northwest wind. The problems began when the cloud
began to fall; but, as will be shown, although the AEC did actively make some attempts to
reduce the dangers posed by the highly-radioactive fallout—positive public relations again
took precedence over precautions.^"
The AEC ordered a roadblock between Las Vegas and St. George and washed
contaminated cars, but the most highly-populated area affected by H arry's cloud was St.
George, Utah, itself.^ ‘ The AEC instructed the Chief o f Police to advise residents to stay
indoors and wash their clothes, and the chief proudly claimed to have done so in such a
way “as not to fiighten or alarm the people.”^^ Meanwhile, even inside their homes,
residents noticed a “strange metallic taste in their mouths, possibly due to the presence in

Las Vegas Sun, May 16, 1953, 1; May 19, 1953, 1.
Upshot-Knothole’s “Test Director’s Operation Order” instructed radiation safety
monitors on the fine art o f public relations. Above all, the monitors were “instructed to
avoid causing fear” and to assist them in that task, the Order issued substantial dialogue to
help the monitors deal with the public. Some phrases were particularly soothing, e.g. at
check points; “If we find traces o f fall-out inside your car, we may wash or vacuum the car
at our expense, even if there isn’t enough o f the s tu ff to hurt anyone . . . We fired an
Atomic bomb near here this morning and we are checking to see if any dust from it fell on
the highways. Don’t be worried if the needle kicks around a bit, because things like a
luminous alarm clock can give you quite a reading on this meter.” 210 [italics mine]. Note
that ‘fallout’ became innocuous ‘dust’ and ‘stuff’ in the mouths o f radiation monitors.
“Operation Order No. 1-53 (Upshot/Knothole)” 326 US Atomic Energy Commission,
location LANL, Collection Records Center E-7 B-39; Folder Test Director’s Operation
Order No. 1-53.
Ib id , May 20, 1953. The local press (in typical fashion) stressed the relatively-small
number of cars that ended up contaminated; “Fewer than 100 automobiles required
washing following yesterday morning’s atomic cloud fallout, although.. hundreds of
vehicles at six check p o in ts.. were monitored.” Idem . 1.
The Chief, Lamb, added that radioactive clouds “always come over” St. George. Ixts
Vegas Sun, M ay 10, 1953, 1.
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the air o f microscopic iron particles—remnants o f the shot tower.

The AEC told its

radiation monitors to avoid arousing concern among the public. People were already
concerned, however, and anxiety spread out o f Utah.
To counter adverse publicity, the AEC took its case to the press. Two additional
radiation safety officers went to Utah to “reassure miners” who blamed their illness on
fallout; but, according to the AEC the trip was meaningless since “radiation feUout from
yesterday’s shot was not hazardous.”^'* Residents in Utah were not convinced, and neither
was president Eisenhower who ordered a re-study o f civil defense precautions, a fact that
went unreported in both Las Vegas newspapers.^* On May 24, Utah’s Congressman
Stringfellow began calling for an end to testing altogether.*^ The AEC and the local press
trivialized the complaints, “information men yesterday were working like proverbial onearmed paper hangers trying to deflate the mass hysteria.”*^
The radiation safety persoimel that the AEC pressed into service after H arry did,
indeed, monitor radiation but they did very little that could have been done to guarantee
safety. One of the monitors assigned to St. George, Frank Butrico, later said he contacted

*^ Miller, Under the Cloud, 175.
*'* “Doubt Illness Caused by Fallout” Review Journal May 20, 1953, 3
** New York Times March 19, 1953, 21. Assorted articles indicate that the local press
paternally protected the AEC. “AEC Takes Dim View o f Utah Atom Protests” May 21,
1953, 1.
*^ Stringfellow said that AEC assurances that there was no danger contrasted with their
warnings to St. George to the residents to remain inside was “disquieting. . .particularly
when we find nuclear scientists themselves voicing a considerable difference o f opinion on
the possible harmful effects o f radioactive fallout. . Human life is too precious to be
risked in experimentation and guess-work.” D eseret News,M ay 20, 1953, 1; May 24,
1953, 1. “Nevadans Fight to Retain A-Tests” i?ev/ew JoMrwa/, May 24, 1953, 1.
*^ “AEC Men Deflate Reports o f Utah Radiation Illness” Review Journal May 22, 1953,
1.
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the test site for instructions when his monitoring instrument in the middle o f St. George
began registering radioactivity, but it took more than an hour after his monitor reached the
maximum range o f the instrument (300-350 mr/hr) for the site to approve a warning to
stay indoors. Later, he said, many apparently had not received it. As he drove through
town, he said that cars were on the road, people on streets, and grade-school children still
played outside on morning recess. In contact with the site, he received instructions to
keep changing and washing his clothes and taking showers until his personal readings
decreased; when he asked if he should issue the same instructions to the community, he
received a “resounding ‘no’” because it might cause “panic.”** Additionally, and despite
the fact that the readings after H arry were extraordinarily high, the AEC performed no
internal monitoring (urine, fecal, or blood samples) even though that procedure was
customary at the time in laboratories when workmen had been exposed to even lesser
dosages. The AEC also neglected a device that could have offered a more complete
picture o f the damage in St. George; instruments used routinely to detect radiation to the
thyroid.*" Important, too, is the fact that the AEC refused, again in the service of public
relations, to allow its monitors to sample local milk—even though the monitors asked if
they should.*" After the furor had died down, the AEC—in the interests o f “public

** Frank Butrico’s story was one included in “Coverup at Ground Zero”, see n.35, supra.
*" Jenkins, A llen v. US, 374.
*" Ib id , 375. Fuller states that Butrico decided to check local milk supplies for
radioiodine, but feared public alarm i f he requested samples from local dairies or backyard
cows. He bought a quart o f milk from a store, but whether it was ever tested remains a
mystery. The D ay We Bom bed Utah, 34. In any event, the milk would only have reflected
radioactivity from earlier tests since it would have been bottled before H arry. Times have
changed; The government evacuated pregnant women and children at Three Mile Island
when radiation doses reached 2 to 25 millirems per hour. H arry has been estimated to
have caused exposures reaching 1,000 millirems per hour. Idem ., 218.
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education”—re-situated Frank Butrico in St. George and asked the residents and
shopkeepers to appear in a government film that ostensibly recreated the day H arry struck
St. George. It emphasized that the residents were good, patriotic citizens and that the
AEC was a sympathetic, safety-conscious, outfit.** Some o f the “actors” have become
bitter over the years over the ways that the AEC co-opted them into its public relations
campaign. Elmer Pickett, a St. George shopkeeper, lost his wife to cancer in 1959.
Claudia Peterson remembers that she was in school on the day o f H arry and when
someone checked her with a geiger counter, he told her the clicking meant “you had a
dental x-ray.” Claudia’s father later died o f brain cancer and her sister and daughter
Bethany succumbed to leukemia.*^

A later analysis by the Public Health Service in 1962 compared H arry's dosage to milk as
comparable to those at Windscale in Britain. Britain’s response to radioactive
contamination o f milk following the Windscale accident on October 10, 1957 that caused
an immediate release o f radioactive material and an immediate analysis o f milk supplies.
As a result o f that analysis, the government instituted a ban on milk deliveries stretching
for 200 square miles. Interestingly, this work references American downwinders and
problems with the AEC. “It seems as if the people o f Nevada should join forces with the
people of Japan in asking for suspension o f all nuclear bomb tests. Because o f the
fantastic secrecy with which the United States Atomic Energy Commission surrounds its
test explosions in Nevada, there is little quantitative data about the spread o f radioactive
fallout. A. Pirie, ed.. F allout (London;MacGibbon & Kee, 1958), 120; 78-79. Windscale
provides a test case for the ability o f a government agency to both prevent ‘panic’ and deal
with radioactivity responsibly. A report after the incident stated “The sober, coolheaded
handling of the incident will serve as a classic model. . it undoubtedly prevented general
panic in the area and prevented the mishap from turning into a disaster.” cited in Jenkins,
A llen V. US, 376.
** Reviewing Upshot-Knothole, the AEC emphasized public relations, not fallout.
“Developments since Upshot-Knothole have recently been reviewed. Events have
intensified the need for a pre-series educational program. . .[to] keep public
misunderstanding or apprehension over use of the Nevada Proving Ground at a minimum
level.” “Atomic Energy commission Public Information and Public Education Programs”
December 6, 1954, US DOE Archives, 326 US Atomic Energy Commission, Collection
1951-1958 Secretariat File, Box 1263, Folder MR & A-7 Teapot Vol. 1.
*^ “Coverup at Ground Zero” note 35, supra.
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The institutional framework o f the AEC resulted in the filtering out o f vital
information that could have mitigated the danger o f atomic testing. Only positive reports
made their way to the commission, those which reflected poorly upon operations were
never considered. Dr. Gordon Dunning o f the Division o f Biology and Medicine played a
large role in reassuring the commission after Upshot-Knothole. Seven veterinarians
analyzed the sheep deaths, tw o from the State o f Utah, one from the Navy Radiological
Defense Laboratory, one from Los Alamos, and three from the US Public Health
Service.*"* All concluded that radiation caused the animals’ deaths, but their written
reports never saw the light o f day. Instead, the commission relied upon the conclusions of
its own advisor. Dr. Dunning, who also had examined citizens complaining o f puzzling
skin conditions after Harry. Those skin conditions, Dunning claimed, were the result of
“allergic dermititis [sic]” or “simbum.” Though reassuring, Dunning’s diagnosis could

*"* In August, a large gathering o f livestockmen met with the AEC and other US officials
and representatives from Iron Coimty and the State of Utah to discuss the sheep deaths.
Though the AEC consistently tried to place the blame on other disease (p. 1), lack o f
rainfall (p. 2), photosensitivity (p. 4) the livestockmen and the State Health Department
logically countered most o f the AEC’s statements. Because it was unable, though, to
address knowledgably details about radiation, the AEC ended with the upper hand, for
example:
Livestockmen:
When you made your tests, you mentioned some sheep
were hot.
What did you mean?
AEC:
It is true that some sheep had relatively high values who weren’t
ill. The Thorley herd has as high an external value on the instruments as
any.
Livestockmen: You said, “This sheep isn’t as hot” or “This is a hot one”. What
did you mean? A dead one was usually hot.
AEC: Any radiation was hot. It didn’t mean anything special. External readings
have no consistency.
“Notes From Meeting o f Atomic Energy Commission, State Health Department,
Livestockmen and Others Held at the City and County Building In Cedar City August 9,
1953” CIC 14039.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

259

have been checked more thoroughly—his only technical expertise was as a high school
physics teacher and his only credential a Ph D. in education from Syracuse University.*^

*

* *

Fallout from H arry aroused the public’s curiosity and fear. It joined international
events and forced the AEC (perhaps for the first time) to explain its activities. Public
safety concerns escalated as the AEC admitted that radioactive fallout had caused injuries
in the Pacific. Shortly after Americans learned the devastating potential o f hydrogen
weapons they learned to their horror that the Soviets, too, possessed hydrogen weapons.
The consequences o f the escalated experimentation were so dreadful that even Churchill
asked for a re-evaluation o f atomic testing. The national conversation about radioactivity
and the fears o f citizens, despite the AEC’s emphasis on secrecy and governmental
attempts to control atomic information, had begun to play out in the press.
The hydrogen bomb caused increasing concern. The AEC, through Chairman
Strauss, admitted that it had exposed twenty-eight Americans and 236 “natives” to

*"*Fuller, The D ay We Bom bed Utah, 40-42. The secreted reports (along with many
others that had been hidden) came to light in the 1970s as a result o f a Congressional
subpoena.
217. That subpoena provided the investigators with a revelation: “All
evidence suggesting that radiation was having harmful effects, be it on the sheep or the
people, was not only disregarded by actually suppressed.” US House Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations o f the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, The
Forgotten G uinea Pigs, 11. Plaintiffs in the A llen trial presented evidence that Dunning’s
repertoire o f deceit continued. At a workshop for radiation monitors in 1980 Dunning
destroyed an experiment that allowed the evaluation o f iodine in a milk sample: “So,
anyway, Frank and I did a few o f these.. and we showed it to Gordon Dunning. He got
mad, red in the face, took it, threw it on the floor and stomped on it. ‘Don’t you do that.’
So I don’t know whether it meant a damn thing or not, it is immaterial, but it sure got
Gordon excited.” Judge Jenkins, too, remained at a loss to explain the significance o f
Dunning’s action, cited by Jenkins, A llen v. US, 376, n. 125.
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radiation in the Pacific. Fallout had unexpectedly descended onto an atoll that the
government had reckoned safe.** Radioactive material also fell on the Japanese fishing
crew of the inappropriately-named Lucky Dragon, who, unaware o f the source o f the ash
that fell on them, made no effort to avoid the fallout and suffered bums and blisters.
When they returned to port, the Japanese government quickly blamed American weapons
tests.** Soon, the Japanese accused both the Soviets and Americans o f poisoning its
people and its fisheries, and demanded schedules for testing.*’ Strauss denied that the
Pacific testing had injured the Japanese. Under intense scrutiny, though he did discuss
another issue—strontium 90—and said that strontium 90 might cause bone damage if it
entered the body.** The American public grew only more apprehensive as they finally
began to leam the serious consequences posed by atomic testing posed.
The boasting fi'om Russians and Americans startled and apalled an American and
international public that had finally begun to confi-ont the morbid absurdities o f the arms
race. On March 26, 1954, the Russians announced that their hydrogen bomb could be
used tactically and that it was “eight to ten times” the power of an atomic bomb.*"
Chairman Strauss responded to Russia’s announcement on March 3 1 and (probably) no
one laughed when the full text o f his speech appeared in the New York Times on April
Fools Day. Strauss’ answer to the American public and to the Russians smacked (perhaps

** New York Times, March 12, 1954, 1. See also Titus who emphasized that Strauss chose
to keep secrets fi'om congress over the issue. Bom bs in the Backyard, 19.
** New York Times, March 16, 1954, 19.
*’ The request was, o f course, refused in the interests o f national security. New York
Times, March 26, 1954, 5.
*" New York Times, March 27, 1954, 1.
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too much) o f a schoolyard taunt: Strauss admitted that although the Soviet’s weapon
could destroy New York City, the American’s H-bomb could level cities with a
destructive capacity “600 to 700 times that o f Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”’" Americans,
astounded at the magnitude o f destruction possible, publicly demanded realistic
alternatives to the arms race and the government aimounced an increased emphasis on civil
defense.’* Fears on this side o f the Atlantic were joined by those on the other. On May 5,
1954, the same day that the AEC detonated a 13.5 MT atomic device {Yankee) in the
Pacific, a group of scientists and engineers in Great Britain called for an end to testing,
and by November, Churchill joined them.’^ In an attempt to stem the rising tide o f
national and international fear. Chairman Strauss disclosed that three divisions o f the AEC
were studying the effects o f fallout, but that he could not comment on those studies until a
later date.’^
Congress, too, began to recognize that the AEC had, perhaps, become
dangerously self-assured and too willing to hide behind notions o f “national security” and
called upon not only the AEC Chairman Strauss to explain himself, but also a non
governmental scientist to try and leam the t r u t h . B e f o r e the subcommittee, Strauss

’" New York Times, April 1, 1954, 1. Strauss could have promised even more complete
devastation had he included fallout considerations in his estimates.
’*New York Times, April 16, 1954 (Letters to the Editor); April 1, 1954, 21.
New York Times, May 5, 1918, 18. Churchill aimounced that he had information that
indicated radiation exposure was cumulative (a fact scientists had known for a long, long
time) and could pose serious problems fbr the earth for as long as 5,000 years. He also
expressed concern that hydrogen weapons only increased the danger. Baldwin Hansen,
New York T/mes November 8, 1954.
Elie Abel, New York Times, December 18, 1954, 1.
The damage that had been done to the reputations of (particularly non-govemmental
and sometimes critical) scientists had already become firmly entrenched in some segments
o f the public before Congress decided to rely upon them. Westbrook Pegler, in a
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admitted that the AEC had purposely kept the report on the Pacific Test that had injured
the crew o f the Lucky Dragon “hidden” for three months because, he said, he feared
“adverse affects” concerning international situations and that disclosure would only have
led to “confusion.” George W. Leroy, a dean fi'om the University o f Chicago, addressed
the committee concerning fallout, and castigated the AEC for its security regulations,
telling the committee that “vital medical information was being withheld fi'om the public
needlessly.”’*
By 1955, Congress’ reliance on an independent scientist spurred a rash o f articles
that not only called into question the government’s stringent security measures, but also
focused upon fallout and its consequences ’* In July, the New Yorker published a twelvepage article on the fallout question with regard to both atomic and thermonuclear testing
that reveals that the public feared not only Soviet weapons, but US experimental testing as
well. As an example o f the very real fear that began to circulate concerning fallout, the
AEC’s New York office regularly received phone calls on rainy days fi'om concerned
citizens;

nationally-syndicated column ranted against scientific ‘doomsayers’; “Today’s scientist is
tomorrow’s hairy ape. . .Oppenheimer, Einstein and Urey are [no] better than a lowhandicap golfer.” Review Journal, March 14, 1955. Locally, on March 21, 1955 Hank
Greenspun responded to critics o f atomic testing in an editorial eneitled “Who’s Behind
the Movement?” indicating that there was an “organized attempt to discredit the Nevada
work o f the Atomic Energy Commission. . among a lot of people in the nation who don’t
know the facts and are misled into believing a lot o f hokum about radiation.” The article
placed the blame on Russian “front” organizations and appallingly declared that there had
been “no two-headed babies bom at Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital.” Las Vegas
Sun, 2.
’* New York Times, March 25, 1955, 11.
’* See, for example, the B ulletin o f A tom ic Scientists, January, February, June, October,
and November, 1955 passim ; and L ife March 21, 1955, 32.
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That’s a perfectly rational question, but then they suddenly break down
completely—crying and carrying on about what’s going to become o f the
world.
Additionally, noting that elements o f radioiodine and radiostrontium had been “found in
the thyroids of cattle and sheep grazing near the Nevad Proving Grounds,” it quoted Dr.
John Bugher o f the AEC who stated that the levels in humans were less than those found
in animals. The reporter pressed further, reminding Burger that he had earlier told a
gathering that radiation could shorten life expectancy “apparently from a general
acceleration of the aging process.” Burger sidestepped a conclusion by saying that the
entire issue was problematical: “human beings have yet to experience the distinction
between a condition that does not cause death but shortens life.” The article concluded
that the disagreements within the scientific community were not only “both exasperating
and baffling, if not actually fiightening.”” While fallout alarmed Congress, fiightened the
public, and alerted the reporters—the military, and the militarily-directed AEC, continued
its business, seemingly unaware or at least unaffected by, the controvery that surrounded
it.
Hindsight should not preclude the recognition that the AEC did have its
supporters. Whilst many on the national front became increasingly concerned about the
testing program, at least one Nevada newspaper editor remained nonplussed. In 1955,
Las Vegas Sun editor Hank Greenspim believed that a Los Angeles article focusing on
fallout might threaten Southern Nevada’s tourism industry, he claimed that the only
concerned tourist he had encountered feared that if his wife found out he was in Las

77

The New Yorker, “Fallout”, July 16, 1955.
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Vegas, she might worry about his “procreative processes.” Greenspun said he “assured
this person that there is danger o f losing one’s potency in Las Vegas but it wouldn’t
necessary come from atomic radiation.” Greenspun believed atomic testing was a
godsend:
Be brave. Face squarely to the north and breathe a silent prayer every time
another nuclear device hits the dust o f Yucca F lat.. .At last Las Vegas has
found a good reason for its existence.’*

*

*

*

Military objectives certainly drove the development and operation o f the Test Site,
but other features built into the AEC as an institution also contributed to the hazardous
nature o f testing at the Nevada Test Site. The commissioners themselves showed
increasing reluctance to try to understand the fundamental nature o f atomic testing and,
relying on only those scientists who would provide approving analyses, allowed the
military to virtually control testing. Additionally, the AEC not only isolated itself from the
public and refused to address in any meaningful way the widespread and growing fears of
radioactive fallout, its multiple components also remained virtually independent entities,
unaware (or unwilling to accept) information generated within alternate strata o f the
organization. A document prepared by a “group leader” after Operation Upshot-Knothole
illustrates a complete failure to integrate known facts into the planning o f testing programs
that permeated the AEC and atomic weapons testing in the US.

78

L as VegasSun^M arch.25, 1955, 1.
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That group leader, one Gaelen Felt, prepared his 1954 document at least six years
after Stafford Warren had issued his voluminous reports o f Trinity and Operation
Crossroads that urged caution relative to detonation size, location and weather.
Additionally, it was prepared at least two years after Shields Warren recommended that
tower shots be prohibited at the Nevada Proving Ground and additionally that shot size be
limited. It was, too, prepared after fallout problems associated with high-yield tower shots
distinguished the Upshot-Knothole (a series o f incidents that Felt interestingly referred to
as “the troubles”—as though the fallout from atomic testing could, perhaps, be equated
with some unavoidable plague or divine retribution.) Yet, Gaelen Felt, Group Leader for
Group J -15 had (quite proudly) concluded:
generally speaking, tower shots are more hazardous than free air bursts,
high yields are more hazardous than low, and weather conditions have a
pronounced effect.’"
Felt, o f course, may have been unaware that his insights were unoriginal. But if he
harbored any notion that his (by then so well-worn) input might make some small
difference in the continued operation o f the Nevada Test Site, he was wrong.
In 1955, the AEC addressed public concern, but only through re-education—not by
any réévaluation o f its own responsibility for causing injury.*" Despite growing scientific
reconsideration o f risks attendant to atomic testing and the the conclusions reached by
Gaelen Felt (and others before him) the AEC launched Operation Teapot, preceded, o f

’" “Memo to A1 Graves, J-Division Leader from Gaelen Felt, Group J-15, Subject:
Radiological Hazards Near Nevada Proving Grounds.” August 1953, CIC 0000892.
*" It perhaps does not have to be pointed out that the “education” did not involve
providing legitimate answers to questions about feUout; rather it was designed specifically
to minimize any chance that the public might object to continued tests and so concentrated
on the lack, rather than the presence, o f hazards.
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course, by an elaborate educational campaign. It was a large undertaking and brought
over 9,000 military personnel and 3,500 AEC and civil defense workers to the site and Las
Vegas—a town with a population o f 40,000.** Of the fourteen atom bombs detonated
during the series, ten were exploded from towers, one with a yield of 43 KT, and all
released radiation off site.*’

** Moehring, Resort C ity in the Sunbelt, 99, 106.
*^ US DOE “Announced United States Nuclear Tests July 1945 through December 1988’
September 1989.
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CHAPTER V n

CONCLUSION

The darkness drops again: but now I know
That tw enty centuries o f stony sleep
Were vexed to nightm are by a rocking cradle
A nd w hat rough beast, its hour come round at last.
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be bom .
W illiam B utler Yeats

This has been a history o f but one element o f the cold war, but it has also
emphasized that a chronological characterization o f regimes matters less than the
practices and behaviors o f individuals who participated within those regimes. According to
the DOE’s oflhcial record o f nuclear tests, one hundred mushroom clouds rose from the
Nevada desert before the United States suspended atmospheric testing in 1962. After
that, radioactivity continued to stray out o f government tunnels and shafts periodically,
with the last reported escape in April o f 1986 from M ighty Oak. Of the 815 nuclear
experiments performed, only 31 were not weapons related.^ In the change o f
governmental philosophy that accompanied the development o f the atom bomb, did the
markers that separate chronological events matter that much?—the end o f World War II?
the cessation of conflict in Korea? the cooling and thawing o f the cold war?

* Twenty-seven under the auspices o f Operation Plowshare and four related to storage and
transportation of nuclear materials.
267

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

268

I cannot say whether all o f the atomic and nuclear tests the United States carried
out were necessary and can only aver that those who argue that policy was a crucial factor
in all o f this are not entirely wrong. While I have purposefully disengaged this study o f the
bomb’s development from its role as a mechanism solidifying US interests within the
international realm, I can not deny the bomb’s influence. No Wall Street public relations
firm could have crafted a more eflScient means o f advertising American power and resolve
than the US government did with its experimentation with atomic weapons. Mushroom
clouds that majestically bloomed tens of thousands o f feet into the atmosphere and
obliterated Pacific islands were, without a doubt, persuasive. Admittedly, then, the atom
bomb served US policy, but this history has shown that policy neither directed nor
controlled the nation’s atomic weapons testing program.
Throughout this examination I have urged the reader to think about atomic
weapons development and testing in a different way: to separate its ends as a component
of national security from its means, atomic governance. Doing so has required a
willingness to consider that policy played only an indirect role in the hazardous nature of
atomic weapons experimentation—that the inceptual and authorizational nature of policy
does not sufficiently explain its implementation. Instead, discrete components—secrecy,
militarism, manipulation o f scientists and media—became integrated and coalesced into
increasingly important (and increasingly dangerous) functional attributes o f the weapons
testing program. It is against these govemmentally-instituted practices and the
simultaneous self-serving behaviors of individual actors—not policy or national security—
that the rage o f victims must resonate.
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Others, too, admit that the blame must lie at the feet of the participants. Dr. John
Gofinan, former chief o f the biomedical division o f Lawrence Livermore Laboratory wrote
in 1979 that he considered his own participation, and that o f hundreds of other scientists,
criminal. We should have been, he lamented, “candidates for Nuremberg-type trials for
crimes against humanity for our gross negligence and irresponsibility.”^ Yet, despite this
disturbing confession, the goverment has steadfastly maintained that policy alone deserves
the blame. In 1981, Rex Lee o f the Department o f Justice blamed policy alone:
'D ecades ago, federal policymakers decided to run some enormous risks. Innocent
American citizens were involuntarily and unwittingly made the subjects of those risks.”^
Likewise, the government applied the same reasoning in its apology to radiation victims,
the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act o f 1990. Since I hope to have made clear in
earlier chapters why my argument against a policy-centered approach is reasonable, I
should now like to briefly address why, aside fl*om historical understanding, that the
government’s refusal to acknowledge any other reason for fallout and its consequences is
significant.
Like the behaviors and practices o f atomic weapons testing that became simply too
useful, the government’s reliance upon “policy” initiatives or “national security” serves a
functional purpose—that trope allows the government to avoid litigation and operates
against any reappraisal o f governmental institutions and behavior. Lawsuits can be brought
against the government only through the Federal Tort Claims Act; however, a provision o f

^ John Gofinan, A n Irreverent, Illustrated View o f N uclear Power, cited in Gould, D eadly
D eceit, 95.
" US House Subcommittee on Oversity and Investigations o f the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, The Forgotten G uinea Pigs, 11.
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that Act, the Discretionary Function Exemption, precludes any claim resulting from an
initiative grounded in “policy” or “national security.” Thus, the government is actually
absolved from responsibility as long as it asserts that its activities (however regrettable)
flowed directly from the exigencies o f national security. The rubrics o f “national security”
and “policy” operate as a shield against embarassing and costly litigation and also, under
the provisions o f the Act, discourage any investigation o f the very real and potentially
lethal influence o f habitus within the government’s own institutions, its departments and
employees—whether that investigation might prevent future harmful practice or more
carefully explore the behaviors o f the past.

* * *

Since the government seems so disinclined to examine the disturbing mistakes of
its past, is it possible that scientists today still sit around tables and bargain away lives in
the interests o f institutional goals? That question may only be answered by historians who
have yet to be bom. We, however, should now finish the business o f this thesis and bring
to a close that with which it started—the AEC’s meeting o f the Division o f Biology and
Medicine. Only by doing so can historians, at least, address the tragic nonchalance of
scientists who, in 1956 and with such ease, bartered with humankind.
It is an interesting paradox that while the National Security Council justified
immense precautionary measures against every imaginable worst-case scenario, another
high-level component o f government, the AEG, cavalierly dismissed so many precautions
on the basis o f best-case prognostications. Despite the fact that the scientists admitted that
further testing posed an increasing environmental burden o f strontium 90 and the
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accumulation already approached hazardous levels (“there is not very much leeway for
additional tests”)'* the committee decided to take no immediate action. Dr. Dunham, in
particular, was especially reluctant to reach any printable decision, saying;
There is a lag obviously between body burden o f strontium and fallout.
This would appear to me, then, to give us a fairly reasonable assurance that
we can go ahead for some time, and see what the proof o f the pudding is. .
.1 think in another two or three years we will be able to have a much
further concept o f what the relation between milk and bone in children is
really likely to be.^
Dunham chose to gamble with childrens’ lives, and so did all o f the others at that meeting
who agreed with him. That they did so demonstrates that those who attended that 1956
meeting clearly placed favorable publicity and sustained testing ahead o f more worthy,
ethical and moral, considerations.

* * *

I began this study with the hope that I could find answers to the many perplexities
that infiltrated the processes o f the nation’s atomic testing program, yet conclude it in full
recognition that more questions remain. How, for example, could some people decide
years ago to take risks with the lives o f children for the sake o f yet another testing season;
or why, so many years later, some seem so disturbingly willing to threaten nuclear
annihilation?® The remaining curiosities and puzzlements, though, are ui - ml in

* Transcript, “Special Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Biology & Medicine to the
Atomic Energy Commission” November 26, 1956, 118.
^Ib id , 121-122.
®“We will create new Hiroshimas and Nagasakis. I will not hesitate to deploy nuclear
weapons. You know what Chernobyl meant for our country. You will get your own
Chernobyl in Germany.” Russian ultranationalist Vladimir 2ffiirinovsky, quoted in
Newsweek, December 27, 1993, 13.
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themselves—it is, after all, the unanswered questions that energize historians. One can
never, o f course, leam all the answers; but I should like to think that by encouraging the
examination o f a national endeavor in terms o f individuals, I have called into serious
question the notion o f the state as a dominant, controlling force that manages the
behavior o f its employees and agents. This study has instead illustrated the impressively
important roles played by individuals who negotiated through the state’s own framework,
directing and channeling a national endeavor, atomic development, toward the fulfilment
of individually myriad motivations and appetities. Additionally, and while I have not been
able to do justice to the many people that I believe became victims o f atomic weapons
experimentation, I have tried also to show that the apparatuses o f state power—as
exemplified by something as terrifyingly grand as a mushroom cloud—can only be properly
understood with reference to an ultimate consequence: an intersection easily exemplified
and imagined, perhaps, by the vision of a bowtied and beribboned teenage couple in
Kansas, caught unawares on prom night in a radioactive rainstorm.
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